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
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PREFACE

THE organizing committee of Section B were anxious that the published papers should be taken as the basis of criticism and debate at the Congress; they therefore arranged that the discussion of each subject should, when possible, be opened by the writers of the papers, some of whom read* their papers in whole or in part, and some of whom preferred to call attention briefly to the more important points in their papers. The following additional rules were adopted in regard to the debates in Section B:—

- (8) The discussions shall be taken on the papers, and the Chairman shall, at his discretion, rule out of order the discussion of topics which do not arise naturally out of the papers.
- (9) All writers of papers under discussion shall have an opportunity of reply, and ten minutes shall be allowed for the chairman to sum up.
- (10) Twenty minutes shall be allowed to the opening speakers only, and ten minutes as a general rule to subsequent speakers.

It was a matter for regret that so few of the distant provinces followed the practice which was adopted by the Church in Scotland and in Japan, of recommending speakers who were well qualified to deal effectively with one or other of the papers. But many speakers sent in their names beforehand in response to the invitation printed in the programme in the *News Sheet* and the *Handbook*, and a large committee was formed of members of the Congress and others, who were invited to occupy the platform and take part in the discussions as occasion might arise. This plan proved to be particularly advantageous on the two mornings, Wednesday and Friday,

when it was necessary to arrange for overflow meetings at short notice. It was, unfortunately, impossible to obtain a separate report of these meetings, or to keep a record of the speeches which were not delivered at the principal meetings.

In compiling this volume, an opportunity has been given, as far as possible, to the various speakers to revise the reports; and it has seemed unnecessary to aim at a strict uniformity in such details as the use of capital letters, or even at a uniform system of spelling oriental names.

W. CUNNINGHAM.

Hon. Sec., Section B.

July 22, 1908.

CHRISTIAN TRUTH
AND OTHER
INTELLECTUAL FORCES
SPEECHES AND DISCUSSIONS

CHRISTIAN REVELATION AND THE SIMILAR CLAIMS OF OTHER RELIGIONS

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. TUESDAY MORNING, JUNE 16

The MOST REV. R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Calcutta, presided.

The RIGHT REV. E. S. TALBOT, D.D., Bishop of Southwark, the author of the paper, "The Christian Claim to Supremacy" (*App.*, No. 1), said: His desire that morning was to lay stress upon the fact that with tests so exacting as the thought of the present day supplied, with the veil drawn away from so many corners within which what he might perhaps call a convenient mystery might lie, Christianity was able to make, he believed, if she knew her own truth rightly, an unflinching stand and, with a profound and humble confidence, to claim to be the religion of the world. That was an enormous claim, which it would be indeed the wildest presumption to make if it were not true. But Christianity must make it, and Christianity was, he believed they would agree, the only religion which could make it with any appearance of truth in the face of the full tide of modern knowledge. They would hear, in sections of the Congress, about Mohammedanism as the great competitor with the Christian faith in certain parts of the globe. He claimed, however, that in the presence of that knowledge which God had given in trust to Europe—religious, historical, ethical, scientific, synoptic—there was and could be no competitor with the Christian faith. But he would also like to say that they were not to congratulate themselves only, or to boast at all, but rather to give thanks with confidence, and, on the other hand, to feel humble and penitent. He made that remark as a preliminary to this: that if they were to make that claim for the Christian faith, they must understand it and perceive it as God has given them the power in these latter days to do. They must not make that claim on behalf of the Christian faith as it was understood, say, two centuries ago, because if they did so they would get into all sorts of entanglements. The faith was the same, but the understanding of the faith, the relation of the faith to all sorts and kinds of knowledge and of life, was very different from what it was in those former days.

The paper on "The Evolution of the Religious Consciousness" (*App.*, No. 2), by Principal Jevons, who regretted his inability to be present, was taken as read; and the VERY REV. H. WACE, D.D.,

Dean of Canterbury, read his paper on "The Authority of the Christian Revelation, compared with the Claims of other Religions" (*App., No. 3*).

CANON MACCULLOCH, Portree, approached the subject from the point of view of comparative religion. A true science of comparative religion was bound to take account both of the evolution of the religious consciousness and also of the Christian claim to supremacy. The relation of Christianity to other faiths was important in order that the position of Christianity as a final and absolute form of religion might be established, and also with regard to its position as a missionary faith. These points having been elaborated, certain similarities between pagan and Christian beliefs were recounted, especially those in a Saviour, in incarnation, in sacrifice, and in sin. The question arose how Christianity was affected by these similarities. From the sceptical side the answer was, that Christianity was just as false or true as other faiths, and that on the whole it was a series of assumptions with no background of reality. This was shown to be an insufficient answer on several grounds. From the Christian standpoint the answer was, that the lofty spiritual expression given to such beliefs in Christianity was almost entirely lacking in paganism. The doctrine of the incarnation was contrasted with its closest resemblance in paganism—the later avatars of Vishnu, and the profound differences between the two beliefs were pointed out. Next, it was pointed out that Christianity alone possessed a definite historic creed, the articles of which depended on each other and formed the complete answer to man's needs. But these pagan beliefs were foregleams of Christianity. Man had formulated them because they embodied what he needed most, and at last they were fulfilled in the Christian revelation. The position of Christianity as the highest stage in religious evolution was next referred to, as well as the relative values of the pagan and the Christian religious experience. From another point of view it was maintained that, without being an eclectic system, Christianity contained the leading ideas of the great pagan religions, but set in due relation to each other. An appeal was made finally for the science of comparative religion as an aid to missionary work, as well as a stimulus to missionary effort. Advantage must be taken of the pagan approach to Christianity, and the heathen should be told that we did not wish to destroy what was honest and true in his faith, but to fulfil it in preaching Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

The REV. W. BREWS, Connor, pointed out that every religion lived not by the falsity in it, but by the measure of truth it contained. The Mohammedan measure of truth, for example, was in the great doctrine of the sovereignty of God. The fact that there were 200,000,000 of our race who regarded Mohamimed not

only as a supreme religious teacher, but supreme also in politics and law, was sufficient proof that he was a prophet, though a very imperfect man and one who made terrible mistakes. For the Mohammedan doctrine of the sovereignty of God did not suffice; they came gradually to feel the burden of sin and the need of salvation, and of some one who would reconcile them to God, and with this object in view they developed a theory of mediation and began to worship the prophet. Buddhism, like Mohammedanism, in order to retain its hold over the hearts of the people, had also to develop the idea of a God to worship and of a ritual of worship, in addition to its belief in the gaining of peace through self-mastery. Each of those religions started with a belief fundamental to the religious consciousness, and each of them was compelled to add to that belief what was also fundamental to the religious consciousness. From a purely philosophical standpoint Christianity contained those two elements in their fullness. The reason surely was that Christianity was founded upon the person and the teaching of the Supreme Teacher. Mohammedanism and Buddhism only emphasized the claim of Christianity to universality. Christianity was the only absolute religion, although that did not force them to deny that there might be truths in other religions, and that other religions might have a genuine though inferior inspiration. After admitting that he was not denying, upon that account, the supreme inspiration of the Jewish prophets, Mr. Brews urged that while the Christian Church must teach the faith, she must not teach it as it was taught two centuries ago. If they were going to repeat the platitudes which had come down to them from their grandmothers, then they might lose their hold upon the younger generation.

The CHAIRMAN, vacating the chair, which was taken by the BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK, specially referred to the paper written by Principal Jevons, who was unable to be present, a paper on "The Evolution of the Religious Consciousness". It was natural, said Dr. COPLESTON, to be greatly interested in any attempt to express in terms of modern thought the dealings of God with man, and the growth of man's knowledge of God. But the wise man would ask himself whether he was truly distinguishing between the forms of thought and the facts to which he was applying them. The main point was this: they were concerned chiefly with a revelation which, in whatever way, had reached them; and not chiefly with the method by which it had reached them. They must not confuse the history of that revelation with the contents of the revelation itself. Certain facts contained in that revelation were the leading facts of human life or history, such as the Fall of man, and the preparation by God for the Incarnation of His dear Son. It was impossible to construct a complete theory of evolution of human knowledge, human morality, human consciousness of God, which should be com-

plete in what people called the scientific sense unless they left out the Fall. But the dealings of God with man from the beginning, and the work and life of Christ, and the whole energy of His Church were based on the fact of the Fall of man. What place had that in their scheme of evolution? If their scheme of evolution tendered to obscure it, then that scheme was faithless to the religion of which they were professing to give the history. Vaster still in the design of God and in the interests of man, was the entrance upon the scene of human life of the eternal Son of God. If their scheme of evolution obliged them to lose sight of the fact that He was the eternal Creator of this world, to whom every soul belonged, then their evolution entirely deceived them. But it was possible, and interesting, and perhaps useful to show that the principles or schemes of evolution could be made to fit themselves into human life; to show, for instance, that it was the infinite condescension of our Blessed Lord so truly to enter into human history that, possibly, in a sense, He could be regarded even as the product of evolution, as having a place in the course of its development.

The REV. CANON MURRAY, Winnipeg, drew attention to the fact that all mankind practically and universally had possessed a religion of some sort or another. That, he thought, was a proof that religion itself was grounded upon truth. No religion which had ever exercised influence over considerable bodies of mankind could be without an element of vital truth, truth which had come from the Spirit of God. But Christianity was the crown, the synthesis of all religions; in it was summed up all that the eternal Spirit had revealed of truth to man throughout the ages. No religion could permanently satisfy the human intellect and the human heart which was not monotheistic. This was the lesson of science. There was nothing that science insisted upon more strongly than the unity of the universe and consequently of the First Cause of the universe. It was next pointed out by Canon Murray that there are three monotheistic religions in the world—Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. Nothing was more remarkable than the monotheism of the Old Testament, and across the whole of Judaism, taken apart from its complement in Christianity, there was written clear and large the word "prevision". Mohammedanism, while it preserved the conception of the unity of God, exaggerated His supremacy so far as to do away with the freedom of man, with results which were easily seen in the fatalism and unprogressive character which marked the disciples of Islam. There remained Pantheism, which had safeguarded the truth of the Divine Immanence or the continuous activity of God in the universe. But Pantheism was illogical because it declared thought to be the essence of the universe, and yet believed in no Thinker. Moreover, it reached by another path the same fatalism as Mohammed reached; for if a man was a fragment of one great

whole he had no true freedom. Christianity alone united those two complementary truths, teaching that God was at once transcendent and immanent in the world, ever active, yet above it, ever distinct from it and supreme. Whenever the Church had suffered either side of that truth to fall into oblivion, evil had been the result. Having remarked that personality alone was the true conception of an immanent and transcendent God, Canon Murray said they need not be afraid that in ascribing personality to God they were limiting Him. Their own personality was limited because they were not personal in the fullest sense of the word, but God was perfect personality, and therefore unlimited in His attributes. A personal God must be apprehended not by reason alone, but by the whole personality of man ; by his heart, and character, and life, as well as his reason. Personality was the gateway of knowledge, and a living Theism demanded a God Who revealed Himself. In the religion of the God-man Jesus Christ, and in His alone, had they reached the sure abiding place for the human soul.

The REV. I. J. COWDEN-COLE, Isle of Wight, showed that there were ideals, common to humankind, which reappeared in a wonderful way in all forms of religion. There was the common ideal of growth, progressiveness, which in itself seemed to have no limitation. That appeared to him to underlie all their ideas of God. What did they want to do with regard to the Eternal Being to whom all their prayers and praises went forth? Was it not that they might understand and enter into something of His nature, to pass behind the veil and gather together into a point what that Being was Who so seriously influenced their daily lives? He ventured to think that the effort which religion was making at the present day was that the manifestation of that which was hidden from the eyes of men, might be clear, so clear that "he who runs may read", and see that which for ages had been unrevealed.

The VERY REV. H. M. M. HACKETT, LL.D., Dean of Waterford, who said he had spent eighteen years in India in the face of the teaching of other masters, spoke particularly with regard to the character of Jesus Christ, and the personal claims which He made upon mankind. The character of Jesus Christ stood absolutely unique amongst the religious teachers of the world, as shown by His life. What other religious man in the world could compare with our Lord in that respect? Certainly not Mohammed. Dr. Hackett protested against the statement made by a previous speaker that Mohammedans worshipped Mohammed. Mohammedans regarded it as blasphemy to recognize Mohammed as God, or to worship him as God. Having contrasted Buddha with Jesus Christ, Dr. Hackett claimed that our Lord was an example which every man in every position in life could follow. He proceeded to speak of Christ's claims as beyond anything that other religious teachers had put forward—His claim to be the Son of God, that

He was one with the Father, that He was the Light of the World, and the Light of Life. Then again, what other religious teacher than Jesus Christ had ever placed sin in all its horror before the minds of men as the thing which God hates ; or given a theory of atonement which could satisfy the instincts of man's spiritual nature ; or promised a Comforter or Holy Spirit ? Jesus Christ's teaching satisfied not only their intellectual, but also their moral nature. He was the only religious teacher who met the social questions of the present day. Dean Hackett concluded by saying that it would not be right to omit mention of the evidence afforded by the personal experience of Christians to the truth of Christ's claims.

The REV. EGERTON RYERSON, Canadian missionary, specially referred to the development of Buddhism in Japan. There were, he explained, two kinds of Buddhism in that country. That known as the Buddhism of the original founder might be summed up in the words, "Save thyself." It crushed out man's very being ; and by a process of self-spiritual annihilation taught him to attain peace. But man could not save himself, he must worship something or some one ; and so the popular Buddhism of Japan to-day might be summed up in the words, "Trust in the Buddhas" (the enlightened ones). There were many Buddhas in Japan through whose merits salvation was hoped to be obtained. One of them was said to have attained to such self-control as would enable him to enter into Nirvana and attain peace ; but he turned back and made a vow that he himself would not claim peace until he had brought suffering humanity with him. Christians need not, Mr. Ryerson pointed out, be afraid of resemblance in heathen religions to the incarnation of our blessed Lord. On the other hand, anything that approximated in that direction was surely a proof of the divine Spirit guiding men to the one incarnate Saviour. After emphasizing the point that men were not satisfied with any theory of religion which excluded a belief in the supernatural, Mr. Ryerson said that the day of the Buddhas in Japan was coming to a close, and it was not Christianity but Western civilization and Western thought that was tending to destroy the old religions there. The result was that most of the educated people of Japan to-day would not call themselves Buddhists ; and they had become agnostics, and some atheists. If the aspirations of the Japanese heart were to be satisfied, it must, he added, be through the preaching of Him to whom Gotama was leading men as a schoolmaster, the one Saviour and true Mediator Jesus Christ.

The REV. L. B. RADFORD pointed out that the relation between Christ and "other masters" ought to be discussed in the light of the fact that the "master" of the authorized version of the New Testament stood not only for *didaskalos* in the Greek, but also for *kurios* and *despotes*. Christians were not merely disciples yielding intellectual assent to a teacher, or subordinates

and helpers yielding homage to a superior, but "bondservants" (*douloi*) belonging to a master who bought them at the price of the cross, and claimed their whole devotion and service, body, soul, and spirit. It was only as teacher, or *didaskalos*, that Christ could be set for a moment even in comparison with other "masters"; but His teaching was the least part of His mastership.

The BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK, replying to various remarks that had been made, said he trusted that it would never be their way to bring the doctrine of the Fall, or the doctrine of the Incarnation, into collision with God's teaching to them about the evolution of human life and human belief; but rather that they would try to see these two things—what the doctrine of the Fall, in its essence and substance, and still more, if possible, what the truth of the divine Incarnation had to contribute, either by completion or corrective, to their thoughts on evolution; and secondly, what evolution brought to contribute to a deeper understanding—it might be a truer, a clearer, a larger understanding—of what was meant by the Fall, and what was meant by the Incarnation. And so evolution would bring one more crown, and not the only crown, not the last, nor the first, but one more crown upon the head of the Redeemer.

The CHAIRMAN, in a few closing remarks, said they had been well reminded that what there was of truth in man's own seeking and finding was, after all, he thought, a proof of the goodness of that heavenly Father Who had not left Himself without witness, but Whose Holy Spirit had been for ever moving over the minds of men. But to that remark he would add that the existence of truth in other religions was something more; it was indeed a witness, a sound witness to the truth of Christ. Was it conceivable that the teaching of their blessed Lord, what they called Christianity, should be true, and that man throughout his history all over the face of the world, in all his strivings, could have found no glimpse of it? If that teaching were true, it must have begun to glimmer in all parts of the world.

CHRISTIAN REVELATION AND THE SIMILAR CLAIMS OF OTHER RELIGIONS

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. TUESDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 16

The MOST REV. R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Calcutta, again presided.

The REV. J. A. NAIRN, Litt.D., Merchant Taylors' School, gave an address which he prefaced by reading the last paragraph of his published paper on "The Process of Revelation: or Conversion" (*App.*, No. 4). The quotation was as follows: "A survey of the history of conversion, ancient and modern, leads us to the conclusion that, in all essential points, spiritual experience is similar in the present to what it has been in the past. We are thus justified in making the process of revelation, as observed in the present, the basis of a claim on behalf of similar processes in the past, and especially on behalf of the inspiration of the writers of the Bible." Dr. Nairn went on to refer to the well-known statement of Bishop Westcott to the effect that inspiration and revelation are correlative terms. Both operations implied a supernatural extension of the field of man's spiritual vision, but in different ways. By inspiration they conceived that his natural powers were quickened, that he contemplated with a divine intuition the truth as it existed. By revelation man saw, as it were, the dark veil removed from the face of things. The general tendency of Dr. Nairn's paper was to emphasize the human element in all inspiration, while fully recognizing and accepting the reality of inspiration in modern as in ancient times.

Fifty years ago, he remarked, the current view was that the Bible as a whole, and in all its parts, was the Word of God, and, as such, it was endowed with all the perfections of that Word. It was now widely recognized, however, that "the very grandest and sublimest of divine revelations had been made through human media, and from time to time they were reminded that the media were human." The extent of the human element was the question between the old conception and the new, and there seemed to be a distinct tendency, not only in but outside the Anglican Communion, to widen the limits of that human element. Few would maintain at the present day, as several of the Fathers maintained, the view that the human part in Holy Scripture was merely passive or mechanical, or that the prophets were deprived, when under the influence of the Holy Spirit, of their natural power of reason, and that the Holy Spirit made use of them as, for instance, a flute player breathed into his flute¹. Or, if they reverently accepted that ancient metaphor which described the prophet as a musical

¹ F. Watson, *Inspiration* (S.P.C.K., 1906), pp. 224-8.

instrument, they would be careful to guard it against erroneous ideas. There was, first of all, the tuning of the instrument. All the prophet's powers were perfected, he was made worthy of the honour of communion with God, and only when he had been thus perfected did the divine revelation come to him, so that he uttered that which had been revealed to him as the spokesman, the prophet of God. So there was in the mind of many eminent scholars the view of a co-operation between God and man, between the Spirit and the human will. Man was regarded as being "a reasonable instrument of music on which God played, an instrument of many sounds, able to respond in many ways to the divine touch." As regarded the inspiration of the writers of Holy Scripture, so, in regard to the subject of conversion, greater importance ought, in his opinion, to be attached than had sometimes been the case, to the personal characteristics of each individual. The belief that conversion to be valid must be instantaneous seemed to him as purely mechanical as the older theory with regard to inspiration. All men could not be forced into that bed of uniform instantaneousness. It was the opinion of men entitled to judge, men who had themselves experienced something of the nature of conversion, that God was pleased to make room for both kinds of change, the gradual and the almost immediate. He hoped the meeting would see cause to accept that view which seemed to himself the more liberal conception of the working of divine providence in connexion with this most important question of conversion.

The REV. A. L. LILLEY, Vicar of St. Mary's, Paddington, the writer of the paper entitled "Revelation and Progress" (*App., No. 6*), said that any consideration of that question must be concerned rather with the human side than with the divine side, which latter religion always took for granted. Religion was not religion until it was felt that all activities of and upon the human life, which were for its redemption and uplifting, were immediately of and from God. He had tried in his paper to suggest how continual progress was visible in the revelation which was peculiarly Christian, the revelation given in the writings of the Old and New Testaments. There were two aspects on which he had insisted in that paper. One was, that as religion pursued its development through the history of man, there was an actual extension of the concepts which made up the sum of religious truth, the sum of man's knowledge of God. That extension did not pursue a uniform course, that was to say, progress was not mechanical. There were times when there were great periods of stagnation, and other times which were characterized by immense energy and activity in the religious consciousness of man. But, on the whole, as generation succeeded generation, some new phase of divine truth which had been hitherto unobserved or of little consequence in past times, came into prominence owing to the new demands of life itself. Another and far more important truth, it seemed to him, was that God's revelation was received by men with peculiar intensity through

particular persons and through particular ages. Those exceedingly intense moments of revelation were moments of supreme significance for religion, and they might come at practically any time in the history of the race, and very often they came early rather than late; just as in the case of poetry or of music, the integral spirit of those arts might be absorbed by an individual, right at the beginning almost of their development. That exceedingly intense moment with regard to religion had a value which regulated all other receptions, through later times, of the divine communication to man. All men who felt the afflatus of God's Spirit had yielded to the great inspiration of the Hebrew prophets, had yielded to the great inspiration of St. Paul, had yielded to a still greater revelation of God, that revelation which they believed to be the perfect and completed expression of the whole nature and activity of God as it came to all humanity. But, he insisted, those superlative revelations, even that unique revelation, were not effective disclosures to man from without of the will and character of God; they did not of themselves compel faith. Exactly the opposite was the case. It was succeeding ages that had gradually discovered the fullness of their worth. Life by growing out of their spirit was growing into it, was gradually realizing the fullness of their spirit. There was one other point that he had tried to make in his paper, namely, that there was what was called a conceptual development in revelation. But he would insist that there could not be this intellectual development of religion without a vital development. Logic or the intellect, in those matters, was called into play only by the needs and claims of life, and it was only in so far as they needed to penetrate more deeply into the secrets of that truth which had been virtually given them in the lives far more than in the teachings of the great masters of revelation, and in the supreme life, in the Incarnate life of our Lord—it was only in so far as the needs of life urged them to scrutinize and analyse for themselves the meaning of that revelation, that conceptual expression of it could grow at all. The one guarantee in regard to religion was, that revelation should be consistent in its growth, and that consistency would always depend upon the adaptation of the life, which made that growing revelation, to the high purposes of God. If men willed to do those things which God had willed, and if they continually willed to do them, then, and then alone, would they not only know of the doctrine which grew out of that willing, that it was of God, but would they be sure also that that doctrine was growing and fruitful and constituting a really progressive revelation.

PROFESSOR CALDECOTT, King's College, London, called attention to the main points in the paper contributed by Mr. C. C. J. Webb, M.A., under the title of "The Notion of Revelation" (*App.*, No. 5). Dr. Caldecott explained that the writer wanted them to have a clear idea of what was meant by revelation, and recommended the distinction drawn, at the opening of the paper, between knowledge by perception, wherein the knowledge was

entirely on the side of the perceiver (in which the object did nothing and was therefore called a thing), and knowledge by acquaintance, in which case there was a contribution on both sides, that was to say, the object known contributed something as well as the knower. It was asked, was there or was there not a third kind of knowledge which came entirely to them, and which was greater than they? Mr. Webb maintained that would be the highest meaning of the term, and would give knowledge of God. Then it was shown that there must be experience before it was of any use to talk of revelation at all. On page 4 the writer called attention to the remarkable fact which deserved reflection, namely, that whilst in their own personal life they always retained a certain sphere for their own individual and private knowledge, that sphere diminished according to the intimacy of those with whom they came in contact, but that the intimacy could never finally sweep away all barriers, and prevent them having a small region where they absolutely walked alone. Yet was it not true that, even within that private area, they had no resentment in thinking that the All-seeing and All-knowing was aware of them, and was with them all the time? That fact was a fruitful suggestion of the kind of thing they meant by the knowledge of God as distinct from all other knowledge of which they could speak. But, granted revelation, there must follow a comparison of the revelation that they claimed, and knew to be for edification, with those revelations which other religions had constantly claimed, and claimed to-day. Mr. Webb had drawn attention to the fact that the common element in all religions was sometimes called natural, and the word revealed was reserved for the special feature. He called attention also to the fact that, whilst they felt surer about the common features of religions, they felt more interested in the religions that were special. With regard to the relation of one revelation to the other, Mr. Webb indicated the theory that the one was true and the rest were taken to be false. There was no doubt, said Dr. Caldecott, that many in that hall would still consider that this was the only sound method to take, and that to it all others must sooner or later be reduced. Mr. Webb's paper was a protest against that reduction, and it was for that Congress to consider whether they preferred to stand on the older view of one religion true and all the rest false, or whether they really sympathized with the efforts made in most of the papers, that some other way must be found of relating other religions to the one which they understood and claimed to be specially revealed. Everybody knew that Judaism was connected with Christianity. That was the kind of attitude, Mr. Webb thought, which they ought to take with regard to all the other religions as well. The speaker added that the Congress would separate, having missed part of its purpose, if they could not connect the newer religions and newer civilizations that were coming into their circle, and work them also into the organic whole of which Christianity was the main centre and source.

The REV. FELIX ASHER, Brighton, said the question was often asked to-day, "Can the finite know the infinite?" and those who asked that question wondered whether, after all, religion based on revelation was not a beautiful human invention. Surely, an answer must be given that the right way of putting the question was, "Can the infinite know the finite? Had God debarred Himself from knowing His own creation?" No possible theory of God could exclude Him from the knowledge of man, and they might reasonably infer that God had left a loop-hole, as it were, in the individual, and in large bodies of individuals, through which He could make known the fact that He watched and knew the doings of man. That God knew man was implied in the Scripture narrative: they were led to think that they were objects of God's knowledge, and revelation was the assurance of that fact. When, as a matter of history, had that revelation been made? If they kept to the substance of the Scripture narrative they would find that the first point at which revelation was focussed and concentrated was in the life of the Hebrew people, to whom God revealed Himself as their God by delivering them from slavery to Egypt, and claiming their absolute obedience and loyalty to Himself. The sanction of the moral law depended on the fact that God had made them His own in delivering them, and each age looked up to God through the memory and interpretation of the fact that God had been their deliverer. The next chief point at which revelation occurred was when Jesus of Nazareth, Son of Man, Son of God, was raised from the dead, and became the ground and centre of a hope for the whole race that it would be delivered from all its enemies. That time in history was a very depressing one for humanity, but it was then that God interposed with peculiar power. He revealed that He knew man's needs, and that He was able to meet them. By raising Jesus Christ from the dead to save mankind, He became the God of the human race and claimed its allegiance. Mr. Asher held that in order to enter into the meaning and authority of this revelation they required the equipment of all modern criticism. But they must be far humbler and quieter in the use of modern methods and formulae. They should realize that in the individual to-day, as in the men of old through whom revelation came, it came only when they were in dire need of it. The truth that God was the deliverer from all our enemies entered only through the experience of bitter bondage and extreme need. Really to enter into the sense of revelation, they needed to be reminded of the truth, "Blessed are the poor in spirit; for to them is given the sense of the sovereignty of God."

The REV. L. B. RADFORD suggested that the treatment of the question of revelation and inspiration should depend upon the purpose of the discussion, viz. whether it was to confirm and instruct the believer, or to equip him to help the doubter. He thought that they must give and take. They must concede the frank recognition of a larger human element in the Bible than

had been recognized as yet; then they could rightly claim the recognition of the divine. Revelation, like nature, involved both the natural and the supernatural, or the explainable and the unexplainable processes of divine action. The prophet's surroundings and his ponderings thereupon, the apostle's recollections of his Lord, were like the pile of fuel gathered by human effort from the ground of earth. That pile needed the fire from heaven to kindle it to light and heat. The human preparation needed the divine touch to quicken thought and recollection into a revelation. Further, the data of a prophet's environment were not a sufficient explanation of his prophecy. Who placed him at that point in history? Providence must be postulated to account for his appearance then and there, just as an aiming mind was required to account for the firing of a shot.

The BISHOP OF BOMBAY viewed the whole of the question before them in a spirit of thankfulness and confidence. Dealing with the unity of inspiration he asked, How could the same inspiration of the same Spirit produce such different readings, such different deliverances in religion, throughout the world? In the record of the Old Testament they had precisely the same difficulty. For instance, in the account given of the slaughter of the Gibeonites, the people of Israel interpreted the inspiration of God to mean that God held whole families guilty for what one member of them did. But to the prophet Ezekiel the deliverance of the Spirit was different: "The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, neither the father the iniquity of the son." Then they had heard, perhaps, the wars of extermination which were ordered by the hand of God, as interpreted by Joshua, compared with our Lord's command, "Love your enemies". How were they to believe in a unity of inspiration which gave such very various deliverances in the course of ages? He suggested that the diversity in the deliverances of revelation did not proceed from a difference in the source of revelation, but in the media of revelation. He had the Lord's own authority for that. The people of Moses' time were given a certain ordinance about divorce because of the hardness of their hearts. He took an illustration from a lighthouse. As the frame revolves, the beholder sees a green, a red, a blue light: yet within there burns ever the same pure white light. So those through whom the deliverances of revelation came were not all perfect nor all similar. The Spirit of God could not come through them and show the same colour as when it came through the perfectly transparent medium of His own blessed Son. Having gone so far, he did not think they could truly say that the Spirit of God never moved amongst the authors of other religions. God had not left Himself without a witness even amongst the lowest tribes of humanity. Were they to suppose then that He had left Himself without a witness in the greater and much purer and much more advanced religions of the world? The positive necessary conclusion was this: that just as Paul said that the law was a schoolmaster

to bring the Jews to Christ, so Confucius was a schoolmaster to bring China to Christ, and the great sages of India were schoolmasters to bring the Indians to Christ. That was at the bottom and behind the whole conception of modern missions. He quoted the authority of his old friend, Dr. G. U. Pope, one of the greatest missionaries and scholars, for saying that by understanding the Tamil literature better, and taking all the good out of it, and showing how Christianity and the Christ completed it, the great intellectual part of Southern India might be won ; but it would not if they went to the Tamil people and said, "That is all wrong : you must begin again." In conclusion, Bishop Palmer admitted the difficulties of conceiving evolution in the history of thought, but pointed out the fact as transparently clear, that every man was a living illustration of the principle of evolution from his birth to his death, and added that however hard it might be for us to follow or prophesy it, there may be assumed to be an evolution of the race.

The REV. T. A. LACEY, London, referring to Mr. Asher's remarks, asked, What does this loophole theory of revelation amount to? Supposing they were in a darkened room in which a loophole was opened, what happened when the light of the sun was let in? They got a very small but distinct beam of light, and at the end of that beam of light, if it fell upon a suitable surface, they got a very well-defined image. If they reduced the orifice to a smaller size they would get what was known as a camera obscura ; they would have, where the beam of light fell, an exact image of something which was outside. But they would certainly not have the whole light of day flooding the room. There was an instrument called the heliostat, which was used to secure that a beam of sun-light coming through a small hole should fall always on the same spot. On one occasion, when Sir George Stokes was lecturing with a heliostat, it got out of order, and when he discovered that the image had been changing its position, he exclaimed, "This incessant motion of the sun is most annoying!" A good many people were trying to use a heliostat with regard to revelation ; their revelation was a narrow ray coming in through a small loophole, and casting a very precise image, and they were anxious to keep that image not only the same in size and general appearance, but precisely in the same place. When their heliostat got out of order, they said, "This incessant motion of the Sun of Righteousness is most annoying!" There was another theory of revelation, and it was, he ventured to think, the theory of revelation contained in the pages of the New Testament. The word "revelation" meant the removal of curtains. If they wanted daylight to flood a room, they must draw the curtains apart to the widest distance possible. The light of God shone upon mankind not as into a dark room through a narrow loophole, but broadly through wide windows, which man's ignorance or malice or perversity had veiled with thick curtains, some of them very opaque, some of them semi-transparent, some of them, perchance, quite transparent. Accord-

ing to the teaching of the New Testament, revelation consisted in the drawing back of curtain after curtain, until the windows of man's soul were open to the light of day.

The REV. DR. McVICAR, Bishop of Rhode Island, referred to the fact that fifty years ago the almost universal idea of inspiration in connexion with revelation was the mechanical idea, "Thus saith the Lord"; and when the ear was open to listen, the very words which entered the ear were supposed to come from the divine throne itself. Of course, there was no room for development under such a theory, much less for possible error. What God Himself had put into words must have been the truth and the complete truth for the time, and for all time afterwards. When we, who hold another view, are accused of sacrificing God's Word, we may well answer back the challenge, that in reality we have saved it. With passages in that Word, which are at variance with the truths of history or science, or contradictory of the dictates of an enlightened Christian conscience, we are no longer forced to resort to methods of explanation, which in other lines would be considered irrational or dishonest. The truth in these passages, so far as it was truth, was God's truth; but it was limited and coloured by the human medium of transmission, while the fuller and complete truth in God's keeping awaited the generation, and the man capable of receiving and interpreting it. How much more reasonable! How much more in accord with the outcome! How much more biblical even, is this view, which places inspiration not in the words, but in the "holy men of old" who wrote the words! So God's truth has waited, just as the ideal of beauty has waited, just as the ideal of music has waited, for the man who had the eye, the ears, the hand, to grasp and interpret it to the developing race. So God had been waiting with all the patience of the Eternal for the time to come when He could speak to that man who could hear and know Him, as Isaiah did; and grasp the dictates of eternal truth and righteousness; as, before, He had been waiting for that nation which by its circumstances and conditions and peculiarities would be most fitted to catch, to understand, and to convey them a spiritual message at all.

The CHAIRMAN, in summing up the discussion, said he thought it had made upon them one very distinct impression. While they had distinguished between the gift of God and the receptivity of man with regard to revelation, they had agreed in laying the emphasis on the work of God. There had been no inclination shown to represent inspiration as only another word for man's ingenuity. From one of the papers, and from what had been said that day, he had seen a new adaptation in those wonderful self-revealing words of St. Paul, in which the apostle preferred to speak not of the Christian as having known but rather as having been known by God. The whole tendency of the discussion had been to bring out the meaning of that teaching which told them that the knowledge by which God intended man to know Him was not that which came through intellect so much as that which came through love.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. WEDNESDAY MORNING, JUNE 17

The MOST REV. R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Calcutta, presided.

DR. ELEANOR M. REED, New York, the author of the paper on "Christian Science and the Contrasting Christian Truth" (*App.*, No. 8), remarked that in order to satisfactorily meet the arguments of Christian scientists, it was not essential that they should have a knowledge of the personal history of Mrs. Eddy, nor of her literary efforts. But what they did need was a knowledge of the Bible, and to be in touch with the teaching of the intellectual leaders of the Church in their own Communion, and also to know something of that most important of sciences, psychology. She testified to having personally examined innumerable cures by Christian Science and having found them genuine, but she had never discovered a case in which, with an ordinarily good working knowledge of psychology, they could not satisfactorily explain the physical changes which have taken place. The real principle of healing was intellectual and physical co-operation with the vital powers within the organism itself. They needed to realize that the body responded to emotional states, whether there was truth or error behind the emotions; and, given the mental state, they were sure to get the physical results. The theories and practices of Christian Science tended to give poise to the controlling power of mind. To give a peace, a serenity to the mind, they must adopt one of two methods. Either they must invent a philosophy to guide life, which removed from the realm of personal responsibility all need for repentance, by denying sin, and all need for sympathy, by denying suffering as an illusion of mortal mind and as something which it was only necessary to change the belief about in order to exterminate; or they must adopt God's plan, which was that of making repentance so deep, and faith in God's pardon and forgiveness so real, and trust in His unfailing love so strong that, in spite of conditions, they might feel in their hearts and manifest in their lives "a peace that passeth all understanding". Christian scientists were using laws which psychology was teaching, but they were using those laws by methods which scorned religion. If there was, as often happened, growth in character of converts to Christian Science, she held that that growth had been due to principles learned from Christianity, and not from Mrs. Eddy.

Dr. Reed went on to affirm that if they accepted the definition of their being as spirit or life, the creative power within them, and mind or soul as the controlling power, and body as the material manifestation of that spiritual and mental life, they would have no trouble in explaining the physical cures which took place as a result of the practices of Christian scientists.

The REV. DR. McCOMB, Boston, Massachusetts, declared that educated opinion in America regarded Christian Science with what one might call amused and good-natured toleration. Christian Science was looked upon as unphilosophical because it had broken with the main stream of philosophy; it denied not only the existence of anything beneath the material phenomena that met their senses, but it denied the existence of those material phenomena themselves. For Christian Science sin, sickness, death, were illusions. Not only so, but it stood condemned in America because it had broken with historical Christianity; it no longer accepted the New Testament as scholarship knew it, and it no longer accepted the great historic creeds of Christendom. Yet it must be admitted that for certain types of suffering Christian Science had, and still possessed, therapeutic value. It had uplifted souls out of despair; over and over again it had dissipated worry, misery, mental and moral wretchedness, and brought back something like a breath of the early apostolic world. At the root of Christian Science there was a truth; and, perverted and distorted as it was, they must nevertheless thank Mrs. Eddy and her representatives for calling the attention of the Church to it. This truth was the influence of moral over physical states. Dr. McComb went on to explain how that truth had been taken up and applied by the Church in America. In Emmanuel Church, in Boston, for the past two years, there had been in operation a clinic which perhaps was without a parallel in the history of Christendom, a clinic in which scientific men of medicine and theologians and psychologists worked, hand in hand, for the alleviation of human suffering. That great Emmanuel movement, as it was called, stood for an alliance between the highest medical science of our time, more especially that department of medical science known as neurological science, and a simple Christianity, as it stood in the pages of the New Testament and in the oldest creeds of Christendom. The one basis on which the Emmanuel effort rested was modern science, especially in the treatment of those functional disorders of the nervous system which went by the names of neurasthenia, hysteria, melancholia, psychasthenia and allied troubles, hypochondria, alcoholism, and morphinism. The question might be asked, "Admitting that the patients can be cured by psychical means, what has the Church to do with them? Why not leave them in the hands of the physician?" The answer was, because those diseases were diseases fundamentally of character, moral diseases; and the Church existed, if she existed for

anything, for the moral uplifting and training of humanity. Dr. McComb pointed out that at the root of the vast majority of these troubles there lay an inarticulate yearning for a religious faith, for spiritual deliverance, for some redeeming power to take possession of the soul, and raise it above the power of the transitory and the temporal. The methods of cure had received the approval of the best students alike of psychology and religion in America, and they were psychological, moral, and religious in character. One of the most powerful therapeutical remedies to-day was the power of suggestion, suggestion to the patient of hope, faith, aspiration, trust, belief that the misery would pass away, and that God was on the side of health, mental, moral and physical. There was another still more important method technically called psychical re-education. The patient had to be trained how to keep in the centre of his consciousness good, healthy, constructive ideas, and how to throw out of his consciousness altogether wrong, mischievous, and destructive ideas. The patient was also trained by a process of religious re-education. At the root of the nervousness from which some of the patients were suffering had been the religious training they had received in their youth, and their malady was known as "New England conscience", a form of moral feeling which exaggerated venial offences into flagrant crimes against God and society. For the re-education of those patients the simple Christianity of the New Testament sufficed; their attention was called to the great sayings of the Lord Jesus Himself, which fell like dew upon their parched spirits—to such truths as forgiveness of sins, the love of God in Jesus Christ, and the efficacy of prayer. All these means had proved in many cases to be of the highest therapeutic value. In conclusion, Dr. McComb expressed his belief that the Church, if she was to vindicate her position to-day, must regain the ideals of the apostolic and the ante-Nicene period, when she cast out the demons that possessed the spirits of ancient men, and was able to stand between shrinking humanity and the onslaught of sickness, sin, and death. He did not plead for a return to the accidents of the Apostolic age, but for a return to its spirit, its enthusiasm of humanity, its power to help disordered souls.

The BISHOP OF BLOEMFONTEIN emphasized the new view of consciousness taken by psychology: (1) no longer regarded as a unity, but as multiform, diffused throughout the organism; and (2) no longer necessarily conscious, but actually for the most part subconscious or subliminal. The main characteristics of subliminal consciousness were its receptivity, or amenability to suggestion, and its power of concentration upon any suggestion when once imparted. It could follow any cue, whether true or false. The phraseology of Mrs. Eddy's book, with its hackneyed commonplaces, was well calculated to stimulate the subconscious mind to activity. Healing resulted from the intimate relation

between the subconscious mind and the bodily organism. To a certain extent Christian Science was useful in calling attention to Catholic practices. The Christian scientist "entering into the silence" was simply the Catholic "prayer of quiet". If healing resulted from the action of Christian Science ideas on the subliminal consciousness, much more might it be expected from the patient practice of Christian meditation in its higher forms. Receptivity and concentration were of the essence of a good meditation, in which the mind, diverted from the hum and buzz of ordinary life, was made quiescent, and was fixed on some truths of the gospel of Christ. Here were real healing truths to be transmitted to the subconscious mind, and to be made effective there for the good of soul and body, and not only of the agent himself, but also of those near and dear to him, remembered by him in this spiritual prayer.

The REV. A. E. OLDROYD, Hampstead, pointed out that Christian Science differed from all other methods of treating disease. Every other method began by assuming the existence of disease, suffering, and pain. Christian Science began by denying that there was anything to heal at all, except illusions and hallucinations. He went on to show that the miracles of healing in the New Testament were of three kinds: those due to the faith of the operator without any faith on the part of the recipient; those due to the faith of the operator and others; and those due to the faith of the operator and the participator. What they wanted now was a combination of those three; they wanted the Lord Jesus, the faith of the patient, and the co-operating faith and intercession of the Church. There were, he thought, two practical lessons to be learned from Christian Science. They needed more co-operation between the clergy and the doctors. There was a need for a brighter and more hopeful office in visitation of the sick. The parish priest was too often looked upon as a harbinger of death. He was not admitted to the sick-room in the earlier stages because he could do no good, and he was only admitted in the last stage because he could do no harm. Another lesson which Christian Science taught was the importance of the anointing of the sick, which the apostles themselves adopted with a view to restoration of bodily health. The tremendous upgrowth of Christian Science and its marvellous spread and success were, he believed, in the providence of God driving them back to a greater and truer realization of true faith-healing, in which they could not only co-operate with the medical means of God's appointment, such as drugs, but in which the whole Church could co-operate with the Lord, the great Physician of the body as well as the Pastor of souls.

MR. J. M. HICKSON, London, urged that we should always keep clearly before us the fact that there is only one Healer, the Lord

Jesus Christ Himself, Who is "the Truth, the Way, and the Life" of spiritual healing. Those whom He calls to engage in His service are only channels through which He is working. Because Christ is the Healer there is no limitation to His work except that of man's receptiveness; and His healing is not only for the body but also for the mind and spirit. The whole trinity of man's being is cleansed and healed, and a right adjustment brought about between those three parts of our being. In spiritual healing we differ from Christian Science, in that we acknowledge, as our Lord and His disciples did, the reality of sin, disease and sickness, and with God's help overcome them. When our Lord came to earth He both healed the sick and preached the gospel, making it clear that that was His true mission. Then He formed His Church to carry on that work, giving a commandment to that effect and the power to do it, and therefore the Church must not flinch from doing what is her duty to mankind and to God Himself.

BISHOP MYLNE related a case of a man who had been healed of a malignant internal complaint, after anointing and laying on of hands, at the house of the last speaker, Mr. Hickson. He argued that all mental healing, apart from direct dependence on the power of the incarnate Saviour, was a survival, even in unassisted human nature, of the sacramental character impressed upon it by God at its creation; which might be distorted by sin, almost annihilated by madness, perverted in demoniacal possession, but never wholly lost in this life, and only temporarily interrupted by death. Humanity, as designed and created by God, was, he said, the most sacramental fact in God's universe; an outward and visible embodiment of the inward and spiritual principle that matter was created to subserve the purposes of spirit, and that man was intended by God to form, in his own person, a microcosm; in which spirit, more than anywhere else that we know of, found its formula, its expression, its embodiment, in a corporeal organism; and in which matter rose to its own highest functions by responding to every command of the spirit embodied in and expressed by it. In the incarnation of the Word, this union of spirit with matter was carried to a point different, not only in degree but in kind, from anything attained before; for in it matter was made the outward expression and agent of a divine as well as a human nature. In it, accordingly, we found displayed to the full what the power of spirit over matter could be. The miracles of our Lord—"signs", "works", "powers", as they were called in Scripture—derived their chief evidential value from being laid before us as samples of what this world would be if God reigned supreme over humanity. They were all in their first intention beneficent, and are only secondarily wonderful—evidences of God manifested in the flesh, rather because they were what every good man would do if he could, than because they were what no other good man could have done

if he would. They came before us simply as the inevitable accompaniment of a life in which the human spirit, because wholly united with God, showed itself as enjoying, and therefore as using for good, a supremacy over natural forces impossible to fallen humanity. But this power, supremely manifested in the incarnate Lord Himself, He commanded His followers to use after Him. And St. James gave us a special injunction to use anointing with oil for the purpose of applying the power; while St. Paul, in a more general way, told us of "gifts of healings". The manifestation of healing power under the influences of "Christian Science" could only be a call to the Church to revive the truth which she had forgotten, and to use the powers which she had neglected. Like every other error, "Christian Science" was merely the nemesis of her neglects. Bishop Mylne himself, with many others, was craving for an authoritative revival of the apostolic rite of Anointing for healing, and longed to have a proper form issued for the setting apart of the oil for this purpose. Meanwhile, they felt that they could not see people die without resorting, as they might, to the use of what an Apostolic Writer had enjoined.

ARCHDEACON CUNNINGHAM, Cambridge, did not wish to raise any question as to the reality of the cures effected by new therapeutic methods. Though personally unconvinced, he was quite prepared to admit their efficacy, for the sake of argument; but he felt that however successful it might be, such healing was fraught with serious dangers of many kinds, and that the Church should refrain from encouraging it in any way. The chief danger was religious; it was a complete reversal of Christianity to make physical health a supreme end, and to regard spiritual power as merely the means of attaining it. Our Lord taught us to aim at using earthly things in such a fashion that we might become better fitted for the life eternal. There was also a danger to personal moral character; those who believed they could bring an unusual spiritual power to bear were in danger of being supercilious, both in regard to ordinary doctors and to their patients; this habit of mind was likely to taint the sources of human sympathy. Lastly, there was a danger of terrible physical mischief if men allowed themselves to run counter to common-sense. Common-sense held that physical evils could be met by appropriate physical remedies. It was a terrible experience to see a relation unnecessarily condemned to death from cancer by friends who insisted that it was merely a case of "thinking sick thoughts". His experience in a smallpox epidemic made him feel the terrible responsibility of those who deprecated attempts to give even partial immunity by physical means. For Christians, who believed in the recorded cures in the early Church, there was no *a priori* objection to the possibility of such cures, but he was not sure that it was wise to aim at going back to primitive times; he wanted to go on. The spiritual gifts displayed in particular cases had given

rise to much trouble long ago, and he believed the Church had been wisely guided when she allowed them to fall into disuse.

DEAN HART, Denver, Colorado, said : He did not treat Christian Science with contumely. He was thankful for the existence of Christian Science. He was thankful for pain; pain was the guardian of the body, and if they had no pain they would not live a week. But pain intimated to them that there was something the matter with their moral constitution. Christian Science was the pain of their moral constitutions; it stood as a rebuke to the doctors and to the Church. Dean Hart proceeded to give an instance of a Congregationalist minister, Dr. McArthur, who had been "a miserable invalid for fifteen years", who had been absolutely cured by Christian Science. He became a "healer" himself. But finding that Christian Science denied the atonement, for his salvation's sake he left their community, and is now still healing by inducing his patients to really live what they profess to believe; by gaining "assurance" and "a quiet mind" obstructed nerval action becomes normal, and the majority of ailments are removed. With regard to the question of miracles, Dean Hart opined that Christ performed miracle as an authorization of what God gave Him to proclaim so that when, for example, the paralytic was enabled to take up his bed and walk, the man was led to argue that his sins were also forgiven through the same faith that imparted physical recovery. It was further pointed out by the dean that when the mind was drawn to certain points in a certain way, it would produce marvellous effects. As an instance in point he referred to a case of stigmata, described in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, in which an hysterical woman had in her hands and feet and side five wounds which bled every Friday. Those wounds were caused by the intense action of the suggestion of a hysterical mind in the direction of being honoured to have impressed upon her body the marks of the Lord's Passion. Dean Hart added that if they believed that Christ gave them righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, and went on their way rejoicing, they would live in godly health and strength until the machinery of the body was worn out and their change came.

MISS WHITEHEAD claimed that she had, without disloyalty to the Church of England, shared in the benefits of Christian Science for six years, and never, except at the Blessed Sacrament itself, had she reached to such a high realization of God's presence as she had found in meetings of Christian scientists. She denied that Christian scientists were unsympathetic. When under their treatment she may have felt a want of sympathy perhaps at the moment, but she knew that the truest sympathy underlay the treatment which they employed.

THE REV. FRANCIS L. PALMER, Minnesota, thought it was their duty not to denounce or ridicule Christian Science, though he thought it would be a mistake to preach it. Personally he

never mentioned Christian Science by name unless alluding to it at different times when speaking of other similar movements. But he often tried to present spiritual truth among those in his parish who were interested in and inclined toward Christian Science, and he generally found a ready response when urging, for example, that they should seek in their spiritual life "the peace of God which passeth all understanding". Mr. Palmer expressed a hope that those who thought of undertaking the work of spiritual healing, on the Boston lines, should not blunder into it blindly or without preparation.

MISS REED said, in reply, that she and others fully realized the danger of subordinating the spiritual to the physical, but that the real danger of materialism came in a false and uncatholic opposition and separation; body, soul and spirit, must all be perfected, that all may be dedicated to Christ; and for the perfection of all, the Church was ordained and given power. She and others did not ask that we should go back to one age or another, but to what was shown to be eternal truth, not only by its catholicity, but by forming a unique part of the teaching of our Lord Himself. She added that our position must be to do what Christian Science is doing, because it is alike within our power and our duty; but on sure grounds, not by denying the physical, but by transcending it in the power of the Incarnation. Christian Science had nothing to add to Catholic truth, but held a rebuke for those, who, by their denial of one portion of such truth and practice, had brought about its reassertion in an exaggerated and dangerous form.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 17

The MOST REV. R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Calcutta, presided.

PROFESSOR W. R. SORLEY, Litt.D., F.B.A., Cambridge, the author of the published paper on "Agnosticism : Its Meaning and Claims" (*App.*, No. 10), drew attention to the agnostic idea that a man's thought could not give him knowledge of what lay behind his sense-experience. Thus stated, the theory was self-contradictory. In order to know that knowledge of anything was impossible, it was not enough for them to have some idea of how they knew ; they must also have a knowledge of the things to which knowledge could and could not extend. They must know God to prove Him unknowable. Professor Sorley went on to point out that the agnostic attitude had taken a great hold, not only on scientific, but also on popular thought ; it had taken too firm a grip upon many thinkers of high rank for it to be without any element of truth. Underlying it there was a real distinction between different ways or degrees of knowledge. But when the scientific Agnostic said that no knowledge was possible beyond experience, they must ask him what he was thinking of by knowledge. What were the special characteristics of scientific knowledge? Scientific knowledge dealt with units of space and time ; it argued from part to part, from one proposition to another, and was thus always partial and relative. Almost every scientific Agnostic, therefore, had admitted that the realities he knew were surrounded by a greater reality, and that in some way we had an indefinite consciousness, belief, faith, or intuition of this great comprehensive reality. Theological knowledge could not claim the special characteristics of knowledge elaborated in the positive sciences. If it did claim them, it would put itself on a level with the partial relative information obtained in studying the details of space and time, and their relations. All scientific propositions were proved from other scientific propositions, but the theological interpretation of the world was an interpretation intended to be a final interpretation of reality. Theological thought had to deal with a sphere of consciousness which was not without scientific connexion, which no doubt must include and account for scientific ideas, but which definitely in its purpose went beyond them. Professor Sorley urged that agnostic philosophy should be looked upon as having

a certain lesson to teach with regard to the connexion between the Christian idea of God and the scientific methods of the day. It was true that nothing that they could say could be accepted, if it contradicted the facts or established doctrines of science. But that was no reason why the latter should be regarded as the sole test or valid method for the former. The former had its own basis, especially in the religious consciousness; its own method of interpreting history, its own method of assigning value to the facts of nature, and to the sciences which describe them. While, therefore, it should be able to comprehend all these within its scope, it should also definitely recognize that it was not any one of them. Theology mistook its true nature and function when it imitated the method and structure of the positive sciences, or when it staked its validity on the truth of some scientific conception—such as the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages, or the mechanical theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection at the present day.

In the absence of BISHOP WELLDON, his paper on "Agnosticism and Belief" (*App.*, No. 9) was taken as read.

BISHOP HAMILTON BAYNES said: Professor Sorley, in his most excellent and interesting pamphlet, has shown that Agnosticism is self-contradictory. It fails to establish the division between the knowable and the unknowable. For in the very fact of drawing a line between them you have already transcended that line. You have asserted the existence of a "beyond". You can only describe what is beyond your boundary wall by some statement which, however vague, implies knowledge of a kind. So, for instance, in asserting that God is unknowable you have already asserted what you deny. If God were really and absolutely unknowable you could not even assert that much; you could make no statement and use no term. In fixing a term you already assert some knowledge. So also in using, for instance, the word "finite" we have taken our stand outside the finite area as "spectators of all time and existence". The consciousness which can stand aside from the time process and gather up and sum its passing and disconnected moments must be itself outside the time process, must be itself other than one of the moments which it sums, other than one of the links of the chain which it holds. It has already something of the infinite. And this truth holds good with regard to all the limitations which in defining we transcend. So we are left with a mere distinction in the kinds of knowledge of which the subject is susceptible. What the statement that God is unknowable often means is simply that physical science is an abstract science. It is abstract in the sense that you have really abstracted a certain part of the field of knowledge,

and ruled off all beyond that part. You take, for instance, matter, and definitely rule out the question, What is involved in the conception of matter? Having started with this abstraction, the scientist is plainly out of court in saying that the very thing which he has ruled out as being beyond the sphere of his investigation is unknowable. (Or else the statement is merely tautological, repeating the fact that for the purposes of his study it may be ignored.) This confusion is perhaps the more apt to escape notice because physical science is less obviously an abstract study than, for instance, mathematics. The mathematician obviously abstracts from the individual and concrete. He deals with abstract numbers. It matters not for his purpose whether the 100 he is considering be 100 pebbles or 100 platitudes. The abstract nature of physical science is less obvious because it deals with the concrete and individual. But whenever the man of science ignores the fact that his study is based on an abstraction, we must insist on asking the question, What is involved in the most elementary and fundamental statement about matter—the statement, for instance, “something is”? We can no more escape from the fact that that simplest affirmation means “something is for a conscious subject” than we can escape from our own shadow. In other words, consciousness is an essential and inseparable factor in even the most elementary form of matter conceivable, and, therefore, when the scientist assumes the right to dogmatize about what lies behind matter, either by saying that mind is a product evolved from matter, or by saying that a universal and infinite consciousness is unknowable, we can only remind him that he is ignoring his initial abstraction and exceeding his functions. These considerations suggest an answer to the Agnostic, whether he be an unbelieving Agnostic, or, as Bishop Welldon, in his paper, confesses himself, a believing Agnostic. (I am compelled by the severe limitations of time to put the answer in its baldest and bluntest form.) When Bishop Welldon, from his standpoint of a believing Agnostic, says “it is inconceivable that man should know God”, I would ask, “Can a child know his father?” His knowledge may not be, certainly indeed is not, exhaustive or adequate; but it is real. Our knowledge of God is not, as he describes it, a balancing of probabilities, in which it is wise to take the odd chance (20 to 19). It is the one thing which we do know with absolute certainty. It is not indeed exhaustive, but it is real—more real than all else, as it is the basis of all other knowledge. The empirical consciousness may say, “I know the things which I see and touch; I also know, though with less clearness and definiteness, the self within; but when I try to rise above the things which I see and touch, and above the self which knows, to a unity which embraces both object and subject, I find myself in a dreamland, and I am an Agnostic”. The consciousness which is at once religious and philosophical, replies “The things without me change and pass,

they are ever in process of becoming ; I know them at best but partially and inadequately. Of the self within I have more certain knowledge. *Cogito ergo sum.* But the one thing which I do know—the one thing which is certain and cannot fail—is God, the ultimate unity of consciousness on which the unity of the whole world hangs, which is the basis and presupposition of all my knowledge, and the only explanation of what I mean by self, the one Eternal Existence in which I live and move and have my being ". This I take to be the true answer, and the answer in which the philosophical and the Christian consciousness meet. But both of these are the results of a long process of mental evolution. As Aristotle says, "That which is first in nature is last in time". Although it is at the end of the process that we come to the clear apprehension of this truth, it is none the less the presupposition of all our efforts after knowledge. For whenever we set out to investigate and to analyse a given substance, we start with the vast assumption that it is the nucleus of an endless system of relations to all other things in existence, that all these relations are already a reality could we but discover them, that the whole is rational and potentially related to our reason, and that inasmuch as the thing exists these relations are already actual for the consciousness which is the basis and presupposition of the world as an orderly whole. That is to say, we start with the assumption of a transcendent unity which bridges the gulf between mind and matter, between subject and object. But though that presupposition is latent in all our search into nature, it is not reflected on in early stages of knowledge. The fact is there are three factors in every act of knowledge. All three are necessarily present, but they are not equally reflected on. The three are: (1) the object, the world outside us, (2) the subject, the self that thinks, and (3) the reconciling unity by which subject and object are taken up into one experience. In early stages of human thought it is the first of these which alone is reflected on. The savage thinks in terms of matter. The little child repeats the experience of the savage, and thinks only of the objects around it. It thinks of itself even as an object, and uses the third person rather than the first to describe itself. Yet, from the first there is present to the savage mind the dim consciousness of a transcending unity beyond the many forms of life around it and within. But this larger unity can only at this stage be expressed in terms of outward objects. So some object is selected for special veneration on account either of its size, or power, or its mystery. It may be a mountain or a river, or some weird combination of natural forms like the composite animals of Egyptian and Assyrian art. In the same way human relations and duties are thought of in the same external manner, as due to some blood relationship founded on a common ancestry or a common descent from the tribal god. With the growth of intertribal relationships men pass by natural transition to ideas of Polytheism, as the gods of other

tribes are admitted into the common pantheon. And from this the transition is not difficult to Pantheism—the sense of a divinity behind all natural phenomena. But Pantheism, the sense that all nature is divine, tends to the obliteration of moral distinctions and to the growth of an optimistic view of the world as it is. But, meanwhile, the human spirit with its restless cravings, with its half-conscious ideals, with its constant appeal from the world as it is, with all its misery and its vanity, to the world as it ought to be, asserts itself. And then comes the reaction from the attitude of mind, which dwells only on outward things, to that inward view which occupies the mind as it turns back upon itself, and its hopes and ideals. (The transition from the objective to the subjective view of life is mediated by the fact that nations like the Greeks, while still in the objective stage of thought, have humanized the gods of nature; or, in other words, while still thinking of the divine as objective, have, in their anthropomorphism, selected as the object of worship the human being, who is at once object and subject. But it is in the revolt of the conscience against the mere optimistic acquiescence in the world as it is, in the persistence of the subjective ideal which is nevertheless conceived as objective, in the guise of being true for others besides these, that the strength of this second phase of religious development consists.) We find it in the Jewish Prophets, in Buddhism, and in the Stoics. We find it characteristically in the vision of him who stands out as the representative of the whole line of Jewish Prophets—Elijah, in his revolt against the objective religion of the Baal worshippers. He sees the giant forces of nature—the “great and strong wind which rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake: and after the earthquake, a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a still small voice.” It is in that still small voice of the human conscience that the divine is now felt to dwell—in the spiritual ideal of the world as it “is to be”, as against the world that “is”. In the first stage it was the immanence of God that was insisted on. It is now the transcendence of God that is emphasized. But as the first stage—the stage of objective religions—involved an optimistic view of the world, so this second stage, the subjective, leads to pessimism. For it contrasts the inward world as alone felt to be divine, with the opposing and hostile world of matter, and leaves us with an unreconciled dualism. And as the first stage obliterated moral distinctions in a Pantheistic conception of the world with its immanent deity, so the second stage emphasizes those distinctions to the point of an irreconcilable antagonism between the transcendent God revealed to the human soul and the evil world in which the soul finds itself imprisoned. The moral outcome of this view is asceticism. But asceticism can never be complete, cannot annihilate the world of matter. The most heroically

ascetic hermit still has a body, and though he mortify that body to the verge of suicide, he still discovers that evil is present in his soul and in his will. And so the Buddhist carries the ascetic principle to its logical conclusion, and bids us mortify not the body only but the soul, and teaches that until all desire, all thought, all volition, is reduced to absolute passivity the Nirvana which is the goal of human life is not reached. And as this Nirvana is a blank negation, indistinguishable from absolute annihilation, the subjective view lands us in the paradox—the *reductio ad absurdum*—that the goal of life is death.

This rapid survey of the evolution of religious consciousness (inevitably most inadequate) seems to me not unnecessary if we are to get at the heart of the matter, and unearth the philosophical fallacy of Agnosticism. The attempt to understand matter without spirit, and spirit without matter ; to separate the objective from the subjective, or the subjective from the objective, lands us in hopeless contradiction. And we are forced back on the conclusion that to understand the world and human nature we need to open our eyes to the fundamental truth that the world is an unfolding of a unifying principle which is infinite, the realization of an underlying unity which transcends all difference, the revelation of a God Who is in the world, reconciling all things to Himself. The modern doctrine of evolution saves us from mere reversion to the Pantheistic conception of an immanent deity. It is the belief that all human knowledge is the process by which our consciousness is gradually becoming one with the universal consciousness implicit in the world, and all human right conduct the actualization of a divine purpose of which we are consciously the organs. Whenever and however we arrive at the consciousness of this truth, whenever we have arrived at it, it is seen to be the most certain of all facts, because it is the presupposition of all scientific knowledge and of all moral action. It may be objected : This is a philosophical answer to Agnosticism, not a Christian one ; we prefer to take our stand on revelation, not on the human intellect. I maintain that there is no such antithesis, and that the Light of the World is the light both of Holy Scripture and of the human mind, and that it is because it is the culmination of the evolution of religious ideas, the light which includes and clarifies all partial and imperfect rays, that the Christian revelation has maintained its hold on 2,000 years of progressive thought. It is true that our Lord did not come as a philosopher, that He came not primarily to solve our intellectual problems, but to save us from our sins, that He came as a working man and taught simple peasants, that He gave men what they were able to receive. But He could say, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." But the simplest teaching may be based on fundamental truth ; and indeed it must be so, if it is to stand the test of all ages, and meet the needs of all men in all times. And the fact that Christianity never grows old, that it does meet

the needs of all stages of intellectual progress, and of the twentieth century as of the first, means that it must be of a piece with all that is true in human knowledge, that it fits into the whole system (if indeed there is a system and not mere chaos) of human development. And we have seen that the human reason (working its way upward through what I have called the objective stage of religion, and again through the subjective stage) demands a theory of life which shall avoid the defects of both. The former, the objective, obliterated the moral distinctions, and in its doctrine of the divine immanence ignored the difference between right and wrong. The latter, the subjective, left us in the paralysis of an unreconciled dualism and its inevitable pessimism. The Christian gospel delivers us from both these evils. None has ever faced more resolutely than our Lord, or probed more deeply the abysses of evil, but He no less resolutely rejected the ascetic solution. He refused to regard the world as the devil's world. In His temptation He denied that ownership, and claimed it all for God. None had ever, in face of all the evil, a more triumphant optimism. His central message was the gospel of the kingdom, the triumphant assurance of its inevitable victory, the announcement that he that is least in that kingdom is greater than the greatest of ascetics. And this kingdom, or Church, He built upon the rock of belief in His own Incarnate Divinity. This Divinity He taught St. John to recognize as the light which had lightened every man coming into the world, the light which He was to impart to all men in its unsullied glory, that He might dwell in them as God dwelt in Him, that He might be the vine of which they were the branches, that it might be no more they that lived but Christ Who lived in them, that the Church might be His body, and all men the sons of God. He has thus for ever put aside the dualism of the subjective religion, and, by His Incarnation and by the sacramental system, claimed matter as the vehicle of spirit. And St. Paul has expressed the philosophic truth of an immanent yet transcendent God as the explanation and presupposition of all the world's painful progress when he says, "We know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now . . . waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God". This seems to me then the exact antithesis of Agnosticism, even of what Bishop Welldon has called believing Agnosticism. And faith—such faith as the Epistle to the Hebrews describes—the faith which is the evidence of things unseen, seems to me to be the very opposite of a balancing of probabilities. As Bishop Lightfoot often insisted, faith is the antithesis, not of knowledge, but of sight. By faith we endure, "as seeing Him Who is invisible". It is true that from many points of view, as Bishop Gore said the other day, it is unnecessary, perhaps undesirable, to ask for a man's reasons for believing in God; the fact that he believes is enough. And I have little doubt that the writer whose paper I have ventured to criticize is much more

devout, and has a faith which is much more effective, though he confesses himself an Agnostic, than I who humbly claim to "know Him Whom I have believed". But we are not discussing personal equations but philosophical questions; and from that point of view, reasons for believing are important, are indeed of the essence of the matter; and from that standpoint I am bound in logical consistency vigorously to combat a view which appears to me to give away the philosophical truth and the real nature of religious faith.

CANON ALEXANDER, Gloucester, thought it of the first importance, especially at a time when Agnosticism had so far filtered down into the life and mind of the people, that we should be prepared to challenge the more popular delusions about it. One such delusion was the belief that Agnosticism is essentially a new thing; and he showed, from the history of Greek thought and modern philosophy, on how many periods of the past it had left a very deep and distinct mark. A second delusion was the idea that the Agnostic was a man entirely emancipated from every superstition of religious belief. He quoted Renan to show that what Carlyle called "the after-shine of Christianity" was probably always visible somewhere in the character and temperament of those who had been educated amid Christian traditions. Dr. Ellicott, the late Bishop of Gloucester, had told him, just before his death, a remarkable story of how, one night at a meeting of the Metaphysical Society in London, when Professor Huxley and others were trying to argue Professor Tyndall into taking up, on the subject under discussion, a more agnostic or materialistic attitude than he thought right to adopt, Tyndall had turned round upon his questioners and said, "There is a window in my heart always open towards Jerusalem, and no man shall shut it." A third delusion concerned the relations of science to Agnosticism. It was not seen that science, as long as it was true science, must be and ought to be agnostic. Using for its instrument the human intellect, and for its methods the methods of observation and experiment, science ceased to be science when it passed beyond the sphere of the material; and it was an essentially unscientific Agnosticism which told us dogmatically that God cannot be known at all. Such a statement was equivalent to saying that there could be no knowledge apart from phenomenal science, and that men had no means of attaining truth but those of observation and experiment. On the other hand, we ought to recognize more than we did the spiritual value of Agnosticism when approached from its positive side—to see in the Agnostic not so much a man who questions the possibility of knowing God, but one who stands in reverent awe and humility before the Eternal Mystery of the Divine Nature. That was the point at which Christianity and Agnosticism joined hands. He would say of Agnosticism, as he would say of Buddhism or Pantheism, of Positivism or Secularism,

"They are but broken lights of Thee, and Thou, O Lord, art more than they."

The REV. CANON J. H. KENNEDY, Dublin, remarked that if there had been a great change since Bishop Butler was able to assume, as a postulate, that there was an intelligent Author of Nature and Governor of the world; this change had not been caused by any discovery that the existence of order and proportion in Nature had been shown to be less prevalent or less striking in the wider field which modern research disclosed to man. However far science might wing its daring flight, it still found that it had to do with a cosmos, never with a chaos. The great prophet of Agnosticism, Herbert Spencer, declared that those who held it legitimate to argue from phenomena to noumena might rightly contend that the nebular hypothesis implied a First Cause, as much transcending the conception of the natural theologians of last century as their conceptions surpassed the fetish of the savage. But at the same time Spencer added a warning that this would be to travel beyond the limits of experience. The crucial question, therefore, was what are these limits? was the dividing line to exclude everything which did not come within the range of sense perception; everything which they could neither see, nor hear, nor taste, nor touch? Comte, the great founder of Positivism, drew the line as near this limit as he could, and accordingly prohibited the very use of the word force as expressing something which was not and could not possibly be a phenomena. Haeckel boasted that the correlation and persistence of force had shown the absurdity of the idea of the freedom of man's will, and had banished God from the universe. Dr. Kennedy proceeded to show that the correlation of force, instead of excluding thought and voluntary action, had proved how marvellously adapted was the universe for carrying out their behests. Then he drew attention to the fact that the dividing line must, unless they outraged common sense, include the consciousness of their fellow men, though that consciousness had never been and never could be directly perceived through any organ of sense. He went on to remark that specialists had in every age felt the temptation to apply the methods of their own pursuit to subjects of a totally different kind. All men engaged in any special branch of study needed to guard against the danger of that limitation.

The REV. R. V. FAITHFULL DAVIES, Christian Evidence Society, pleaded for sympathy for the Agnostic. He took leave to doubt that there was much real Agnosticism, and for this reason: that the position of pure Agnosticism was, he believed, philosophically and morally an impossible one. There were those who were trying to take it up, and who lamented that they were unable to believe in Christianity. What must be the position of those who had known the consolations and hopes, and the glorious faith that Christians enjoyed, and gone over to Agnosticism? He pleaded for sympathy

and prayer for them, and that Christians might show them that argument which was, after all, the most powerful, either in the face of the Agnostic or Atheist at home, or the heathen abroad—the testimony of a life consecrated to the service of God, and lived by the influence of His Spirit.

The REV. PROF. CALDECOTT, Litt. D., King's College, the writer of the paper on "Pantheism and Christian Thought", referred to a certain journalist who said yesterday that he could not see what Pantheism had to do with modern thought. Many journalists did not see what was the connexion between things that were very much alive and the Christian religion, and yet they were in very responsible positions, and were called upon to write and speak, and they were writing and speaking a great deal in the mistiness of only half-knowledge. Dr. Caldecott went on to say that in his paper he had indicated the trend of thought in reference to Pantheism, which was the belief of a moiety of the human race, and, in the opinion of some people, was tending to increase its area. Why, he asked, should Pantheism be a potent influence to-day? First, they were being drawn more and more within the sphere of the hundreds of millions of their fellow-creatures who inhabited Asia, and whose modes of thought were oriental. The influence of oriental thought was going to tell more forcibly upon the attitude of Europeans than had been the case in generations gone by. Another reason was the increase of the influence of modern science on the Western mind. Science was being more widely known and participated in by every class of the community. The increased study of the cosmos had a strong tendency to increase the influence of Pantheism in the direction of Cosmotheism. On the other hand, on the Eastern side there was the great conception of the eternal and unchanging completely dominating the imagination. Neither of these views could possibly be accepted by people who lived in the Christian faith, because the conceptions remained below the level of the thoughts that Christians possessed. Their thoughts, when highest, moved in the direction of personal life. They stood perfectly clear on personal Theism. How were they to think of their relation towards God as a person? They were largely responsible for the conduct of their lives and for a destiny which went beyond these bounds of time and space, and they stood and worked and lived in the presence of an Almighty Eternal Spirit personally, and they wanted to call themselves His children in one family. All this gave a definite and clear basis for the central beliefs of their Christian faith.

The REV. CHARLES H. HAYES, D.D., New York, maintained that since Pantheism was spreading nowadays, and taking on many popular forms, for example, in Christian Science and in the "New Theology", it was of great practical importance to understand and refute the reasons which led to its acceptance. These reasons, as in so many other cases, were not always con-

sciously held or explicitly formulated. One of them was to be found in the attractiveness of the idea that God, according to Pantheism, was very near to every man. If He was present in every leaf and bird, rock and coral, then every man was in close touch with Him. But to suppose that such nearness could satisfy the deep instinct for communion with God was an illusion. Even if the Divine Being was immanent in each of us, it did not follow that we stood in such relations to Him as would answer our moral and spiritual needs. For this He must not only be "closer to them than breathing", but closer than friend to friend. The people in a train were nearer to a traveller than the rug he wrapped about him, because he could observe them and know a little of them. And the members of his family, far away at home, were really nearer still, because of the personal relations of knowledge and love existing between him and them. Unless relations analogous to these could exist between man and God, the spiritual nearness which Pantheism seemed to offer was impossible. These considerations were suggested not as an appeal to sentiment, but as indicating the relative moral worth of Pantheism and Theism. From the rational point of view the question between the two types of thought resolved itself into this: whether their ultimate conceptions should be formed upon the analogy of the relation between the inner psychical aspect of a living organism and its outer physical aspect, as Paulsen would hold; or upon the analogy of that which they knew best, man as personality, knowing, acting, loving.

The REV. DR. FIGGIS, Mirfield, spoke of Pantheism as the greatest foe on the intellectual as distinct from the ethical side. It was a religion, and expressed man's sense of the greatness of things, and of the majesty of law. But it is a system to which Christianity is irresistibly, irretrievably, uncompromisingly opposed. Pantheism had no gospel for the poor and outcast, except a vague dream of a world regenerated and a higher social system. It could not effect the redemption of the individual. Why? because it could not have a doctrine of evil that fitted with the experience of men and women. To the sense of sin and penitence, to the soul crying, "What must I do to be saved?" "Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"—to this sense it had nothing to offer but an interpretation which told them they ought not to have it. Pantheism said they were not really sinners, and if they thought they were they were fools. Pantheism destroyed man's dignity to raise that of the universe. It enabled men (like the hero in "Maud")

"To understand

A sad astrology, the boundless plan
That makes you tyrants in your iron skies
Innumerable, pitiless, passionless eyes,
Cold fires, but with power to burn and brand,
His nothingness into man."

What was it that lifted the beam above this inhuman system?
Nothing but Love.

“But now shine on, and what care I,
Who in this stormy gulf have found a pearl,
The counter charm of space and hollow sky,
And do accept my madness, and would die
To spare from some slight shame one single girl.”

It was the madness of love which gave the lie to the hard, elaborate, systematized world of Pantheism. This philosophy shows us the greatness of things, and can fill man with awe of the sublime. But it is the infinite tenderness, the affecting gentleness in God revealed in Christ that are the true differentia of Christianity. The philosopher in his study may talk of “The starry heavens above him and the moral law within”; but “Jesus took a little child and set him in the midst”.

How are we to fight Pantheism, which in some of its Protean forms was rife to-day?

By insisting on the truth of human individuality. Let us not in our desire for the recognition of the religious society, or for the improvement of the social system, ever forget or ignore the appeal of Christ to the sense of personality. The gospel and the gospel alone assures to men—to the poor, the suffering, and the simple—that they are not mere cogs of a machine, but souls with an end in themselves, of infinite meaning, and worthy that God Himself should suffer and die to redeem them.

CHRISTIAN MORALITY

A. AS CRITICIZED IN THE WEST

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. THURSDAY MORNING, JUNE 18

The MOST REV. R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Calcutta, presided.

The RIGHT REV. C. F. D'ARCY, D.D., Bishop of Ossory, the writer of the paper on "The Ethical Aspect of the Faith" (*App.*, No. 11), insisted that the world of to-day needed, above all else, a great positive ethical teaching to give inspiration for progressive moral effort, and to draw together the various elements of good which existed in diverse forms. Could Christianity, he asked, supply this need? If the Christian Church could hold out to mankind such teaching she would prevail; if not, she would perish. There were those who held that there was no such message for the world in the Christian faith—that the ethics of Christianity were too negative, that they lacked virility, that they failed to teach social and political duty, that they had too much of the character of other-worldliness, dealing too much with hopes and fears which looked beyond the grave, and were, therefore, out of relationship with the aims and labours of everyday life. He did not deny that Christian ethics, as taught at certain times, and by certain teachers, were more or less open to these charges. But no one age, and no one teacher or school of teachers, could express the fullness of Christ. If men desired to gain larger views, they must go back to Christ. The teaching of our Lord was dominated by one supreme conception—the kingdom, and the kingdom was first presented by Him as a moral ideal. This aspect of it was presented in the Sermon on the Mount. There we are taught the necessity of inward purity in the heart of the individual, and the supremacy of love as a bond of union among men. But how could this great conception be brought into relation with ordinary human life? "Seek first the kingdom" was the maxim which expressed our Lord's ethical teaching on its most positive and objective side. It was a maxim which had its application to the simplest and most commonplace duty, and which grasped all that was greatest in human effort and noblest in human aspiration. Here it was that our Lord's teaching succeeded where all philosophies failed. How was it that to-day every one who dreamed golden dreams for the future of mankind, every worker for the improvement of the conditions of life, spoke,

and must speak, the language of the kingdom? Who made that language the only adequate means of giving utterance to all that was best in their hopes for mankind? Surely it was Christ, and here was proof that He, and He alone, had actually given to man the needful moral idea. This idea was applicable to all social and political duty. If they sought the kingdom in their politics, they would not go far wrong. Every organization or institution which helped to identify the individual with the common good was, in its due place and degree, a seeking of the kingdom. After pointing to the noble optimism belonging to this teaching, Bishop D'Arcy remarked that all that the Jewish law taught about the rule of God and the keeping of His commandments, all that Greek thought taught about man in his relation to the State, all that Japan was preaching about the power of loyalty and patriotism, all that Confucius taught as to the necessity of virtue for the well-being of the individual and the community, was included in the great doctrine of the kingdom. Love was the only power which could truly create unity in the spiritual world, for love was the only power which could overcome an opposing will without destroying it. Force conquered and destroyed. Love conquered and fulfilled.

The REV. H. RASHDALL, D.Litt., who contributed the paper on "Christianity and the Legalistic Religions" (*App.*, No. 12), argued that true Christianity was not a legalistic religion, but pre-eminently a religion of the Spirit. If Christianity was to conquer the nations who were so rapidly and surprisingly awakening to an interest in Western science and culture, it must show itself, as on the whole it did in earlier ages, very unmistakeably the ally of that culture, and avoid in its teaching about the sacraments, about the Bible, about the universe generally, anything which even a malevolent criticism could plausibly represent as an attempt to substitute one superstition for another. When he looked back upon the intricate systems of mediaeval, Roman, and even Puritan casuistry, when he remembered the way in which not long ago people attempted to solve difficult questions of conscience by ingenious combinations of texts from the New or even from the Old Testament, he could not but feel how seriously at times Christianity had been tinged and tainted with legalism to the obscuration, though never to the entire extinction, of its true character as the religion of the Spirit. Dr. Rashdall maintained that the profoundest difference between the different religions was the difference of moral ideal. The chief obstacles, as now recognized by experienced missionaries, to the acceptance of Christianity lay in the existence of antagonistic moral ideas, together with social systems based on those ideas, while the chief strength of Christianity and its hope of ultimate victory lay in the fact that it appealed to the deeper, the higher, the progressive conscience of mankind. When once it was recognized that the

Christian view of the universe—the view which ascribed it to a personal will—and that the Christian ideals of life were fundamentally true and reasonable, the difficulties about Christology would not, he thought, in general, be found insuperable.

The REV. FATHER KELLY, Director of the Society of the Sacred Mission, said morality was a habit of conduct formed by acts, ultimately based on reasoned motives. As an end, naturalism could only offer an ideal, such as humanity, which was “my abstraction”, and a motive which was “my self-development”. Love, faith, and humility are not part of moral growth, for self-development cannot come to self-forgetfulness. The reasoned moral motive of the world was pride, and its virtues to the Christian were but “splendid vices”. The salvation of the Athanasian Creed was a salvation from self: “This is the faith that we worship”, God and not ourselves. Christianity had made this possible for us, in that it had set God before us as a reality, known from the manifestation of Himself, not as an abstraction from a diffused operation. There was no true righteousness until they realized that it was God who was doing things, until they ceased from the admiration of their own morality and learned penitence. The world began by saying, “I want to be a fine fellow”; the Christian began by saying, “I am a fool, and it is good to be so, that God may be all in all.”

The REV. DR. WHATELY, Guildford, asked: In what way did men at the present day quarrel with Christian morality? In the first place, it was said that Christ's teaching was ascetic; that it disallowed a great many things perfectly allowable and excellent in themselves; that it looked askance upon the ordinary world-life of men. This objection might be met by saying that Christ mixed with men, that, for instance, He attended a marriage festival, and sympathized with the ordinary earthly pleasures of men. But there is an answer that goes deeper. If what Christ said about His kingdom was true, and if they really and seriously believed in what He said about it and about sin, then they must judge the world-life from that standpoint even if He did require asceticism. It was also objected by some that Christ suppressed genuine individuality, virility, and proper self-respect; that He taught submission to injury, and humility, in a very pronounced and marked manner. Nobody took in its absolute literalness what Jesus Christ said about turning the left cheek; but how was it that Christianity could demand that self-suppression, in the sense in which it did demand it? Simply because Christ offered men a new and higher individuality. They were to sacrifice self in order to win it again on a higher level. If the offers and demands of Christ were true, their whole life must be regulated thereby. Christ's teaching was even said to be contrary to evolution, to the very meaning of progress, to the survival of the fittest,

according to which law the stronger man thrust aside and, if necessary, trampled upon the weaker. In face of such ethics, it was clear that they owed much to Christian ideas. What might not happen if they abandoned the religious basis of Christian morality? They were told sometimes that Christianity was unsocial, because it did not recognize the rights and duties of citizenship. But Jesus Christ offered men an eternal life, and if it was what Christ claimed it would be, it would make them good citizens. Believing what Christ taught, it was their duty to admit His absolute claim upon their will, His absolute call to self-surrender with no reservation. If they preached that, discarding the temporary advantages of compromise, they would in the long run promote morality instead of throwing it back. Christian morality was based upon, and must be judged by and through, the Christian religion.

The REV. T. A. LACEY took exception to Dr. Rashdall's words, "Our Lord was not explicitly teaching the rudiments of morality, because they were already in existence." They were inadequate. It would be more true to say that the moral work of Christianity was not to preach a revealed morality, but rather to inspire with a new spirit the morality which existed universally amongst men. Dr. Rashdall had insisted on the distinction between spiritual and legalistic religion. But by an inexorable law of human nature, spirit must express itself in body, and the necessary expression of spirit in body inevitably imported a certain limitation to the freedom of spirit. The human spirit was gloriously free, but it could only act in the human body. That principle was capable of very wide extension without losing its truth. For example, the spirit of liberalism was a glorious thing, but it found an embodiment in the Liberal Party, a miserably inadequate organ. And yet it was an absolutely necessary organ, and without that organ the glorious spirit of liberalism would evaporate into vapid sentimentality. That applied with equal truth to the Christian religion. In order that the glorious free spirit of the gospel might become an effective force in human life, it had to find its embodiment in the Church, and it was necessarily limited by its embodiment therein. The Church was a society, and a society could not exist without a certain minimum of legalism. He submitted that this consideration involved an important modification of that which Dr. Rashdall had so admirably put before them—the distinction between spiritual and legalistic religion.

The REV. F. G. GIVEN-WILSON, Dedham, believed that the problems which in the future would engage the Christian apologist would be those concerned with Christian ethics rather than with historical questions. A former speaker had instanced that very hard saying of Jesus Christ, "Resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." For the protection of their own rights and those of the State, men could not allow that wrong should be done them and that

the wicked should go unpunished. They must for their own protection resist evil, and return in measure blow for blow. For all that, it was such a spirit of forgiveness that our Lord taught, above all in the parable of the Prodigal Son, as a principle of the divine order. The method of Christ's teaching was not to deal with particular questions of morality, but to disclose fundamental principles. If the Lord had engaged Himself with particular cases of morality, Christian ethics would have long since passed away. It was because He resolutely refused to be entangled in particular disputes of the time that His teaching had survived to the present day. This method of His teaching was specially shown in what He said about the sabbath, and in the instance given of His refusal to be made a judge or divider over men. It should be remembered that when upon earth He was legislating not so much for men as citizens of this world, but as citizens of the kingdom of heaven.

The LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK asked his audience to recognize the intense importance of the point, that religion and morality were two things which were meant to draw together in one. He emphasized that point because there was a tendency here and there to say, "Let us transform religion into morality"; there was even a tendency to say that our Lord had for His work to transform what was a great legalistic system of religion into a morality which people were to recognize as their whole salvation. The more they thought of it, the more they would find the importance of recognizing that the two sides had equal validity. Dr. Talbot cautioned them against an attempt to apply the truth of Christianity, in the moral sphere, in a hasty or short-sighted way. That, he thought, would meet what was said by those who declared that Christianity was too effeminate, too patient and meek. It should be remembered that they had not only their Lord's beatitude on the meek, but that splendid impulse to virility of life that came from the courage and fearlessness which were as true features of His Cross as its patience and submission. On the other hand, they must not let their critics be in a hurry to sweep away the truths of the atonement and the forgiveness of sins; for the effect of those great revealed truths was seen in the deepening of moral life and moral meaning. The bishop further pointed out that if only Christian people would read half the potent meaning of the records of history and morality, they would see that God had constantly taught people what He wanted them to know, through the mouths and by the work of men who were not upon what might be called the central line of His providential development. Though their conviction was that the Christian religion was the only one that could make any possible claim to be the one religion, yet they must go to other religions and be quick to read in them certain things of teaching or example, things which they would then find were accordant with their own faith, and under its power inspired as they were not in-

spired in any other religion. They must remember that their notion of Christianity was not the whole of Christianity ; they were learners in the school of Christ.

THE REV. H. J. R. MARSTON, London, asked what was the precise value of any criticisms which might be made on the ethics of Christ and of Christians? What, for instance, was the worth of the criticism of such a man as Tolstoi upon the teaching of our Lord and His apostles? Though such censures might be inevitable and so far legitimate as steps in the mental growth of a given individual, yet, in themselves considered, they appeared to the speaker to be reactionary and barbarous, as being adverse to that system of morals which had for two thousand years achieved the highest results for mankind. Therefore the consideration of such writers as Tolstoi might be approached with a prepossession against ; and not, as in the case of such a work as Luthardt's lectures on Moral Truths of Christianity, with a prepossession in favour.

MISS E. CONSTANCE JONES, Girton College, spoke of the relation of ethical science, as ordinarily understood, to the central principle of our Lord's teaching. She pointed out that (as the Bishop of Ossory had shown) on the one hand that central principle was progressive ; and on the other, it was not worked out in our Lord's teaching into any fixed and complete scheme of duties. The law—the system of duties and observances—was there already, and Christ taught men that the meaning and essence of it was, just to express and embody the spirit of goodwill and benevolence, as between man and man. The principle was wide enough to cover political as well as private action. Reflective moralists had been driven to accept, as the one all-sufficient principle of scientific morality, that very principle of love or benevolence which was the first and last word of the teaching of Christ. Ethical science was, fortunately, not needed to induce people to accept the ethics of the Gospel on the one hand, or the morality of common-sense on the other. But that ethical science should support and explain common-sense morality by the fundamental principle of Christian morality, was a fact of extreme interest and importance.

THE BISHOP OF RHODE ISLAND did not believe that Christ came primarily to announce a new morality. Our Lord spoke of the law of love, as a commandment "from the beginning", though He reiterated it as a new commandment. The Bishop was of opinion that the Church was responsible for the fact that the world looked askance at the ideal which Christianity had set up, and that it asked, perhaps, more than doubtfully, whether Christianity could furnish a morality which could satisfy the world and the ages. That had been the mistake of, at least, part of the Church—a mistake which he thought she was awakening from—that she held up an ideal which was not warranted by the New Testament and the dictates of Jesus Christ. Our Lord refused

to take out of ordinary categories of life the Christian life. He said to the world, "Judge it as you would judge everything else. I ask no favour for it; if my religion does not produce a better life, a higher ideal, and a possibility of its realization than other schemes, discard it." It was further shown by the bishop that in Christianity asceticism found its place, just as it did in the case of the athlete or college man who was next week to try his skill and power on the boat-course, and was sacrificing comfort and pleasure because it was going to make him so much more of a man in the contest awaiting him. The ideal that such asceticism held out to him was fullness of manhood. Christianity was coming back to set up an ideal which did not make men narrow and puny and one-sided, but held out to them as an aim the perfect One. "Until we all come unto the perfect man, the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ."

The REV. G. H. AITKEN, Haslemere, called attention to our Lord's words which had been quoted, "If a man smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." To some of them, in practical life, that turning of the other cheek had its own definite meaning, instead of being merely an ideal. For instance, in East London it was continually found that that command, literally carried out, did perhaps more to commend Christ to men than any other thing that could be done, more, certainly, than anything that could be said. The same was true in the foreign mission field. He believed that such teaching as that of Tolstoi was doing them good. If they had been more ready to take the Lord's teaching literally in many respects, and apply it wherever they could as illustrated by St. Paul, "Be ye angry and sin not,"—that was, keep out the personal element—Tolstoi would most probably not have been writing as a non-Christian teacher. Mr. Aitken held that it was impossible for them to regard Christian morality as something which stood apart from that morality which had been given as a guide to the consciousness of mankind through the ages. God had been teaching the world what Christ Himself taught with a fullness of revelation by man's simplest and most catholic institution which the world possessed—the family. What Christ did was to take family morality and proclaim that, first of all, as possessing in itself the elements of supremacy in its application everywhere, because man was one family. He did two things. He raised those ethical qualities which formerly had been disregarded to their right place. He enlarged their borders by making all men brothers; and the whole task of the Church, since our Lord's time, in the moral field, surely had been to take those moral qualities developed in family life and apply them ever more widely to the community, to the nation, to international life. When that had been done, obviously the Church would have won her last battle. In the ordinary rough-and-tumble life of the family they were bound to learn something of the elements of true Christian morality; they must

learn something of give-and-take, and of making room for other people's opinions, they must learn obedience, reverence, humility, sympathy, self-sacrifice, the very things which our Lord brought out and made supreme. Therefore, there was no need to separate the Christian religion from that training in the matter of morals which God had always been teaching the world.

The BISHOP OF BOMBAY took up the point of "the law of liberty", a point which he thought most necessary for the Church at this as at other times, but especially at the present time. The spirit of liberty was the spirit of Christ. There were many things which recurred in life ; therefore the spirit of liberty would express itself in the same way on many different occasions when it had to deal with the same thing. As a consequence, there arose in the action of any person led by the spirit of Christ a tendency to obey willingly, and of his own free will and choice, a law of action. Men might be right in adopting for themselves a law of total abstinence from drink, because drink was a temptation common to their fellow countrymen. But, supposing a different state of society were to come over England, it might be quite right to say "Teetotalism has now become wrong"; and the spirit of liberty would have to judge. For Christians a law arose from the application of the spirit of liberty freely to a perpetually recurring circumstance. The law, in itself, was of no absolute value, but was only valuable so long as it was expressive of the spirit, and opportune for the time and place. He maintained that the Church as a society had every right to make its laws if it understood what it was doing, if it understood that it was making laws expressive of the spirit of Christ, laws of no absolute value in themselves, but of much educative and expressive value. The moment, however, that those laws ceased to be expressive or opportune, away they must go. Addressing himself to the question of Christian morality, Bishop Palmer spoke of how Christian morality was often criticized by those who said they could no longer be Christians. But the real question was, "What morality is criticized? Is it the morality of Christ, or is it the morality of you and me?"

The BISHOP OF OSSORY replied to the statement made by Father Kelly, that "Pagan virtues are only splendid vices", a very ancient statement, but strange to hear at this time of day. The love of a mother for her child, the devotion of a patriot to the State, as they existed in pagan times—were they vices or not? Let conscience, common-sense, and reason answer that question. But, looked at philosophically, the statement was wholly wrong. A man, for example, devoted himself to the service of the State. Supposing in that devotion his one thought was, "I will get *kudos*." Was that moral? Certainly not. On the other hand, suppose a man simply discerned the claim which the State had upon his services, discerned, that was, the unity between himself, his heart and soul, and what he called the duty given him to do ; and that he by a splendid act of faith did the thing which the

State required of him, was not that moral? That was as much an act of faith, in its own degree and place, as the faith of a Christian to his Lord. Not only was it as much faith, but the same faith in a different degree. Christ was "the light that lighteth every man", and His grace was in every good work. Father Kelly had also told them that the ideal of perfection was an abstraction. Plato and Hegel taught that that was not true. And in the Sermon on the Mount had they not a presentation of an ideal which, as they grasped it, they felt to be more real than life itself?

DR. RASHDALL, who also replied, said he agreed entirely with nearly every word Mr. Lacey had said, though probably not with a good deal of what he meant, nor with all the applications which he might give to the principle he enunciated.

The CHAIRMAN, in summing up, said they had been taught, in that discussion, to doubt, perhaps, whether there was any such thing as a separate Christian morality, or whether, as there was but one religion ultimately, there was but one morality. He was sure they need not say there was no morality outside the gospel; but it was the Christian morality which gathered together and inspired the morality which existed, and which God had been teaching in every part of the world.

CHRISTIAN MORALITY

B. AS CRITICIZED IN THE EAST

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. THURSDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 18

The LORD BISHOP OF EXETER presided.

The BISHOP OF CALCUTTA, the writer of the paper on "Buddhists and Christian Morality" (*App.*, No. 13), held that in connexion with foreign missionary effort the work of the Christian Church was not to bring one set of convictions or opinions into collision with another, but to bring the gift of God to human souls. What, he asked, was conversion? It was not the altering of a man's opinion to another set of opinions, but bringing his conscience under the dominion of Christ. They sometimes spoke of conversion of the heathen as if it were something merely intellectual, forgetting that all men had to be converted and that there were difficulties in the way of the conversion of each. One man it was difficult to convert, because obedience to the law of Christ would interfere with his business; another, because it would interfere with his pleasure; another, because he had a dullness and stupidity which made him indifferent to spiritual questions; another, because he professed a different religion. With regard specially to the last-mentioned class, in his fallen state man was unhappily very unwilling to receive those gifts which God was so earnestly seeking to pour out abundantly upon him, and he fortified himself, as it were, against the appeal of his Heavenly Father and his Saviour by holding up the screen of the religion he already professed. Sometimes that attitude was a consciously critical, sometimes a more or less unconsciously unfavourable, attitude towards Christian teaching. It was more often the unconsciously unfavourable attitude which believers in Eastern religions occupied. They had been brought up with prepossessions, with customs, with convictions, which offered resistance to the appeal of God's truth. Buddhists, at any rate—and he thought he might say all genuine Hindus also—held up the screen of their belief in an entirely different system of rewards and punishments. The sanctions on which Christian morality mainly rested were not recognized by them. This life was for them not the only opportunity of probation, nor the life that followed it more final than this one, or than ten thousand that had gone before. They were very seldom brought over from that attitude by argument or persuasion. The subtle influences of Christian civilization more often dissolved those ideas. Another reason

why they regarded the Christian code as imperfect lay in the fact that they looked upon it as ignoring almost altogether the "wickedness" of the taking of life, not only of the life of man but of any animal. In any Buddhist book sin was almost invariably defined as "taking life, or other sins".

The REV. W. H. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, D.D., read passages from his paper on "The Faith and Legalistic Systems" (*App., No. 14*), in which he compared Christianity especially with the caste system of Hinduism, and the rigid religious laws of Islam. All legalistic systems, he said, were more or less consciously based on the axiom that method lay at the root of whatever was to be done properly, which, again, implied that law ruled the universe. Hence, in each of those systems an attempt was made to prescribe rules to regulate men's conduct. The attempt of Mohammedanism to prescribe rules regulating conduct had naturally resulted in a system of casuistry, like that of the Jesuits. The Hindu caste system had enacted a considerable number of laws, which were rigidly binding upon every member of each several caste. Infraction of even the least of those was an unpardonable offence against the caste, and the culprit at once lost family, friends, country, home, and all claims to participation in the joys to which the members of his caste looked forward in more births than one after death, subjecting himself to great humiliations in transmigration. Nor did the laws of caste at all coincide with the moral law of conscience. They caused much suffering, parting men from one another, and making sympathy impossible between members of different castes. The caste system was based upon the difference of social rank, which must in some measure exist everywhere, and upon the desirability of preserving purity of race and colour by preventing mixed marriages. But it produced extreme injustice to the children of such marriages, punishing them for their parents' offences. It also stereotyped society, by forbidding a man of ability to rise to a position of higher rank and greater usefulness than that held by his forefathers. Christianity, added Dr. Tisdall, substituted a principle of life for a code of rules, and was the only religion which recognized the value of the individual in God's sight.

The REV. T. IMAI pointed out that, perhaps, the most widespread criticism put forward against Christianity, in its moral aspect, in Japan, was the idea that Christianity was too individualistic on one side, and too cosmopolitan on the other. Those criticisms were both brought against Christianity from the particular conception of family, so characteristic of Japanese minds. In his country the family was the unit of the national life, and every virtue that could be called virtue was derived from that idea of family. It must, he thought, be admitted that Christianity was highly individualistic, and they must adhere to

that view if they were to convince the Japanese people of the personal responsibility of each soul before God, and if they were going to inspire into them a keen sense of sinfulness, which was sadly wanting in their conscience. Again, Christians in Japan must be highly cosmopolitan if they were to witness to the Fatherhood of God revealed in His only-begotten Son. Mr. Imai described Christianity as a moral religion, and said that Japan needed further development in contact with the ideals of family. He was afraid that missionaries from the West did not in earlier days quite realize the importance of that development which would characterize Christianity in Japan as a special contribution to the fuller realization of the kingdom of God. Christ ought to be preached not only as the infinite living Lover of the individual soul, and the whole human family, but also as the greatest Lover of the individual family and the noblest of patriots. He (Mr. Imai) was always glad to speak of England, of its beautiful home life, of the people's strong patriotic spirit, as an objective witness that Christianity could make a nation and its families as patriotic and loyal as the Japanese could desire; and that Christianity had the principle and vital power to make a people good, loyal subjects, and a trustworthy ally. He further stated that no intelligent Japanese would now deny that Jesus Christ was the greatest of all the moral teachers that the world had produced; and they were willing to admire and learn the spirit of sacrifice and love revealed in His Cross as the noblest of the moral ideals. But they asked, "Why is it that Christians themselves cannot be one in the bond of peace and love?" And who could refute that moral criticism brought upon the sadly divided state of Christendom? Another stumbling-block in their minds was the entire absence of Christianity and its moral life among some of the Western people who either resided or travelled in Japan. That was a great disaster, if it was true. The only way to remove that criticism was, perhaps, to send missionaries for the white men in the East.

The REV. EGERTON RYERSON gave a summary of a paper by the Rev. C. H. Shortt, Tokio, on "Non-theological Ethical Systems in Japan (Buddhism, Confucianism, and Secularism)." The writer stated that the one predominant non-theological ethical system in Japan was that of the Emperor and of his Government, a system based on the famous Edict on Education issued in 1890. Its motive power was loyalty and patriotism. Nothing was said in it for or against any religion. The Government gloried in its perfect toleration of all creeds, and protected the freedom of all religions in Japan. At present there were amongst the educated Japanese four views regarding that system. There were those who thoroughly believed in a purely intellectual culture as providing all that was necessary, and who opposed Christianity as a danger to the continuation of Japanese stability.

There were those who were sure that the authorized ethical code was not enough ; that this had already become evident in the general loosening of morals in everyday life. A third group, and an influential one, though admitting the inadequacy of the present code, and though not being personally convinced of the truth of Christianity, would yet be very glad to see the Christian religion become that of the Japanese people. There were, lastly, the Christians, who of course believed that the morality following from the acceptance of the Christian faith included all that was within the Japanese authorized code, and that it rose far higher, and they tried to show that the adoption of Christianity as the national religion ought to make the people's loyalty even stronger because more intelligent. Would the time come, asked Mr. Shortt, when education would have banished all the old beliefs, and the nation would try to live by the cold code of Government ethics? Many thought that that time was certainly approaching, and they feared the coming gloom. They who were Christians did not take that view. Already they saw some streaks of dawn, and they knew that the day was coming, and soon the mount would glow with the crimson and gold of the sunrise. Adding a few remarks of his own, Mr. Ryerson said that the Japanese nation were catching the commercial spirit, and this was affecting the morality of the people, though not in every respect for evil. There was one great danger facing Japan from that growing commercial spirit : it was that men so stuffed themselves with the "sweetmeats of commercialism" that they had no appetite at all for the "pure milk of the Gospel", that they had no time for religion. Then, again, industrialism was turning upside down the whole social system of the people. That problem would never be solved without the love and fellowship and sympathy which came from the religion of the Carpenter of Nazareth. Further, there was a movement towards individualism. In the old days custom counted for a great deal. A man who lived in a community of those who knew him was not so likely to do what was very wrong as when he was quite free and among people unknown to him. This freedom was another great danger in Japanese life. While there were, continued Mr. Ryerson, many things to deplore in the morality of the Japanese, there were still more things to admire ; and the Christian Church should not endeavour to christianize the Japanese because they were so bad, but rather because they were so good—showing, as they did, such care for the family, such regard for parents in their old age, such wonderful respect for authority. Those who were loyal to an earthly ruler would, it might fairly be expected, also be loyal to a heavenly ruler. By sending more missionaries, by endeavouring to educate more Japanese, and by pouring into the country a great mass of Christian literature, they must do all they possibly could to bring their great ally into the Christian faith.

The REV. H. W. GAIRDNER, Cairo, speaking with regard to Moslem criticism of Christian morality, said it was sometimes stated in the press that Christianity was too high, too great, too good, too refined for such people as Moslems, whose ethical ideas were not fully developed. For his own part, he felt that certain rules should be laid down for converts from Islam to Christianity, rather than that they should be given big principles and allowed to work them out. Therefore he, with other missionaries, wanted some help as to how to show that spiritual religion was absolutely necessary, and how they could not but aim at the highest, and yet how they might, for the sake of the weaker brethren, the "babes in Christ", be able to give them the law, just as Christians in this country gave it to their own children. He had come to the conclusion that the greatest difficulty in Islam was that it had got no idea of holiness. In this connexion, however, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity had been a great help, because holiness when analysed was just this—related things living according to their own nature and in harmony together. If they could not get that idea into the Godhead, it seemed to him that they could not get holiness into the Godhead; and if they could not get holiness into the Godhead, they could not get holiness into men. Another point criticized in Cairo was that of purity, the Moslem considering that the Christian treatment of morality was wanting in reasonableness and balance. They pointed now to the extension of divorce laws in the West, and said, "Your own West is saying that Christianity has been unreasonable in this matter, and has gone contrary to the laws of human nature." Monogamy did not seem to them to quite fit either the psychological or the physiological constitution of man. Again, the words of Christ most frequently criticized by Moslems were the words, "Love your enemies." They regarded that as an impossibility. The Moslem had not got the idea of holiness, therefore he could not have that passionate sense of pity for the fallen and for the sinner which was the only emotion which ought to be aroused in the breast of the injured Christian. Further, they criticized the Incarnation as involving weakness in God. Their whole idea of God was power, force. Much more to them was the death of Christ weakness. They did not know the strength there was in such weakness.

The REV. ROLAND ALLEN, London, urged that in speaking about Christian morality and religion, or about the morality and religion of any other type, they ought to draw a distinction between the religion of the schools and the religion of the market-place. The religion of the schools was criticized and also the religion of the market-place, but the criticism in the one case did not always apply to that in the other. If he talked to the Chinese about Christianity, he could take to them the best theology of the West, and say, "This is Christianity." But they would come to London and walk about the streets, and they

would say, "This is Christianity!" Or, they would go to Shanghai and see professedly Christian men living their lives there, and they would say, "This is Christianity!" The Chinese people did not criticize the religion of the schools so much as that of the market-place; they did not, as a rule, criticize the doctrines of the Bible; they did not criticize Christ: they criticized those who professedly represented Christ. They criticized Christian morality, especially with regard to the sale of opium. They resented in the very strongest possible sense the support of Christians by foreigners in law suits. They believed with all their hearts that, at any rate, a large section of the Christian Church would support a Christian whether he was right or whether he was wrong. The Anglican Church in China had always been very careful to avoid any action which might give excuse for such misunderstanding. The Chinese were persuaded that the education brought to them from the West was non-moral. The Chinese were a moral race, they had a high moral code. In that respect there was a difference between India and China. Whilst in India a man could be a "holy" man and a very bad one, in China there was no such thing as a man being a saint and not living a holy life. If the Christian Church allowed Western education to be presented to the Chinese as non-moral, she would be making a fatal mistake.

The BISHOP OF NEW WESTMINSTER, having described the thousands of Chinese amongst whom he had lived in British Columbia as a moral people, went on to speak of Buddhism as he had seen it in Ceylon. The Buddhists of Ceylon, in spite of the cheerfulness often noticed amongst them, lived in perpetual fear of malignant spirits whom they believed to be around them. The goal of Buddhism was absorption into the universe, or what was practically annihilation of personality. Therefore, the missionaries went to those people acknowledging every truth held by them, but at the same time telling them that that truth could be complemented with fuller truth. The missionaries would say: "We know very well that we shall have a personal immortality; we know very well that, if we only believe with all our hearts in the incarnate God, and follow His precepts, we shall rise ever nearer to Him throughout the ages of eternity. We hold out that hope to you, and we will teach you as far as we can what we ourselves know." With regard to the morality of the Cingalese, the bishop said that, in their original state, so-called Buddhists had no regard whatever for truth. District judges had told him that it was almost impossible to get at the truth in any case heard in any court of law. In conclusion, a reference was made to the craze at present among some English people in the direction of Buddhism. Those people, it was pointed out, evidently did not know that Buddhism was an imperfect philosophy, and that it was supplemented by devil-worship.

The CHAIRMAN was of opinion that, as regards criticism of

Christian morality, as it was in theory and in practice, they must regard the Mohammedan as their most formidable critic. Mr. Gairdner had asked whether, in Christian work amongst Moslems, it was not better to aim low and to succeed, than to aim high and to fail. Mohammed knew very well that the ordinary man could be relied upon to go through religious forms and to fight, and he made that the turning-point of his religion. But St. Paul had taught them—it was a startling paradox, whether they regarded it as a matter of theory or of practice—that “sin shall not have dominion over you, because ye are not under law, but under grace.” “Not under law.” But as long as they had anything to learn, as long as they needed schooling and drilling and moulding in forms of habit, they were under law. They must be under law, and yet they ought not to be under law. That was the paradox. That paradox went back to the teaching of our Saviour Himself. Let them, for instance, think out His demand that they should take up their cross and follow Him. That was not the demand of Mohammed, or even of Confucius, but it was the demand of God come in the flesh. Let them try to reconcile it, if they could, with their Lord’s assurance, “My yoke is easy and my burden is light.” It was not left for the Moslems of Cairo to find out this fundamental difficulty, because the Christian Church was prepared for it long ago by St. Paul and St. Paul’s Master.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. FRIDAY MORNING, JUNE 19

The LORD BISHOP OF EXETER presided.

MR. G. F. C. SEARLE, F.R.S., Cambridge, practically read the whole of his paper on "The Modern Conception of the Universe" (*App.*, No. 15), and though he necessarily much exceeded the time allotted to each speaker, he was listened to with intense interest from beginning to end. He had endeavoured to set down, as simply as possible, some of the conclusions to which modern scientific investigation unhesitatingly pointed. Some persons, he remarked, had not grasped the distinction between a hypothesis and a fact, and were in danger of supposing that great questions were settled by the pronouncements of whatever speaker happened to be popular. Having illustrated the extraordinary complexity of nature by reference to a milligramme of radium, which could give off many millions of separate particles every second for millions of years, he said that all the molecules in the universe were so linked together as to form but a single system. The scientific facts indicated that both the plan and the energy of the universe came from the same source. The evidence of the unity of the universe led to the conclusion that it was the work of a single Creator, and that the energy in the universe was His gift. If there were no motion in the universe we could set no limit to its age, but the universe did contain matter in vigorous motion. Modern investigations showed that while the total amount of energy remained unchanged, there was a progressive diminution in its availability; when further redistributions of energy ceased to be possible the universe would be physically and chemically inert; in other words, dead. Tracing the operation of physical laws backwards, greater and greater availability of energy was found; but there was a limit to this process, for the total sum of energy was limited. Only a finite number of years had elapsed since the creation of the universe. Between life and matter there was evidently a profound difference. Life involved individuality of a kind not possessed by a molecule. The life of an individual preserved its identity, though the body which it controlled was never composed of the same molecules for two minutes together. Experiments led to the conviction that in the present order of things the linking of life with matter could only arise from the action of living organisms, and thus we reached the conception that living organisms did not appear on the earth as the unaided result of

actions between mere molecules. The conclusion was that the first living organisms were created. What happened to its life when an organism died was a question to which physical or chemical science gave no answer, for life evaded the measurement and analysis of those sciences. The power of free-will was of great significance, for the physical effects of a single act of free-will extended through all space, and lasted through the rest of time. All the impressions received by man's consciousness were, undoubtedly, phenomena occurring in the universe. Among them were the demands of conscience, the sense of temptation and the knowledge of yielding to it, the power of prayer and the consciousness of answers to it, and man's other spiritual experiences. It would be strange indeed if spiritual things were not subject to laws, though it was to be expected that these laws would differ from those obeyed by inanimate matter, just as free-will differed from gravitation or chemical affinity. Mr. Searle's paper concluded thus: "The unity of the universe proclaims that there is absolute harmony between what is true in science and what is true in religion, and the fact that many of the greatest men of science have publicly acknowledged God in their scientific work shows the fallacy of the supposition that there is any antagonism between science and religion. Among these pioneers was Newton, who concluded his great *Principia*, or Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, with a wonderful passage on the nature of God, 'to discourse of whom', he wrote, 'from the appearances of things does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.' Another pioneer has lately passed away from us in the person of Lord Kelvin, who for fifty-three years began the first lecture of each day by reciting a collect from the Prayer Book. In such lives as these there was wisdom and there was holy fear. May it not be that, after all, the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom?"

The REV. F. R. TENNANT, D.D., Cambridge, the writer of the paper on "The Faith and Science" (*App.*, No. 16), summarized the main points with which it dealt. The fact from which he set out was that, to the Christian theist, the world of nature, as the work of a creative supreme Being, must be in some sense a revelation of that Being. Their generalized scientific knowledge must therefore be in the last resort theological knowledge also. But notwithstanding that truth, the fact stared them in the face that, throughout the larger part of Christian history, a great number of churchmen had looked with suspicion and uneasiness upon the successive endeavours of science to discover the truth about the physical universe. Sometimes, indeed, the prevailing attitude of churchmen had been one of opposition to the pursuit and to the teaching of the natural sciences. Dr. Tennant went on to remark that in the Patristic Age he had failed to discover anything like intentional obscurantism in theological literature. Greek empirical science had already decayed and experimental investigation

had practically ceased when Christianity appeared. Several historians of the warfare of science and theology had written sometimes as if, in the fourth and fifth centuries, there was a solid body of universally acknowledged scientific fact and law in existence, with which the Fathers ought to have been acquainted, and which they deliberately evaded or opposed. This, however, was an entirely erroneous supposition. It was rather in the Middle Ages, when a rigid view of the nature of scriptural inspiration had become the common property of churchmen, that science came to be suspected, disliked, and retarded within the Church. This spirit of antagonism to unwelcome truth sprang, of course, from no essentially Christian frame of mind; and though common amongst Christians, it was unfair to attribute it to their Christianity as such. It sprang rather from a universal failing of our human nature; and the historians of the natural sciences had to record numberless instances of its activity on a smaller scale in the scientific world. The warfare which had existed in the modern period between Christian theology and physical science, had in reality been concerned with one fundamental point alone, namely, that doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture which came at an early date to be received by the vast majority of Christians, and which entrenched itself through successive centuries in the ordinary churchman's mind until it became very difficult and very painful to eradicate. They now no longer regarded the Biblical cosmogony as divinely revealed scientific truth. Attempts in that direction were futile and mischievous, however much they might be dictated by piety and good intentions. Thus "made free" by the truth thrust upon them by the natural sciences, they might consider the old conflict at an end. Dr. Tennant further urged that in so far as science meant a body of empirically verifiable facts and inferences logically deducible from them, with no admixture of unproved speculative interpretation, it was solid truth which no theological doctrine could contradict and at the same time be true. Toward future extensions of such knowledge, they looked forward with no misgiving or fear, but rather with reverent curiosity. And they could confidently assert that science as thus defined—the only science possessing the right to their intellectual homage—contained no single truth that was incompatible with any tenet essential to the Christian type of Theism. Objections sometimes raised against doctrines, such as those of creation, divine government, miracle, human immortality, were not possible to pure science. Such men of scientific culture as held aloof from the Christian faith deceived themselves if they thought they did so on the strength of any truth in their possession rightly to be called *scientific* truth. Materialism and naturalism were not science, but philosophical or speculative interpretations of the data supplied by science. With them, Christian Theism was indeed at war, confidently at war. These theories, naturally plausible to men of scientific training,

did not fall within the scope of the paper now under discussion. They must be met upon their own ground. Dr. Tennant was now only concerned to emphasize that that ground was not the ground of science. This distinction between the deliverances of pure science, on the one hand, and the presuppositions, extensions, and crude metaphysical glosses sometimes associated with them as if equally "scientific", on the other, needed to be very jealously drawn. To proclaim this vital difference was, perhaps, the most important task of apologetics at the present time.

DR. WOODS-SMYTH, Maidstone, put forward the view that the Bible did not teach that the universe arose by a system of special creations. The mode of operation, or creation, signified by the Hebrew verbs, showed the first chapter of Genesis to be a consecutive narrative of a consecutive and progressive evolution. The special creation theory was a late post-Reformation theory. The intellectual Fathers in the early Church were Evolutionists. St. Augustine, St. Basil the Great, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and St. Thomas Aquinas, all held a doctrine of evolution. St. Augustine spoke of the animals having been created by a "process of growth which the after-time brought forth". This was evolution, and it is expressed in those terms to-day by men of science. The second causes mentioned in Genesis were the great factors of evolution. The earth was said to bring forth the forms of life—"to bring forth the living creature"; that was recognition of the great importance and potent influence of environment. Not only was creation by the process of evolution taught in Genesis, but all the details of that creative evolution, and their order, were perfect. Those details included the primeval physical condition of the earth and the change which came to pass; the darkness that reigned on a waste and empty world—on the face of the deep, was now a fact of geology, and was even quoted by leading geologists. The dawn of light—before the sun—light from the condensing nebula which lay inside the orbits of the planets, and was destined to become the sun, was to-day a fact in astero-physics, and in Sir Norman Lockyer's system of planetary and solar evolution. The dividing or differentiation of cloud (which was genuine water and not mere vapour) from the seas beneath, the gathering together or segregation of land and water, were admitted and stated, even by Professor Haeckel with admiration, to be facts of evolution. Another detail was the first dawn of life in the waters (such was the force of the Hebrew, according to Gesenius). The kinds and order of the several forms of life in the course and times of their genesis were identical with the kinds, order, and times given by Sir Roderick Murchison and Sir Archibald Geikie, the greatest authorities upon those points. Geologists gave three great divisions of all life, namely, ancient, middle, and recent life. Genesis gave the very same divisions. Several geologists had

given the time-ratios of those three periods ; Dana had 12-3-1, Walcotte 12-5-2, Professors Hull and Haughton 12-9-7 for middle and recent, the Bible gave 12-3-3. Latest researches show the Bible time-ratios to be the most correct. Science gave also the relative ages of the earth and sun. These were from the estimates of Sir George Darwin, Professors Sollas, Blyth, Newcombe, Helmholtz, Lord Kelvin, and others. In time-ratios the age of the earth was from 5.5 to 6 ; of the sun 2.5. The Bible also gave the time-ratio of the age of the earth and sun ; for the earth it was 6, and for the sun it was 2.5. They must regard the six days of Genesis as long ages, because the writer of the Hebrews called them *eons*. Science, moreover, gave a six-fold division to the creation. Professor Haeckel, in his *Evolution of Man*, gives a five-fold division, but he commences the first with such highly specialized forms as the acrania and tree-seaweed. The Bible commenced much earlier, viz. before life, and with life in its simplest forms. This was another division as long as the others, and made six divisions in all. This, Dr. Wood-Smyth said, completed the survey of the first chapter of Genesis in the full and fierce light of modern science, and found it absolutely invulnerable.

The REV. DR. HART, Dean of Denver, dealt with the question of the present state of geological knowledge as to the time when man first appeared on this planet. He held that if they could establish the date of the end of the glacial epoch, they could have an indication of the earliest time when the signs of human presence appeared. In working out that point he explained that so long as the ice barrier blocked the Mohawk Valley, the drainage of the great American lakes found its way to the Gulf of Mexico by way of the Mississippi and other rivers. When, however, the ice had sufficiently retreated the water found its present channel, and in going eastward fell over a limestone escarpment, now forming the Falls of Niagara. The water wore back the ledge over which it fell. For seventy years accurate measures had been secured of its action, and it was now an accepted fact that that gorge of seven miles had not taken over five thousand years to form. As far as geology at present informed them, man appeared suddenly, and late in time, on the surface of the earth ; exactly confirming the Biblical account of his creation. The theory, that through a long course of ages man was gradually developed from some pithecoïd ancestry, was a pure theory and as yet was unsupported by a single fact. So far from the narratives of Genesis conflicting with the scientific conclusions of recent years, he held that they were daily more and more substantiated. The Dean urged that clergymen who had to deal with people constantly must make up their minds as to the truth of God's Word, or else they had better drop preaching altogether. He was glad to be able to say that he had come to the conclusion

that there was not a single fact stated in the Bible that real science contradicted. They had had enough of the disturbance between science and religion. There was really no disturbance, for science was proving the Bible to be a true book. All they had from the other world to hope for was founded on the promises of God. If a man came and made him a promise and somebody said, "That man is not reliable; he made a promise which he broke", what confidence could he have in that man's promise? And if a man came along and said to him, "The Bible has got statements in it which are not true", he would sift those statements to the bottom, because an untrue statement in the Bible would discredit the Word of God, upon which his whole salvation was founded. If they eliminated from the atmosphere of their civilization all that they had got from the Bible, they would have nothing left. He asked them to study their Bible with common-sense. It was the glory of the gospel that Jesus Christ said it was to be preached to the poor; and all that he (Dean Hart) could add was that if "higher" critics and people of that sort were the only people going to populate heaven, he did not particularly want to be there.

The REV. EDMUND MCCLURE, Secretary of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, confined his remarks to the meaning of two words, important from a scientific as well as a religious point of view. There are two familiar words, he said, upon the meaning assigned to which controversies between science and religion mainly depend. These words are "Matter" and "Spirit". The earliest significance attached to the former ("matter") seems, judging from its etymology, to have been that of something resisting to the touch and out of which things could be made. The concrete representative of it to both Greeks and Romans seems originally to have been "wood" (a meaning still preserved in the Spanish form of the word, *Madera* = timber). Whatever the origin of the term, it came in a mysterious way to be associated at an early date with evil. Plato¹ assigned "the falling off of man" to the admixture of *Matter* in him. Some such view found entrance into Christianity as a heresy even as early as Tertullian². From the third century onwards the doctrine of Manichaeism had obtained a more or less strong hold upon Christians, and we are not, I fear, quite free from it to-day to judge by the disparaging terms in which "matter" and "materialism" have been referred to in Section B this morning. St. John Damascene³ (born at end of seventh century) found it necessary in his time to rebuke Christians for holding this heresy. "Do not," he says, "following the opinion of the Manichaeans, despise matter, and stigmatize it as vile. For nothing can be considered vile or abject which has God for its author";

¹ *Statesman*, 273 B.

² *Adversus Hermog.* 25, where he calls certain heretics *Heretici materiarii*, and attributes to such the belief in the eternity of Matter.

³ *De Imag. Oratio* I.

and he points out how Christ took upon Him matter in assuming a body, and that He worked out our salvation in that body, and carried it to God's right hand.

The origin of the other term "Spirit" is even clearer. In the original language of the Old Testament, and also in that of the New, the chief terms used for this have, like *Spiritus* its immediate antecedent, the meaning of "breath" or "air". The invisible breath, which came and went as long as a man was alive, was the unseen agency that moved and controlled the body. When the breath was out of a man the body was dead—dead matter. Starting from these primitive concepts the words *matter* and *spirit* have become gradually filled with a more comprehensive meaning, but it is not too much to say that ordinary views about them are still of the vaguest character. We may have come to include in the classification of "matter" a far lighter gas than the atmosphere we breathe, and we may have attained to such a subtle concept of "spirit" that we regard it as a directing intelligence pure and simple, capable of separate existence; still we are far from having definite ideas about them, and still further from freeing ourselves from the belief in their mutual antagonism.

It cannot but be helpful, therefore, if we look for further light to the results of that methodical investigation of nature which we call science. Now, although science has a ready definition for "matter" in its conception of "mass" and "inertia", it is beginning to have views about it which seem to suggest that "mass" itself is not an *ultimate* thing. The most recent views about "matter" are still fluid, so fluid indeed that no existing physical textbook is quite up to date. These new views have been led up to by separate modes of experimenting. For some time back we have been accustomed to see matter, and that, too, in its subtlest gaseous forms, reduced to a temperature never, as far as we know, realized in Nature. The oxygen, which is the vitalizing element in the atmosphere we breathe, has been cooled down to a temperature at which it becomes liquid and can be poured from one vessel into another. The remarkable thing about it, however, is not this. As the gas loses heat, that is as the average motion of the molecules which compose it becomes more circumscribed and less rapid, the gas itself seems to lose its most active properties. It loses, for instance, its capacity for making chemical compounds, and as it is this capacity of oxygen which makes it able to sustain our life, vital existence, if it could be *otherwise* maintained at this low temperature, would be for this reason impossible. The lowest temperature attained in the latest experiments has been some 15° C. above the absolute zero, that is some 464 degrees of frost. One distinguished professor at least was of opinion that if we could expose matter to the temperature of the absolute zero, it would possibly have no properties which could affect our senses, that is, it would be *to us* non-existent. I asked Professor Dewar once, what is the temperature

of interstellar space—did he think it was that of the absolute zero, and that this was the cause of its being empty? With the prudence of a scientific investigator he replied he did not know, but wished he did. This is a theoretical but possible view of matter which may affect our belief, but there is another view of matter which has been arrived at only within the last five or six years which must bring about a readjustment of our religious conceptions. Not many years ago the atom was considered to be the most minute possible portion of matter—indivisible and permanent. It was the *ultima thule* beyond which investigation could not be profitably pursued. It is now known that *the atom is a composite*, and that the elements which make it are among the most active things in nature—the atom is, in other words, a world in miniature, full of activities. The very active “things” which gives the atom being are called electrons, and the point of interest to religiously minded people is this, that we have in these electrons, according to an investigator of world-wide reputation, the nearest analogy to a disembodied spirit, that is a charge of electricity pure and simple. And the suggestion, moreover, has been made that electricity—which is not “material” in the ordinary sense—is the only source of *mass* and *inertia*—which are the *differentiae* of matter. Mr. Searle, whose able paper we have just heard, holds, he tells me, in common with many scientific men, this opinion. This is still a matter of speculation, but work is going on at a rapid rate in this new field of investigation. Every day brings out something which tends to impress us with the conviction that we are on the eve of some great and simplifying discovery. Even while this speech is in the press, the discovery of a *positive* electron has been announced to the French Academy, and the assumption has been made that electricity is a transition stage between ether and matter. A new world is gradually being revealed to us. As the fifteenth century gave us a new continent, and stirred thereby the productiveness of English minds to give us the immortal literature of the spacious age of Elizabeth, so this fresh insight into the arcana of nature cannot but inspire us with ennobling thoughts in awaking that wonder, which is the source of all true philosophy, and the mother of new ideals.

Face to face with this new world of science we shall be disposed to recognize more fully than before that nature and revelation are not in antagonism—not even similar to parallel lines of railway which do not meet—but are lines already in the process of converging towards that point where, at the consummation of things, God will make “the pile complete”.

The REV. T. A. LACEY, London, said he wished to repudiate with all the force of which he was capable the apologetics of Dr. Woods-Smyth. It was, he supposed, just within the bounds of possibility that Dr. Woods-Smyth might be right in his interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, and that modern discoveries in biology and geology were anticipated there. But if that could

be proved, he should regard it as disastrous, because it would once more divert men's minds from the true meaning and true purpose of Holy Scripture to a false and imaginary conception of it, which would have the most dangerous consequences to religion. He must also protest against the apologetics of the Dean of Denver. If what the Dean of Denver had said about the gorge of Niagara was true, it had not the slightest value for religion. But he (Mr. Lacey) must seriously protest against the statement that in the library of Hebrew literature there did not occur a single inaccurate statement. If a man chose to say that, after examining every statement that purported to be a statement of fact, he had found them all accurate, that was not a matter of the smallest religious consequence. But if a man told them that the truth of the gospel depended upon the demonstration that in that literature there was not a single inaccurate statement purporting to be a statement of fact, he told that man he was not a Christian. And if a man studied the Bible for the purpose of demonstrating that there was not a single inaccurate statement of fact, with a mind ready to give up his Christianity if he found one, that man's scientific investigation of the Bible would be worthless, because prejudiced, and his profession of Christianity was not much better. He was in entire agreement with one of Dean Hart's statements—that the Bible should be studied with common-sense.

CANON MURRAY, Winnipeg, thought that when there was conflict between religion and science, it was due to faults on both sides. Scientists were sometimes fond of leaving their proper field of observation and examination of physical facts and phenomena. Again, the scientist often failed to recognize that the very existence of science itself depended upon the truth of the existence of God. The late Professor Romanes had said, "Science can only exist on the assumption that the world is not chaos, but cosmos." To say that physical science existed was to say that mind had entered into an organic connexion with the universe. To the question, How was this possible? the only answer was because there was reason in the world corresponding to reason in the mind. The constitution of their minds necessitated that their thought would correspond to things if these things were intelligible. It was only fair to say that there had been equal faults on the side of religion. Instead of welcoming every scientific discovery, men had got the impression that the more science there was, the less room there was for faith. It was the duty of theology to fit scientific facts, as they were revealed, into their system, to reshape popular ideas as to the truth. To the devout mind natural laws were the continuous expression of the permanent will of God, but the operation of a lower law did not prevent it being guided by a higher law, as in the case of miracles. And might not the personal will of God guide an answer to prayer without interfering with the operation of

lower law? Evolution had been thought to contradict the argument for "design", but it only shifted the argument for "design" from the universe to the fact that in the universe there was a great purpose. Evolution without God could not explain anything; evolution was merely a method, not a force.

The REV. W. R. WESTROPP ROBERTS, Trinity College, Dublin, remarked that the judgements we formed on many problems connected with religious belief were influenced and often determined by our views with regard to the universe. These views must be founded, at least partly, upon scientific facts. Science might be defined as a knowledge of the laws of phenomena and of their regular sequences and conjunctions, and there could be no conflict between true science and religion. But a philosophy based on the conclusions of true science might, or might not, be atheistic according to the attitude adopted by it with regard to the first principle and ultimate reality of things. He went on to consider the claims of one of the most subtle and formidable theories of the present day—materialistic monism—to account for the universe. A crucial test of the truth of this rationalistic theory, which adopted, as its main basis, the principle of conservation of energy, was afforded in the phenomenon of consciousness. In their investigation of this phenomenon, science pointed to the existence of something which was not matter, nor energy, and which materialistic monism consequently failed to explain. The theory was rejected then on scientific grounds. Christian Theism accepted all the conclusions of true science and postulated the existence of an omnipotent, directing, and personal God. Experience showed that man possessed a directing power over the forces in nature knowledge was consequently power, and they inferred that an All-wise Being must be all-powerful and could bring about any event without the abrogation of any law. They saw then that the difficulties which they might feel with regard to miracles were removed, or greatly diminished by scientific knowledge. By assuming a directing influence, on the part of God, over the forces which science reveals in the study of nature, which assumption Prof. Roberts held was in no way contrary to scientific belief, the Universe, and in particular the birth and development of our solar system, the origin of life and of species and of man on our globe were all shown to be facts, not isolated and due to chance, but intimately connected as parts of a whole, the purpose of which was the pleasure of God.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL G. MACKINLAY referred to what was mentioned in Mr. Searle's paper about Sir Isaac Newton's investigation of the motions of the planets. It was noteworthy, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackinlay remarked, that Newton in his book, *Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel*, made statements which helped to lead on to a new test of the truth of the Gospels from a consideration of the sun and the planet Venus, and their movements in relation to each other in the

ancient times of Christ's life upon earth. Christ had made a large number of references in His parabolic teaching to things actually present; it was His constant habit to do so. This peculiarity in the method of expression employed by Christ had hitherto been but little noticed, but it was deserving of great attention. Christ was referred to repeatedly in the Bible as the sun, and John the Baptist figuratively as the morning star. The planet Venus was not always shining as the morning star; there were periods of some eight or nine months of shining, alternating with longer periods of non-appearance. The periods of shining, during the few years historically possible for the life of Christ, had recently been calculated by the use of modern astronomical tables. Remembering that it was Christ's habit to refer to things actually present, he concluded that John the Baptist was only referred to under the figure of the morning star when it was actually shining at the end of each night. It was readily found by reference to the astronomical tables that all those references would only be fulfilled when the Crucifixion was taken to have occurred (A.D. 29), either on the supposition of a two years' or a three and a half years' ministry—a result in accord with the latest accepted results of the historical researches carried out by Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay and others, and now very generally received. The relative movements of two of the most important heavenly bodies in the universe, in the time of Christ, thus bore their silent testimony to the consistency and truth of the gospel record.

MISS WIGRAM said she thought one difficulty they had to contend with was to reconcile the work of grace and evolution. What they had to do was to try and show, not that grace was part of evolution, but that evolution was part of grace. The natural was contained in the supernatural, and was not separate from it, but was only that part of it which they could see, or see in some measure. The beautiful order and progress of the universe, and of its development, had captured the homage and reverence of many thinkers of to-day, and it seemed to them an outrage that it should be necessary for God to intervene in His own universe through the Incarnation, the Atonement, and Resurrection. The difficulty seemed to be that the naturalist demanded an inevitable pardon, a pardon that came through laws of evolution, whereas the man in the street demanded a free and easy pardon. But why was it necessary for Christ to suffer and die? It was necessary because God would not break His own laws. Sin which came into the world was disobedience, the breaking of His laws, and Christ satisfied the law of God perfectly.

MISS MAYNARD, Westfield College, University of London, insisted that they could not hide from themselves the fact that science and religion had come into collision several times, and on every occasion science had won and religion had retreated. The great battles might be enumerated as three. The first was the triumph

of space, as achieved by Galileo. Would they wish to go back to the belief that the earth was the centre of all things? The second great battle resulted in the triumph of time. Last century there was a great uproar made by those who stood up for the literal time in the first chapter of Genesis. But now geology had taught otherwise. Would they wish to go back to that former view? The patience of God in making "our house" was a beautiful thing to consider. The third great battle ended in the triumph of method, or of what was usually called evolution. Was there anything in that which militated against salvation? She held that right views of the universe, or even of man, physiologically, were not necessary to salvation. But at the same time a rational basis of religion was assuredly necessary, especially for the educated young people of the present day, as well as a devotional basis of religion. Miss Maynard added that she, for one, did not believe that the Bible taught positive error, but that if the expansions by space, time, and method were read into the records, they were true.

The CHAIRMAN said the thought which had occurred to him during the discussion had been that between faith and science, in the strict sense of the word, there was no room for antagonism. There was no inherent incompatibility in what simple faith believed and the single-minded disinterested pursuit of any study whatsoever. It was only when faith, as it inevitably did, explained itself and took on the form of theology; or when, on the other hand, science attended by speculation went on, as she inevitably always had and always would, into the region of cosmological generalizations—it was only then that theology and science discovered points which they had approached from opposite directions, and regarding which they found it difficult to agree. The conflict between them was due not so much to the difficulty of finding a formula of agreement on this or that given point, as to the incompatibility of temper between men who, so to speak, lived their lives almost in different worlds. In the very highest minds, however, both on the theological and the scientific side, that incompatibility of temper showed a marked tendency to decrease, if not to disappear altogether.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. FRIDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 19

The Right Rev. C. F. D'Arcy, D.D., Bishop of Ossory, presided.

SIR DYCE DUCKWORTH, M.D., LL.D., London, the writer of the paper on "Science and Christian Faith" (*App.*, No. 17), thought that the idea that a profound knowledge of any branch of natural science was incompatible with the convictions and assurances of the simple Christian faith was probably less tenable to-day than it was some five-and-twenty years ago. Some people, he said, of honesty and high attainments seemed to be kept from the faith by a mental condition akin to colour-blindness. Some had never thought seriously about the matter, but cultivated in themselves the doubts which they heard others express. There were also many who professed to know something, but were simply ignorant. Without doubt, much of the faithlessness, which was prevalent, was due to the fact that men had never assumed a proper attitude towards Christian truth. It was sometimes asserted that the ability to hold the divine faith was a matter of temperament. But the acquirement of the faith could in no way vary or modify temperament. A man might lose and reacquire his faith without altering that natural endowment. The right attitude, in which the Christian faith was alone to be secured, was primarily one of humility, and a determination to make the experiment of a trial to hold and live by the simple faith. With that effort, made in all honesty and earnestness, together with prayer for guidance and grace, came unfailingly and gradually the conviction of its power and reality. The faith, as delivered by Jesus Christ and His apostles, was the faith which might be fairly claimed as held by the great majority of those who as "priests of the body", were engaged in daily service to minister to the needs of suffering humanity. The agnostic physician brought little brightness and assurance to the bedside of the sick, and even he must testify to his experience of the calmest and most happy death-beds, as being those in which the patient was sustained by that faith which had no meaning and no comfort for the Agnostic. Sir Dyce Duckworth, in his closing remarks, said he thought they might safely repose in the faith of one of the greatest Christian philosophers of modern times, recently entered into rest—Lord Kelvin, who, with his vast knowledge of science, was never moved from a faith in a world that was real, though invisible.

Having quoted the words of the great Frenchman, Louis Pasteur, "Through science I see God," Sir Dyce Duckworth maintained that the inevitable changes in knowledge and thought which came with each century, could never, and should never, shake or blot out the simple Christian faith, which must ever remain as fundamental and essential, and as the most refining influence for every wise and thoughtful man who did his duty strenuously as he passed through the world.

The REV. PROFESSOR CALDECOTT, King's College, London, called attention to the main points in the paper on "Science and Religion" contributed by Dr. F. C. S. Schiller (*App.*, No. 18). He explained the position taken by Dr. Schiller to be, that science and religion had really no conflict, because they were not doing the same thing. Science was trying to know, and religion was seeking for guidance, for help, for something to trust in, as to the practical side of life, or the central unity of life. The object of both science and religion was the same, namely, the ultimate and final reality. It was the attitude towards that reality that made the two different. They both arose from the weakness of human nature—science, because men were weak in the direction of knowledge, and if they knew everything there would be no more place for science: religion, because men sinned, and if there were no more sin, there might be no more place for religion. It was also pointed out that there was a priority of faith to knowledge, and to the certainty of practical rules, and that this priority was really as true for science as for religion. They had all known, for religion, that faith must precede their proof as to whether they could trust or not; that they must trust before they knew quite for certain whether it would be justified or not. But faith had the same priority in science; there must be a certain amount of faith in something before they could inquire after reality. Then it was shown that the test of both science and religion was that they must work. Science must tell people something, and religion must help them to do something. Then a certain difficulty was pointed out. People would say, "All religions work a little; are they all true?" In this connexion the following words in Dr. Schiller's paper were quoted: "It is not true that there is no pragmatic difference between a theory which is true, and one which is merely thought to be true. Though all theories which are current must work in some degree, the true theory works better; and this is precisely the reason why, once thought of, it is accepted, and supplants the theories which were merely thought to be true. Moreover, for any theory to work, it must be believed in, i.e. believed to be true. If there were no 'God', i.e. nothing that could offer any satisfaction to any religious emotion, the whole religious attitude would be futile. If it is not, it must contain essential truth, though it may remain to be determined what is the objective fact corresponding to the postulate".

Dr. Schiller further pointed out that the truth of religion had both a subjective and objective aspect, and that the two were connected, and the way to the latter lay through the former. About the subjective side of religion, science could speak more positively than about the object of religion. Religion required that there should be unity of purpose in a reality, which was the essence and being of the universe; it required that goodness should be there; it required that the reality should be of a nature to enter into union with man, and not remain in isolation, however majestic and high might be the attributes which were attributed to it. The writer asked whether the Christian religion shared with other religions the position of being only symbolical, of expressing in symbols the scientific and religious aspirations of mankind. There was something symbolical in it, but Dr. Schiller claimed that its special ground was that it was historical, and presented the fact of Christ. So it was that Christianity led the way. In conclusion, Professor Caldecott quoted the last paragraph in Dr. Schiller's paper as follows: "Such, approximately, are the claims which science and religion seem to make on man's allegiance; and it will be seen how little need there is to construe them as incompatible. Both are the expression of human needs, and their (partial) satisfaction. Both should be directed towards further and loftier achievements. And it is safe to hazard the prediction that the form of religion which realizes this most clearly will be the religion of the future."

DR. BEVERIDGE, Aberdeen, claimed for the scientific principle that there was no method other than the scientific by which man might acquire a fresh knowledge of the truth. By the scientific method he meant observation, accompanied, if necessary, by experiment, plus reasoning on the facts observed. He repudiated, then, on behalf of religion, the claim that it rests on any other than a rational basis, that it is to be believed apart from evidence. The divine revelation of God in Christ had, indeed, been presented to man from above. But now it is so presented, we do claim that we have rational grounds founded on sound evidence for believing it. If, then, we define the scientific method as observation of phenomena, followed by reasoning on the facts observed, we ask ourselves what are the phenomena and what the reasoning involved? The phenomena are the facts of our own instinctive nature. The peculiarity of our specially human instincts, as compared with those which we have in common with the whole animal world, is that they continually reach after but never find a definite goal. Thus the lover of nature revels in her beauty, yet finds in it no full satiety. He thirsts, and longs, and dreams, but never touches or realizes. So with the artistic sense, so with poetry, so with the moral sense. Now unless man is in contrast with all other organic beings, there must exist somewhere realities to which all these thwarted instincts point. And those who believe

in Christianity maintain that it alone sets the heart at rest, and indicates in what alone man finds his satisfaction. Directly in the immediate present, it smoothes down and softens the asperities of unsatisfied desire with a progressive consciousness of satisfaction and peace. Thus, in the moral domain, Christ triumphs over sin. So with the other human aspirations He would have us know that they are meant to point us to Himself. But it is especially by its promises that Christianity sets the heart at rest. The baffled will finds strength in the hope that God has created us for Himself, and that life's failures will fade away in the light of the life everlasting. Now, if it satisfies the higher instincts, otherwise disappointed, then it follows that this religion is true. For we are entitled to conclude from all we know of organic life, that what satisfies a real instinct is itself a reality.

The REV. F. C. KEMPSON, Demonstrator of Anatomy, Cambridge, drew attention to the importance of the fact that religion was no mere matter of teaching or example, but involved divine sympathy with human effort. They had, he remarked, passed beyond the days in which the conflict between Science and Religion could be summed up in the phrase, "Men are descended from monkeys, therefore there is no God!" But the difficulty of mechanical determinism was still with them; and if man was nothing but the resultant of the material motion of his bodily cells, all his actions were pre-determined, and the effort of religion was for him a delusion. This doctrine was clearly expressed by Professor Haeckel, when he said, "Comparative Anatomy and Physiology teach that the mind of man is a function of his brain, and that the will is not free." The fallacy of this attitude was that man through his senses could perceive nothing but matter in motion, and therefore should not try to prove from outward observation that the sum of existence was confined thereto. Haeckel's writings were a refutation of his doctrine, because they revealed his well-marked personality. He stultifies himself every time he uses the pronoun "I."

The practice of religion, Mr. Kempson pointed out, was conditioned by the defect in human nature known as Original Sin. The doctrines of heredity, taken out of proportion, might direct the mind into a fatalism destructive of religion, which might either be optimistic or pessimistic. It was pessimistic if it gave rise to the idea that sin was thereby inevitable; and optimistic, if original sin were regarded as a "fall upstairs". He insisted that progression from lower to higher forms was compatible with increased wickedness. In his opinion, it was wrong to belittle the inspired quality of the earlier chapters of Genesis, on the grounds that they were not historical; though not historical, they might reveal the true philosophy of man's place in the Universe.

The realization of the certainty with which effect followed a cause, had its positive use; it taught them, as the life of our Lord

taught them, that it was only by the paradox of submission to mechanism that they could ultimately escape from it into the glorious liberty of the children of God.

The REV. CANON G. HARFORD, Liverpool, said they only knew the macrocosm or great world of the universe, through the microcosm or the little world of the nature of man. Every discussion held in that Congress, in the last resort, turned on the nature of man. They as churchmen approached all questions from the point of view of a high conception of human nature. They were there that afternoon to seek to justify that conception. There were three methods of studying man's nature which were independent of the Church, and three in which the Church had special interest. Social anthropology, or the science which studied primitive humanity through savage customs and folk lore, had its witness to bear. Professor J. G. Frazer, in his recent lectures at Liverpool on "Totemism in Australia", showed how altruistic tendencies could be traced progressively gathering strength. Comparative religion had its witness to bear. Two recent writers on Buddhism—Mr. Fielding Hall, and the author of *The Creed of Buddha*—agreed in two points in which early Buddhism met the needs and revealed the true nature of man, i. e. in its stress on the order of the universe, and on the worth and progressive development of the soul. Experimental psychology had its witness to bear. The study of hypnotism, and of other normal and abnormal mental states, was likely to throw light on the nature of man. T. Jay Hudson's theories of the objective and the subjective mind deserved more attention than they had had. Personal experience had its witness to bear. Rapid judgement enabled them to know one another with confidence. One who knew his father truly as a child, might, after that father's death, write his life from a different kind of knowledge. So peasant or philosopher might know God truly, but diversely. Biographical study had its witness to bear. In the face of Christ, they, with St. Paul, might see the glory of God, and also, after their measure, in the saints. Inductive study of vital religion in Christendom had its witness to bear. Already Dr. Starbuck, and Professor W. James, had reaped the first-fruits of that harvest field. But there was room for a careful inquiry, over a large area of cases, into the factors and conditions of the spiritual life, as lived under what those present there considered the incomparable influences connected with Anglican Christianity.

The REV. R. C. FAITHFULL, Glington, confining his remarks principally to the popular conception of the nature of man, said that people often talked of heart, and mind, and intellect, and affection as if the affections had nothing to do with the intellect, and the heart had nothing to do with the mind. That was surely both unscientific and unbiblical. The modern use of the word heart was to describe the affections. The Bible use of the word heart was to describe the intellect. If they were to enter into

sympathy with the prophets and psalmists, they would do well to strike out the word "heart", almost wherever it occurred in their Bibles, and substitute the word "mind". "The heart of man believeth unto repentance; with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." The misuse of the word "heart" placed religion in a false position, and also made great mistakes as to the nature of man. For instance, however great the intellect of a man might be, yet, if he was selfish and self-centred, his intellect was undeveloped. The seat of the affections was in the mind as much as was the reason. The intellectual development of man, if it was to reach its completeness, must be on the line of the affections as well as of the reason. They should try to live so that the mind might become the organ of the spiritual nature, and not the organ of the carnal nature. If, as St. John taught, they had love to their neighbour, they must be sure that the spiritual nature within them was becoming the master, and obtaining the control over the whole of the mind.

The REV. C. A. SADLEIR, South American Missionary Society, considering the nature of man from the scientific standpoint, argued that if human nature were artificial, they would expect to understand it from without, but if it was, as they believed it to be, the product of an evolutionary process springing from life itself, it must be studied from within. The hand was material matter, but in the hand more was seen than matter; it moved, and that motion gave evidence of intelligence, purpose. But behind all there was the ego, the person, who having formed that purpose, intelligently and dynamically used the hand and other parts of the body to accomplish it. He held the view that man was a triune being, a personal spirit with powers (intelligence, feelings, and will), and a material or physical frame. Man was made in the image of God, and if he (Mr. Saddleir) did not believe that man was a triune being, he would not be able to believe in the Trinity. Even the Indians of Auracania had three words to express the three-fold nature of man, words meaning spirit, soul, and body.

The REV. HERBERT KELLY, Kelham, dealt with the inquiry, whether there was any space in the operation of human mind which was not explicable by law of human process, and if so, what? Human thought was first inductive, then deductive, i. e. it worked first from observation to law by means of an hypothesis, which the mind then verified, and applied deductively. All these processes were simply explicable except the formation of the hypothesis, which we called an "inspiration" or "happy thought". In education we carried a child through the progress of centuries, first by grouping its facts, and then by "suggesting" those connecting ideas which came to mankind so slowly, which form the real centre of thought, but which, in big matters or small, we cannot get, we can only wait for. God gave those ideas or suggestions to whom He would, when He would; most richly, but by no means solely, to those most interested, for our keen-

ness did not determine absolutely the formation of our ideas. "Suggestion" was the first sphere of grace. This left induction, the use or working out of the idea, as in the main a purely human process, and as governed by known laws. But as an activity it was governed also by will. Personally, he had convinced himself that, strictly speaking, there was no such thing as wrong thinking. There was a confused thinking, in which the mind shifted from one subject to another; there was imperfect thinking, in which a person started with premisses and then drew no conclusions; but once the whole meaning was quite clear before them, they could not force the mind really to think illogically. They got tired of the effort, they resented being driven to an unwelcome conclusion, but these were failures of the will to maintain a persistent action. They were not failures of the intellect. The operation of the will did not seem to him at all determinate. Plato maintained, and others maintained, that a man always desired what he thought to be good. Every one who had known what it was to be in a sulk knew that was not so. And in many other matters, we must all know in common experience that there is no uniform rule which would maintain the interest of the will. He believed it could be shown psychologically that there were in both directions large spheres of human action in suggestion and interest inexplicable on any possible human ground.

The REV. PROFESSOR WESTROPP ROBERTS, Trinity College, Dublin, explained force, resident in every molecule, every atom, as being due to the immanence of God. Man's body, he held, was a living machine, and as such was subject to the physical laws regulating all machines. But man's will was free, at least so far as a choice between good and evil was concerned, and this freedom of choice was fully recognized by the inspired writers of the Old Testament and by Christ. Professor Roberts explained Kant's view of the soul of man, and the argument by which he secured our moral freedom, and that upon which he grounded his belief in the soul's immortality. But the Christian Theist reached the same conclusion by another route. The future life was a revelation from God, communicated to man by the Holy Spirit. It could not confessedly have been deduced with any certainty from reason alone. In the Christian revelation the doctrine of the resurrection and of a future life was, as St. Paul assured them, the most central and vital fact. According to Christian theology, an immortal soul was lodged in every man. With regard to all metaphysical theories concerning the existence of God, man's free will and the immortality of the soul, Professor Roberts remarked that if they reviewed all the evidence which they possessed regarding them, they must admit that the strongest argument for their religious belief was afforded, not by reason nor by scientific knowledge, but by the fact that those who had sought for the spirit of God had found

it, and that those who had found Christ required little from science to assure them of the truth of the Christian religion. The Higher Criticism and Science had often made them pause, and had brought doubts and difficulties before them. But those who had found Christ, who had felt the Spirit of Christ within them, and abiding in them, had no fears; they were assured of His presence, and with St. Paul they could say, "We know". There were times in the lives of all of them when the wheels of life were slow, and doubts wrapped them about, but in such times, although the horizon might be blackened by clouds, they raised their eyes aloft and there they found light, light sufficient for their guidance. The figure of the Saviour upon the Cross appeared to rise before their eyes, and they seemed to hear the divine words in their ears, "Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in Me."

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that two apparently opposite thoughts had been presented to them in the discussion; one of these based reason upon faith, the other justified faith by the appeal to reason. There was no real contradiction, for in the last resort, faith and reason are the same. In the endeavour to solve the great problems which confront him, man proceeds, and must proceed, by faith in the trustworthiness of the universe, in God. Science satisfied the needs of the intellect. The needs of the soul must be satisfied by something greater, and surely the whole meaning and tenor of the discussion that afternoon was, that this greater satisfaction could only be found in Christ.

RELIGION AND THE PRESS

A. GENERAL LITERATURE

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. SATURDAY MORNING, JUNE 20

The RIGHT REV. A. ROBERTSON, D.D., BISHOP OF EXETER,
presided.

The paper on "The Church and Literature" (*App. No. 19*), by Mr. A. C. BENSON, who greatly regretted that he was prevented from attending in person, was taken as read.

CANON RAWNSLEY, Crosthwaite, Keswick, spoke of what he called the railway novel nuisance. He showed how, in the past ten years, by reason of the flabbiness of public opinion, the uncertainty of legal definitions as to the words "indecent" and "obscene", and the fear of the guardians of the law acting upon evidence because of this uncertainty, there had been allowed to grow up a great industry of indecent publications so far-reaching in its poisonous influence, so flagrant in its public display, both here and on the continent, that an International Congress of 150 delegates met last month in Paris to consider how best to suppress obscene publications, written and pictorial, and a joint committee of Lords and Commons, under the presidency of Earl Beauchamp, was now sitting in London with a similar object in view. Five years ago a judge had declared from the bench that close on half a million copies of indecent papers were being circulated every week, and that four tons of one of the worst of these was being exported weekly to our colonies. This paper is one of those that is still being sold upon some of our railway bookstalls. Since the judge spoke, the circulation of these indecent weeklies is said to have risen to nearly a million. Speaking of the new novel, which, under the guise of a philosophical treatise on the sex problem, was being published and exposed for sale with utter shamelessness, Canon Rawnsley referred to a recent statement of the editor of the *Academy* that some writers had had their manuscripts returned by the publishers with the words "Not hot enough for us" written upon them. He made a stirring indictment against the publishers, the distributors, and the railway directorates that had allowed this distribution, and quoted at length the memorandum which was sent to the railway directors at the time of the change of the bookstall contract in 1905 by Dr. Rendall, of Charterhouse, as chairman of the Head Masters' Conference. He ended his address by an appeal to the Churches of England, and espe-

cially to the Church of the Anglican community, to rise to the occasion, and so move public opinion that this hydra-headed monster of immoral literature, which no longer lurked in secret places, but had come out into the open to poison the life of our youth, should in the name of Christ be trampled under foot. In the cause of the sanctities of home life and of marriage, of pure motherhood and maidenhood, and of all true manhood, he urged positive measures as well as repressive ones. He called upon the bishops, the clergy, and the laity to make themselves acquainted with the facts, and to go forward bravely in a great cause. He asked that, instead of the eminently respectable but pre-eminently dull books that are now supplied by Church societies to Sunday school teachers and others who give prizes to their Sunday scholars, the ablest pens of Church folk should be enlisted to supply such wholesome and attractive books as should enkindle in the hearts of the young love of country, love of our brethren across the sea, a belief in our nation's mission, a love of home, a love of work, and a sense of the nobility of service and self-sacrifice, with a true belief in the presence of God, in the personality of Christ, and in the joy of the Christian life.

The REV. F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON, D.D., Cambridge, the author of one of the two papers on "Literature and the Church" (*App.*, No. 20), commenced by summarizing the other paper, that of Mr. A. C. Benson, M.A., with whose contribution, he said, he was in fundamental agreement. Mr. Benson desired to show what ought to be the attitude of the Church to literature. He foresaw with perfect accuracy that the literature of the future would deal with the problem of religion with, if possible, a freer hand than it had done in the past. "The duty of the Church", Mr. Benson stated, "is rather to strive after simplicity than intricacy of ideal, to emphasize points of agreement rather than points of difference; to make the old run smoothly into the new, and not to sacrifice the interests of the future to the claims of the past." To do this, he rightly remarked, "the Church must direct her members not what to think but how to think"; and he desired to make every sphere of life a part and parcel of the Christian system. "All intellectual speculation, all scientific discovery, all political remedial measures are matters which are bound to occupy the mind of the serious Christian." With singular wisdom Mr. Benson reminded them that the ideas which were now accepted as truisms, called forth torrents of ecclesiastical censure and abuse on the *Tracts for the Times* and *Essays and Reviews*, and warned the Church against making a similar mistake at the present time. Finally, he dwelt on the note of aspiration which was so prominent in the literature of our own time, and called upon the Church to welcome it and make common cause with it, "sympathizing with the spirit, even when she cannot wholly approve of the method; and thus to show the boundless possibilities, the infinite adapta-

bility of Christian principles." The ideas suggested by that admirable paper, continued Dr. Foakes-Jackson, gave them ample food for thought and opportunity of discussion, and he would gladly dilate upon them more fully. He thought, however, that it was expected of him to speak also of his own paper. In it attention had been called to that separation between sacred and profane, so characteristic of the Reformation movement, or rather of the political ideas which came into prominence when the keenness of the first struggle between the old and new religious aspirations had somewhat abated.

It was beginning to be realized, he remarked, that man must either be absolutely Christian or give up professing the faith. Consequent on this was the growing demand to be told what Christianity really meant. For this reason he appealed to churchmen to apply to the task of producing a better literature. The Anglican Church was not doing the work she ought to do in that respect. While there were wonderfully clever books put forward by the Dissenters, while the cause of the Roman Church was ably stated, there was nothing of the kind in the English Church at the present moment. What is needed so much is not only to learn about the Church through fiction and popular literature, but real instruction in Christianity. The need of readable histories of the Church was very great, as well as books clearly stating the doctrine and teaching of the Church. It was hardly credible how ignorant many of the so-called educated classes were about the real beliefs of churchmen. This widespread ignorance permeating society was, he believed, doing enormous harm to the cause of their common Christianity and of the Church to which they were all devoted.

The REV. Y. INAGAKI dwelt on the importance of the relation between literature and the Church for missionary work in a country like Japan. He said that the Church in Japan needed literature for self-defence and for her propagation. Realizing that need, and fearing that humanitarian and anti-Christian literature threatened the Church's principles, a committee on Church literature in Japan had been organized to supply theological literature for the instruction of young people; apologetics with which to oppose scepticism and materialism; and periodical literature. Mr. Inagaki referred to the fact that to-day translations of *Paradise Lost*, *Pilgrim's Progress*, and many other Christian books had a great sale in Japan. In magazine articles Christian expressions were familiar, and several non-Christian authors had written lives of our Lord. This was greatly due to the popularization of Christian thought through literature, for people read Christian books even though they dared not go to church. There was, he felt sure, a golden opportunity at present for the Church to encourage native Christian writers to Christianize the people through literature.

MRS. ROMANES, London, described "the staple reading of infants" in various recent times. In a reaction from *Ministering Children* and the *Wide World* type, they now had books purporting to describe the life of ordinary children, but ignoring the religion which played no inconsiderable part of that life. She did not believe in much religious talk, but she did believe in atmosphere. Mrs. Romanes then spoke of modern novels. After pointing out that an enormous debt was due to Mrs. Humphrey Ward for upholding in her stories the sanctity of marriage, Mrs. Romanes declared that they needed more and more to impress upon the young and innocent a sense of the romance of their holy religion. They associated their religion too often with petty details, statistics, offices, boards, meetings, and forgot all the romance and glory which underlay those necessary evils; that romance which, if she might say so, was in every Eucharist, and which lay on the very surface of that Congress. That Congress had made even the *Times* poetical and romantic. What might it not do for them all? They must put the Church before all the world as a thing of beauty, of high romance. Life was beautiful and romantic, and no one had shown that more truly than Browning. Let them take the lesson to heart.

O world as God has made it. All is beauty;
And knowing this is love, and love is duty.

What further may be sought for, or declared?

MR. R. B. C. CORFE, London, drew attention to the fact that the enormous circulation of cheap pernicious literature was causing deadly havoc to the Church and to all civilized education in many parts of the world. Seven years ago he urged the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole subject, and now a Joint Parliamentary Commission had been appointed for that purpose, but only in conjunction with two other important questions, so that a third only of the Commission's time was available for considering that terrible evil with regard to literature. If the State protection against pernicious literature was temporarily withheld, and nearly 1,000,000 copies of degrading literature were published, as was the case, every week, who but the Church should take up arms against that state of things. There were seven Acts of Parliament forbidding and penalizing anything approaching the evils complained of; but those Acts were put into force only very rarely, and in most extreme cases. What did that lead to? In these days tens of thousands of school boys and girls travelled daily to and from school by railway, and there, thrust in front of them on bookstalls, were piles of pernicious publications utterly depraving. Then again, directly school was over, myriads of children flocked out into the streets only to see in the shop windows shameful pictures, depraving their whole nature. After stating that a large amount of capital was invested in that

degrading and lucrative trade, and speaking of mutoscope shops as an abominable scourge, Mr. Corfe said he thought the clergy might do more than they had done by investigating what was sold in their own parishes and what was being read by their own school children. They ought to have the courage to remonstrate with the newsagents and others who circulated those publications; they might invoke the aid of the police. Certainly, they could commit no greater mistake, no greater dereliction of duty, than to turn a blind eye to the evil, or to sit with folded hands.

MISS IRENE BARNES thanked Canon Rawnsley for his heart-stirring appeal in reference to the abolition of impure literature. She went on to ask what they, as members of the Anglican Communion, were doing to get into touch with, and influence for God, the men and women writers of the present day. Did they realize that hundreds of writers were at work with "Satan at their elbow" dictating the evil he would fain promulgate in order that his kingdom might be extended? She thought the time had come when there should be a federation of Christian authors and of publishers in English-speaking nations. Such a federation, if wisely organized, would lead to the raising of the standard of the secular as well as the religious press, and tend to the production of more virile, as well as more pure, literature.

The REV. E. McCLOURE, Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, believed there had never been a time in which literature had come to such a low pass as in the first years of the reign of Edward VII. Why was that? It must be ascribed, to some extent, to the fact that their traditions had become shaken and their ideals lowered by the destructive criticism of the times. The convictions which swayed conduct in the past were no longer fixed but, as it were, in solution, and had not yet precipitated. Hence, in the absence of other resources, the recourse to excitement—excitement in all shapes, including exciting literature. And here those primitive instincts and elementary passions, which were always with us, made their demands felt. The writer tried to meet them, and the publisher saw in them his opportunity. The publisher was the real culprit—not so much the writer or reader, who were simply the products of the time. It was the financial question that ruled the whole thing. The taste for certain literature existed, and the publisher knew this and provided for the taste. They were harking back to primitive instincts on the one side, and to the idealizing of those instincts in the gods of Greece and Rome. What was the cure? The cure was to elevate the taste. How? By presenting higher ideals. Men's ideals were, as I said, in a state of solution, and they wanted some grand ideal put before them, that would lift them above what was commonplace. That Congress had met to give them a high ideal of corporate action in regard to that great branch of Christ's Church called the Anglican Communion. Their great ideal was to make Christ the aim and influence of

their lives, and if they raised their fellow men in that direction they would produce a taste to which the class of literature they complained of could never appeal. He did not agree with what some of the speakers had said that afternoon. The books on railway bookstalls were not wicked books, in the bulk. They might find two or three bad books perhaps in a hundred, but books on those bookstalls were really, as a rule, good reading, at any rate they were harmless reading. He believed that exaggeration would do more harm than anything else in regard to the question before them. Let them not exaggerate the evil. W. H. Smith & Sons would not, he believed, willingly and knowingly put upon their bookstalls distinctly demoralizing literature. "Let us", added Mr. McClure, "try to increase our interest in the highest and most satisfying ideal, and in this way elevate our literary tastes, and thus prevent the greedy publisher from making money out of our imperfections."

THE REV. R. V. FAITHFULL DAVIES, Christian Evidence Society, said there was a very great deal of literature existing which was intended to deprive the mind of the realities and the comforts and the influences of religion. He contended that such literature needed answering definitely and directly, point by point. It was no use to say, "We must leave it to die a natural death." Much of this literature was read by the man in the street, the man behind the counter, the girl behind the typewriter. Its effect upon young men was, in many cases, to encourage them to substitute amusement on Sunday for attendance at church, and ultimately to alienate them from religion altogether.

THE RIGHT REV. DR. CHADWICK, Bishop of Derry, dealt with two answers which he said would certainly be made to some of them. It would be said that they were attacking the liberty of the press. "We have a right to free trade in all opinions, and in all manner of thinking about life. Allow a free press, and allow controversy to go on through it, and what is bad will be found out." He would ask those who made such a statement, why did they not apply that absolute and reckless freedom to the body before they began to apply it to the soul? Why should free trade in opinion be allowed any more than free trade in drugs? A chemist would not be allowed to put his poisons and other drugs all on one shelf, labelled, "Your choice for sixpence." The second answer that would be made was, "Art for art's sake; art claims all things as its province." Precisely; and if an artist had a whole landscape before him, he had the less excuse for confining his attention to the cesspool and manure heap. Writers should be asked not to withdraw their attention from any part of nature, but to follow Shakespeare, Scott, Browning, and the Bible, in placing the emphasis and centre of attraction where it ought to be. When it was said that art claimed the whole of humanity for its range, it should be remembered that all the greatest artists without exception had

been pure. He did not mean that impure writing could not be torn out half a page here and there, but he meant that the emphasis, the attractive centre of all the greatest artists in the world had been, as nature around them was, pure.

The REV. W. G. EDWARD REES, Manchester, thought they should not put too much trust in legislation. All the laws that they could put on the Statute Book would not make a moral and Christian people unless there was a force of Christian conviction behind to make those laws work. His main point was that in the newspaper offices of this country there was a very large proportion of true catholic-minded Christians belonging to the English Church, a large number of men who handled the matter served up in newspapers morning by morning, who were loyal to the fold of Christ. What he should like his pastors and masters to do was to organize and focus an opinion, and bring it to bear not only in the interests of their communion, but in the interests of morality, in the interests of national manhood, in the interests of purity, and in the interests of the faith.

The REV. T. A. LACEY thought that the police were sympathetic, but badly needed help, and did not get it. Two years ago he enabled the police successfully to prosecute a certain shopkeeper. The police told him (Mr. Lacey) that he was the thirty-fourth person that had complained to them of that man, but he was the first who was willing to give evidence. What chance had the police if those who made complaints refused to back them up? Mr. Lacey further stated that having occasion frequently to pass by a certain shop in Bloomsbury, he noticed a growing filthiness of things exhibited in the window. He wrote to the Chief Commissioner of Police, calling his attention to it. The Commissioner replied, thanking him very heartily for what he had done, and telling him he had sent down a man to warn the shopkeeper. Two days afterwards he saw that shop window and it was comparatively clean, in regard to what was exhibited. "You can all do that kind of thing," added Mr. Lacey.

MISS COMPTON, from Natal, gave facts showing what great difficulties she had experienced in securing books of a really suitable character for young people to read.

MISS F. LAWRENCE, Girls' Friendly Society, said that those who managed that organization tried to spread good literature by every means in their power, because they had found that they could not turn out what was bad without putting something else in its place. Wherever they held meetings or festivals—and they held these in nearly every branch of the Girls' Friendly Society in England and Wales—they tried to have a bookstall of good books. For those books they had a very large sale. Could not something of that sort be done, on a very much larger scale, wherever there were meetings of young Church people? That those books supplied a need was evident from the fact that the society had sold some 90,000 of their almanacs every year. Why

should they not, as a Church, have their own bookstalls? By that means much might be done to spread good healthy literature amongst men and boys, and women and girls. Could there not be certain workers responsible for the carrying on of such a project throughout the dioceses of England and Wales? In this way they would be fighting for the good, which was much better than railing at the ill.

The CHAIRMAN, having remarked that the discussion that morning had dealt with topics of great variety and exceeding gravity, nevertheless expressed a little misgiving about some of the proposals which had been made. The novel with a purpose was apt to excite distrust. People felt rather taken in when they came to the "purpose", much as they did when a thrilling paragraph in a newspaper turned out to be the advertisement of a cure for rheumatism. He did not think anybody could question the existence of the evil to which Canon Rawnsley had drawn attention, but he did not think it would be removed by writing interesting stories in favour of Christian morals. What was chiefly wanted was that they should try and get into touch with those concerned in the production and sale of bad literature, and in the name of God and Christ, persuade them that, at any rate, they would forgo the temptation to make gain out of what was evil, and threatened Christian civilization with destruction.

RELIGION AND THE PRESS

(b) DRAMATIC LITERATURE ; (c) JOURNALISM

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. SATURDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 20

The RIGHT REV. DR. E. M. PARKER, D.D., Coadjutor Bishop of New Hampshire, presided.

MRS. EDWARD COMPTON, London, the writer of the published paper on "The Church and Dramatic Literature" (*App.*, No. 21), pointed out that the play-actor and the ecclesiastic had many points of resemblance, but the comparison soon broke when the superficial characteristics of both were passed. The priest used his gifts to arouse emotion for a worthy object ; the actor had not necessarily an object in view. The priest's aim was to make them love God and hate sin, specially their own sins. Unfortunately, dramatists had no such aim ; they sometimes took an enormous interest in sin. She did not think, however, that because sin was brought before them in a play, that play was to be condemned. On the contrary, they had only to remember Shakespeare to know that to see sin put before them in its true light was to receive from the stage lessons of the vastest, the deepest kind. But to see sin glossed over, excused, made attractive and interesting, made amusing, made nothing of, or made an inevitable sort of necessity—who could say what harm that was bound to do? That was why she said that actors did not always use their gifts to arouse emotion for a worthy object. The Church had always been suspicious of the stage, as of any institution that seemed to hold some of her own secrets. The stage, too, had always been apt to scoff at the Church, from a certain feeling of familiarity with the ways and means of extorted emotion. Having remarked that religion and art were attempts to express the same aspirations to the eternal, Mrs. Compton referred to three forms of literature with a religious bias. The shrieks of theological melodrama were, she thought, harmful to the cause it sought to assist. With the pageant they were on rising ground, and, if its authors would curb their ambition, great results might be expected. Then there was the real drama of England, as exemplified in the plays of Mr. Pinero, Mr. Barrie, and Mr. Shaw. In analysing these three forms of the drama, she observed that clergymen who complained of being caricatured on the stage should remember that actors were often caricatured in the church. The "pulpit voice" was the caricature of a very bad actor. Every clergyman who mumbled the prayers helped to perpetuate an impression that the faith was something outside ordinary experience, and recognizable by extraordinary symptoms. The Church was the stage of the soul ; let it then be natural. Mrs. Compton, alluding to musical comedy, with which, she said, they were drenched at present, described it as a very

harmless way of giving amusement to a very large number of people; but, like everything which merely diverted without any pretensions to beauty of form or expression, it vitiated public taste. As for its attitude towards morality, it preserved a chilling indifference. Religion did not inevitably promote good taste, but bad taste was certainly subversive of religion, and sham sentiment, sham drama, sham music, sham gentility, even sham vulgarity, would not breed a taste for *Hamlet*; and if the nation that produced Shakespeare could cease to care for him, there would be a perilously small hope for the Bible. Again and again they were, she admitted, seeing modern plays which only made for good—wholesome thought, wholesome amusement. If the unwholesome were sometimes met with, who, she asked, was most to be blamed? Not the actor, not the dramatist, but the public, for they governed the supply; what they asked for they immediately received. Let them ask for the things that were true, honest, just, pure, lovely, and these would be forthcoming. Mrs. Compton thought that while the stage was deeply to blame for the stigma of worldliness attaching to it, the injunction against the dramatic representation of biblical subjects produced a very serious waste of good material. In conclusion, she described the Church as the stage of the soul, and added: "Let her be natural, and the drama infected by simplicity would discard its conventional impropriety, its conventional propriety, and realizing that Christianity was the flower of art, of science and humanity, would not be afraid to be Christian in fact as well as in reputation."

The REV. WALTER E. BENTLEY, Founder of the Actors' Church Alliance of New York, held that the histrionic instinct was divine, and, with the devotional, constituted that image in which man was made. To play was as natural as to pray, and their nurseries combined their earliest churches and theatres. The Church, he said, created the chasm which had existed for centuries between herself and the theatre, and it was the Church's duty to bridge it and to bring that long neglected and despised portion of her flock once more into the fold. The Church's business was not to elevate the stage, but to recognize and minister to the members of that profession and inspire them with a higher sense of their vocation, not merely as amusement purveyors, but as recreators of the tired nerves and jaded lives of weary men. Why, Mr. Bentley went on to ask, should not the dramatic profession become good recruiting ground for the ranks of the ministry? He had been privileged himself to help some dozen men to the ministry, and within a few weeks he had received twenty-six men applicants for Holy Orders. Mr. Bentley confessed that his interest in the theatre was deep-seated. He supposed he was the only clergyman in the world who ran a theatre regularly, wherein Shakespearean and other classical plays were presented as a department of parochial effort, and with increasing success. They were all to work out their salvation and bring the world back to God, and in doing so the Church must

inspire all vocations with the spirit of her Lord and Master. The stage preached, and preached mightily. Let them see to it that her lessons were wholesome. He thought the clergy might be furnished with lists of the best plays and commend these to their parishioners. In that way they could help to create a better taste throughout the community, and, while establishing closer relations between two great and hitherto estranged forces, aid the theatre to redeem herself.

MRS. BAILLIE REYNOLDS, London, speaking as a novelist and Christian mother, referred specially to what had been advocated by Mr. Bernard Shaw as scientific marriage, by which it was meant that the best of both sexes should unite to produce a higher, purer, better race. What was their answer to that? Simply that that kind of reform was in the world already, and had been for two thousand years; the only difference was that they called it Christian marriage, sacramental marriage. She maintained that in the Western world everything which had hitherto been done in the name of purity, justice, honour, and progress, had been the result of that form of marriage for which they had been mocked at and jeered at. It used to be a fashion to say, "How narrow-minded you are to think that you must only marry a Christian!" But they knew that, so far from being too narrow, they had not been particular enough. Why did nearly all novels make so much of marriage? Because it was almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of marriage in human life. The whole future of the race depended upon what they thought and did upon marriage. With regard to the purification of the press, Mrs. Baillie Reynolds remarked that if they brought up a generation of people, born of clean parentage, and with clean ideas, those people would have the kind of literature that would suit them, and impure literature would simply perish for lack of purchasers. They were not going to make men temperate by shutting public-houses; or make them pure by taking away certain books, and saying, "You must not read these." They were going to make people temperate and pure by giving them a temperate and pure training.

MR. BUCHAN read extracts from the printed paper, "The Ethics of Journalism" (*App.*, No. 22), contributed by Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, editor of the *Spectator*. The writer spoke of the newspaper as indispensable to progress, and to progress in the right direction. Unless they knew, day by day, what people were doing in the nation, in the country, in the town, in the village, they would find it far more difficult than was the case now to obtain the co-operation of others for good and worthy objects. It was well to know of the righteous work which was being done by others; it was even well to know within certain limits the evil that was being done, so that they might lay their plans and bring up their forces to check that evil. It was urged that publicity was a function of very real utility to the State. The more they studied the question of

publicity the more it appeared that what was wanted in the public interest was a just and clear understanding of the way in which publicity was to be achieved. The journalist's business was publicity, but it was also his business to see that this duty of publicity, though carried out to the full, was carried out in a way which would do not harm but good. If the methods of publicity were sound, fearless, and without guile, all was well. If they had not these qualities, then publicity might become the most degrading and dishonourable of trades. Mr. Strachey held that the justifiable complaints that could be raised against popular journalism in its newest form were irresponsibility, cynical carelessness in the matter of truth, sensationalism, the destruction of a manly and honourable reticence, and the introduction of triviality. To his mind the worst of these faults, after the supreme evil of indifference to veracity of statement, was triviality: What he meant by triviality could be seen at its worst in the American daily press, but it was fast becoming a feature of our own newspapers. Passing to the question of comment, Mr. Strachey contrasted judicial journalism with the journalism of advocacy, for which he said there was little defence. However, the notion of the political journalist perpetually writing leaders against his own convictions was pure imagination. Mr. Strachey defended anonymity in journalism as making for responsibility, not irresponsibility. Men who wrote anonymously, and in the name of their paper and not of themselves, were much less likely to yield to the foolish vanity of self-assertion. Again, the signed article, however true and sound it might be, was always to some extent discounted through the personality of the writer. As to the subject of newspaper proprietorship, he did not agree with what was sometimes said, that it was a great misfortune that the newspapers of England were, as a rule, owned by rich men; at the same time he thought it was a great misfortune that a newspaper could not be started by a poor man. His reason for desiring that, as a rule, a newspaper proprietor should be rich, was the danger of newspapers being bought, or, at any rate, of their articles being bought, as too often happened in those foreign countries where newspapers were not great properties. But the proprietor should derive his wealth from the newspaper, and not from other sources. In conclusion, the writer of the paper counselled the public not to be afraid of the press, but to do it justice, and keep it in its place—the place of a useful public servant, not of a master.

MR. G. K. CHESTERTON, London, asserted that if modern Christianity talked less about other people's business, if the modern clergyman were less concerned to be a political economist, a showman, a journalist, an editor, and other things, and more concerned to preach the religious principles it was his duty to preach, the whole modern world would be changed. He demurred to some of Mr. Strachey's statements. If Christ meant anything in what He said about the camel and the needle's eye, He certainly meant that the

rich were in more moral danger than the poor ; but Mr. Strachey had argued that the rich were less likely to be wicked, and could not be bought. In modern society, the rich man who received an enormous income, and lived in luxury on the understanding that he pandered to certain causes and needs, was bought already. As for anonymous journalism and Mr. Strachey's plea for its sincerity, he himself had not read an obviously honest leader for twenty years. The danger of the modern world was secrecy. Under ancient conditions, in all simple societies, the man who tyrannized over his friend did so in the open, with a crown or mitre on his head, and having detected the head, they could cut it off. The peculiarity of modern tyranny was not that it was worse than other tyranny, but that it was secret. When, for instance, a man was sacked from his job, that was an act of tyranny very often of the most violent sort ; and the essential point was that he did not, in modern society, really know who had done it. Mr. Chesterton said he thought that under modern conditions it was, upon the whole, a bad thing that most journalism was unsigned. It was quite true that if a man signed his article it would be discounted by the fact of the life that he lived—the fact, perhaps, that he was obviously in difficulties, or had just borrowed money. But if soldiers, and sailors, and doctors, and professors and clergymen did certain things, and their life was taken into account in judgment of what they said, who was the journalist that he alone should not have his public utterances discounted by the obvious facts of his life ? If a man was an obvious coward, his work should bear the brunt of it ; if he was a drunkard, he should not be allowed to pose as a teetotaller. If Christianity meant anything, it meant that a man's work ought to be discounted in the light of his life.

MISS G. M. IRELAND-BLACKBURNE, F.J.I., London, mentioned a few ways in which the Church and the press annoyed each other. How did the Church annoy the press ? It did not understand the ways of the press, nor the power of the press, nor the actual righteousness or ability of the press. How did the press annoy the Church ? Because the Church hated vulgarity, and up to a late time had thought all publicity to be vulgar. Then again, there was the ignorance of the Church reporter and writer. Should journalists pass an examination ? was a question for the journalistic world. She thought they might ask the press to send only people to report Church proceedings who had at least entered a Church of England place of worship before. There was a need that journalists should recognize the services of the Church, and that the Church should capture the imagination of the press.

MR. A. WALLACE RIMINGTON, London, thought that one of the facts to be faced at the present day was, that in some continental countries a certain or even considerable proportion of the newspaper press had become anti-Christian. In England they might pay an ungrudging tribute to the admirable tone of most of their leading journals, and, as a whole, the newspaper press had not been hostile

to religion ; but there were signs that this might not continue in the case of some of the less important papers. Two practical suggestions might be offered. First, in the case of small manufacturing towns or districts, or other localities, where there was need for wholesome journalism, local newspapers, secular in character but edited from a Christian standpoint, might be started under the management of a lay committee, or some other body affiliated to the Church. Secondly, where that was impossible, a committee might be formed with the object of supplying information upon religious subjects, and correcting misapprehensions and misstatements where these existed. In many cases newspaper editors would be glad of that help. If community of aim between the Church and the newspaper press could be strengthened by these and other means, and the press brought more actively into the service of Christianity, greater things in social regeneration might be accomplished than they were able to foresee. The newspaper press was one of the increasingly powerful influences for good or evil, and the Church could not safely neglect to devote some of her attention and energies to that potent agency.

The REV. CANON HARFORD, Liverpool, spoke first of the importance of newspapers providing for the public such reading as represented fact. Then he thought that clergymen in their respective neighbourhoods should do their utmost to induce editors of papers to deal more largely than at present with ecclesiastical matters. Book reviews were important means of influencing the judgement of the public. People wanted their books tested by competent men, and theological books were sometimes very poorly treated in provincial journals. Canon Harford drew attention to the fact that editors welcomed suitable news which was written on one side only of the paper. He thought that a good way for any one to begin press work was to write letters in the "correspondence" column. He claimed that correspondence in a local paper might be made extremely useful by clergymen.

The CHAIRMAN laid stress on the possibility of more co-operation between the Church and the press. They must not, he remarked, expect the press to do just what they wanted. They had got to fit what they wished to say into the shape in which the press could use it for its own purpose. He thought that secular papers might be induced to take a much greater interest in Church news than was the case at present. Dr. Parker went on to speak of the necessity resting upon them all to remember that the things they had been hearing must be turned to personal, moral effort. It was not things and classes so much as it was persons that they must go away and attempt to influence. The possibilities of their influencing the stage or the press were comparatively limited. But every one of them had opportunities to do something for people who would have a hand, great or small, in the press or the stage of the future, something to uplift representatives of both those professions.

THE CRITICAL STUDY OF THE BIBLE

(a) THE OLD TESTAMENT

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. MONDAY MORNING, JUNE 22

The MOST REV. R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Calcutta, presided.

ARCHDEACON CUNNINGHAM, Cambridge, explained the grounds on which it had been arranged to take, as the basis of discussion, the four papers which had been already published under the title, "The Critical Study of the Bible." He gathered, from letters he had received, that there was some misapprehension on the subject. Twenty years ago, when the question of the critical study of the Old Testament aroused much excitement in Scotland, there were many who said that though they did not see how his criticism was compatible with reverence, they could not but feel that Robertson Smith was a deeply religious man; they distrusted him as a critic, but they respected him as one whom they felt to be an earnest and devout man. The committee had asked those scholars to write, not so much as critics, but as men; and to explain what, taking account of all that scholarship had to say, they believed the Bible to be to the Christian man who searched it as the revelation of the mind of God. There might be much controversy as to what the Bible was in itself, apart from any use of it, and therefore apart from divine blessing on the reading of the Word. But such controversies were merely academic, and would be out of place at a Congress which was, before all else, a religious gathering. He believed that if the religious aspect of the question were kept prominently forward, the discussion would not be so much controversial as co-operative in the endeavour to help one another to use the Bible aright both intelligently and devoutly.

Indeed, there was far more agreement among them than was sometimes supposed. They were all at one in condemning Bible reading which was quite perfunctory, without either intellectual or devout effort—as if the divine influence of the book was thaumaturgic. They were all at one in deprecating the merely literary and historical study of the Bible, as if it were nothing more than the record of the life of a great people in the past. They all desired also to find a divine meaning for themselves to-day. They were at one, too, in believing that all, scholars and simple alike, who sought God's help in searching

the Scriptures earnestly and thoughtfully, would find guidance and comfort. Surely it was permissible to hope that, as the result of that discussion, many of them might learn to take more heed how they read, and to rely more entirely on the Spirit who would lead them into all truth—remembering that “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty”.

The REV. PROF. KENNETT, B.D., Cambridge, the writer of the paper on “The Christian Use of the Old Testament” (*App.*, No. 23), remarked that in a discussion of that subject the first question to Christians must be, What was Christ’s use of the Old Testament? To Christ, the Old Testament was the Bible. He did not merely use it as a concession to the prejudices of those whom He taught. It was part of His own devotional life, as evidenced by His threefold quotation from Scripture in His temptation, in the cry in which His agony found vent on the Cross, in the words in which He committed His soul to His Father’s keeping. The Church, therefore, must regard the Old Testament, not with a mere sentimental reverence, as they might reverence a tool which had been handled by Christ, but as something which was part of Christ’s very life. But though Christ held the Old Testament in the highest reverence, and declared that He had not come to destroy the law and the prophets, but to fulfil, He led the way in criticizing the Old Testament. He criticized it, so to speak, from within, when He compared certain precepts, given because the hardness of men’s hearts prevented them from receiving anything higher, with its great and eternal principles, on which, Christ maintained, all the law and the prophets depended. Thus Christ compared with the ideal, that a man should leave father and mother and cleave to his wife, the law which allowed men, for the hardness of their hearts, to put away their wives. Christ criticized the Old Testament from without when He in principle abrogated all the law setting forth the distinction of clean and unclean meats by the declaration that “whatsoever from without goeth into the man, it cannot defile him, because it goeth not into his heart”; thus giving as a reason for the abrogation of the law, not a religious or theological reason, but a physiological fact. They must follow the example of Christ. He who drew lessons from the lilies of the field would not have men disregard the equally obvious lessons written on the rocks of the earth. They must remember that it was possible to believe that all Holy Scripture was written for their learning, without being compelled to suppose that every portion of it was valuable for immediate spiritual edification. At the same time, it would be disastrous for the Church to attempt to make a selection of only those portions of the Scriptures which were of value for immediate spiritual edification, or to sever the Old Testament from the New. There was no necessity to tear out any part of the Bible if that were remembered. It was much to be desired that the Church

should give up singing as Christian hymns with the *Gloria Patri* at the end, curses such as those contained in Psalms lxix, cix, and cxxxvii. There would, however, be no objection to reading these from the lectern. The Prayer Book had recognized the principle of selection for the purpose of worship in the Service for the Churching of Women, where verses of Psalm cxvi were omitted simply because they were unsuitable in the mouth of a woman giving thanks for her recovery, and further extension of this principle was all that was necessary. Lastly, the Church needed the Old Testament for its devotional life, not merely because it was our Lord's Bible, and because a knowledge of it was necessary to the right understanding of our Lord's life and teaching, but because in the Old Testament they found the language of perfect faith which came to them as a spiritual tonic. They needed to keep before them the truth so insisted upon by prophets and psalmists: "God is our hope and strength: a very present help in trouble. Therefore will we not fear."

The REV. DR. C. F. BURNEY, Oxford, read extracts from his printed paper on "The Writers of the Old Testament and their Message" (*App.*, No. 24). The special point which he selected for consideration concerned the authors of the Old Testament literature. "Adopting the modern critical standpoint, how far may it be said that we gain a clearer insight into the personality of the writers, and the message which they felt themselves inspired to convey to their age?" In dealing with this subject the writer took his starting-point from the eighth century prophets (Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah), and worked back from these to the prophetic schools of the middle and earlier period of the monarchy, as illustrated by the old narratives embodied in the Pentateuch and the Historical Books (Joshua to Kings). This led him further back to speak of the importance which is to be attached to the personality and work of Moses. He considered that we are bound to assume "that Moses not only established the exclusive worship of the one God Yahwe, but also must have invested his presentation of the Deity with certain definite moral characteristics which enabled the religion of Yahwe to resist, in the long run, the seductive influence of the nature-worship of Canaan, and preserved it to become the pure ethical monotheism of the eighth-century prophets. Granted this, it becomes relatively unimportant how much of Israel's religious institutions can, in the form in which they are known to us, be actually ascribed to Moses. Throughout Israel's subsequent history, the ceremonial codes which took shape from time to time represent the adaptation to the needs of particular ages of the religious principles which Moses laid down. They may be regarded as the stream of which he forms the fountain-head, and thus (if we judge them by the literary standard of their age, and not by our modern standard of literary

integrity) they are justified in assuming the sanction of his great name. The ultimate test of their religious worth is not what verdict would be passed at the present day upon such a method of literary composition, but the way in which their purpose appeals to the human conscience as having been animated and directed by the Spirit of God."

Omitting the remaining sections of his subject, which dealt with the development of Old Testament religion in the ages subsequent to the eighth century, Dr. Burney summarized his paper as follows: "In this brief sketch my aim has been to show that, through recognition of the process of development in Old Testament religion, which has been brought about by the modern critical method of study, the figures of the writers of the literature come to stand out in bolder relief. A man is best known through the understanding of his ideals; and it may be claimed that we now possess a clearer comprehension of the religious ideals of individual writers through the viewing of them in relation to the history of the times which gave them birth, and as links in the chain of religious thought which can now be traced through the pages of the Old Testament. The fact that many of the Old Testament books are seen to be composite, and to contain the work of several writers instead (as was formerly thought) of one only, is surely of the nature of a gain rather than a loss. For this means the gaining of new accessions to 'the goodly fellowship of the prophets', who, in many ages and under varied circumstances, felt themselves moved by the Holy Spirit to proclaim some special aspect of divine truth, and thus to prepare the way for the Revelation in the fullness of time."

The REV. DR. WACE, Dean of Canterbury, said it was with much regret that he felt obliged to offer a strong opposition not only to a great deal of what had been said by the writers of the papers respecting the Old Testament, but to the main principles which they had assumed. He thought it would be a very grievous thing if those papers stood alone, before the Church and the world at large, as the view generally accepted in the Anglican Communion on the subject before them. In the face of the maintenance of strong dissent from their views, both in Germany and in England, he could not but regard it as lacking in fairness that the writers should speak as if the view which they took on the subject were the only one tenable in the light of modern scholarship, and that Dr. Burney, for instance, should content himself with a brief and magisterial rejection, in a note, of the arguments of the principal representative in this country of the traditional view—Professor Orr, of Glasgow. Dean Wace expressed the hope that the universal belief of the Jewish and Christian Churches for 2,000 years, respecting their sacred Scriptures, might still be allowed a hearing in an assembly of the Anglican Church. Strongly upholding the traditional view of the Bible, he pointed out that

200 years before our Lord, the Jews regarded the books of the Old Testament, as we now had them, as containing the inspired record of their history, and entertained the same general view of that history as had prevailed in their own Church and in the Christian Church until quite modern times. Part of that view was that the ceremonial, as well as the moral law of Moses, in the Pentateuch, as well as the book of Deuteronomy, proceeded at least in the main from Moses. The theory assumed by Dr. Burney, in his paper, was that Deuteronomy must be ascribed to about the year 600 B.C., and that the greater part of the ceremonial law was drawn up during the exile, about 500 B.C. So that they were required to suppose that the Jews of 200 B.C. had somehow been persuaded that laws or writings which were only 300 years old, were really 1,000 years older. Was it conceivable that an acute, tenacious "stiff-necked" race had allowed a whole code of laws, and the sudden enforcement of those laws by alleged divine authority, to have been imposed upon them as having been given by God to Moses, when those laws were really not much older than times which were no further from them than Queen Elizabeth's days were from our own? Every scholar nowadays had on his table a complete code of laws comparable in extent and character to that of the Pentateuch, which was ascribed to a king named Hammurabi, who lived about 2,000 years B.C., and who was probably a contemporary of Abraham. Dr. Wace went on to contend that it was immaterial whether the Pentateuch was written by half a dozen hands or not. The real question was, whether they wrote on the authority of loose popular reminiscences, or, as might be reasonably supposed, on the basis of ancient documents. Criticism might be justified in not assigning all the Pentateuch to Moses, any more than all the Psalms could be assigned to David, or the Proverbs to Solomon. The traditional view was that the compilation was made under the superintending influence of God's Spirit guiding the writers to the essence of the history. Every archaeological discovery of the last few years had either added to the probability of that view, or removed difficulties from it. The assumption of those whom Dr. Burney represented was a perfectly preposterous application of criticism. Vital spiritual principles were involved in the conflict between the theory which Dr. Burney represented as the critical view, and the view of the Bible. The narrative in the Bible represented God as the great author and inspirer of His own revelation, not leaving men gradually to find Him out as they would discover principles of science, or of ethics, or of theology, but Himself finding them out, entering personally into relations of covenant with them from the very outset of revelation in the person of Abraham, and leading them on by successive words, promises, rebukes, disclosures, to know Him better, to trust and to follow Him. The other view represented men as struggling for centuries with crude thoughts of God, without any

sure, clear, or authoritative revelation from Him. It was all the difference between a natural evolution and a positive supernatural education. If they were wrong in their conceptions of the order of the divine revelation, their authority as spiritual teachers was dangerously, if not fatally, shaken. But he submitted they had abundant reason, alike in the best criticism and in the most striking archaeological discoveries of their day, for adhering firmly to the old belief and in trusting the Bible's own plain account of the history of God's people.

The REV. A. R. F. HYSLOP, Warden of Glenalmond, said he stood as an unworthy representative of a large body of schoolmasters who had been helped by the modern criticism, not in its extreme development, but in the fact that it gave them a point of view from which they might teach their boys. The modern critical view had cleared the horizon, and enabled him to teach Old Testament literature as being in a sense co-ordinated to the other early literatures of the world. There was, Mr. Hyslop declared, no question of undermining the early beliefs of the boys whom they taught, but the object was to imprint upon their minds the indelible knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. It had been said that they were overthrowing the beliefs of those whom they taught. His own impression was that the schoolboy had very few beliefs to overthrow. They wanted so to teach him that he would not have to unlearn his knowledge when he went out into the world. In the opinion of some people, the religious education of a public school resembled a refined Paganism. He supposed that was so at its worst, but at its best it was capable of something more. He hoped the day would soon come when head masters would recognize their duty not only to teach the Old Testament and the New, but also to give their scholars a thorough knowledge of the Catechism and Prayer Book, so that they might thereby be influenced to become loyal sons of the Church.

CANON R. B. GIRDLESTONE exhibited the traditional view of the Old Testament as modified and confirmed by a critical study of the sacred text. Jews and Christians agreed, he remarked, in accepting the Old Testament as having been in existence, substantially as we had it now, since the second or third century B.C.

1. How did they get back so far? To that end let them approach the subject as they did the New Testament: examine MSS. (none very early), versions (especially the LXX, of which they had only Christian copies), groups (see Prologue to Ecclesiasticus), quotations and allusions (New Testament, Josephus, Philo, and Apocrypha).
2. How did they get back further? Let them loosen the books of the Old Testament and put them in order according to their ideas, historical contents, genealogies, allusions, and quotations. N.B. Hebrew authors did not mark their quotations or name their authorities (but compare Jer. xxvi with Micah iii). The later presupposed the earlier all the way through.

What was Nehemiah's Bible? Let them note his use of Lev. xxvi and Deut. xxx when he pleaded in prayer ; and go back to Amos' use of Deut. xxviii in the solemn climax of his fourth chapter. In this way they could work back to the age of Moses, and thence to the patriarchal age. This was the main method on which they depended, and it produced moral certainty if not absolute demonstration that the traditional view was substantially true.

3. As to the positive age (as contrasted with the relative order), they judged by contents. Genesis was made up of patriarchal records which naturally came into Joseph's charge. The next four books contained history, legislation, and parting speeches, as the official records prepared under the authority of Moses. They had marks of being contemporary. The books of Samuel and Kings were one consecutive work prepared, not by secular annalists, but by prophets who were a school (compare the case of the *Saxon Chronicle*) founded by Samuel, the Kohathite and the descendant of the ill-fated Korah. He was the connecting link between the old and new régime. On collating the historical portions of Chronicles with these books it became clear that the chronicler had them before him ; thus, 200 verses out of ten chapters in Samuel were used in Chronicles (see *Deuterographs*, Clarendon Press, Oxford) ; and, thanks to the chronicler, they knew the names of most of the writers of Samuel and Kings. But the collation of the texts showed us that much must be allowed for bad copying, for late notes, for transliteration, and for translation. Those who held the traditional view regarded these histories as of the highest authority, and as written by prophetic men whose labours were directed by a Power higher than their own. In assuming the substantial integrity of the books, they parted company with those who considered themselves at liberty to discredit or at least suspect any passage which contained a miracle or a distinct prophecy, to bring down dates and alter texts at will, and to fix attention on discrepancies and supposed mistaken repetitions rather than on the grand proportions of the books as a whole.

4. Hebrew language had something to say to the subject. There was a stratification in the books in spite of later unification. Genesis had its archaisms. The pre-technical usage of certain words and the provincialisms, which were by no means marks of lateness, should be specially noted. In the next four books they should note such words as Abib, the Moabite "curse", the differences between the lists of animals (Tristram) ; and in David's time the new military and musical words, and such new titles as "the Lord of Hosts", also the two spellings of David (Kings and Chronicles). In conclusion, Canon Girdlestone urged that more time should be given to the books than to the criticisms. He held that the mission of Christ presupposed, accounted for, and endorsed the Old Testament narrative and record as a whole.

The BISHOP OF CALCUTTA left the chair, which was taken by the BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK. Dr. Copleston pleaded for longer hesita-

tion before the Church accepted, especially in their extremer forms, the conclusions of the critics ; not because he was afraid of them, but because he did not believe they had been proved. His reason for hesitating to accept them was not that he insisted on believing only what could be proved deductively, and knew nothing of induction. He brought the critical conclusions to the test of the laws of induction, and the principles of probable inference ; and he seemed to find the induction vitiated by defects, and the balance of probability wrongly constructed. Amongst defects he reckoned such as these : recourse was occasionally had to the alteration of the text to suit the theory ; excessive recourse was had to what was sound in a limited extent, the supposition of editors by whom the texts have been revised ; these editors, when their work was looked at in detail, were found at one time incredibly careless in leaving things unadjusted, at another, incredibly shrewd, not to say wily, in adjusting them ; while on a large scale they displayed in selection a genius which would be itself a miracle. Further, the theory involved a considerable number of authors, quite unknown, each of whom would have stood in the very first ranks of literature, beside a Plato or a Shakespeare. By removing from the beginning of Hebrew literature the Mosaic books, the critics left unaccounted for that unity of the language of the Old Testament, from the beginning to the end, which, though it was not absolute, was far more signal than could be found in the first four or five centuries of any other literature which had not been controlled by some great authoritative standard work, or group of works. Against the probabilities which made, he fully admitted, a striking and imposing array on the side of the critics, he set such as the following, which belonged, he believed, to a higher order. The improbability, in view of the character and circumstances of the Jewish nation, first, that they were widely ignorant of the history of their own literature, and secondly, that so large a proportion of their literature was anonymous or pseudonymous ; the still greater improbability, in view of the same conditions, that their notion of their national history, so definite, so modest, so wrought into all their life, was totally mistaken ; and the improbability that a national character, so strong and so unique, should have been the product, not of historical causes calculated to produce it, but of the adoption of a legend. Yet it was to be admitted that all these criticisms, even if admitted, left untouched the spiritual and miraculous character of the Old Testament. The Jewish Bible, as it stood, say, fifty years before our Lord came, was in itself a product far beyond anything else that existed in the world, and in the light of its fulfilment it was seen to be a miracle greater than any that it recorded, a wonder unexplainable, a sign of divine revelation, a work of almighty power—able to make men wise unto salvation.

The REV. W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, D.D., Principal of

Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, said: It has recently been said (Burney, *Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1908) that the documentary hypothesis together with its corollary, the priority of the prophetic to the legalistic period of development, has been "proved up to the hilt for any thinking and unprejudiced man who is capable of estimating the character and value of the evidence". Nevertheless there are still some who have examined this evidence as thoroughly as they can who are yet impenitent and unabashed in their opposition to the critical position. The right of Old Testament criticism is one thing: the validity of current Old Testament criticism is quite another. In spite of having to be regarded as unthinking and prejudiced they believe that the critical position in general and the documentary hypothesis in particular, as usually stated, are almost entirely untenable. They believe this on the following, among other grounds.

1. The critical hypothesis really raises the fundamental question whether Israel's religion is an evolution or a revelation. Either theory alone is arguable, but it is absolutely impossible to blend them. If Jehovah was originally an unreal Storm God or something of the kind, the conception of Whom was an evolution of the Israelites' own thoughts (or borrowed from others), but Who, as time went on, was developed into a real God, the God of the prophets, Who really chose the people of Israel and made His covenant with them; then He is not the God Who revealed Himself to Abraham and to Moses as the one true God. Evolution of man's thoughts about God and the revelation of the true God by gradual stages to men are, both of them, positions that can be understood, but the attempt to cross from the one to the other, or to state the one in the terms of the other must always prove a failure. At the back of all questions concerning documents is this fundamental problem: Is Israel's religion a human evolution or a Divine revelation?

2. The second fundamental question at issue is the general trustworthiness of the contents of the Old Testament and of the picture of Israel's history as therein recorded. It is not primarily a question of date, or authorship, or of the number of documents, but of trustworthiness. Is the Old Testament history true? Are its predictions genuine? Are its institutions Divine? The Divine purpose was embodied in and organically developed through the Old Testament, and the reality of this purpose is a proof of the truth of the history which embodies the purpose. It is *in* the history that the purpose is displayed, and it is impossible to deny the trustworthiness of the history without thereby denying the reality of the Divine purpose embodied therein. As it has been well said, "A theory which turns a living history into patch-work is not *a priori* reasonable."

3. The third fundamental question is as to the relation of the documentary hypothesis to the view of religion found in the Old Testament. It is true that the documentary theory can be dis-

cussed apart from the religious, and there is no reason why the various literary strata of the Old Testament should not be considered, and, as far as possible, distinguished; but it is well known that the current critical theory associated with Graf and Wellhausen builds upon this documentary theory a religion of Israel which is frankly anti-supernatural. Dr. Driver, referring to the documentary hypothesis, has said that "Wellhausen's theory, or one approximating to it, harmonizes most completely with the facts of the Old Testament". And yet both by Kuenen and Wellhausen the supernatural element of the Old Testament is definitely denied. Israel's religion is deprived of this supernatural element by the critical rearrangement of the books so as to bring the religion into harmony with the principle of evolution. It is scarcely possible to separate the literary from the religious problem, for in many cases the decisions arrived at on literary grounds are almost entirely controlled by the view taken of the origin and development of the religion.

4. The next question is as to the tenableness of the documentary hypothesis itself. It is well known that it commenced, and was for long almost entirely associated, with a distinction of use of the Divine Names, but, as Professor George Adam Smith says, the distinction "is too precarious to determine a distinction of authorship" (*Modern Criticism*, p. 35). Besides, how on this theory are we to explain the frequent divergences of the Septuagint and the Samaritan texts from the Hebrew in reference to the names of God in Genesis? The fact is that the documentary hypothesis has undergone and is still undergoing marked changes at the hands of its advocates. The "assured results" are by no means assured, but are in a state of almost continual movement. Thus, the train of reasoning in so recent a book as Driver's *Genesis* (p. xxviii, ff.) as to the chronology of the Priestly Code, has been completely refuted by a recent discovery which has vindicated the accuracy of the Biblical data (L. W. King, *Chronicles concerning Early Babylonian Kings*, vol. i, pp. 22-5). Bishop Stubbs, who ought to have known the rules of historical evidence, says that "the fact that Holy Scripture is like no other book has led critics to apply to it methods of arbitrary, wanton, and conjectural criticism which, if applied to Greek, or Roman, or even Anglo-Saxon literature would be laughed out of court".

5. The evidence of archaeology is also to the point. Not only has it not made a single contribution in support of the essential principles of the Old Testament critical school, but it has provided not a few which support the traditional position. One after another of the leading archaeologists have given up their adhesion to the Wellhausen school and have become its resolute opponents. Dr. Burney's recent admission of the need of a reconstruction of the commonly accepted critical view, as to the development of Israelite religion, is one out of many proofs of the influence of archaeology; and the Elephantine Fragments constitute another

indication of the problems that still remain open which were thought to have been closed for ever.

6. From an entirely different standpoint we also contend that the new view of the Old Testament has not as yet lent itself to Christian use in preaching and teaching. One who is himself a higher critic says that "It is not possible for the ordinary mind to follow the patient and intricate processes of historical criticism. . . In speaking to the people the preacher must take the Old Testament as it stands or else leave it alone" (Robertson Nicoll). As a result the Old Testament often *is* left alone by those who ought to be teaching it. But if the critical view is right, inasmuch as it makes so great a difference to the Old Testament, it ought to be preached fearlessly and fully. If it cannot be preached the new view stands self-condemned. If it can be preached we have yet to see how it is possible to do so without overturning the historical tradition of centuries. People do not easily understand how a historical revelation of God can be mediated through so very much unhistorical and unreliable material. Certainly the preaching of the new view would give an idea of the Old Testament very different from that held by our Lord and His Apostles.

7. We contend that the new view of the Old Testament not only does not solve the many outstanding problems, but raises still more than it solves. We want a theory that will fit all the facts and not some of them only, and we maintain that the conservative and traditional view fits more of the facts than the modern view does, and above all that it provides room for and explains the supernatural element. As Dr. Plummer says, "It is not contended that no difficulties are presented by the history as it stands. What is denied is that what has been called the 'destructive criticism' has found a way out of them. On the contrary, it involves us in far greater difficulties than it removes" (Pulpit Commentary, *Introduction to Joshua*, p. ix).

For these reasons, therefore, we maintain an attitude of opposition to the critical position, and we still wait for critics of the first rank to face in detail and vanquish the positions maintained in such books as Robertson's *Early Religion of Israel*, the same author's *Poetry and Religion of the Psalms*, and Orr's *Problem of the Old Testament*. These, and other books, have never yet been dealt with as they deserve and demand by leading critics of the opposite school. Meanwhile those who know what the Old Testament has been to the Jewish Church and the Christian Church in all ages, the trustworthy embodiment, progressively revealed, of the Divine purpose for the world, will continue to hold fast to the traditional view, more convinced than ever as they continue to study the critical position that "the old is better".

MRS. CARUS WILSON asked what was the result, for the average Bible reader, of the identification of Bible study with the critical hypothesis? The result was simply that knowledge of the Old Testament became less and less. The average man and woman,

when confronted with different critical views, felt bewildered. They did not read the works of scholars, and they got their ideas of criticisms of the Bible at second or third hand and in a crude and exaggerated form, and in consequence they left the Old Testament alone altogether. Mrs. Wilson maintained that there was nothing to fear from a criticized Bible. Criticism that was true would illumine the Bible; criticism that was not true would recoil upon the critic. What they had to fear was a neglected Bible as the result of critical theories regarding it. The proof of the inspiration of the Bible, she added, was now, as it had always been, found in the inspiring power of the Bible.

The REV. DR. REDPATH, London, pointed out that the present condition of things with regard to the higher criticism was causing much unrest and distress, and he thought that any one who could, should do his best to allay it. In the few minutes allotted to him, he could only lay stress on two points. It seemed scarcely credible that it should be left to the nineteenth or twentieth century to find out that that which had been believed to be history was nothing of the kind, but that the writers of the history were of a much later day and read into it the views and thoughts of their own days. As to evolution, it was a matter for serious consideration whether the doctrine of evolution could be applied to spiritual matters, especially in these days when men of science were telling us that there was a great deal in that direction beyond their ken. Further, if the ideas formed about God were due to evolution, there was great danger if this theory prevailed that it might appear that the Divine Being was after all a creation of man, and not a revelation of Himself from God to man. The whole problem then comes to this: Does evolution come before revelation or revelation before evolution? If it were asked, "How do you then account for the degraded forms of religion, which arose so early in the history of the world?" the answer may be made in the spirit of the old proverb, "The corruption of the best is the worst." We have only to consider the degraded forms of Christianity which are to be found in the world to see that even the most degraded heathen religions can be such a corruption of the purest revelation made at the beginning.

The REV. J. GREATHEAD, Corringham, remarked that if our Lord had criticized the Bible—He was Lord of it all—that would not justify every sciolist in doing so; but He did not criticize the Bible, which He always treated with the greatest reverence: He criticized men. "Moses, for the hardness of your hearts, allowed you to put away your wives." With regard to the imprecatory Psalms, it was to be feared that Christian people did not understand that the Psalms were to be said in the person of Christ, and not in their own persons, as they may use hymns. David and the psalmists wrote by the inspiration of the Spirit of Christ. "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy" (Rev. xix. 10).

The Psalms were in the first place the Prayer Book of Christ, and they come to us as such. They had no right to pick out certain Psalms, and call them Messianic, as Psalm xxii, and deny that title to Psalm xxiii, the Psalm of the Good Shepherd. In using the Psalms especially, Christian people must remember St. Paul's saying, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me".

The RIGHT REV. J. E. HINE, Bishop of Zanzibar, asked how, in the face of prevalent Bible criticism, they were to teach the Bible to people who had just come out of barbarism? Or how were they to speak of the Bible to, say, Mohammedans in Africa? They were bound to be definite. How were the higher critics going to teach the Bible to heathen people? How were they to teach it to young African teachers and clergy, when they did not know what professor this and doctor that would say about it next year. What was wanted in the foreign mission field was facts, and not vague, fluctuating theories. The bishop thought they should adhere to the traditional methods of teaching till the Church gave them definite guidance on the subject.

The BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK declared that the new way of regarding the Bible had helped him to understand and love and preach the Old Testament. It had removed various difficulties and some anxieties that he had felt in regard to that portion of the Bible. He looked at the traditional view with great respect, but there had been vast changes in the proportion and perspective of thought in all matters, and he felt that all this required that they should have things new as well as old. The traditional view was not so traditional as had been represented. Origen, for instance, said long ago that God allowed unhistorical statements in the Old Testament lest men should put their faith in the letter and miss the spirit. Origen discerned what it was given them to see in much fuller measure, and was very far from pinning himself literally to what might be called the traditional view. As to substitutions of legend for history, was there not relief to their minds and consciences in the assumption, which seemed so obvious, that God should have worked through imaginative forms as well as through mere record and chronicles? At any rate, whatever they believed, let them not bind burdens on other people's consciences. If it was their view that all the ten plagues of Egypt happened exactly as they were recorded in the Bible; that they were as much history as was Hansard; let them keep that view until they saw reason to change it, but let them not condemn their brother who considered that belief inconsistent with the best light God had given him. It was to be noticed that Dean Wace did not give his authority to those who claimed all the Pentateuch to have been written by Moses. Having remarked that those of them who felt certain that in the main the critical position meant an onward movement of thought and knowledge, and illuminated their whole conception of God, Bishop Talbot said they did not want to get rid of miracle, but they wanted above all to see that

the whole work culminating in Christ, was, in a unique sense, of God. He had no doubt that the first of the new critics had done what the first men in any movement were very apt to do—they had gone a great deal too far. Some of Dr. Cheyne's work, for example, was quite astonishing in that way.

CANON KENNETT, in the course of his reply, said that one thing he should like particularly to emphasize was that to the Hebrew nation historical truth was of very little moment compared with spiritual truth, and he therefore thought it was very unfortunate that people were in the habit of speaking about "the historical books of the Old Testament". They had only to look at a book, like the Book of Kings, to realize that the writer or compiler of that book was not writing history in our sense of the word. Canon Kennett protested against the supposition that evolution and revelation were in the least degree antagonistic. With regard to the teaching of the young, his experience at Cambridge was that those who came there had no knowledge of the Old Testament: not because they had been taught critical questions, but because those that ought to have taught them—their fathers and mothers and teachers—were too timid to face those questions for themselves, too timid to make up their minds as to what they ought to teach their children. Moreover it was not critical truth that unsettled people's minds, but having to unlearn what their fathers and mothers had taught them as truth. With regard to what should be taught in the mission field, he might say that he had friends and pupils, holding in the main the teaching so much attacked, who were doing magnificent work as missionaries in Central Africa. That teaching helped them to speak in St. Paul's spirit, "Whom ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you;" and they could go to the natives with infinitely greater sympathy than if they had to say, "You must give up everything you have received from your fathers."

DR. BURNEY, in his reply, commented upon the absence of acrimoniousness which had characterized the discussion, and said that one could not help being thankful for the advance which had been made in recognizing the right of criticism, and in not imputing wrong motives to those who were spoken of as higher critics. He must have singularly failed if his view could be represented as turning the Old Testament topsy turvy. The great gain from criticism was that it helped to elucidate the Old Testament revelation, restoring, as it were, the mosaic instead of leaving us merely with the scattered fragments. In answer to the argument of the Dean of Canterbury, as to the possibility of the existence of written documents in the age of Moses, Dr. Burney stated that this had been granted by all critics without exception for at least the past quarter of a century, and that he himself was in cordial agreement with all that the speaker had said upon this point. The critical theory of the composition of the Pentateuch was, however, based on other

grounds than this ; and if the Dean's argument was the strongest that could be advanced against it, the case upon the other side could not be regarded as a very strong one. Dr. Burney went on to take exception to the distinction drawn by Dr. Griffith Thomas between evolution and revelation, as though the two terms stood in necessary antagonism. Throughout history they found God's Spirit revealing itself through a gradual process of evolution, and in the Old Testament they found this in a very special sense. The justification of the Old Testament was found in its fulfilment in the New Testament. Some speakers had emphasized the fact that they had nothing to fear from criticism. How could they fear when their Lord Himself had said of His Church that the gates of hell shall not prevail against her? That was the confidence in which they ought to study the Bible in the light of modern criticism, and then they could trust that, in the future, things would become more clear, and that the inspiration of the Old Testament would be more fully understood and valued.

The CHAIRMAN, in a few closing words, spoke of the debate as having established, at any rate, one thing—that whichever side upon the great questions which they had discussed they might take, scholars who stood within the sacred circle of God's Church, and were enlightened by His holy ordinances, could hold either view without the slightest detriment to the loyalty and intensity of their faith in Him Who was the centre of all.

THE CRITICAL STUDY OF THE BIBLE

(b) THE NEW TESTAMENT

KENSINGTON TOWN HALL. MONDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 22

The MOST REV. R. S. COPLESTON, D.D., Bishop of Calcutta, presided.

The REV. DR. SANDAY, Margaret Professor of Divinity, Oxford, the writer of the paper on "The Gain from Criticism for the Study of the New Testament" (*App.*, No. 25), compared notes with Professor Burkitt, the author of the paper on "How to Teach the Bible" (*App.*, No. 26). Dr. Sanday said he was a most sincere admirer of Professor Burkitt's writings, but he must confess that the paper did not satisfy him. Professor Burkitt, he thought, was rather too much of a Modernist, and he (Dr. Sanday) had always been what might be called a Biblicist, holding that the Bible could stand upon its own base, and that it needed no recommendation from without. No doubt it had received such commendation; it had been endorsed and sanctioned by the Church and by the devout use of Christian people, and he was glad that it should have had this sanction and this use. If it had not been so—a state of things which they really could not conceive—the Church itself would have been immeasurably poorer; indeed it would not be the Church which they knew. But he believed that the Bible stood upon its own merits, and would stand upon them, even though it had no external support of any kind. He believed that, notwithstanding the fact that he could not help assenting to what might seem to many a sweeping sentence of Professor Burkitt. The sentence was this: "We have found out that the science of the Bible is antiquated, its history not essentially different in kind or in accuracy from other old chronicles, and its ethics and its theology at the best only suited for the stage of development at which the various writers have arrived." As he was going to express some difference from Professor Burkitt, it was only fair and right that he should begin by saying how far he agreed with him, especially as he knew that not a few would condemn them both together. However that might be, with the exception of three small words, he must in honesty say that he agreed with the sentence he had quoted. He might have said "reluctantly agreed"; but that, too, would not be right. He regarded the sentence as true; in other words, it represented what was God's doing; and whatever God did was well, whether they could see it at once or not. But his main point was that, although the

sentence on the whole was true, it did not affect the heart of the matter. When every deduction had been made, there was still that in the Bible which was not to be found, in anything like the same degree, in any other book, and it came home to them in a way that no other book ever did. When he said just previously that there were three little words in the sentence with which he could not agree, he was referring to the phrase "at the best", where it was said that the ethics and theology of the Bible "at the best" were only suited for the stage of development at which the various writers had arrived. He admitted that there was a good deal that really was adapted to, and they might say limited by, the particular state of development for which it was written. But by the side of all this, there were hundreds of things, thousands of things, that did go beyond the immediate outlook, and were true permanently for all time; and these were just as fresh and as penetrating now as when they were written. He would illustrate what he meant with reference to the remainder of Professor Burkitt's paper, where he would like to state the facts, as they appeared to him, rather differently. Perhaps they might come round to something like the same view in the end; and he should be glad to think that they did so. But the main tenor of what Professor Burkitt had written seemed to him to pitch the claims of the Bible, and particularly of the New Testament, too low. There were three grounds on which they might base the claims of the Bible. First, they might base them upon the fact that the Bible told them about Christ. That was the ground which many modern writers would take; and the larger part of what Professor Burkitt had written would come under that description. It was a further step to say that the Bible "preaches Christ"—*Christum treibt*, as Luther had said. This seemed to him to be the more adequate way of speaking. But he should like to go further still, and to say that the Bible—Old Testament as well as New—not only preached Christ, but preached religion; and that far more powerfully and effectually than any other book in the world. He did not like it when his colleague said that "very few of us become Christians from reading the Bible nowadays." Of course, if they were to be pedantically literal, very few of them there had become Christians at all, because they were made Christians before they could speak. But as to the sustaining and expressing of the religious life, he for one believed that he owed more to the Bible than to anything else besides. He could not put in contrast to the Bible what he did or observed in obedience to the Bible. But just in that direction, there was one practical reform that he personally desired more earnestly than any other reform besides. He wished that they of the Church of England could follow the example of the American Church in using at their services and in their Prayer Books, not the whole Psalter as it stood, but a selection from the Psalter. That was to say, he wished that they

had the Psalms "at their best", and not simply as they were suffered to be written for the hardness of men's hearts. He desired this, if he might be pardoned for saying so, because his admiration for the Psalter was so intense. Those ancient saints put into his mouth words which, but for them, he would have longed to be able to say, and would never have succeeded in saying—such words, he meant, as, "Like as the hart desireth the water brooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, O God"; "Whom have I in heaven but Thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison with Thee." But he confessed that it did jar upon him more than he could say, in taking to oneself such a sublime Psalm as the 139th, suddenly to come across the verse, "Wilt Thou not slay the wicked, O God; depart from me, ye bloodthirsty men"; or again, in the 137th, that most pathetic song of all exiles and captives, to end with a prayer that even the children of Babylon might be dashed against the stones. These things, he confessed, troubled him more than the Athanasian Creed. Just this amount of eclecticism he should like to exercise; but only, as Professor Kennett had so admirably pointed out, in the sense in which an example had been set by their Lord Jesus Christ Himself. On the larger question he might be allowed to repeat what he said in his previous paper. Their forefathers received the Bible as a sacred book, and for them too it was sacred. They believed it to be sacred because inspired. They believed that the Holy Spirit really influenced the minds of the human authors, that the book really was what God willed that it should be; that it conveyed what He willed that it should convey, and therefore that it was still rightly called His Holy Word.

The CHAIRMAN said he would be expressing the feeling of the meeting when he stated that every word that Professor Sanday had uttered they were thankful to hear. But the New Testament, not the Old Testament, was the subject for consideration that afternoon. Therefore the speakers who were to follow must not take up the lead which Professor Sanday had given with regard to books of the Old Testament.

MR. F. C. BURKITT, Norrisian Professor of Divinity, Cambridge, replied to what he termed the very thoughtful and suggestive criticisms that they had heard. He really thought that he and Dr. Sanday meant very much the same thing in the end. So much were they agreed, so admirable was the way that Dr. Sanday had put the main uses of Bible study, that he would repeat something Dr. Sanday had said. "The Bible told them about Christ." Yes, there they were all agreed; without the Bible to inform and to correct us, we could not learn to make the acquaintance of our Lord. "The Bible preaches Christ to us." Yes, it presented men with a view of human life, in history and in psychology,

in which our Lord was set forth as the central figure round which the whole revolved, and from which the phenomena of life received their real meaning. "The Bible—Old Testament as well as New—not only preaches Christ, but preaches religion; and that far more powerfully than any other book in the world." Any other *book*? Here they came to the thought which he had tried to express in his paper. He had no desire to set up any form of ecclesiasticism in contrast to the Bible. He could not claim to be a High Churchman, nor did he wish to press the point that it was the Church of former ages that collected and canonized the Bible. But was it not a fact that Christianity was transmitted by the living hands of men, by the ministration of living Christians? Christianity was not really carried about in a book, however canonical, however inspired. If the Christian religion were to die out, he did not suppose it could be revived by studying the Bible. It was very well that the ultimate shrine of Christianity was in the hearts of men, and not in a written constitution contained in the Bible; otherwise, the progress of critical study might be a danger rather than an advantage to them. The critical study of the Bible, that was, the study of the Bible as a collection of pieces of ancient literature to be viewed and understood in relation to the general history of the world during times at which various parts were written—this study was no mere passing attack upon old-established beliefs. On the contrary, it was a science that had come to stay, and to exercise a most important influence on their own views about religion. Indeed, it had already influenced their views. Critical theories about this or that study of the Gospel history, or of St. Paul's doctrines, might come and go, they might take this or that side about current Biblical controversies; but this at least was true—they no longer believed, or disbelieved, on the authority of the Bible itself. The Christian who had felt the power of religion in himself, or seen it demonstrated in others, might continue to give the Bible a respectful hearing, he might appropriate its ancient phrases as the vehicle of his own religious utterance, he might cherish the belief that the difficulties of the Bible were capable of explanation; but he did all this because, for other reasons, he was attracted to the Christian religion. With the outsider it was different. The man who had lost his Christianity did not feel the authority of the Bible. The outsider felt neither mental nor moral effort in disregarding its message. This was not always the case. There was a time, not so very long ago, when the Bible seemed to speak to men with authority about the beginning of this world and about its approaching end. It told the history of mankind before secular records began, it unveiled the secrets of heaven, it was without a rival. No wonder, therefore, that the study of the Bible was felt to be a sacred duty. But how did things stand now? To the outsider the Bible was one of the Sacred Books of the East, one out of the literatures of Western

Asia. It seemed to him now that the Christian Church should realize this change more clearly than it had yet done, and consciously value the Bible for the reasons that made it still really valuable, rather than for the glamour which yet remained of its ancient nimbus. And, therefore, he had desired to put before them the prosaic contention that the Bible was mainly useful to them as their chief source of information about the career on earth and the message of Jesus of Nazareth, and about the deeds and words of His first disciples. The impulse that compelled men to search for the fullest and most trustworthy information they could obtain concerning this corner of human history did not come from the Bible. He needed only to look round that crowded hall to see where it came from; it came from the living devotion of the Christian to his Lord, of Whom indeed he was a member. It was the Church, the still living Church, that made the Bible still interesting to others than professional scholars. That view of the Bible, as educational rather than as directly edifying, would help to keep them from the vain attempt to fence round a Bible within the Bible, or to save the New Testament by throwing the Old Testament over to the critics. They needed the New Testament to familiarize them with the figure of our Lord, but they needed the Old Testament—the Apocrypha as well as the canonical books—to familiarize them with the atmosphere of thought in which He lived as a man amongst men. Therefore, they could never afford to do without the Old Testament, they could never cast it aside, just saving a collection of elegant extracts for private use. They needed it all to understand the New Testament. And they needed the New Testament not so much to lead men to Christ, not so much as a positive means of grace, but rather as an instrument of criticism. It supplied the material by which they could correct and focus the image of Christ which had been imprinted on their hearts by their fellow Christians.

The REV. LL. J. M. BEBB, D.D., Principal of St. David's College, Lampeter, pointing out that the critical study of the Bible began as part of the general examination of historical documents characteristic of the last century, held that it was, therefore, not to be viewed by Christians with hostility or even suspicion. Biblical criticism had now passed from textual and literary to historical criticism. It had certainly changed their attitude towards the Bible, but it had enormously strengthened its position, both on general points of textual criticism and literary exegesis, and also in regard to the historical value of separate books like the Acts.

As a result of critical study, teachers should frankly recognize and not explain away the existence of difficulties and discrepancies. But the difficulties were often not new, but as old as the Bible itself, and in the Bible, as elsewhere, they were the soil in which

faith grew ; and to cease to have difficulties was to cease to make progress, while the discrepancies were often due to the incompleteness of their knowledge, and were in many cases of minor importance.

As a result of critical study, again, teachers should remember that in interpreting the New Testament it was not one book, but many, teaching them as the Old Testament did by "divers portions and in divers manners", written by different persons in different circumstances, with different literary canons, e.g. as to the use of the Old Testament, and expressed in the religious language of the time, but amid all the diversities of thought, circumstance, and expression, united as the record and interpretation of a life.

But at the same time the teacher should be on his guard against false antitheses—"the letter and the spirit", "Paul or Christ" ; he should not necessarily assume that repetition in our Lord's words was impossible, that similar narratives were always two versions of the same incident, that parallels with other literatures, e.g. in regard to the Virgin birth, made the Bible narrative unhistorical, or that the difficulties of an individual in regard to single incidents, like the raising of Lazarus, were conclusive against its accuracy ; he should be distrustful as to a sweeping use of certain arguments, e.g. those from silence and from literary resemblance, and remembering that he was a trustee for the past to the future, he should assume that tradition was right till it was proved wrong. Lastly, he should remember that the end of Biblical study was not criticism, but life, and that therefore he should be constructive and positive, the end of the study being that they might embrace and ever hold fast the blessed hope of everlasting life which God had given them in their Saviour Jesus Christ. He should therefore endeavour to "make the salient points salient", i.e. those which gave the Bible its permanence and its distinctiveness, viz. its revelation of God, of man, of life.

In regard to the present-day method of teaching, it would be wise of the clergy to adopt more largely courses of expository sermons, and to emphasize the study of the Bible itself, rather than books about the Bible, for "though commentaries may teach, it is the text alone which inspires".

In regard to the teacher himself, he should remember (1) that spiritual truth could only be spiritually discerned, that the bond between the subject and object of knowledge was the Spirit which alone "searched the deep things of God", and therefore he should be "filled with the Spirit"; (2) that "authority was the life of teaching", and therefore he should be able to "teach with all authority", but that authority at the present time should be not official, but personal, based on knowledge and on sincerity.

The REV. DR. JELF, Master of the Charterhouse, thought there were many delegates in that great Congress who, like himself, were

quiet people, with no special ability for criticism, shy of hearing their own voice, sometimes troubled by the many voices around, but who yet deeply venerated and daily searched their Bible and that beloved Prayer Book which constantly reflected it, and brought illumination from it, and made it home-like. Might he offer his message to them? None of them who revered the Scriptures need be debarred from some share of that criticism of them which consisted in knowledge, comparison, inward digestion, memory, and love. These were fruits of Holy Writ itself. "When Thy word goeth forth, it giveth light and understanding unto the simple." It was not cleverness, but faith which held the key of the Scriptures, and the key was Christ Himself. Had He not told them, "They are they which testify of Me"? Yet they must bear in mind that the witness to their Lord, though it required the witnesses' entire faithfulness, did not imply detailed infallibility. In the fear of the Lord they need not be afraid to criticize the human elements in the Word, though sure that it was chiefly and essentially Divine. It was not the foolishness of criticism that St. Paul thought of, but the very opposite quality, when he said, "I speak as unto wise men, judge ye what I say." Just so, in a social matter, that same apostle distinguished between his ministerial counsel and his Master's commands. To some he passed these on, as duties divinely authoritative, enjoined by the Lord, not merely by man. "But to the rest", he continued, "speak I, not the Lord." Those instances were suggested to remind them how far, and in what way, they might criticize the setting of the Gospel of our Lord, and the form of His apostles' teaching. They were not to pin their faith on every word or every sentence which was written, but rather to bear in mind the character and temperament, the circumstances and limitations of those "holy men of God", even of the prophets. And so they might use the faculties which God had granted them for discernment, comparison, and interpretation. Many more of them, for instance, might thus note the value of the Revised Version. Many also of their fairly educated churchmen and churchwomen might follow the clergy in the study of the Greek Testament. Therefore they need not be afraid of other and more accomplished critics. There are among them men of devout faith and deep reverence, whose study of the Word and desire to elucidate it should be to us causes of encouragement rather than of alarm, though remembering their changes of opinion we need not necessarily be tied to their conclusions. Time failed to suggest many particulars. Suffice it to advise them, if he might, to be fair to themselves, and not one-sided; to follow the light and leading of the Church, as presented to them in her glorious Creeds, and her peculiar use of the Scriptures entrusted to her; to remember that it was our Lord Himself who opened to them the Scriptures; and to comfort themselves with the assurance that "mysteries are

revealed to the meek", and that "he that is spiritual judgeth all things". But, specially be it theirs to study, every day, that living word of God which was a light unto their path, that everlasting Gospel which enabled them already to know their Lord Jesus Christ. Their glory was not the intellectual appreciation of the Scriptures, but the privilege of reading and learning them spiritually, day by day. They had not forgotten the experience of the pilgrim of their Pan-Anglican allegory, how through sleeping on the hill, he lost awhile that priceless "roll" which used to relieve him, and which, as he said, "should have been his pass into the celestial city." Oh the joy when he found it, and hastened on, never more to part from it! In bygone years they had let all sorts of reading hinder them from that which was the very best of all; and too often they had slept instead of studying. For the rest of their brief life all this should be changed. No day should pass without their searching, at least for a few minutes, that written Word, in which the incarnate Word was found. The sun was going down upon Christian; but the "shining ones" were near, and the darkness was past, and the cherished Gospel showed the way to the home of eternal light and eternal love.

The REV. H. J. R. MARSTON, London, said he thought Dr. Sanday had somewhat overstated the advance of criticism within the last fifty years. Belonging to the Lutheran Church in Germany, there were great interpreters of the Scriptures before the time of Darwin—men who studied mainly to defend the position so severely handled by Dr. Burkitt. Mr. Marston was also of opinion that Dr. Sanday had overstated the debt which they were bound to pay to criticism. It had been virtually claimed there that day that recent critics had humanized the Bible. He ventured to question the accuracy of that statement. If a good deal of what he had read in some recent German writers were true, it was certain that much of what was called humanization of the Bible was rather caricaturization of the Bible. He did not want the Bible humanized. His appreciation of *Faust* had declined since he had read Goethe's autobiography. He preferred the sacred writers to remain in their august impenetrable aloofness, so that he could peruse what they had written without being embarrassed by somewhat petty biography. Further, he dissented from Dr. Sanday's appreciation of what was called the comparative method in religion. If there was anything that struck him (Mr. Marston) about the New Testament it was its incomparability; the New Testament had only the slightest common measure between itself and any other body of literature. While the New Testament remained, as it had so long remained, apparently the unique and mysterious acme of human thought and human language, he thought they were not bound to look with special gratitude upon the achievements of the method of comparison between the New Testament and other books of religion. Mr. Marston went on to say that there were those who

conceived of Christianity as principally an effluence of the Incarnation. For them a great Church, a great philosophy, a great social enthusiasm might easily suffice. But there were others who regarded Christianity as pre-eminently the religion of redemption rather than the religion of the Incarnation. On one point these could never capitulate—the divine and supreme authority of the written Word, which taught the unpalatable doctrines of human guilt and the revelation of the grace of God, and which justifies the sinner in Jesus Christ alone.

The REV. PREBENDARY H. W. WEBB-PEPLOE, London, reminded the clergy, amid some dissent, that their oath and the Articles bound them to believe in every portion of Holy Scripture as a divine revelation. Then he mentioned that a leading authority in the Church of England had written him a letter the previous week concerning the published papers before them that day and certain of the statements made in connexion with the Congress. The last words of that letter were as follow: "Can nothing more be done, than is being done, to arrest the progress of these critical teachers? The Church seems to be handing herself over to the tyranny of the professors." Prebendary Webb-Peploe went on to assert that the whole question of Bible criticism seemed to hang upon what they understood by inspiration. In the deep sense of the word, inspiration meant what St. Peter said, that "holy men of old spake as they were moved" (borne along) "by the Holy Ghost". If the Holy Ghost moved men of the Old Testament, what would they Christians say concerning the men of the New Testament? He maintained that to upset by criticism the faith of men in Jesus Christ, in any one single iota of His being or revelation, was to destroy that which was their fountain-head of hope, their assurance of blessing in eternity, and their power for holiness of life even now. Christ Jesus was Himself the living Word, and the whole book, called the Bible, was the written word concerning Him. Therefore the Bible was, Mr. Webb-Peploe claimed, not as it were an instrument for criticism, but a revelation of God manifest in the flesh for the salvation of man.

The REV. H. N. BATE, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of London, restricted himself within the sphere of New Testament criticism. But New Testament criticism, he remarked, was never without relation to Old Testament studies; and he would be glad if what he had to say tended indirectly to modify the impression produced by most of the speeches that morning, namely that Anglican opinion on critical subjects was mainly retrograde. The study of the New Testament, or rather the Church as using the New Testament, had gained immensely from criticism. The gain was twofold. In the first place, the amount of work done by students had been enormous. In the last seventy-five years a greater mass of minute inquiry had been directed upon the Bible than in the ten preceding centuries. It had been viewed

through the microscope, the telescope, the spectroscope: dissected, analysed, viewed synthetically. Men of all temperaments had worked at it: the German with his laboriousness and masterful apriorism, the Englishman, sometimes, with his special gift of common sense. It was an immense gain for us that our documents had stood out in the light of pure research. I do not say that established views about them have withstood every test; but the fact of having faced the specialists conferred a status upon the books which they did not possess before. The time for timidity, reserve, obscurantism, was past: they are out in the light and rejoiced to be there. But there was also a special gain that had come from criticism. In the early days of modern critical study there were no canons of research, no criteria of evidence to prevent the most fantastic dating of the New Testament literature. The imagination of the learned peopled the second century A.D. with pseudonymous apostles and evangelists. It was possible to place the synoptists a full century after Christ, and St. John at the end of the second century. It was no longer possible to do that. The books had come back step by step to their traditional dates: and this was a gain of the first importance. But, let them remember, that is the fruit of free discussion, and of that very spirit and method which some of them treated with such ungenerous, unchivalrous hostility. It was beside the mark altogether to ridicule the exaggerations of earlier students. Those who know what inductive inquiry was are aware that science owed much to those who ventured much: it was the man who was fertile in hypothesis yet strict to discard the untenable that helped in the mental building of the world. Turning from the past to the future, Mr. Bate remarked that the recovery of an early date for most of the New Testament was not the end of criticism; it was barely more than the beginning. New questions surrounded them. As typical problems of to-day he mentioned the following: What was the essence of our Lord's teaching? what did He mean by Messiahship, and how far did He claim it? Did the kingdom of heaven, as He proclaimed it, belong to this life or only to the next? Or, again, what was the relation of the historical Jesus to the Christ of the Church? Did St. Paul create or inherit his Christology? Was there at any point in the birth-years of Christian theology an invasion of fundamental error? Such were some of the typical problems of the immediate future. Much must depend on the attitude adopted by churchmen to those who pursued such studies, and by critics towards other churchmen. The student need not expect the Church at large to assent readily to new conclusions. The mind of the Church moved slowly: it was well that it was so. It was healthy, normal, that criticism should be forced to try its cases over and over again, and that its conclusions should filter very slowly into the general Christian consciousness. On the other hand, the Church could not ask of the critic anything but sincerity

and reverence. There was one demand that it must not make. It must not ask the student to approach his task with his mind made up, with presuppositions which must be retained whichever way the evidence might point. The principles laid down by some speakers to-day would make scientific study of the New Testament impossible. Science must be free. They must not bar off any inquiry by saying that it would imperil this tradition or that. They were not meant to be the slaves of any tradition : they were surely meant to follow the light, firmly believing that the Holy Spirit would guide them into all the truth.

THE REV. DR. OXENHAM, Rome, spoke a word of encouragement to those devout people who were distressed by Biblical criticism. There were, he admitted, difficulties in the Bible, but they were all capable of explanation, although men had not been able to explain them. Many books in the Bible, critics said, were not written by the persons supposed to be their authors. That was often a confident assertion based on nothing better than guess-work. But suppose it was so ; suppose (contrary to the balance of evidence) that the Fourth Gospel was not written by St. John, was it any the less a canonical book, received by the whole Church as a genuine gospel, as an integral part of Holy Scripture ? They valued and revered the books of the New Testament, not because they were written by this or that writer, but because the writer, whoever he might be, was inspired by the Spirit of God. They used to be told that the "Epistle to the Hebrews" was written by St. Paul ; critics now were largely agreed that St. Paul was not the writer of that epistle. Did they value it one jot the less ? Take another "difficulty". It had been said there were so many disputed passages in the New Testament that they could not feel sure of what they read. There were, doubtless, many such passages, but if the critics were made a present of every disputed passage, and if every one of those passages was erased, it would still be found that what remains undisputed was amply enough to prove every single article of the Christian faith. He would say then, first : "Don't believe in all that the critics tell you, although much of it is quite true ; indeed, you cannot believe all they say, because sometimes they contradict each other" ; and secondly : "Don't imagine for a moment that the critics have, or ever will, upset the New Testament, or diminish by one iota the value of the Four Gospels, as records of the life and the words of Christ."

THE REV. DR. LOCK, Warden of Keble College, Oxford, referring to the phrase "The tyranny of the Professors," said that "tyrants" were the last things that professors wished to be. They did not wish to create difficulties and perplex simple Christians ; they found difficulties and wished to solve them, and whilst doing so were helped by the devotional value which true Christians attached to the Bible, and they looked for the prayers of such for help in facing their own difficulties. Each generation had its own

special difficulties ; those of the present chiefly affected the Gospels, and rose out of literary facts. Analysis seemed to show that the later evangelists used the earlier ; they deliberately altered and adapted the previous record to produce new effects, and as they did so they deepened the traits which marked the Lord's divine nature, until the teaching about that reached its climax in St. John's Gospel. Now of those changes two explanations might be given : either the latter accounts were legendary, less trustworthy amplifications of the simple historical facts ; or the writers were drawing out of the Church's store fresh facts, new aspects of truth, which had always been there, and as they got deeper and deeper, were getting more trustworthy, more close to the core and centre of the Lord's life, more adequate in their interpretation of it. Between these two interpretations, their surest guide was the instinct of the Church, of the living society, which gave forth the Gospels as the account of its own life. The Bible could indeed "stand on its own base", but it was the Church which placed it on that base. It chose its canon, and then placed it on the pedestal where it was to stand for ever. They need not fear that any criticism could ever alter the great central verities of the revelation of God's nature, of the character of the Lord, and of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

LIEUT.-COL. MACKINLAY, in reply to Professor Burkitt, wished to demonstrate the truth of the Gospels by new historical evidence. He said that, besides other observances, on every seventh (Sabbath) year the Hebrews were forbidden to sow or reap (Lev. xxv. 4, 5). Sabbath years were observed during the time of Christ, according to Tacitus and Josephus. The year ending eighteen months before the crucifixion was almost certainly a Sabbath year, during which Christ warned His hearers against anxiety, by telling them that birds did not sow, nor reap, nor gather into barns, because God cared for them. Why this form of expression ? Because it was the Sabbath year ; as Christ habitually referred to things present in His parabolic teaching. Hence they found a new historical meaning in the words of Matt. vi. 26. More than a dozen other passages in the Gospels gave like evidence. Those numerous references to the Sabbath year had a special value, because Titus swept away all Jewish observances in A.D. 70, when he destroyed Jerusalem. It was a mark of truth that no explanations of those references were given in the New Testament : explanations would have been quite unnecessary for the first readers, who were all familiar with the observance of Sabbath years.

DR. SANDAY, in his reply, described criticism as not the ultimate end but something subordinate ; its purpose was to help them to understand and then to know. When speaking of the advance that criticism had made within the last fifty years, he was limiting his remarks to this country, not to Germany. With regard to the question of the humanization of the Bible, he quite understood

that Mr. Marston had been a little disillusioned by reading the life of Goethe. It all depended on the life. To know the life of Goethe was one thing ; to know the life of St. Paul was another. Dr. Sanday held that the comparative method enabled them to look upon the history of the human race as a whole, and upon that history as working out a great divine purpose.

PROFESSOR BURKITT, who also replied, said that by criticism of the Bible he had always understood a study which was distinct from the emotional, devotional study of the Bible. He was not going to define "inspiration of the Holy Spirit". But inspiration was not only a thing which they claimed to have been possessed by the writers of the Bible ; it was something which Christians themselves prayed for.

The CHAIRMAN said they often heard it said that the Bible was on its trial. The living Word of God, he reminded them, was Himself once upon His trial, and there fell upon the man who had to examine him the most tremendous responsibility, perhaps, that had ever been laid upon man. If upon them any parallel responsibility was laid, he trusted that by the help of God they would avoid Pilate's terrible fall. It had been Pilate's duty to take in hand the trial of the Lord, as he would have done that of any other man. So it was, perhaps, our duty—it was probably the clear duty of some of us—to begin the examination of the Bible as we should that of any other book. But as Pilate went on he found himself treating his prisoner, as he had never treated any prisoner before, and asking "Art thou a king, then?" And later a still more solemn awe fell upon him and he "was the more afraid". Let us go again into the judgement hall and let the Bible speak to our consciences. It would compel us to acknowledge its royalty over our hearts, and so we may find an answer to the question, "What is Truth?"

CHRISTIAN TRUTH AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL FORCES

ALBERT HALL. MONDAY EVENING, JUNE 22

The BISHOP OF CALCUTTA presided.

The RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR said : I have been asked to speak a few words at this, one of the last, but surely not one of the least, of the great assemblies which have marked the occasion of the Pan-Anglican Congress, upon a subject which has been the cause of much deep anxiety to many men of religious temperament in these last few generations—the subject, I mean, of the conflict or supposed conflict between religion and science. If I thought that any of you expected that I should be able to deal with a theme at once so vast in its dimensions and so tremendous in its import as the one which I have just mentioned, within the few minutes which are allotted to me this evening, I should shrink from the task imposed upon me. But I know that is not the case, and that you are too well instructed in the basic arguments around which the religious controversy has turned to suppose that any speaker, on any occasion, could in a few words deal with so august a subject. Yet I welcome this opportunity, brief though it is, to say something upon the matter. For I have in the course of my own lifetime seen what I conceive to be a great change passing over the thinking portion of mankind upon this very subject. I remember that it was universally thought by a large school that there was a fundamental conflict between the religious aspect of the world and the scientific aspect of the world—that naturalism was on the one side, to be taken or rejected, with no compromise between naturalism or a scientific view of the world—the two things, though very different, were confused by the thinkers of whom I speak—and the aspect of the world which we may call religious. The persons of whom I speak, and of whom there are still many representatives among us, imagined that science was founded upon experience and induction, and that religion represented the last dying phase of a history which went back and was lost among the early and savage superstitions of mankind. They further supposed that, while intelligent persons, who held religious beliefs, made a kind of compromise between the recent teaching of science and the modified religion which they thought they could defend, all such compromises were doomed to early extinction—that the sphere of science ate into the sphere of religion as the ocean eats into some coast-line and gradually

erodes it, and although a retaining wall might be put up here and there the result was inevitable and could easily be foreseen—a result which would compel us to look upon the universe, of which mankind is the temporary fleeting citizen, as a merely mechanical set of causes and effects owning no intelligent Creator and having no moral purpose and leading to no end. For my own part I believe that view, however widely it may yet be held among a certain section of our fellow countrymen, is not the view which is gaining ground either among philosophers or among men of science; that it is already antiquated and belongs to the past; that it is not one among the many problems which are destined to call for Christian effort, and that this problem will not long survive and trouble us. I do not, of course, mean that the growth of scientific knowledge of history, theology, anthropology—all the vast accumulation of learning which the last two generations have given to the world—has no effect on the mode in which religious men and Christians hold their beliefs. On the contrary, if we suppose the theologian of the twentieth century discussing these questions with the theologian of the sixteenth century, though they might both belong to the same Church, subscribe to the same symbols, and share the same faith, do we not all know that the language in which they would speak to each other on some aspects of religion would be widely divergent? But that is not the question I am dealing with to-day or attempting to deal with. I desire to touch upon larger issues. The issue I wish to put before you is this: Has the growth of science, or has it not, made it easier to believe that the world had a rational and a benevolent Creator, or has it rendered that belief entirely superfluous, to be added by the Theist or the Deist, but in any case superfluous and wholly unfounded on any rational or philosophic grounds? I think the progress of thought has been in the direction that we all in this great hall desire.

Consider the old argument of design, which was based mainly on the fact that material nature was orderly, uniform, showed the marks, as Maxwell said of the atom, of being manufactured, of having come out of one mould. But the real strength of the argument from design rested upon the adaptation between the living animals, whether men or lower animals, and the mechanical world which they inhabited. The religious philosopher said: "Can you suppose that animals would be so happily adapted to their surroundings unless they had been created by an intelligent Creator?" And the argument seemed extremely strong; but then came natural selection, then came the Darwinian doctrine, which indicated that all these wonderful adaptations were explained or explainable by the action between the living organism and its environment, and that what had been supposed to be due to design really had nothing in it of final cause, but was due to action and interaction between the living organism and its environment. That discovery gave great pain, and

caused profound perturbation in the minds of vast numbers of those who were told that the discoveries of science were inconsistent with the fundamental truths of religion. And I am not surprised, because I think the old argument of design, though I should hesitate to say it was worthless, had lost much of its efficacy in the consideration of recent biological discoveries. But there is one thing which wholly escapes this criticism, and that thing is the existence of reason. Now, if we are to look at the universe simply from the naturalistic point of view, what is reason? Reason is nothing more than one of the many expedients by which nature has blindly adapted, or enabled an insignificant number of living organisms to adapt themselves somewhat better to the surroundings into which they are born. That is the only account naturalism can give of the existence upon the planet of *homo sapiens*. It is an inadequate account, and its inadequacy must be evident, and ought to be evident, to the man of science, for this reason, that if reason be really only the product of irrational and mechanical causes going back to some illimitable past, reaching forward to some illimitable future, and accidentally in the course of that endless chain producing for a brief moment in the history of the universe a few individuals capable of understanding the world in which they live, what confidence can you place in reason if you wish it for any purpose beyond life-preserving or race-preserving qualities, for which, on this theory, it was brought into existence? Every day some new scientific discovery carries us further and further from the petty world in which we believe, and teaches us to reinterpret the material surroundings in which we find ourselves, so that the experience by which we direct our daily lives is, in the eyes of science, the crudest symbolism of reality. Is reason to be trusted or is it to be spurned? If it is to be spurned, the fabric of science falls with the reason that creates it. If you take the other alternative, and say that we are the individual possessors of powers far in excess of those purposes for which that reason was called into existence, if we regard ourselves as moral beings understanding a rational world, I ask you, can we believe that that reason is merely the product of purely mechanical forces, of gases coalescing, of worlds forming, of unknown combinations of organic particles, of creation by some process hitherto undreamed of, of life which is gradually working up throughout other spheres of lower and irrational organisms to the reason which now reaches out beyond the farthest star? That is a conclusion which is wholly impossible; and the contrary inference, to which I ask your assent, is the inference to which science and philosophy are driving us more and more, and making an apologetic for a theistic and religious view of the world, undreamed of in the time when the human outlook was narrowed by its ignorance of the material universe.

Briefly and most imperfectly I have attempted to lay before

you one argument—not perhaps very easy to apprehend—to lead up, as I think, to a conclusion absolutely necessary if we are to be saved from hopeless pessimism. For my own part I cannot conceive human society permanently deprived of the religious element. On the other hand, I look to science far more than to the work of statesmen, or to the creation of constitutions, or to the elaboration of social systems, or to the study of sociology,—I look to science, and to science more than anything else, as the great ameliorator of the human lot. If I had to believe that these two powers were indeed immutably and perpetually antagonistic, then it would be impossible for me to avoid that hopeless despair which makes effort impossible, which deprives labour of all fruit for the future, whether we live to see it accomplished or not ; which makes the travail and struggle of mankind towards a better condition of society utterly beyond any reasonable expectation that we can form. I at least should hardly think it worth while to spend efforts, to waste time in doing that which I know would be a fruitless task ; namely, to make a race such as we are, men such as ourselves, forefathers of future generations who are to attempt the impossible task of abandoning all religious outlook upon the world, or of rejecting the ministrations of that science which more and more, I am driven to believe, is the greatest mundane agent for good.

BISHOP WELLDON said the subject prescribed for him was the criticism of the Bible. He would begin by saying that he was heart and soul in favour of a free and full biblical criticism. The attempt to stifle criticism, not by argument but by authority, as in the well-known letter of Pope Leo XIII, he would for himself, and for the Church of which he was a minister, repudiate. It was not by authority but by deeper and wider learning that criticism of the Bible, so far as it was imperfect or erroneous, must be met. He did not hold any narrow or rigid view of the inspiration of the Bible. He could understand how God, by the process of revelation, breathed into the minds and hearts of men spiritual truths which it was all important for them to learn, and impossible for them to learn except by His revealing grace. When he asked himself how the authors of the sacred books in their writing, in their actual composition, differed from the writers of secular literature, he had been unable to find an answer. He made that remark to show that he was not moved by any dread of criticism or any fanaticism for the Bible in holding that a great part of the so-called “higher criticism” of the Bible was scientifically false. It sometimes surprised him that the critics were not more modest than they were, seeing how often they, or their predecessors, had been proved to be wrong. Dr. Salmon, in his latest work, stated that when he entered upon the study of theology the field of criticism of the New Testament was occupied by the school of Baur. He who was not a follower of Baur was

supposed to be an ignorant or prejudiced person ; but what had become of the school of Baur now ? He put it to the meeting that the theories of the Tübingen school as relating to the New Testament in general had been rejected, and as relating to the Gospels they had been practically reversed. He pleaded for critical modesty. There were critics to-day who had so nearly boxed the compass of opinion that it was difficult for them to say anything without contradicting what they had said before ; but if an unhappy prophet or psalmist seemed to contradict himself he became two, or even more than two, men. He would offer the meeting a few thoughts concerning the errors which lay not behind criticism, but behind the extreme negative criticism against which he protested. Such criticism was far too subjective, and consisted too much in asking what a writer, in the opinion of the critic, might be reasonably supposed to have been likely to say. He appealed to the articles of writers like Dr. Cheyne and Professor Van Manen as extreme instances of subjective criticism. He himself was brought up in a different school—the school of Westcott, Lightfoot, and Hort ; and he had learnt that the best, if not the only, source of truth regarding the ancient literature lay in the collection and comparison of evidence. Secondly, he held that a great part of modern criticism of the Bible was far too confident. His own studies had led him to know something of ancient literature, and there was hardly any task which demanded a more careful scientific method than the effort of forming an exact opinion about books of remote antiquity. He could not undertake to do for the poems of Homer what not a few critics had tried to do for the books of the Old Testament. It was not, in his opinion, critically possible to split up a book into a number of minute fragments. Still less was it possible, with anything like certitude, to assign a particular year to a phrase or even half a phrase in a particular book, and to assign another year to the remaining half phrase. He pleaded again for more modesty in the efforts of recent criticism. In his judgment this criticism failed, at times at least, in the sense of literary discrimination. He was willing to admit that the books of the Old Testament, or some of them, might be composite books ; he was willing to admit that they might have been subject to a large measure of revision, and even of rewriting ; but it did seem to him that, beyond that point, it was not safe to go, and if any one told him that the early narratives of Genesis did not date from something like the childhood of the human race, he would say that that man, whatever his literary equipment, was destitute, or almost destitute, of literary perceptiveness. The extreme criticism against which he protested seemed to him to be open to criticism itself. There was the argument from omission. He used to think that Bishop Lightfoot had pretty well disposed of that argument ; where in the world was the title which any one possessed to assume that a person writing to his friends—and

the books of the New Testament were written for Christians—was bound to tell them everything that he and they both knew? It was often not the facts that were stated—it was the facts that were implied which were the most certain. There were facts which were too well known to need statement. As he read the books of the New Testament there was nothing which struck him more than the tacit assumption in them all of a strong, divine, uniform Christian creed. When he found that assumption pervading the entire literature, it seemed to him the strongest conceivable argument for the truth of the creed therein implied. Continuing, he said that a great deal of the criticism levelled at the sacred volume was almost fallacious. He then proceeded to indicate what he thought was the true way of regarding the Bible. He based his own view of the Bible upon the person of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. He had read nearly every biography of Jesus Christ which had appeared in recent years, and he would say that the attempt to reduce His life to the measure of humanity, however exalted, was and would be a failure. Believing in the divine personality of Jesus Christ, believing in His supernatural acts and claims, he could not exclude arbitrarily and absolutely what was called the miraculous element from the history of the Christian Church. It was his deliberate conviction that the books of the New Testament represented, with substantial accuracy, the early history of the Church of Jesus Christ. When he turned to the Old Testament he allowed himself a greater freedom. It must be admitted that certain parts of the Old Testament, being further removed from the times in which we lived, did not rest upon the same authoritative evidence, but he knew of nothing in modern criticism which could justly be held to discredit in the main the Church's accepted view of the Old Testament. So long as the Jewish people survived, so long as the Christian Church prevailed, he held that they possessed, not perhaps an absolute, but a sufficient guarantee for the truth of the Holy Scriptures of both Testaments. The Jewish people, the Christian Church, these were the witnesses to which he appealed. Let criticism go its way, unfettered and unimpeded. He would be the last person in the world to stay its course, but he would end by professing his profound belief that when the latest heresy, like the oldest, had sunk in the waters of oblivion, the Bible would still shine as the one unfailing celestial source of truth and peace and salvation for all the many millions of mankind.

CANON HENSON spoke on the relation of Christianity to the other religions of mankind. He would begin, he said, by stating shortly the reasons why Christians could not listen to the suggestion that they should confine their evangelistic efforts within the limits of Christendom. Christianity was essentially a missionary religion. It could not, without self-stultification, accept any compromise with other religions which would imply a surrender of its

claim to be the religion of mankind ; that it was the religion which alone could satisfy finally the spiritual needs of the human race. This necessity of unceasing and uncompromising missionary work arose from two causes. On the one hand Christianity claimed to be, and Christians must assume that it was, the complete and final revelation of spiritual truth, a revelation guaranteed to be final by the fact that it had been ministered by no mortal human agent, prophet, sage, or scribe, but through the Incarnate Creator Himself. On the other hand Christianity, though itself *ex hypothesi* the complete and final revelation, was brought to the human race gradually through the efforts of the society of Christians, and in such ways that its full significance was only discovered and its redemptive resources brought into action by the contact with human needs. Thus it was true to say that the contents of the original revelation would not be disclosed and its finality not be demonstrated until every part of humanity had passed under its regenerating influence. Christendom must finally exhibit the religion of Christ through the medium of the rich and manifold life of perfected mankind. Christianity, he continued, was evangelistic because the inner necessity of self-expression compelled it to appropriate every fragment of the human subject-matter which had so far lain outside its action. To accept exclusion from any part of human life would involve a mutilation of the Gospel—to deny its catholicity and, if that were possible, to set limits to the action of the world's Creator. Whenever they attempted to reduce this exalted theory to practice, they were at once encountered by the difficult and urgent question as to the view Christians should take of the other religions of the world. What view must Christians take of the religions which were actually in possession, and which must be displaced if ever the Catholic mission of Christianity was to be fulfilled? There was doubtless a time when such a question would have received a decisive answer. All non-Christian religions were regarded as systems of destructive error provided by the craft of Satan for the ruin of mankind. Their unhappy votaries were perishing, and unless the Gospel were brought to them they could by no means escape from eternal flames. This indeed provided the Christian missionaries with the motive for their work. This attitude of mind was no longer possible to educated and thoughtful men. A juster apprehension of the Gospel had disallowed it. A better knowledge of the earliest Church, and especially of that notable branch of it which flourished in Alexandria, had enabled them to appeal to the large charity of some Christian thinkers in the third century against the intolerance of later days. A closer study of non-Christian religions had prohibited a merely hostile attitude, and it could not be denied that a great change had passed over their manner of thought and speech about the relations of Christianity and the other religions. The latter had been studied with care and sympathy, and their characteristic excellences realized. A science of religion had come into

existence, based on the assumption that religion was a natural, and therefore universal, factor in the evolution of the race. Everywhere the religious consciousness manifested itself, and always was subject to a process of development, and everywhere this process appeared to follow the same course—to illustrate the same tendencies. Christianity itself, though it transcended, did not stand outside the natural religious development, and therefore could not be understood or appreciated if it be isolated from the other religions of mankind. Much of Christianity which once was thought to be part and parcel of a special revelation was now seen to belong to the common stock of religion. Most of the ethical teaching of the Gospel, for instance, could be paralleled from the teachings of the religious founders of the East, and the great leading ideas of sacrifice, incarnation, atonement, immortality, were not distinctly Christian. The machinery of religion was everywhere similar. In these circumstances manifestly the old ruthless doctrine which separated Christianity sharply from all other religions, ascribing them to an evil source and limiting the notion of divine revelation solely to the religion of Christ, could not maintain its ground. There must be a frank recognition of the genuinely religious character of the other religions which satisfied the spiritual needs of men and guided their earthly course. Their attitude towards such religions could no longer be one of pure destructiveness. Rather we must approach them with the assumption that they enshrined an element of necessary truth, and had been serving by the will of God a didactic purpose.

Until they had appreciated those aspects of any religion they could not really understand at what point it met the message of Christ in the gospel. The development of religion proceeded everywhere, but not everywhere at the same pace. There was need of the more rudimentary religious systems alongside of the more advanced. To forget this and roughly to sweep away every rival to Christianity always involved the infliction of grievous spiritual injury, and the higher religion of Christianity forced on those who were not sufficiently advanced to receive it became in their hands a disastrously altered thing. They dragged it down to the level of their own comprehension. It was not necessary to go outside the history of Christianity to find proofs of this. The source of that immense corruption of mediaeval Christianity was the fact that the religion of Christ was forced on populations who were not competent to understand it rightly, and so immediately transformed it into something intelligible, something that was grossly materialized. The moral he would draw from this was a reverent treatment of every religious system which was morally strengthening to its votaries, and such a presentation of the gospel as manifestly recognized whatsoever elements of truth that system may have contained. The original element in Christianity was Christ, and that element was alone the persistent and unalterable element. They might seek in the history of other religions for any

founder who might be fairly placed on an equality with the Founder of Christianity, and they would seek in vain. Why should they claim for that religion so much? The answer was because when by the aid of the science of comparative religion they had disentangled the common elements of all human religions and had classed appropriately all those theological, psychological, sacramental, sacerdotal, and ascetical elements, which were then seen to be common to all developed religions, they were brought back to the Founder Himself as the unique and dominating factor in their own religion. The uniqueness of the Founder could not be gainsaid—a fact the more impressive since the materials for forming a clear historical verdict on His character appeared to be more ample and trustworthy than in the case of the others. Western civilization, he continued, with all its evils, stood for the best notion mankind had yet reached of what civilization ought to be, and he knew that the defects of that civilization were precisely connected, not with the success of Christianity but with its failures. The life of the religious systems of mankind showed beyond all doubt, as a writer had remarked, that the Christian religion was absolutely superior to all other religions, and that Christianity represented the highest point which religious development had reached. All former lines of religious thought appeared to converge in Christ's religion, so that the student of non-Christian religions found himself carried on to that *denouement*. Christianity was the only possible religion for the progressive nations of the earth. Western civilization was not conceivably reconcilable with any other. Western civilization was the civilization of the future. The East admitted that from the West it must receive the principles of its future polity. It was indeed lamentably true that at present certain people appeared to distinguish between Western Christianity and the Christian religion which was the historical source of its best elements, and it could not be denied that this idea was encouraged by many signs and testimonies from the West itself. That, however, would pass. Religion was natural to man, and sooner or later it must reappear even where it had seemed to disappear. Nations which accepted the civilization of the West could only become religious by becoming Christian, and religious they must finally be, not because they were Orientals, but because they were men.

The REV. P. N. WAGGETT, S.S.J.E., was obliged, he said, to recall the meeting from the splendid fields of general religious thought to the comparatively narrow path where religious faith and natural science met; and he would speak of the result of that meeting in religion itself. The effect of the controversies of the last age, he said, had been wholly for the good of religion. It had made religious thought more religious. In the course of an effort of self-defence religious thought had become not simply more generous in sympathy but also more ambitious in

its claim. It had suffered no retrenchment of statements which could not be maintained by proofs, but it had been found to require an enlargement of scope so as to embrace fuller statements, not only of the facts of the world but also of those realities which were made known to mankind in faith. This opinion was illustrated in the case of three questions: questions (1) about creation and evolution, (2) about divine design and natural adaptation, and (3) concerning faith in man's free will, and what man was being made to know by natural science of the necessary effects of his inborn characteristics and the relatively fixed environment in which he lived. The first two questions had reference to the power and purpose of God. The third had reference to the limited, but yet real and most momentous, power and purpose and choice of man. With regard to the first and the second, the process which he had indicated was complete. With regard to the third it was only in process of making, but he confidently looked forward to the day when they would think concerning heredity and environment as they then thought about natural selection and evolution. They would see that the spiritual truth which they had inherited had received a larger scope. This opinion he contrasted with two others, the first that religious faith had been damaged and even fatally damaged in collision with science; the second that it had escaped from that collision but escaped only "so as by fire" and at a certain cost; that while what had been thrown overboard was unnecessary and dangerous, yet it was something they would gladly have kept had it been possible and safe to keep it. He contended, in contrast to both these views, that religion had suffered no loss, and that the change effected had been the abolition of some limitations and negations. Christian thought had not taken in sail; it had, on the contrary, spread more sail to the wind. They found that they wanted more action and more courage. They found that they needed, not to retract the statements they had made concerning the government of God, but to enlarge them and make them more universal. With regard to the controversy about creation and evolution, the restatement made necessary was to the effect that God's creative activity was not confined to the past, but was now proceeding. The new scientific criticism collided with a religious language which spoke of the world as having left the Hand of the Creator more perfect than we now see it and as fully differentiated. We were obliged, in self-defence, to amend our language, so as to reach the statement that the world had never left that Hand at all, and still showed the activity of those processes by which its present degree of differentiation had been reached. This was a statement not only scientifically more tolerable, but theologically more valuable. With respect to the controversy about design and natural selection, we had to part with no theological treasure but with the narrow and impoverished conception of God as working to the best of His ability in a world beyond His general control. We had to urge that

God was above all things and in all causes, above them and beyond them. The whole world was rational through and through.

So far of evolution and of natural selection, the scientific account of the principal guiding factor in evolution.

In the matter of inheritance and free-will, environment and free-will, the case is different. Here we are only beginning a work which must demand much labour. But the other two instances, once apparently so difficult for faith and now so little formidable, give reasonable ground for hope of a similar result in the new and much more difficult questions of nature and conduct. The speaker could on this occasion give no sketch even of the work already undertaken, but he confessed the confident hope that our new knowledge of the constitution and circumstances of man will be found to have provided a more intelligible foundation to morals, to give to moral effort a wider scope and to the call of duty a more exacting penetration; to manifest a richer power in the grace of God acting upon the will of man—the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus delivering us from the law of sin and death. Not only science, not only liberty of thought, but religious and devotional thought in particular, had made through these debates large advances on their own special and native ground.

MR. C. F. G. MASTERMAN, M.P., spoke of the controversy concerning conduct. They stood between a time, he said, when the Christian revelation had been defended by those who desired the maintenance of the Christian morality, and a time when the sanctions and restrictions of that morality were becoming toilsome. He would not be surprised if the history of the future called attention to this distinction—that while in the sixteenth century the common current of European thought in religious matters was shattered, the twentieth century might see the main restrictions of European morality shattered by those who saw no kind of reason why an ideal which might appear impossible, and a standard always difficult of attainment, should, in Bishop Butler's famous words, "any longer interfere with the enjoyment of mankind." He wished to call the attention of the meeting to one particular aspect of this impeachment,—the habit which set self-development in its more naive aspect as the only ideal of human life, an ideal, therefore, which not only swept aside the vision of effort towards contentment in a world beyond this world, but also regarded as immaterial any kind of gospel of life which did not aim deliberately at the ideal of "the individual for himself". This ideal was repudiating the Christian doctrine of sin, and was also repudiating the Christian doctrine of sacrifice. There was perhaps a graver danger at present in the attempts to see if a civilization could not be founded upon a purely rational and naturalistic basis. There were at the present time in the colonies, in America, and in certain countries of Europe, small communities who tried to live on these lines, repudiating

the idea of any supernatural sanctions, declaring that man had too long turned his thoughts to an impossible heaven beyond the grave. There was also in other quarters the demand that mankind should no longer play the game of some tyrannical or whimsical Creator who was playing with the lives of men. There were two answers possible to all this. One, the appeal to conscience, and the other the appeal to experience. The appeal to conscience was an appeal not to those in the sunshine of life, but to those who had experienced the dark as well as the bright sides of existence—whether, after all, there was not something in mankind which demanded the gift of life as well as the taking of it, and whether, after all, in the words of the poet, it might not be “sweeter to be kind than fierce, and wiser to be sane than mad”. The appeal to experience was an appeal to a judgement written large over the pages of history. Those systems, to which he had referred, represented a condition unsuitable to such a creature as man, in such a life as he found himself living in the world, and sooner or later they had been terminated by calamity or revolution. Time and again in that pitiful progress through the centuries, man had asked that he might be allowed to settle down and make himself comfortable in the world. Time and again he had tried to interpret the world, not as a rough voyage over stormy seas, but as a pleasant peregrination along pleasant paths; time after time the realities which had been outside his control had suddenly torn aside the stage of make-believe that he had constructed to himself, and restored the vision of “clanging fights and roaring seas, and sinking ships and praying hands”. Might they not conclude that amazing series of meetings with some such conviction as this? They had been discussing temperately, sincerely, he thought courageously, some of the tremendous problems of thought and conduct which to-day confronted the Christian society. They had been wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other but hardly coming to birth. They had discussed race suicide, and the relationship of the races; the new ideals of the East suddenly awakened, the ideals of the West which seemed to have been losing their vital value; a social discontent which they could neither appease nor forget, with at the one end a demand for increasing the burden, at the other end the voice of those whose wages were kept back. At the end of it all they could claim that they believed from their hearts that they had the secret of a life, and an ideal adequate to all those things—an ideal which was beyond any sustained demand which could be brought against it, and an energy for which at the present time they could find no adequate substitute. They continued joyfully to call themselves members of a society endowed with the work of the redemption of the world.

The BISHOP OF CALCUTTA, in concluding the meeting, said they had begun the meetings with prayer, and it was fitting that they should bow their heads at the last moment in solemn acknowledgement of God's goodness.

APPENDIX

PAPERS PREPARED AND PUBLISHED
FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CONGRESS



PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

Being Problems for consideration at the *Pan-Anglican Congress*, 1908.

THE CHRISTIAN CLAIM TO
SUPREMACY

BY THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF
SOUTHWARK

MOST of us would agree that the highest truth is its own best witness. The value of physical light is best understood by those who have seen it shine; and a *chef-d'œuvre* commends itself: though we have to remember how much light trains the eye, and beauty forms the aesthetic capacity for its own appreciation. All this repeats itself in higher regions yet. We should shrink with a stronger instinct than we could in a moment explain from being asked to assent to something because it was written in flame across the sky. But we are perhaps unaware how much Christian influence has done to create that instinct, by enhancing the value of all that is natural: by accustoming us and emboldening us to think that the human is the best index of the Divine: and that the best proof of anything is that it most deeply commends itself to what is best in us.

The Christian faith, then, must be mainly self-avouching, simply as is so much high spiritual truth. But it makes a yet higher claim: it claims to be the Truth, God-given, for all men and all times. You will recognize the description as true, and supply the qualifications which brevity forbids. What can self-witness be, what form can it take, in such a case, a case of which there can *ex hypothesi* be no second example?

It seems to me, as I stop to think, that we have perhaps never sufficiently estimated the difficulty, the prodigious difficulty, of making good a claim to be not only a true religion, with flashes of light and glints of gold, but the true religion, the Truth which is to suffice the world. We hardly face the fact that none of us could believe this to-day of any religion but one: and that, though there are doubts and difficulties, it is at least believable of that one. The more we look into the reason of this difference, the greater I think shall we find its significance to be.

But, returning to the question, of what nature can this witness be? We know the road by which it must come: it must come by the interpretation of experience, the common

road of all knowledge. It comes out of the facts. Only the experience must not be thought of as monotonous or stationary. There is nothing to show that Nature, in the largest sense, does not yield new things, or that new things do not show themselves through her. There is much to show the opposite. Life appeared (whether suddenly or gradually matters not) upon a lifeless world: so afterwards did thought: and so did the beauty of virtue. Our categories must be provisional, and capable of extension to hold what we find. Nor again is there any shadow of reason for assuming that the higher truth, or new truth, is merely the mechanical yield of experience, working upon a receiving machine in man. The instinct of men in all times from Homer onwards that some power above themselves could teach them, the facts of genius, the influence of the moral factor upon all true interpretative work, increasing as the work ascends—all these remind us that what on one side seems interpretation made, may on another side be most truly teaching received. They secure for us as, to say the least, possible and probable a method of revelation, of unveiling, by a power which may at once bring forth the thing that is new, and give the power to interpret it.

But, all this understood and remembered, what evidence for a Gospel can come to us along the ways of fact? Or can any come? Does the question betray a radical misunderstanding, because none *can* come, and the astronomer of the hackneyed quotation ought to have known beforehand that the sweep of his telescope would never find a God who is invisible? The answer surely is that there is experience which can witness to religion, if we take experience whole as we find it, not as we trim, and carve, and limit it. Man is part of Nature, and the things of his heart and brain are part of the facts.

Take three things which seem to me as real for one who interprets the facts that he finds as are the solar system, or the order of the seasons. First, the feeling in man, dim, inarticulate, apparently contradicted, and yet persistent, that he receives through the mighty Order of visible things real impressions, which are neither graphic, numerable, nor ponderable. The impressions have been crude or refined, that of the man who, when the sky is black, cowers before the thunderbolt or lightning spear of Jove; or that of Clough calling upon "the Only Source of all our light and life, unnamed but not unknown"; they have been those of the child drinking in from Nature something more than physical exhilaration or depression: or those of the poets, straining to express for themselves and for us not fancies, not illusions, but ever-

haunting, ever-eluding realities of awe or glory, or of beauty behind the beauty that is seen. But they are there, and the glare of our artificial light, or the noise of our own loud voices and thundering machinery, does not do more than dim them; nay, sometimes seems by contrast when the hour of stillness comes to make them more real. Nature has voices, it seems, that speak to men, or touches that they feel. Has any generation felt it more than ours?

The second thing is the mystery of imperiousness in the conscience of man. That conscience is himself, the most intimate part of himself. And yet it commands: and it seems to command because it hears: to rule because it serves. You may analyse this, and show how it has been fashioned. You may explain the chemistry of the conscience. Does that make much difference? Things are what they are, however they came to be.

And the third thing, perhaps too near the last-named to be separate from it, is that for which man has got to find a name because it is so real to him, but of which he can find no name, except through the inadequate symbol of the thinnest and most fleeting of material things, the breath—Spirit. Spirit, a great category, which man has made for himself out of his experience, of something within experience, or behind experience; perhaps, if you will, a glamour over the face of experience; perhaps, as it has seemed to mighty minds, a reality of which experience is but a passing dress, or a struggling expression. Spirit, something in himself, found and known there first; but by no means such as can exist only in him, nay, such that he can hardly conceive of it in its association with his clay as other than an atom, or an effluence, of some mighty and mysterious Entity around, above, before, behind, beneath him.

These three, then, I submit, are parts of experience. And all the splendid fearlessness of inexorable scientific analysis, and all the marvellous unfolding of the inconceivable subtleties and potencies of process—those things which frightened us older men, as if everything were going to be explained away—have only made their reality more real, so that to-day you hear men say almost too glibly that materialism is out of date.

But when we have thus reminded ourselves of the true width and content of that to which we give the name experience, we have still to ask what possible witness can experience give to the claim made by the Christian Gospel to be the True Religion? I will put to you very briefly the suggestions which I have to make.

It would seem that if in the midst of the tissue of experience

an all-commanding spiritual Truth is to emerge it must have the following characteristics.

First it must interpret. I use a single word to express all the manifold relation of the new to the old. Whatever truth man had, or comes to have, must seem clearer, or more coherent, or deeper, or more valid and trustworthy in the light of that which has come. It must interpret, and in large part it must interpret by completing, by bringing to fulfilment. A complete organism is more intelligible than its stages. The artist's purpose is only read clearly in the finished design.

But then next (however strong the seeming contradiction), the new must be indeed and effectively new. It must inaugurate: it must make the world a different place, and life a different thing.

These two things are in a measure true of every epoch-making step in thought and achievement.

But the claimant for the name of the Truth must have more to show than this. There must be finality. In this unceasing flux, from off these ever moving looms of time, there must come that which is a climax, in such sort that it can never be surpassed or antiquated. It must be final in one most true sense.

And yet (which is the fourth point) it must emphatically not be final in such a sense that it should stereotype life or call to human progress "halt" or "mark time". It must be always pointing onward, even at what may seem logically to be the risk of being itself left behind.

These are simple things to say—I hope quite common-places: and yet they do cover an immense range: they do impose conditions so exacting upon a would-be universal Gospel that the impossibility of their satisfaction might seem a foregone conclusion. Any claimant must either be bidden to withdraw, or at best asked to take a place along with many other events, developments, and messages which have wrought for good in human history.

And yet—such is the question or questions which I desire to suggest—has not the Gospel of Jesus Christ in a wonderful way the appearance at the least of satisfying these very demands? and further, may it not be found to satisfy them in truth and very deed?

There is an incident in the Gospel story which may help us in a very simple and concrete way to face those questions:

"And one of them, a lawyer, asked Him a question, tempting Him: Master, which is the great commandment in the law?"

"And He said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all

thy mind. This is the first and great commandment ; And a second like unto it is this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hangeth the whole law and the prophets."

We have in these two commandments a master instance of interpretation and fulfilment. Our Lord borrows them, and there is stress on the fact that He borrows them, from the Old Scriptures, for He is come not to destroy but to fulfil. Yet the command, though old, is still new : new by new proportion and emphasis, and by disentanglement from much else that was temporary and partial. It is fit for use in a condition of things over which is writ large that it is new : a new covenant, which makes all things new, for a new Jerusalem, in which every citizen is to be a new man.

Again the double Commandment is final, there is neither spiritual nor moral progress beyond it. The first half gathers up in simple, but colossal form all those spiritual instincts which we saw to be so true a part of experience : it focusses them in a single faith. That faith is simple enough for every child of man ; yet it puts no restraint on man's questing thought other than this, if restraint it be, that the incapacity of his own finite faculty to conceive an Absolute otherwise than by negation of all attributes, shall not forbid him to recognize in ultimate Being the source of those things of Life, Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Love, which are to him the greatest realities of experience.

It is final : but it contains within it room and impulse for all that the purer, larger, deeper power of man can do to gain deeper, larger, and purer thoughts of God : and for all the illimitable developments that philanthropy, fellowship, and the spiritualizing of social moulds and motives, can do to work out into organized form the principles of brotherly and neighbourly love founded on, coupled with, explained by, the common relation of all alike to a God who claims Love, teaches Love, and is Love.

Surely it is impressive, in a most solemn sense, to find that the teaching satisfies (and I trust to your thoughts rather than my words to affirm that it does satisfy) those demands which seemed so hopelessly exacting. But a teaching is after all not religion : because man has more in him than thought. No one thinks to-day that the bid for the world's allegiance made by the Gospel of Jesus Christ is adequately explained or supported by the perfectness of their teaching. No, it was a word with power ; a word of life. And life and power in Christ went with, or came from the fact, that it was embodied in Him from whose lips it came. Here again what had been

or was anywhere in human life was not done away with, it was interpreted by that which brought all the broken and flawed goods into one lucid whole. The most varied characters recognized in it the good sides of their own: the glory of their heroisms, the dignity of their patience, found, as it were, explanations which their own faults or inconsistencies had obscured. The thing before men was a human life, entirely native, and unflinchingly complete. Its conditions were those of human simplicity, unadorned and undisguised. And yet it was undeniable that in the texture of human history a new thing had appeared. Perfect stainlessness, perfect sureness of spiritual intuition, and as it seemed of communion with the Unseen, a tone of unique and unfaltering authority, contributed elements in an impression which included, and was greater than, them all. Here for discerning eyes (and we have remembered already that no truth of whatever sort is recognized without some aptness in its observers) was something by which the world was changed; it had been darkness, now it was light; they had passed from death to life. There were new powers of satisfying and sustaining truth: there were new powers of moral victory and achievement. There was indeed no disturbance of the world's course; how should there be? if this was Truth that was to complete or crown. There was room left, and there was to be time, centuries and epochs of time, for development. But yet there was this difference—that the Kingdom of God was with men. And we who look back from such a distance, who have seen so much crumble and alter, who belong to a generation which has changed everything, and which feels itself on the brink of further change, who have seen the outer form and fabric of the religion in which this living truth found body cracked, and shaking, and disfigured, and as it may seem to many awaiting by destruction the end of its decay—we still find that one Name is honoured above every name, with a difference of kind rather than of degree, that men respond to and reverence Christ who repudiate what, rightly or wrongly, calls itself Christian, that the best inspirations which are with us, or of which we catch the whisper, are well within the ideal of Christ, within His two-fold commandment embodied in His example. Nay, we can judge for ourselves whether there is any truth in the world but His which could conceivably be to us the Religion of Man: or whether there is any intrinsic reason (apart from what is thought to be want of evidence) to disable the truth of Christ from being that religion.

Do we ask what explains this wonderful thing, what secret is at the heart of all this? Ah! there we are upon the very

threshold of the inner Sanctuary, and it is not for me to-day to enter there. Only we may put to ourselves the question whether it may not be that that old kinship between man and the Being, high and holy, who in Nature is part revealed and part concealed, that kinship which is the secret of man's power to interpret nature, which makes all his best moral effort seem to him to be but a response and an imitation—whether it may not be that that kinship has found at length some new and full completion, a unity final, and yet infinitely germinal. And as he ponders this, a man may well be drawn on to ask himself whether for this thing, so entirely natural and yet so overpassing all that was known as Nature, the true expression is not found in that conviction about the person of Jesus, so simple on the lips of the Christian child, so profound in the thought of the Christian philosopher, which takes shape, with whatever imperfections and dimnesses of human thought and speech, in the imperishable utterance of the Christian creed.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

BY F. B. JEVONS, LITT. D.

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Rend my sins, like a garment !

My God, my sins are unto seven times seven.

Forgive my iniquities.

Oh, Lord, Thy servant, cast him not away,

The sins which I have committed, transform by Thy grace !

I, Thy servant, full of sighs, call upon Thee.

Like the doves do I moan, I am o'ercome with sighing,

With lamentation and groaning my spirit is downcast.

Lord, my sins are many, great are my misdeeds.

THESE words are not from the Psalms of David, or from the Old Testament. Neither are they borrowed from them or inspired by them. They are not even the product of a monotheistic religion. Yet they are the work of the religious consciousness : no one who hears them can doubt that. They go to the heart of every hearer. They are proof that the religious consciousness is not the peculiar product or especial privilege of any one faith or of any chosen people. They are an exemplification of the universal truth that God "is not far from each one of us". That truth we have to bear in mind from first to last in any attempt to trace the evolution of the religious consciousness. In tracing that evolution we are dealing with a characteristic of man as man, with an attribute of our common humanity. The history of religion has to record painfully but faithfully the human sacrifices of the Mexican, the Carthaginian, and other religions ; the sacrifice of children to Moloch ; the existence of sacred prostitutes in West Africa, West Asia, and elsewhere. But the evolution of the religious consciousness is a process which may be considered apart. That process is a process of search. It is a process in which, on the authority of St. Paul and according to the evidence of the facts collected by the science of religion, "every nation of men" has been engaged—"that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him." The process may be termed one of search or one of evolution. If we regard it as one of evolution, we may apply, for its elucidation, the principles on which the theory of evolution generally proceeds. Thus, innumerable forms of life, from the highest to the lowest, are

found side by side to-day ; and the higher are regarded as having been evolved from the lower, or their ancestors ; but the lower still persist to this day, though many higher forms have perished, as the palaeontological record shows. So too at the present day innumerable forms of religion, from the lowest to the highest, are found existing ; and though the lower still exist, many higher forms have perished—for instance, the Babylonian polytheism, from whose Penitential Psalms the quotations at the beginning of this paper were taken. If, now, we are to trace the evolution of the religious consciousness, we must make the scientific assumption that the lowest forms of religious life—as of organic life—are the earliest. The lower forms of religious life may be studied amongst the black-fellows of Australia or the negroes of Africa ; and we may assume roughly that the remote ancestors of the Indo-Europeans or of the Semitic peoples started from no higher point than the forefathers of the natives of Australia or Africa. At the same time, in view of the difference in the outcome of these different lines of religious evolution, we must bear in mind the possibility that the present condition of the aborigines of Africa and Australia does not reveal to us, with entire accuracy or complete fullness, the contents of the religious consciousness of the original Indo-Europeans or Semites. Still, we may make allowance for this, and yet be satisfied that anthropologists have succeeded in picturing fairly well the contents and even the structure of primitive consciousness.

By primitive man the changes and chances of life, the events that happen to him, are regarded as having been produced in the same way as man himself brings things about. But the category of cause and effect is unknown to him. For him everything that happens is the doing of somebody—of whom, may, and must often, be uncertain. The agents at work, the powers who acted, are in such a case unknown and mysterious. The problem set to primitive man in such cases is not, “ Here is a thing which acts : how does it act ? ” but, “ Here have I been injured : who did it ? ” The fundamental assumption made by man in the period of Animism is not so much that things are animated as that everything which happens to me was done by somebody. What is postulated by Animism is not so much that there are animated things as that everything which takes place is done by a doer, by a person. The doer or person may stand revealed in some corporate form or thing, but also may remain unrevealed in bodily form, and patent only in what he has done. Thus primitive man is surrounded by unknown agents. The category of cause and effect has not yet been reached—agent and

act alone are comprehended. Everything which happens is done by some one: all facts are acts—acts are the only facts. The interpretation which primitive man puts upon the facts of which he is aware is determined accordingly: they are acts, therefore they must be prompted by motives, they must be expressive of emotions, such as govern primitive man. Thus far in our analysis of primitive consciousness we have come across nothing characteristic of religion. When, however, the cause (as we should say), the doer (as primitive man assumes) of an injury or misfortune is unknown, the motives of the doer are also unknown, and therefore as mysterious to primitive man as sometimes to a child are the motives which actuate its elders. In such cases the feeling inspired is that of awe—generically the same as that felt by Kant gazing on the stars in the midnight sky. That is distinctively one characteristic of the religious consciousness: awe—awe of the Unknown. It is the first altar—not made by hands—raised, in the temple of man's heart, to the Unknown God, for whom even primitive man, half unconsciously, was groping, peradventure he might find Him.

It is with the search for the Unknown, and with the awe felt for Him, that the evolution of the religious consciousness begins; and it follows one of two courses. Either man does or he does not come to believe that he has discovered the object—be it rook, tree, animal, cloud, storm, sun, or sky—in which dwells the power or person who did the mysterious things which have befallen and do befall him. If he does not, cannot, identify the unknown power or person with any material object, then we get the belief, found among the tribes of South-East Australia, in an All-father, or Father of us all, who lives above or beyond the skies, venerable, kindly, full of knowledge and power; or the similar native belief of the negroes of Western Africa in a Maker and Father, who dwells afar off, remote from the world. Unless Jahwe, the God of Israel, is to be regarded as originally a wind and storm god, it would be more proper to consider that He was revealed in the primitive religious consciousness as a power or person not to be identified with any material object. Without attempting to decide this point, we may notice that to the Australian All-father and the African Maker and Father, no worship is now paid. To the personal powers which elsewhere are believed to manifest themselves in animals, trees, sun or storm, &c., worship is paid. It is paid by the community and not by the individual as such. It is paid, in the form of offerings or sacrifice, when the community is visited or threatened by affliction, in the belief that such affliction is provoked by the

offence of some member of the community, and in the hope that the power worshipped by the community will be induced to forgo his anger and to stay his hand. Let us now see what this stage in the evolution of religion implies as to the contents of the religious consciousness. There is a person or power. That personal power is regarded with awe. The awe felt is quite distinguishable from fear : spirits which are regarded, as many are regarded, with fear are shunned, or are subject to ceremonial expulsion, as being evil. Religious awe is akin to the awe felt by a child for its father : it is not merely compatible with, but implies confidence and trust. That confidence is shown in the conviction felt at this stage that calamities must be due to the anger of the Being worshipped, and that the anger is not irrational, but must have been provoked by some offence, and that reconciliation will follow if amends be made. The relation of the Being worshipped to his worshippers is paternal. It is further evident, on reflection, that the religious consciousness as thus displayed belongs to the domain of *Völkerpsychologie*, and is not, like the pains and pleasures felt by an individual, peculiar to the person experiencing them ; but is objective, in the sense that it comprises experiences common to all who share in it, and develops where it does develop, in accordance with its own laws of evolution, and not according to freaks of individual fancy, which as being individual find no echo in the souls of others. Hence it is that religion in its most rudimentary forms is an affair of the community and not of the individual. The god is a god of the community. It is by the community he is worshipped. It is on the community that he visits his anger. It is by the offerings of the community he is appeased. It is on behalf of the community that he averts plague, pestilence, or famine ; or that as god of battles he leads the community in war. It is in the common consciousness that he fulfils these and all other functions, not in the personal imagination of some one individual. What is meant by the psychology of the common consciousness will perhaps be made more clear, if we reflect that it is exemplified in morality. Morals manifest themselves first as the custom of a community. The custom is made by no individual and is dependent on none. Yet it exists and grows—in the common consciousness. And it regulates the actions of every individual. The desire of the individual, which, being a desire, is peculiar to the individual, and therefore in many cases opposed to the desire of others, is in matters of tribal custom inhibited by the customary action of the common consciousness. Violation of the custom, moreover, presents itself to the common consciousness as an offence against the god

of the community, a public not a private offence, for it brings down the wrath of the god not on the offender but on the community, which is punished collectively by pestilence or famine; and that wrath is appeased only by religious means. Morality has no existence apart from religion: it figures only in the religious consciousness.

If we wish to have a scientific account of the evolution of religion, then we must recognize that religion is a fact of the common consciousness, and that our theory of its evolution must be in accord with the laws laid down by the psychology of the common consciousness.

The importance of this consideration lies in the fact that it requires us on scientific grounds to reject the theory that religion originated in fetishism. A fetish is an object in which resides a spirit who may be persuaded or compelled to gratify the personal desires of its individual owner. That is beyond doubt. If then we wish to find in fetishism "a basis from which many other modes of religious thought have developed", we must hold that in fetishism "we encounter religion under the guise of desire". Religion, therefore, on this view originates in private desire, and its function is to gratify the personal wishes of the individual owner of a fetish. This view, then, is an attempt to explain religion by means of the psychological analysis of the individual. So long as it remains faithful to its method and to the psychology of the individual, so long it will be tied down to the private desires and personal wishes of individuals. And so long it will ignore the observed and established fact that religion first manifests itself, in the common consciousness of the community, as a relation between the community and its god, which not only rises above, but on occasion absolutely overrides the private desires and personal wishes of any individual member. It is the common consciousness, the religious consciousness of the community, which alone can do this. Private desires and personal wishes may provide every man with a fetish—the wish indeed is father to the thought that in this object which arrests my attention may reside a spirit which will assist me in realizing my wish—but religion from the beginning is an affair of the community. Indeed the very existence of the individual as an individual and in abstraction from the community was only imperfectly realized in philosophical speculation even by Plato and Aristotle. The idea that religion originally was, like fetishism, merely a means for gratifying the personal desires of the individual, breaks every time it is brought into contact with hard fact. It might be supposed, for instance, that in prayer we come across an unmistakable expression of personal desire. And it

is impossible to deny or even to minimize the importance of the part played by prayer in the religious consciousness and the evolution of religion. The reason of primitive man's search for the author of the haps that befell him, the reason of the offerings and sacrifices made by the community to its god, was simply to enable man to offer his prayers to the right quarter. But the moment we take the trouble to ascertain the nature of the petitions made, and the circumstances in which they are made, even in the lower forms of religion and the lower grades of the religious consciousness, we find that they are made either on behalf of the community for public benefits, such as a good harvest, success in war, deliverance from pestilence or famine ; or, if by the individual, then they are uttered aloud in the public presence, and are therefore such as are compatible with and conducive to the good of the community. Desires directed to or entailing injury and evil on one's neighbour are expressed only to a fetish or are effected by means of a spell. What is thus true of the lower forms of religion is true of the higher forms : the object of prayer is not that my desires may be gratified or my will be done. The highest level reached by pre-Christian prayer is that expressed in the Babylonian Penitential Psalms, " Lord, my sins are many, great are my misdeeds ". We are not permitted to underestimate it, when we recollect what was said of the publican's prayer. But neither may we forget that the evolution of the religious consciousness is carried to a higher level by Our Lord's Prayer. The Babylonian Penitential Psalms are the work of the religious consciousness of a polytheistic people. In the quotations made from them at the beginning of this paper it may be noted that the prayers are addressed not to a plurality of gods but to the Godhead, conceived in the moment of prayer as one person. That is the ordinary attitude assumed by the polytheist in prayer. Just as the Israelite, at one period of his history, prayed to Jehovah, without doubting the existence of the gods worshipped by other peoples, so the polytheist in prayer ordinarily ignores, though he does not doubt, the existence of the deities whom he is not addressing. The evolution of the religious consciousness, however, requires not merely that one God alone should be addressed in prayer, but that one God alone should be believed to exist. There is, however, no law of religious evolution which of necessity brings this to pass : polytheisms do not of necessity, or even usually, pass into monotheism. The evolution of the religious consciousness in part consists in the process, however brought about, whereby the community comes to understand that as for the gods of the

heathen, they are but idols. Doubtless in polytheistic peoples here and there philosophers have arisen who have said in their hearts, "As for the gods of the people, they are but idols". But they have not persuaded the people of this. And the reason is clear: religion is not an individual affair, it is part of the common consciousness of a community. The ordinary man, if he is to leave one community, must have another ready to welcome him and capable of attracting him. But as the evolution of the religious consciousness consists from one point of view in the process by which the truth comes to be discerned that there is one God alone, so it correspondingly consists in the process by which it comes to be recognized that there is, or should be, but one community or Church of faithful worshippers throughout the world. The community, which once consisted of the members of a tribe, may come to comprise a nation. That which consists of a nation must aspire to become a universal religion, or it must slowly but surely perish. If it is to become a universal religion, it cannot subserve national ambitions, or subordinate itself to Imperial ideas, or postpone the fulfilment of its mission until a political world-empire has established itself. Mohammedanism does thus postpone its mission; and, so long as it so postpones it, relinquishes the ambition to become a universal religion. Christianity and Buddhism are dependent on no one form of political organization and are limited to no one nation or empire. Buddhism, however, is—I say it deliberately—not a religion: it is a striking instance not of the evolution but of the etiolation of the religious consciousness. The degradation began with Brahminism, which made religion an affair not of the community of worshippers, not of the common consciousness, but of the individual; and taught that the distinction between self and God was illusion—an illusion to be dispelled by the absorption of the self in God. The motive was the concentration of the individual's thought on himself and his desire to escape from personal suffering. Buddhism also is based on the denial of any duty on the part of the individual to the community: it is fundamentally anti-social. The end at which it aims is solely the deliverance of the individual from personal suffering: it proposes, "as man's final goal and aim, extinction or Nirvana". And this result it proposes to obtain, not by absorption into God, but by cessation of existence. Such a system has no use for a god; and accordingly, "Buddhism admits no Supreme Being". And from Buddhism "the idea of duty is utterly absent". It is not surprising, therefore, to find that wherever Buddhism dominates religion, "civilization and morality have stood still" or have "sunk deeper and deeper into spiritual death".

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Nor is it to be wondered at that Buddhism, which prescribes the cessation of existence, only continues on the face of the globe because its followers have been faithless to its teaching and have had children born unto them.

But, if Buddhism thus drops out of the race, or remains in it only by faithlessness to its own doctrine, Christianity does not. And it is not only on religion but on the whole of knowledge that the Buddha declares war, "Because, oh my disciples, knowledge brings no profit to you". If God be not known, nothing can be known. The contents of the religious consciousness are not something other than those of the general consciousness. They are not merely subjective; they are objective in the same sense as science is. In science a statement is only accepted as being a statement of objective fact, provided that every one who observes the required conditions finds the fact to be as stated. The statements of religion which fulfil the same conditions are, in the same sense as scientific statements, statements of objective fact. In both cases they are the judgements of those who are qualified to judge; and may be repeated—or, as in the case of the roundness of the earth, denied—by those who do not trouble to qualify themselves. Religious truths may not spread so easily as scientific truths, because they require something more than merely intellectual assent: the will must conform to them and our practical life be controlled by them. It suffices not merely to *say*, "Thy will be done." A heart-felt recognition of what God is to us is the first thing Christ requires of us for reconciliation with God. That recognition bursts from the heart in the words, "Our Father," with which Christ has taught us to begin our prayer. No other religious teacher in the world has taught us thus to pray. In Him alone, with the fullness of truth, is the revelation of God to man.

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

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THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION, COM- PARED WITH THE CLAIMS OF OTHER RELIGIONS

BY THE VERY REV. H. WACE, D.D., DEAN OF CANTERBURY

THE authority of the Christian Revelation is believed by Christians to be that of God Himself. From first to last, from Abraham to the Apostles, it relies on words and messages addressed by God Himself to chosen men. They recognized that it was God who spoke to them, and it was in obedience to His command that they proclaimed His message to others. Of course, if this be the case, no religion inconsistent with Christianity can possess any Divine authority. So far, indeed, as any religion independent of the Jewish or Christian faith has been true to the voice of God in the conscience, and has not overlaid that voice by human devices or superstitions, it is an elementary form of the true faith, and may prove a stage on the road to it. In most religions there are germs of this character, which have been stifled by immoral or superstitious corruptions. Buddhism, indeed, does not claim Divine authority. It might be described as the science of extinguishing evil, discovered by one of the greatest of "those who know"; but it does not pretend to know anything about God, still less to have any authority from Him. Mohammedanism does make this claim. It says that there is but one God, and Mahomed is His prophet. While it starts, therefore, from the primary truth of the Christian faith, it has developed into the direct negation of Christianity, which says in effect that "the Lord our God is one Lord", and Jesus Christ is His prophet, and more than His prophet. The sole question ultimately at issue, therefore, between Christianity and all other religions is whether the witness of our Lord and of the Prophets and Apostles is true, and whether the words they proclaimed were truly from God. In respect to Mohammedanism, the issue is simply the old one: was Mahomed, or was he not, a false prophet? To this, in the end, the whole controversy between religions must be reduced.

Accordingly if Christianity be not based on definite revelations from God, it has no claim on our belief; for some of its cardinal truths could only be revealed by God, and cease to be credible if His positive authority be removed. There is, for instance, no truth in our Creed more vital to its character than that our Lord has been appointed Judge of all men, living and dead, and that He will some day return visibly to execute that judgement. But that is a matter entirely dependent on the Divine will, which can be determined only by God Himself, and

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cannot be known to men except by His express revelation. It involves a prophecy of the most momentous nature, and it renders our Lord supreme in Christian thought over all the moral problems of life. The promise of forgiveness of sins, the most precious to the human soul of all the promises of Christianity, is also really dependent upon this revelation of our Lord's position ; for it is only a person who speaks with the authority of the Divine Judge of all who can give an adequate assurance on this subject.

The first question, then, in considering the authority of Christianity is that of the evidence on which such statements as these can be accepted as revelations from God. That evidence, it would seem, can be only the testimony of the persons who allege that such communications were made to them. Such truths or facts, being not open to observation, could not be discovered by reason, and cannot therefore rest upon a mere basis of reason. They may, indeed, be tested by reason. If such statements as we have mentioned could be shown to be inconsistent with either the logical or the moral reason, they could not be accepted on any personal authority ; and this is a test which affords sufficient ground for the rejection of many points in Mohammedanism, Buddhism, or Brahmanism. Reason thus applied is the great solvent of false religions, and it is slowly but surely undermining the great religions of the East. If any of the essential truths of the Christian faith were similarly inconsistent with reason, they would have, as Butler said, to be "given up in the name of God". But no such inconsistency has been established, and, on the contrary, as is shown in the Bishop of Southwark's essay in this series, the truths of our faith are felt more and more to be congruous with the highest thoughts, moral convictions, and spiritual cravings of men and women. One of the chief functions of the Christian apologist is to exhibit this congruity, and, in the old Father's phrase, to show that the human soul is "naturally Christian". That is a task which requires the highest capacities, both moral and intellectual ; it requires the capacity of penetrating into the deepest meaning of Christian truths, and of entering into the innermost secrets of the human heart ; and neither of these achievements is possible without moral and intellectual qualities of the first order. To some extent, indeed, the evidence of reason may be positively as well as negatively applied, provided it be applied within those limits of inductive probability on which Butler laid such stress. The so-called proofs, for instance, of the existence of God may be effectively criticized if they are relied upon as logically demonstrative. But if they are regarded as so many inductive approximations to the truth, they possess a cumulative force of the highest kind. Absolute demonstration has no place in such matters, but there is a moral demonstration to be insensible to which is immoral. As is admirably said by Coleridge, the axioms of geometry are such as no sane man can deny ; the axioms of religion are such as no good man will deny.

But, nevertheless, the main authority of the Jewish and Christian

religions does not rest on the mere acceptance of such primary religious and moral truths. It rests upon positive claims to obedience addressed to men by God Himself, through His prophets, and finally addressed to them by our Lord Jesus Christ in His own words, and by His Church. Much of the language which is common in the present day about the "ethical monotheism" of the Jewish religion and of the Jewish prophets is quite beside the mark. The Jewish prophets and people, from Abraham or Moses downwards, were not engaged in developing monotheistic or ethical views. They were obeying or disobeying definite commandments and requirements, addressed to them by One who claimed their allegiance as the Lord of heaven and earth, and as their deliverer. That their apprehension of His character and nature was a gradual process does not alter the fact that He from the first appealed to them in that character, or that His Revelation was of the nature of a command. The first of the Ten Commandments is not a mere statement that there is but one God; it is the solemn adjuration, "I am the Lord thy God; thou shalt have none other Gods but Me." The religion required is not an opinion, but an action. The Old Testament contains a history in which various acts of God are recounted, from the days of Abraham downwards; those acts, with the words by which they were accompanied, constitute the Revelation of God, just as a man is shown by his acts and words; and the question addressed to the Jew at every stage is whether he will acknowledge himself the subject and servant of the God who is thus revealed. In the New Testament this character of the revelation is still more conspicuous. The question addressed by the Apostles to their hearers is not merely whether they believe that Jesus Christ was the Son of God; but whether they will accept Him in that character as their Lord and their God, and submit themselves to Him in life and death. Christianity, like the Jewish religion, is a religion of action, not of mere opinion or belief. The demand which it addresses to men requires the most responsible answer which can be conceived: Do you, or do you not, render allegiance to Jesus Christ as the Son of God, as the Lord and Judge of mankind? If that question be addressed to men by responsible lips, the answer to it is the most momentous act that a man can perform.

On what responsibility, then, is it addressed to men? In the answer to that question lies the chief superiority of the evidence of Christianity to that of other religions. In the first place the claim itself, the words assigned in the Scriptures to God and to our Lord Jesus Christ, have in them a palpable divinity of character and substance. "Then for the style, majestic and divine, it speaks no less than God in every line." But to press this point would lead us into a consideration, which belongs to other writers in this series, of the moral and spiritual evidence of Jewish and Christian truth. The point here chiefly in view is that of the quality of the testimony by which these claims to allegiance are urged; and it may be safely said, under this head, that there is no such band of witnesses in the world to any religious claim. There

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is first the supreme witness of our Lord Himself, of One who was without sin, and who meekly, and, as He declared, voluntarily, laid down His life in attestation of His claims. He claimed, on oath, to be the Son of God, knowing that the claim would involve His being put to death. The moral authority of His Apostles is similar. They cannot, indeed, claim any approach to His perfection. But it may be claimed for them that they were a band of men who had shown no disposition to ill-balanced enthusiasm, who were simple men, without any capacity for creating a new religion, with no personal temptation to claim allegiance for their master, and that they all staked their lives on their message, and in some instances actually sacrificed their lives. The old argument of Paley remains unanswerable, as long as its force is applied within the sphere of moral evidence only. Men of this character who proclaim such a message, in such a manner, and at such a sacrifice, have a strong claim to be believed, and it is a very grave matter to refuse obedience to the message they bring. What other religion can produce a set of witnesses of the moral weight of our Lord and His Apostles? Is it possible, from this point of view, to mention such a name as that of Mahomed in comparison with them? There is one condition, indeed, which in the present day must be associated with their testimony. It is bound up, both in the case of our Lord and of His Apostles, with the substantial truth of the Old Testament history, at least from Abraham onwards; for they appealed to that history, and in great measure based their appeals upon it. The God whom they proclaimed was the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and our Lord claimed His position as "the Son of David, the Son of Abraham". Any criticism which shook the truth of those appeals would at least undermine the claims of our Lord and His Apostles to a true knowledge of God's dealings with their ancestors in the past, and would grievously weaken their credibility as teachers. But as personal witnesses their qualifications are unrivalled. Their testimony is written in blood, and the most precious blood the world has ever seen. Many collateral truths of the highest consequence are involved in Christianity, which cannot here be followed into detail. All that has been attempted is to indicate in the main the authority on which it rests; and that, as has been shown, is the authority of God. He has always been a living force in the world, speaking, in natural religions, to men's consciences; speaking to them under the Jewish dispensation by special revelations to patriarchs and prophets, and finally, under Christianity, speaking by His own Son and by His Apostles. There is, therefore, in essence only one religious issue in the world: God has said, "This is My beloved Son; hear Him." Will men hear Him or not?

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

Being Problems for consideration at the *Pan-Anglican Congress*, 1908.

THE PROCESS OF REVELATION: OR CONVERSION

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CONVERSION may be defined¹ as "the process by which religious realities take a firmer hold upon us than before". It is a subject of deep and permanent interest for mankind.

To men in general its interest lies in the vastness of the change which, in many cases, it effects in the characters and actions of those who experience it. To the theologian, again, its interest lies in the part which conversion has played in certain Protestant sects.² Among the Methodists and Moravians, for instance, it has given rise to an important dogmatic principle; most clearly, perhaps, expressed is the well-known assertion of John Wesley³ that "sanctification is commonly, if not always, an instantaneous work". Not only is conversion (according to Wesley) essential to salvation, but, if salvation is to be effectively received, conversion must be instantaneous in its operation. But conversion, as a psychological experience, is not confined to any one belief. It is common to men who profess distinct beliefs, and examples of it are found in every period of Christianity. Indeed, each conversion is still best described in words⁴ which date from the very earliest years of the Christian faith: "and *when he came to himself*, he said . . . I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him: 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee.'"

That conversion is a subject of very general interest seems scarcely to require further proof. To members, however, of the Anglican Communion, to whom this paper is specially addressed, conversion has peculiar and quite exceptional importance on account of the claim of John Wesley, as mentioned above. The Anglican Church has always maintained that for each individual the Sacraments, and the faithful fulfilment, in general, of his ordinary religious duties, are all-sufficient unto salvation. The Methodists, on the other hand, hold that salvation is incomplete unless some crisis has been experienced in which the soul suddenly surrenders itself to God. Hence not only to the agnostic psychologist, but also to each member of the Anglican Communion, one chief problem of conversion is whether this process is gradual or sudden.

¹ See Professor W. James's important work *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 189 foll. (Longmans, 1902: *fifth* impression cited throughout).

² Professor James, *op. cit.* p. 227.

³ Quoted by Professor James (*ibid.*) from Tyerman's *Life of Wesley* (i. 463). For Wesley's own conversion see also Southey's *Life*, ch. iv.

⁴ St. Luke xv. 17 (in the parable of the Prodigal Son).

If, in all cases where it occurs, it can be shown to be sudden, then the contention that it is indispensable to salvation assumes some plausibility; if, on the other hand, there are clear and unmistakable instances of *gradual* conversion, and if these instances, no less than others of a different character, are distinguished by sincerity and by fruitfulness in good works, then the historic attitude of our Church on this subject, viz. the elevation into prominence of the ordinary as against the extraordinary, of daily uneventful duties as against dramatic and emotional crises, is seen to be an attitude thoroughly justified by experience.

Among conversions of the sudden and instantaneous kind, that of St. Paul stands out conspicuously. To many it is even the one typical example of conversion. It should, however, be always borne in mind that we do not possess a complete record—in fact we have a very scanty record—of the development of St. Paul's religious opinions in the earlier period of his life, and especially in the all-important and critical period between the martyrdom of St. Stephen, which he aided and abetted, and the journey to Damascus, on which his conversion took place. Did we possess such a record, we may conjecture, without undue rashness, that St. Paul's conversion would be found to be in reality less sudden, less abrupt, than it appears to be at first sight. For example, it is possible—and this thought has occurred to others besides the present writer—that the memory of St. Stephen's death, faced by him so bravely and unflinchingly, and of the fortitude with which the early Christians, as a body, had met persecution and martyrdom, gradually, and little by little, led St. Paul to realize that Jesus was indeed the Christ. It may be noted that on each of the two occasions in the *Acts of the Apostles*¹ when St. Paul narrates his conversion, in speeches addressed, one to the Jews, the other to Festus and Agrippa, it was natural for him, and at the same time a proof of his deep and genuine humility, to dwell upon the final and culminating act of grace on the part of our Lord, rather than upon any pre-existing tendency in his own religious development; for to dwell upon such a tendency might have seemed to diminish the miraculous character of the change, which took place in him so quickly that he felt able to assign to it a definite time and place. It is of interest to note that the late Cardinal Newman,² whose opinion on the subject of religious development is worthy of special attention, held that St. Paul at his conversion "underwent no radical change of religious principle".

Though in regard to St. Paul we are to a certain extent left to conjecture, this is not the case with St. Augustine, whose conversion is only less important than that of St. Paul in the history of the Christian Church. St. Augustine in his famous *Confessions* has left us a complete record of the changes which took place in his attitude towards the Christian religion. Though his conversion is sometimes referred to as sudden, possibly on account of the dramatic description of the final

¹ chh. xxii. and xxvi.

² *Parochial Sermons* (vol. ii. "For the Festivals of the Church": Sermon ix. "The Conversion of St. Paul", p. 112 of the 1843 edition).

impulse unexpectedly given to him,¹ yet it had been preceded by a long course of preparation, and so is beyond all doubt not sudden, but gradual. In the *Confessions* this preparation is described at great length: it occupies several of the early books into which the work is divided, and shows that St. Augustine was being gradually led to Christianity by various influences, such as the example (at different epochs) of his mother Monica and of Ambrose of Milan, the philosophical studies which helped him to form a higher ideal of God than before, and his careful and prolonged study of the Scriptures. These influences were at work for the space of thirty years before their effect became finally apparent.

With St. Augustine we may range a modern thinker, viz. the French philosopher Maine de Biran (1766–1824), whose *Journal intime*² is a noteworthy record of gradual conversion. It was kept in the form of a diary (during the years 1814–24), and thus records the changes which its author experienced at the time when they actually occurred. St. Augustine, on the other hand, is in the *Confessions* largely concerned with the past.

Of late years considerable attention has been directed, not merely in France but also elsewhere, to a remarkable group of conversions,³ namely, those of Paul Bourget, Joris Karl Huysmans, Ferdinand Brunetière, and François Coppée. These four distinguished French writers, within the space of nine years (1892–1901), declared successively their submission to the Church of Rome.

Examination of the earlier works of each of these writers,⁴ and study of their respective temperaments, has shown that the conversion was in each case gradual, and that signs of the final change were not wanting before it actually came. In the case of M. Bourget, the stimulus was given by study of the venerable traditions of the Church of Rome; in that of M. Huysmans, by the *taedium vitae* which he experienced, a sense of the unsatisfying nature of the pleasures of sense. M. Brunetière was less widely separated from the Church (his difficulties turned partly on the question of miracles), and he had indicated his growing inclinations towards Catholicism in the pages of the *Revue des deux Mondes*, of which he was editor. M. Coppée was brought up in the principles of Christianity, and was a *Catholique pratiquant* for several years after his first Communion. It is true that M. Huysmans,⁵ at least, ascribed his conversion directly to a supernatural influx of grace,

¹ At the end of the seventh book of the *Confessions* (the cry “*tolle, lege*” which prompted him to open the Scriptures at Rom. xiii. 13).

² Published posthumously in 1857 under the title *Maine de Biran, sa vie et ses pensées* (par Ernest Naville); see A. Nicolas, *Etude sur Maine de Biran*: Paris, A. Vaton, 1858.

³ See *La Terre promise* and *Cosmopolis* by Bourget (1892); *En Route* by Huysmans (1894); *Après une visite au Vatican* by Brunetière (end of 1894); *La Bonne Souffrance* by Coppée (1897); also the interesting psychological study of this group by M. Jules Sageret, *Les Grands Convertis*, Paris, 1906.

⁴ See Sageret *op. cit.* pp. 40, 64 (Bourget); 111, 116 (Huysmans); 172–75 (Brunetière); 224–34 (Coppée); also p. 240 (the group as a whole).

⁵ See the obituary notice of Huysmans in *Times Literary Supplement* for May 17, 1907.

and denied that any influence had been exerted in this direction by his surroundings, material or moral. But the evidence of his own works points to his progress from those rare and violent sensations, in which he had once taken pleasure, to the stable and permanent satisfaction of a mind set on higher things, and fully accounts for the change which came after the way had thus been unconsciously prepared.¹

Thus, while not denying the existence of sudden conversions, we appear to be justified in denying that *all* conversions are sudden. Some, at least, are gradual; and a careful analysis will not infrequently show that there was in reality some previous preparation for an event which, at first sight, seems unconnected with anything that went before. Cases where sudden conversion is stated to have been experienced by many persons at once, as at revivalist meetings, will sometimes, if thoroughly investigated, prove not to be without preparation; but the investigation of such cases, for obvious reasons, is seldom or never thorough and scientific.

A common basis of agreement for all interested in the subject of Conversion will perhaps be afforded by words of Dr. Arnold of Rugby²—“The truth is, I imagine, that most men who have ever become Christians in earnest can look back upon some one part of their life as on what I may call the crisis of their character, when the change in their principles and conduct first began. And it is often the case also that they can remember some particular circumstance which first led to this change. . . . But those must be persons of rare happiness who can recollect that the improvement in their characters was very great all at once. . . . I do not deny that there have been such instances; I only mean to say that they are cases of such extraordinary happiness, that no man has the least right to expect them for himself.” We may also perhaps be able to agree with Professor James³ in his conclusion that the quality of suddenness is unessential, and that the value of conversion depends not so much on the process as on the fruits.

A survey of the history of conversion, ancient and modern, leads us to the conclusion that, in all essential points, spiritual experience is similar in the present to what it has been in the past. We are thus justified in making the process of revelation as observed in the present the basis of a claim on behalf of similar processes in the past, and especially on behalf of the inspiration of the writers of the Bible.

MARCH 2, 1908.

¹ Compare the modern psychological doctrine of the subliminal or subconscious self: Professor James, *op. cit.* pp. 231 foll.

² *Sermons*: first series, Sermon ii. (p. 12 of 1874 edition).

³ *Op. cit.* pp. ix, 237. I wish to take this opportunity of acknowledging obligations (such as every writer on the subject of conversion must feel) to Professor James's book.

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THE NOTION OF REVELATION

By C. C. J. WEBB, M.A.

IN every kind of knowledge there are a knower and a known ; but the part which we attribute to each is different in different kinds of knowledge. Thus, in the case of that kind of knowledge which we call perception, where what we perceive is something sensible or material, we are inclined to attribute to it a part in the process little or no more than merely passive. The perception is described as an act of the percipient alone, and that which is perceived we readily speak of as just an object, as though nothing were of interest about it except that it is perceived. Thus it is that, although we certainly seem to imply when we speak of perception that the existence of that which is perceived is independent of its perception by us, and, if we thought it were not so, we should more naturally speak of "imagination" or "fancy" than of "perception", yet so much are we disposed to attribute the predominant rôle in perception to the perceiver—to what the philosophers call the "subject"—that it was possible for a celebrated thinker, Bishop Berkeley, to contend that the very existence of the ordinary objects of perception lay in their being perceived, that their *esse* was *percipi*, and to argue in support of this view that nothing was gained by supposing any existence to belong to them over and above this "being perceived", for any such further existence could neither be perceived itself nor make any difference to the perceptions which we actually have. The case is however different when we pass from the perception of material objects by means of the senses to knowledge by one person of another—not of his external form merely, but of his mind and character. Here we should be disposed to point indeed to the possibility of some measure of knowledge in which the object was as indifferent to the observation of him by the subject as a table or a stone would be ; but we should readily allow that such knowledge as was possible under these circumstances would fall very far short of what we should generally mean by knowing a person or being acquainted with him. That would certainly seem to imply a reciprocal knowledge or acquaintance on the part of the person known. Acquaintance is a word which implies a mutual relation. When we pass from the knowledge by persons of one another, which we call acquaintance, to man's knowledge of God, which is religion, we find that it is the instinct of the religious man to ascribe the preponderant part in this kind of knowledge to the object of his knowledge, that is, to God. Not only cannot he truly be said to know God any more than he can know a fellow man without a reciprocal knowledge on God's part, but he does not conceive that he can know anything of God but what God suffers him to know. He cannot suppose that he can know God without, still less against, the will of God ; nay, he is sure that he himself is from the beginning wholly known to God, even though he knew it not ; his utmost ambition is to know as he is known ; when he speaks of others having known God, he adds at once in correction "or rather are known of Him" ¹. Hence in this sphere he speaks not of *perception* or of *discovery* (where the subject is the predominant partner), nor even of *acquaintance* (where subject

¹ Gal. iv. 9.

and object stand on the same level), but of *revelation*; it is God, who is known, that in this knowledge reveals Himself; it is He that is active throughout; and whatever activity we attribute to ourselves in the matter we recognize as due to the operation or grace of His Spirit, that is of God Himself. I have spoken here as though the religious man were the Christian; on the present occasion this needs no apology; but I would point out that, while we shall find these thoughts present in Christianity in their most adequate form, they are not present there only: and that, on the other hand, in so far as Christianity works out this line of thought more thoroughly than other creeds, we just on that account reckon it to be a higher mode of religion. For here the knowledge of the divine is no secret which, although at his peril, some Actæon may penetrate against the will of God; no jealously guarded treasure which some Prometheus may steal for men's benefit and call down on himself the vengeance of the Deity; but it is recognized that it belongs to God's own nature to reveal Himself—that the Word was in the beginning with God and was God¹; that the eternal life which is the very life of God Himself is a life of mutual knowledge and love, and that so far as we live this life by knowing and loving God, we live the life of God, our life is one with His, we dwell in Him and He in us. But it may be objected that in fact revelation has not been usually held (as in the above remarks it is) to be the sole channel of the knowledge of God; it has been contrasted with knowledge gained by means called in contradistinction *natural*: that, although we may speak for example, of a revelation of God in nature or in conscience, yet *revelation*, where used without further qualification, has traditionally been regarded as something *supernatural*, which imparts a knowledge such as reason or conscience by themselves are incapable of imparting. It has been matter of controversy whether there is truly any such channel of knowledge of God beside reason and conscience, but it has often been held on both sides of this controversy that such an additional channel is conceivable and that the knowledge, if any, derived through such a channel would be entitled to the designation of *revealed* knowledge in a pre-eminent sense. We must therefore consider in what sense, if any, a certain sort of knowledge of God can be supposed better entitled than any other sort to the name of *revelation*, which it is, as we have seen, natural to use in speaking of any knowledge of God whatsoever².

It will however, I think, be found necessary before proceeding further to ask oneself precisely what weight ought to be given to the opinions of the "plain man" (to use a phrase classical in English philosophy) in such subjects as those which we are discussing. I shall venture to lay down what appears to me to be the true answer to this question, without any intention of suggesting that no other view could be taken, but in order to show my readers on what principle I shall sometimes appeal *to*, sometimes *from* what may (at first sight, at any rate) seem to have an equal right to be considered judgements of what may be called the "ordinary religious consciousness". These principles I shall state and illustrate in reference to religion, because we are occupied with a religious subject; but I do not suppose the principles themselves to be applicable only to religion; they would to my mind apply *mutatis mutandis* to the case of the "plain man's" convictions on other matters beside religion.

In the first place no weight can be attached to the experience of any one

¹ John i. 1.

² I understand that the historical use of the word "revelation" and of the distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion will be discussed by the writer of another paper; and I therefore think it will be better for me to take such senses of this word and of this distinction as seem to be actually in use; although for the full elucidation of these a consideration of their history would no doubt be required.

who has not real first-hand religious experience of his own. I do not mean of course first-hand in the sense in which we should use the expression only of prophets or inspired persons, any more than, if I were speaking of scientific or artistic experience, I should confine myself to that of a Newton or a Shakespeare; I mean any experience which is not merely acquaintance with received phrases or practice of customary observances, but a real living experience with a quality of its own; just as I should call a personal pleasure of any kind in music, however simple and uncultivated, a first-hand aesthetic experience, while a mere acquaintance with what music is generally admired and sought after, however accurate and extensive, would be, I should hold, nothing of the kind. Hence, in regard to our present subject, whatever there is reason to regard as the expression of a real first-hand religious experience has a claim to be considered; and any theory which may be advanced, so far as it fails to account for it, is so far found wanting. Further, a general preference for one particular philosophical or theological phraseology to another may be good evidence that there is something in common religious experience to which such phraseology is felt to be congenial, while its rival is not felt to be so; although there must always be much difficulty in knowing how far associations of a more or less accidental character may affect such a preference. On the other hand one cannot legitimately extend the sanction which the general judgement of religious people may have given to one mode of expression as against another, when presented in connexion with some particular controversy, to all the logical consequences of a theory which insists on that mode of expression or even to that theory itself, as against some other which has never been presented at all to the consideration of religious people in general. It is with a view to illustrating these general observations, and not with the intention of entering now upon a profoundly difficult question, that I add to them a particular instance, though perhaps this illustration may prove of use in the sequel. We may admit that the common religious consciousness, at any rate in our part of the world, affirms God to be a Being with whom we can hold communion in prayer, thanksgiving, and love; and that it readily consents to call Him "personal", where it is understood that to deny this would leave Him something less real, concrete, and substantial than we are ourselves. But it is too often assumed that the common religious consciousness is therefore committed to the belief that He is personal in the sense in which that word is taken by thinkers who define personality according to what they find it to be in their relations with other finite persons, leaving out of count altogether those special characteristics of religious experience, that is of our experience of God, in which it *differs* from our experience of other men. The "plain man" may well be called as a witness to the necessity to religion of the belief in the personality of God, if by the personality of God we mean that He is a being to whom we pray and whom we can love; not so, if we mean to imply the truth of a particular and very disputable theory of what personality means. Unfortunately the word "personality" is frequently employed as though it were the solution rather than the statement of a problem.

Religious experience, then, is no prerogative of philosophers, any more than ordinary perception is. A philosophy of perception, a theory of knowledge, must be able to give an account of what we really find in the simplest perception; if it cannot do this it fails; and so, too, a philosophy of religion or theory of God must give an account of what we find in the simplest religious aspiration. But it is the philosopher's business, not the plain man's, to *think about* these experiences. The plain man has no qualification for sitting in judgement on a philosopher's theory, except so far as he has facts of his own experience which it contradicts or illuminates. Where the question raised

means nothing for him he can have no opinion worth stating upon the answer. Theology is not religion; but neither is the religious man necessarily a theologian. *Pectus facit theologum*, the heart (it is said) makes the divine: this is true in the sense that a man cannot think about an experience which he does not share; not in the sense that having an experience and thinking out what it means in relation to the general scheme of things are all one.

From this preliminary digression I return to our inquiry as to the alleged distinction between knowledge of God obtained by revelation and knowledge of God obtained otherwise. We speak of our relation to God in "anthropomorphic" language, framed at first to express our relation to other men. And hence we sometimes speak of God as we might of a fellow man who should tell us something about himself which we could not have learned except from his own lips, and call this "revelation" in contrast to what we might learn of him apart from such a communication. But here, as in other cases, it needs only a little reflection upon our own feelings and on our language—this very "anthropomorphic" language—to see that after all we do not think of God as of just another person, standing side by side as it were with us among the many beings whom the world contains, though (no doubt) immeasurably superior to us in power, wisdom, and goodness. That we do not so think of God I will prove by a single fact. Did we guess that any other man or angel saw and knew, without our consent or privity, our inmost thoughts, we should feel that nothing could be more horrible than such a violation of the very sanctuary of our personality. Many shrink from reflection on the facts discovered through the study of the hypnotic trance and of kindred phenomena just because they suspect that they might be forced to believe in the possibility of such a violation. To open of our own accord the secret chambers of our hearts to those we love may be the highest privilege of affection; but it is a very different matter to think it possible for them to know our thoughts, not as expressed in act or word, even where act or word issues as it were unbidden and instinctively from its springs in the heart and betrays secrets we would have wished kept, but as thoughts unuttered and unexpressed. Such knowledge of the thoughts and intents of the heart, however, all believers in God would unhesitatingly attribute to Him: yet no one, I venture to say, however much he may tremble at the reflexion that there is nothing in him but is naked and open to Him¹ in whose sight the very heavens are not clean², feels for one moment the sense of insecurity and of outrage that he would did he think that his heart was exposed to unauthorized prying from a fellow creature. And why? Because it belongs to our very notion of God that He is *not* just another person side by side with us, however superior to us, but rather One in whom in literal truth we live and move and have our being³, from whom even in the depth of our personality we are not divided. And, just in the same way, that element of the casual, the arbitrary, of what might have equally well been otherwise, which gives meaning to the experience which is ours when what we can find out about a fellow man is supplemented by a statement made voluntarily to us by himself, we cannot, if we reflect, suppose to exist in our intercourse with God. On the one hand can there be any question of chance, of accident, in the communications of the Eternal Reason?; on the other hand can we think that *anything* which we can find out about God is found out without it being just as much by His will and through revelation from Him as anything else? We may speak indeed of God's "free grace" to indicate that nothing constrains Him from without, that neither our merits nor anything else can bind Him without His will, like a genius of the *Arabian Nights*, to work *our* will; but must we not then go on to allow

¹ Heb. iv. 13.

² Job xv. 15.

³ Acts xvii. 28.

all that we receive of God—our being and our merits also—to come of His free grace, none of it in any other way? Can we speak as though part of God's action were free and part were under some compulsion? Or if, on the other hand, we prefer to say that God must do always what is right and good, must we not regard all His action as in this sense necessary, none of it as proceeding from mere caprice and whim? It certainly then seems difficult to maintain a distinction between a *revealed* and an *unrevealed* knowledge of God similar to that between what we know of a man from his own lips and what we learn of him in other ways. But it seems that we cannot on this account simply give up the attempt to distinguish a revealed from an unrevealed knowledge of God, until we have examined the famous distinction of Natural and Revealed Religion which was so familiar to the thought of the eighteenth century (though its origin is far older than that) and which is commemorated in the title of Butler's great work. What is the *natural* religion which is thus contrasted with *revealed*? Where this distinction has been made, I think that it will be found that the *natural* in religion has been regarded as on the whole corresponding to what was found, or thought to be found, held in common by all or most religions; what was *revealed* as something special, belonging to one religion only, just because it was something beyond the powers of our common human nature to discover, and came only by express communication from God.

Now it will be obvious that the great increase among ourselves in recent days of knowledge concerning other religions than the few which belong to the later periods of the history of European civilization—that is Graeco-Roman paganism, Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism—must tend greatly to transform our notions of what is *common* in religion, and that the old ways of drawing the line between the common and the special, the natural and the revealed, have to a considerable extent become obsolete for us. On the one hand, a closer acquaintance with the religious systems of the far East has familiarized us with the fact of creeds widely accepted, and that among people possessed of a high degree of culture, which appear to lack elements which seemed fundamental and universal as long as attention was concentrated on the countries included in or bordering on the Roman Empire; on the other hand the researches of anthropologists or archaeologists, guided by the dominant idea of evolution, have opened up a view of primitive religion which suggests that what all religions have or have had at one stage of their development in common includes much that the higher religions would be by no means ready to agree upon at present as common ground of meeting. For as long as the distinction of Natural and Revealed Religion was a commonplace of theology it always, or almost always, tended to lay the stress on the *common* element in different religions rather than on the *special* elements which distinguished one religion from another. Some might deny the need of any addition to the common stock of religious belief, the truth of which sound thinking would demonstrate or make probable to all who would examine without prejudice the facts which nature in star and plant and animal and man presented to the studious observer. Such facts would prove the existence of a wise and good Creator—some would go further and say that in the facts of *human* nature was evidence enough of freedom and immortality as well. To such an alleged revelation of doctrines other than these was needless and they did not look for it. To others, who agreed on the whole with this position, it seemed that "revelation" while not adding to the substance of natural religion, had anticipated the slow processes of reasoning by setting forth in vivid symbolism, which he who runs could read, truths the knowledge of which only few otherwise could have obtained; or had supplied motives, appealing to all, in the shape of the description of future rewards and punishments, or the attraction

exerted by a winning example of goodness, for following a line of conduct the intrinsic reasonableness of which would not otherwise have prevailed with the majority of men over the passions tending to drive them into courses incompatible with their true and ultimate interest. It is easy to see that this last way of looking at the matter would harmonize with the traditional belief in a "fall of man" to which could be ascribed the necessity of something over and above man's original endowment, to make up for what he had lost, and permit him notwithstanding to reach the point he could, without the "fall", have reached in virtue of his original endowment. In all these types of opinion it is plain that the *essence* or *substance* of religion is to be found in what is natural: "revelation" is only a "republication of the religion of nature" in terms more striking and more easily intelligible. Again if the content of revelation was considered as something quite different from that of natural religion, yet if it was (as for the most part it was held to be) a superstructure resting on the foundations laid by natural religion, it was clear that the articles of the latter would be thought of as necessary to the structure, in a sense in which the revealed doctrines were not, since the "truths of revealed religion" could be, and had been, held without the revealed doctrines, while the latter could not be held without the former. And while the types of opinion described above regarded the difference of the revealed doctrines from those of natural religion as lying not in their content but in their more ready appeal, those which emphasized the difference of the content were tempted to exaggerate it until they did not hesitate to revel in their strangeness and unacceptableness to reason; a view parodied without the intention of parody in Bacon's comparison of the dogmas of the Church to the arbitrary rules of a game¹.

Now the emphasis upon this distinction of Natural and Revealed Religion in the age which has been called the *saeculum rationalisticum* brings to light a difficulty which will very likely have occurred to those who have followed the very summary account—too summary, I fear, to be easily followed—which I have just given. It is a difficulty not confined to the sphere of religion, though it is very conspicuous in that sphere. On the one hand we feel surer of the truth of that on which all or most are agreed than of the truth of that on which there is a great variety of opinion; on the other hand we are more keenly interested in the truth of those of our opinions which are controverted. We seldom admit to our minds doubts as to the multiplication table, but neither does it stir us to enthusiasm as do the tenets of our religious sect or political party. Nor is this merely due to the more abstract or prosaic character of the former. Make the most trivial habit such as divided the Big-Indians from the Little-Indians in the commonwealth of Lilliput², or the most abstruse metaphysical or logical subtleties (such as must some of the most celebrated controversies in theological history have been to many of those who were ready to fight for them) the badge of party strife, and they will excite the fiercest passions, while the great principles of justice, mercy, and truth, of which no one disputes the importance, are often regarded, for that very reason, as "mere morality" and thrown into the background by the titling of mint, anise, and cummin, regard to which is the hall-mark of the Pharisee, while his neighbour of another school despises and pours scorn upon it. Thus when the distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion was most in vogue, some would frankly regard Natural Religion as that religion the truth of whose tenets was sure and certain, as the general agreement upon them indicated; while those who clung to the special doctrines of what was held to be Revealed Religion had to face the difficulty of the great disagreement between these and the

¹ *de Augm. Sci.* ix. 1.

² Swift, *Voyage to Lilliput*, iv.

doctrines of other religions claiming to be revealed, or even between these and those drawn by others from the same revelation otherwise interpreted. How was it possible to claim for such doctrines a higher rank than mere opinion? And how was it possible to defend the insistence upon these matters of opinion where it involved, as it did, a weakening of the opposition which might else have been offered by all who agreed in the great fundamental doctrines of Natural Religion to the assaults of the enemies of all religion whatsoever? The difficulty which thus confronted those who maintained the value of the special doctrines of their own religion could not be adequately met with the help of an abstract logic untouched by the thought of development, which took little or no account in dealing with other peoples and other ages of the different intellectual contexts in which their statements were made, and scarcely conceived of any relation between the different doctrines which obtained in different periods or among different nations, except the relations of agreement or disagreement. With such a logic it was only possible, if one held to the truth of the doctrines of one's own religion, either to suppose all other doctrines simply false, a view difficult for men of culture who were aware how much they themselves and their religion owed to the believers and teachers of other religions; or to suppose that one and the same esoteric doctrine (whether traceable or no to one primeval "revelation") had been taught unchanged in divers religions under different phraseology. This last view does not now recommend itself to scholars or scientific theologians, but it has still great attractions for many who have enjoyed only a general and unsystematic education, as the success of the Theosophical Society and of kindred movements sufficiently proves; and in a former age it was entertained by men who stood in the first rank of the learning and science of their day. Without going back to the attempts of ancient thinkers like Philo to find Platonism in the Old Testament, and the like efforts of later theologians and philosophers, a notion of this sort is the leading principle in a work of vast learning and deep thought, the production of which conferred honour upon Cambridge and England in the seventeenth century, Cudworth's *Intellectual System of the Universe*; and we may find a lingering echo of this way of thinking in the late Mr. Gladstone's discussion of Homeric religion in his *Juventus Mundi*. It is easy to see that this kind of treatment of the historical succession whether of philosophical schools or of religious doctrines gave a meaning and an interest to it which was lacking where it was made to appear as a mere chronological list of opinions, mostly beyond doubt erroneous and none generally accepted, one following another without any reason given for their order being what as a matter of fact it was. At the same time the diversity of doctrines was left unexplained, or at least rendered unimportant, by the theory of a single esoteric doctrine; the multiform manifestation of one truth appeared rather as affording exercise for curious ingenuity than as increasing and enriching what in a less manifold presentation would have been something thinner and poorer. To advance further it was necessary to introduce the conception of development. It is this conception which in biology has given us a genealogy for a catalogue, a history of struggle and success for a mere procession of forms. It has been not less potent in its application to the history of philosophy and of religion. The introduction of this principle into this sphere we owe to Hegel. Since his use of it there we can recognize different opinions as related one to another not merely as alternatives but as stages in a single process, to the full accomplishment of which each is necessary in its place. They all have one meaning, as for the believers in an esoteric tradition; but this meaning is seen to need all these words to express it fully; the different statements are not mere *involucra*, wrappings of a mystic treasure, which yet themselves form no part of that treasure; rather they constitute

an *evolution*, an unrolling of the truth, natural and orderly, as the bud expands into the full-blown flower.

A little above I spoke of the logic which was untouched by the thought of development as an abstract logic. I should like briefly to explain what I mean by so calling it. I do not of course mean merely that it takes account of some features of reality to the exclusion of others. All logic and all science must do that; and in a certain sense all logic must be abstract. But the word has also been used in this connexion to characterize a mode of thought which does not seek to understand things as they are, to penetrate their real nature and discover what it is that makes them what they are, so much as to test them by their conformity or nonconformity to some ready-made standard, which, though very likely derived originally from a real investigation of something, is then used mechanically as it were, as the measure of some other and quite different thing. Perhaps an illustration of what I am trying to express may be taken from the sphere of art. Every one knows how great masters of poetry, of painting, of music, have been at their first appearance decried for violating the recognized standards of their art. The analysis by an Aristotle, for example, of the nature of Greek drama was once used as though it would serve as it stood to test the value of a different sort of drama altogether, such as that of Shakespeare. The same kind of mistake is often made now as in the past; but perhaps we are more ready to admit, in general terms at least, that the true criticism of art is not the application of ready-made standards but the effort to understand the essential structure—not merely, as the uncritical admirer does, to feel the appeal—of art as it really exists in the poems, pictures, musical compositions which the imagination has actually produced. In the same way in the sphere of religion we have not only (as has been said above) come to see that different religious positions are not simply alternatives to one another, but form various stages in the development of an idea which can only express its fullness in them all. We have also come to think it less profitable to study under the name of “natural religion” a religion reached by abstracting from each religion what is peculiar to it and retaining only what is common, a religion therefore which never really exists as the religion of any nation or people. We think it better to try to understand a real actual religion, one which has grown up with the natural development of a people’s mind, to seek to discover why it has just the peculiarities which it has, why in these particular respects it has departed from some older religious system which may have preceded it, or has opposed itself to the religious systems which confront it in the same or neighbouring lands. Thus the distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion seems in this way to break down, and indeed we hear little of it now. We think that all is *natural*, that is, belongs to one intelligible course of development, but that so far as it is on the upward path, so far as it expresses a part or side or moment of the truth which is gradually coming to fuller expression, so far it is the progressive unfolding and *revelation* of God, whose self-revealing principle or Word is the only light that from the beginning lighteth every man coming into the world¹. It is well known to students of philosophical terminology that *nature* is a highly ambiguous word. The particular ambiguity in its use which concerns us here is that by which it sometimes refers to the whole of reality, including the mind and will of man and all his works, sometimes only to what man finds given to him, whether within or without himself as material for thought and action. Now, if we take it in the former and wider sense, plainly no line can be drawn between Natural and Revealed Religion, unless we are prepared to deny any continuity between the latter and the evolution of human thought; and this is a denial upon which few would venture, and which would be alien from the

¹ John i. 9.

main tradition of Christian theology, though it might win some support from Marcion in ancient, and from Ritschl in modern times. But if we take *nature* in the second or narrower sense, we may say with truth—and it is worth saying, that though the religious mind looks upon the material universe and its order as the *biding* of the power of God, it is not there but in the thought of man as expressed in his civilization, his art, his morality, his philosophy, his religion, that He is *revealed*. It is man that is made in His image; only in a human life can the eternal Life which was with the Father be manifested unto us¹.

Thus a distinction may be drawn between Natural and Revealed Religion which does not either deny the divine origin of *all* knowledge of God, nor break the continuity of the age-long search for that God, in respect of whom, according to Christ's promise, to seek is to find². The distinction will be one of degree only; but it is a real distinction. As Elijah on Horeb in the old story found Jehovah at last not in the fire, the earthquake, or the storm, but in the still small voice which told of the remnant of seven thousand faithful men in Israel, so man seeks for God in what is inhuman, strange, and terrible, but finds Him at last in the voice of his own conscience and in the love and service of his brethren. *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor*³; but when we know what He is whom our fears first imagined, we discover that He is love: and this is *revealed* religion: yet this religion is the natural sequel of that which in contrast with it appears as unrevealed. Perfect love casts out fear⁴, but the fear must be there; it is, as we know, the beginning of wisdom⁵.

But here I may seem to many to have evaded the most difficult and the most important point. I spoke of a way of looking at the history of religion under the guidance of the principle of development, which would give meaning not merely to what the various actual systems of religion have in common, but to their different special tenets. This at once raises for believers in any particular religion the problem of the position of their own religion over against others. In what sense can it claim to be the true religion and on what grounds can it justify the attempt to convert to itself the adherents of other faiths? Instead of dealing immediately with that question, however, I went on to deal with religion and the possible meaning of a distinction between Natural and Revealed within it, as though religion were one and not many: and I may only seem to have added to the confusion by sometimes using language which would imply that (like Dr. Thwackum in Fielding's *Tom Jones*⁶) "when I say religion I mean the Christian religion". I would, however, attempt to defend this course by saying that to my mind it is only on the basis of a frank recognition of the solidarity of religion as a whole that a satisfactory preference for one religion to another can be established; and that, when the solidarity of religion is recognized, it is legitimate for one who professes a particular religion, speaking to others who profess the same, to choose examples of religious doctrine from the religion most familiar alike to himself and to his audience. But it certainly remains to say something further as to the principles on which one religion can be preferred to another, can be described as "the true religion" and as pre-eminently "revelation"; for "revelation", if my contentions in the early part of this paper have any force, is equivalent to "truth in the sphere of religion".

It belongs to the natural order of things that any one bred in a particular religion becomes acquainted with religious experiences and ideas in the form which they take in that particular religion, and if nothing in his education or in the circumstances of his life cause him to make acquaintance with the

¹ 1 John i. 2.

² Matt. vii. 7.

³ Statius, *Theb.* iii. 661.

⁴ 1 John iv. 18.

⁵ Ps. cxi. 10.

⁶ Bk. III, c. 3.

doctrines of other religions than his own; it may never occur to him to suppose that these experiences and ideas can take other forms or exist out of the context which is theirs in the system to which he is accustomed. He may well, however, if he lives in a modern community, where the secular life exists over against the religious in a state of independence or possibly of hostility, come to distinguish the moral sentiments and principles which appear in the secular life and institutions of his country as well as in the teaching of religion, from the doctrines which, referring, as they do, to definitely religious experiences, which perhaps he has not personally shared, have no obvious connexion with his secular activities. He will probably gain by this, even if it leads to his neglect of religious observances. For, whatever he may lose by alienation from these, his loss will be less than he would suffer, had he supposed them to be so closely bound up with the moral sentiments and principles which his early education had associated with them, that in losing touch with the former he had parted with the latter also; while he might very likely, even had he remained faithful to the practice of traditional religious duties, have failed to enter into the inward religious experiences which give to these duties their significance and value. For such an one a knowledge of other religions than that of his own people, should it afterwards come to him, may be a means of arousing interest in a range of beliefs and practices so widely spread, so variously exemplified, while the customs and forms of expression of his own inherited religion have through familiarity lost interest, and have perhaps come to be associated exclusively with individuals, parties, or interests with which he has fallen out of sympathy. With others however it is just the new knowledge of facts about alien religions that disturb their acquiescence in their own. They find that neither the sacred stories nor the ceremonies nor the doctrines nor the moral ideas of their own faith are unparalleled in other religions; and it is a short way from this discovery to the view that all these religions are equally false or equally true with their own. According to the different characters of the men who embrace this view it leads to different attitudes. Some cease from the practice of religion altogether; some continue to practise their own, but with no such conviction of its universal validity as would justify attempting to convert adherents of others; some, more religiously minded, may conform to other religions when among those who inherit them, or select the religion that they think suits their idiosyncrasies best, or attempt an eclectic combination of the most attractive features of divers religions. All however are lost to the body of those who hold their original religion for the true religion and believe in the duty of preaching it to others. Nor can any result other than this be expected if the apologists of their original religion attempt to deny or minimize the relationship of it to others, or to insist that where like stories, ceremonies, doctrines, moral ideas are found elsewhere the likeness is illusory or (as has even sometimes been asserted) due to diabolical mimicry.

A rational and secure ground for the preference of one religion can, as it seems to me, be found only when its organic relationship to others is admitted. It is important for Christians to remember that the view which is traditional in Christian theology of the relation of Judaism to Christianity, however much it may in the past have expressed itself in ways uncongenial to our modern methods of thought and inconsistent with the results of historical criticism, contains a valuable principle ready for extension to other ethnic religions. To regard Judaism rather as the *representative* of non-Christian religions, the first with which Christianity was in contact, because it was out of it that it originally grew (though it was afterwards to strike roots in others also) rather than as in a class altogether apart as "revealed", while in the others was nothing truly divine, is to regard it in a way which is not without

precedent among the ancient masters of Christian theology, and which is natural to us who are much more fully aware than were our fathers of the close connexion of the religion in which Christ and His apostles grew up both with antecedent and with surrounding heathenism. It has been usual for Christian theologians to regard Judaism as containing indeed implicitly or in a less perfect form what is explicitly or perfectly stated in the Gospel ; but the constant usage of the Old Testament by the Church alongside of the New means also that the less perfect statement is not simply superseded ; it has a permanent place of its own in the organism of Christian doctrine. There is no need to regard Judaism only in this way. In practice, if not in theory, the Church has treated the religion of the Graeco-Roman world as it has treated Judaism. Many of the materials of the Catholic system of dogma, organization, ritual are derived from that religion and the culture historically connected with it. The body of the world's religious experience constitutes an organic whole ; but that does not mean that because each part has its place, therefore any part will do as well as any other. It means indeed just the reverse ; for an organism has a definite structure and a definite manner of growth. In regard to the secular civilization of the world we always recognize that this is so. The philosophical and scientific development which is central for universal civilization is that which originates among the Greeks. The existing political system of the world traces its descent from the Roman Empire. In the same way the main line of religious development is, I take it, that which centres in the Christian Church. This is not to say that the religious contributions of all the peoples who have come or will come into connexion with that development do not really and truly modify it. What the Church after its emergence from Judaism drew from the soil of Graeco-Roman civilization in which it struck such deep roots, what it has drawn since from the Teutonic soil, in which it struck yet new roots in later centuries, all makes the resulting growth different from what it would be, had it not struck these new roots in soil so remote from that in which the seed was at first matured. Nor is this an adequate metaphor. Better would be the apostolic one of the grafting in of new cuttings upon another stock. The seed from the fruit of Israel's trees sown by our Lord in Palestine is not the only germ from which the religious life of the present or of the future springs or will spring. But it is, in a real sense, into the stock that sprang thence that the grafting has been and yet will be. In our own day we are watching not without wonder and apprehension the entry into the general life of the civilized world of a nation whose religious tradition cannot be traced to Israel, nor its tradition of secular wisdom to Greece, nor its political order to Rome. This is a new phenomenon in the history of our civilization, for of Mohammedan culture these things could not be said with the same truth. The Mohammedan world, like the Christian, looked back, though it may be through a distorting medium, to the sacred personages of Israel, Abraham, Moses, Jesus ; to the masters of Greek thought, Plato and Aristotle ; to Alexander the forerunner of Caesar, if not to Caesar himself. None of these names enter into the national tradition of Japan. Yet the advent of the Japanese does, I think, but illustrate anew the truth of the organic unity of the world's civilization and of its religion. No one would hesitate to admit that, while Japanese men of science now meet on equal terms with their European colleagues as fellow labourers in the field of exact knowledge, this has only come to pass through their contact with the general scientific tradition which reaches back through the philosophers of Christendom to the philosophers of Greece. They are now fellow heirs with us of this tradition. They are in no way bound to follow ; they may, for all we know, come to lead : but the past cannot be altered ; the gospel of science came to them from Christendom and not from them to Christendom.

The case of religion is parallel. It is interesting to note how candidly a cultivated and thoughtful Japanese, Mr. Anesaki, in his article in the *Hibbert Journal* for Oct. 1905, can admit that the religion of the future must be Christian. It is not claimed that Buddhism is the main stream or the main stock (we may vary our metaphor with advantage), however much the accession of the Buddhistic tradition may make the religion of the future different from the Christianity of to-day. To deal with this subject as it should be dealt with would need a longer paper than the whole of this, and I must therefore ask for forgiveness if I state dogmatically and without giving my reasons, except in a summary manner, what seems to me to be true concerning it.

It would be generally admitted that, in any complex religious system which has grown up through a long course of development, different parts must be held to be of different importance. There is in it a "word of God" and also a "tradition of men", sometimes serving as a "hedge of the law", a protection to the great principles with which it is associated, sometimes making it of none effect¹. But to draw the line is difficult. Much as the influence which for a long while past Buddhism has been exerting over the higher minds of Christendom may be intensified when a nation trained by Buddhism, not by Christianity, becomes a co-operator in the task of civilization, yet it will always be true that it was in Christendom that the task of developing universal civilization was begun, even though the latest come labourers, as in our Lord's parable, are made equal to those that were there long before². As the Jews of old had to learn with difficulty to admit on equal terms with themselves those who were not born the heirs of the promises, we Western Gentiles may have to learn the same lesson with respect to the Eastern; but the Gospel will always have come from us to them as it came to us from the Jews, and it will still be true that in the words of Athanasius the commonwealth of Israel will have been the school of the knowledge of God to all nations³; or, in the older language of Scripture itself, that in the seed of Abraham, which is Christ, all the nations of the earth are to be blessed⁴.

This paper has already run to an unwarrantable length: but one point I think remains to be discussed. Can we within Christianity itself distinguish revelation from what is not revelation but merely comment thereon?

Now there is a certain view very widely spread which supposes that somewhere we can find in the body of our religious tradition a nucleus, as it were, which is *given*, a deposit of revealed truth, which for believers must be beyond criticism. About all else differences of opinion may exist, and the inquiring mind may range freely and question as it will within the Christian community, but this hard kernel of truth must be taken or left; no doubt reasons may be given for accepting it; but when once accepted it must remain beyond the sphere of discussion. Views may vary as to the relation to this kernel of what encloses it; it may be regarded as a naturally developed protective envelope, the growth of which is to be attributed to the same divine power as wrought the kernel itself, or as a wrapping put about it by human hands, which, though it may have been necessary to its preservation under special circumstances, is of alien stuff; but in any case the sacrosanct character attributed to the kernel as the immediate gift of God, like the original tables of the law in the story of the Exodus, or the image which fell down from Jupiter at Ephesus, places it outside the reach of change. We may lose it or break it as Moses broke the tables, but it neither develops of itself nor can we modify it without it ceasing to possess its original virtue. Now whether the whole body of ecclesiastical tradition be placed in this position,

¹ Matt. xv. 6.

² Matt. xx. 12.

³ *de Incarn. Verbi*, c. 13.

⁴ Gal. iii.

or the Bible only, or certain parts of the Bible¹, or only the acts and words of Jesus Christ, or those acts of His which are mentioned in the Apostles' Creed and the words which the common tradition authenticates, or certain sayings of His which Dr. Harnack or another regard as fundamental and essential; however great or however small the bulk, the principle remains the same; there is an irresolvable something *given* and fixed beyond doubt or question for those who call themselves Christians. The Christian cannot be a freethinker, or a philosopher in the sense which the greatest masters of philosophy would have understood the word. This view however (I venture to think) in the long run destroys itself. It starts as the safeguard of objective truth; it issues in the uttermost subjectivity. But in truth it has been subjective all along. The deposit of revelation is supposed to be distinguished by certain external marks; but the choice of marks is determined in each case by considerations which are unintelligible apart from the special circumstances of the person or society who pitches upon them. And, apart from this, to be recognizable by an external mark is not really the same as to be known as objectively true. The question must always remain—would these marks guarantee *any* content? If not, it is the content in the last resource and not its guarantee that is selected. Hence there is *least* subjectivity and arbitrariness where there seems to be most—less in Dr. Harnack's choice of essential sayings of Jesus than in the choice of the facts recorded in the Apostles' Creed or of the words guaranteed by the common tradition; for the sayings are chosen by Dr. Harnack for what is actually said in them. To me the theory that we should accept on rational grounds certain beliefs which are then to be kept sacred from re-examination seems doomed to break down. It is quite impossible to parallel with the process thus recommended the process of accepting mathematical principles and taking them afterwards for granted. So far as it is believed to be inadmissible to call these into question, it is not on the ground that they have been accepted, but that they are (whenever considered) self-evident; and no one pretends that all the doctrines of the Apostles' Creed, if any, are self-evident. Again it is, no doubt, matter of circumstance or of choice whether a man becomes acquainted with these mathematical principles or takes notice of them; but there are not alternative principles which other men under other circumstances adopt with equal conviction in their place. The possibility of dispensing with a deposit of revelation in the sense of hard irreducible kernel of positive fact to be taken or left, without thereby throwing overboard the whole notion of a dogmatic creed independent of individual wilfulness and caprice, has lately been illustrated by the writings of the Abbé Loisy. It appears to me that this eminent theologian's thoroughgoing rejection of any such theory of a deposit and that firm grasp of the great modern principle of development which enables him to do so make his book *L'Évangile et L'Eglise* more philosophically satisfactory than Dr. Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums*², admirable as in many ways it is, to which it is in form a reply. I should be inclined to criticize M. Loisy's book chiefly because in one point he seems to me to waver in his wholehearted evolutionism; I mean in his failure to recognize that the seed sown by our Lord and His apostles is represented to-day by the vigorous life of the separated Churches as well as by that of the main body in communion with the successor of St. Peter. I do not feel sure but that (had I a right to an opinion) I should think M. Loisy had gone too far in his doubts of the trustworthiness of the records of the foundation of our religion as they

¹ Cf. the curious position taken up by Coleridge, *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, ed. 1849, p. 16 (Letter II on the Inspiration of the Scriptures).

² Translated by Mr. Bailey Saunders under the title *What is Christianity?*

stand: still it is in my opinion a subject for gratitude that the very radicalism of his view has compelled him to face, as few theologians have faced who desire to retain their place among the worshippers and ministers of a historic Church, the consequences of perfect freedom of thought in historical criticism. I think that he has faced these consequences and shown them to be compatible with the loyalty of a Christian to his Master and to the body of which that Master is the head. I know that some fear that, unless they assume a more detailed and certain knowledge of the earthly life of that Master than M. Loisy's criticism would leave them, they have lost all that differentiates him from, say, Socrates. But surely this is not so. This very person, Socrates, was one who like our Lord wrote nothing, and the precise nature of whose teaching is difficult to discover and is matter of doubt among historians of philosophy. Take another great man, Julius Caesar. We know much more of his biography; but it is very doubtful how much he consciously planned of the imperial system of which he has always been regarded as the founder. But though we know vastly less than we do of the careers of Socrates or Caesar, we should still differentiate them from one another, because from the discourse of one has flowed the main stream of European philosophic thought, from the administration of the other the main stream of European political law and order. From the life and death of our Lord has flowed a stream different from either of these, though mingling its waters with theirs, the river of spiritual life, which makes glad the city of God¹. It is the business of historical criticism to discover as far as it can what was the life of Socrates, or Caesar, or of Jesus, when they walked among men; and very likely in all cases much must remain undecided. But our special interest in all these cases is due to the importance of these persons as the fountain heads of movements which are alive and mighty now. Socrates became to the civilized world a teacher and an example; but Jesus has become more to those who believe on Him not less than the power of God and the wisdom of God². And it is this Christ, the ascended Christ, the Christ after the spirit, whom we worship in our Churches and with whom we communicate at our altars, and who, through the power of His Spirit, dwells in us and we in Him. Again, while an empire might well bear the name of a merely mythical founder, so that had the contemporary record of Julius Caesar's deeds perished, the laws of the empire remaining extant, we might have been uncertain whether he was ever a real man, this could scarcely be the case with Socrates. The Platonic dialogues and Xenophontic memoirs often leave us in doubt of the point at which they cease to be historical, but they would be inexplicable if Socrates were not a real man at all. We may, I think, say the same as regards our Lord. This is often not sufficiently realized, because it is thought that what distinguished Him from others is to be found in the miraculous stories told of Him or in the ascription to Him of divine sonship, and not rather in what makes the stories different from the like told of other founders of religions, in the definite character of the divine life which was revealed in Him and imparted by His Spirit, in that "mind of Christ"³ the recognition of which as divine has been, amid all lapses into lower thoughts of God, the peculiar heritage of His Church in all ages. A very distinguished English theologian has lately criticized M. Loisy in a way to which I ought, I think, to refer. I am thinking of Father George Tyrrell in his most recent book *Through Scylla and Charybdis*. He finds this difficulty in the evolutionism of M. Loisy, that the revelation of God in the life and teaching of Christ is there regarded too much after the fashion of a germ, which one would suppose to be in all ways at a lower level of existence than the fully

¹ Ps. xlv. 4.² I Cor. i. 24.³ I Cor. ii. 16.

developed organisms hereafter to come out of it. This he thinks inconsistent with the standard or normative character which we attribute to the New Testament teaching. He therefore desires to restore the old distinction between revealed dogma and theology. The *theology* of the apostles he is willing to admit was germinal; as *theologians* the divines of to-day occupy a position of superior knowledge, in the same way in which a physicist of to-day has far outstripped Newton, though no doubt the individual genius of Newton may have been greater than his, or that of St. Paul than, say, M. Loisy's; and though, in virtue of his genius, St. Paul may have seen further than many that came after him, just as it is some time before the students of any science learn the lessons of such an one as Newton and pass on to further developments. But, Mr. Tyrrell would say, there was a special revelation in the New Testament time, not indeed in the form of statements of fact delivered to our apprehension from without, but in the form of spiritual experiences which remain as classical standards for us, whose experiences have but a secondary character as compared with these. In this sense (though I am not sure that I agree with all that Mr. Tyrrell says in this connexion) I think we must admit that in religion we have something analogous to what we find in art. While the matter to be expressed in poetry now is no doubt more complex and more elaborate than that which moved Homer to song, yet the song of Homer is not antiquated, as the science of a long past age is antiquated; it does not become, like that, a thing of merely antiquarian interest, which the modern student of the science does not need to study; it remains part of the existing achievement with which the student of poetry has to do. We might illustrate the same principle from other arts. Just so it is also in religion. The experiences of the great religious leaders of our race do not become antiquated by the progress of thought. But we know where to find our classics in religion, as in art, not by external marks of authority, but by the appeal of their intrinsic excellence. And if, when we read the record that we have, however imperfect it may be, of our Lord's life and words, we recognize therein an experience not merely loftier than any we know, but different from that of the greatest saint besides, in its assurance of immediate divine sonship; then it will be in the intrinsic character of that experience, not in any external credentials, that the evidence for this unique quality is found. It is a mere superstition however to suppose that a judgement must be "merely subjective" or "merely individual" because it has to do directly with its object and does not depend upon agreement with a *general* rule. We may expect some general rule to hold in a particular case because it held in other like cases; but that is not why it holds there, only why we expect it to do so. The "universal" (as logicians say) is in that particular just as much in its own right, so to put it, as in any of the other particulars which have fallen under our notice before. Not because we see a thing for ourselves do we see *only* for ourselves; on the contrary we may see (as we do in mathematics) that it *is* so and *must* be so, and this is the same thing as saying that it is not so merely for us as this or that individual. And there is no need to ascribe to the witness of the Spirit in ourselves less authority than we attribute in other spheres of life to our own perceptions, our own mathematical and aesthetic intuitions. An intuition need not be irrational; some intuitions are so, or are at least unrationalized; but all rational judgement is ultimately intuitive in the sense that a man must make it for himself if it is to be *his* judgement.

We come back then to what we reached in the earlier part of this paper. There is a revelation of God throughout the Christian religion, as throughout the religious experience of the world at large: but the Christian religion, like the religion of the world at large, is comparable to an organism with

a definite structure, rather than to a homogeneous undiscriminated mass. We are members of the mystical body which is animated by the Spirit which proceeds from Christ : but He and none other is the Head. The revelation of the Spirit of God did not cease with the death of the last survivor of the apostolic college ; in every age we may hear what He saith to the Churches¹ ; but He is still the Spirit of Christ who takes of His and shows it unto us².

¹ Rev. ii. 7.

² John xvi 15.

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REVELATION AND PROGRESS

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EVERY religious fact has two aspects, under both of which we must realize it if it is to be for us a religious fact at all. It is on the one hand a direct manifestation of the power of God. On the other it is a manifestation of that power through some living agent, an agent whose life is limited by certain conditions. Now the only religious facts which are real for us are manifestations of the Divine activity which are mediated through our own natures or through natures akin to our own. And in realizing such facts we sometimes apprehend them entirely as original and immediate manifestations of God's action, and sometimes as effects of that action in ourselves under conditions which our knowledge of ourselves enables us to determine. The former is the apprehension of faith, the latter the apprehension of knowledge. In the one case we see only God Himself, the veritable and unique object of faith, in the religious fact. In the other we concentrate our attention upon the vital process by which the Divine activity becomes manifested in us. I claim that this is the only meaning we can attach to what is called religious knowledge, which is the attempt demanded by the very nature of faith to phenomenalize, as it were, its own immediate certainties. By faith we feel God. By knowledge we trace the method by which that feeling has become and increasingly becomes ours. Yet I would not be understood to mean that faith and knowledge are, as it were, distinct and separate activities. That they cannot be, since they are but different expressions and functions of the one vital source in us. What I mean rather is that faith is immediate and unanalysed knowledge, that knowledge is analysed faith, and that the analysis which it involves may to some degree intensify and deepen faith. The relation between them is something like that between life and the knowledge of the end of life. Such knowledge is no doubt involved in life itself. Yet we must live in order that we may know it, and the knowledge which we gain serves to direct life more surely towards its end.

Let us apply this distinction between faith and knowledge to the case of revelation. For faith, revelation is God's manifestation of His will and character to us and in us, to us through

members of our race in whom that manifestation has been superlative and unique, and in us that we may recognize it at all in them. This immediate faith-perception of a Divine Revelation I propose to take for granted throughout the rest of this paper. It is our necessary starting-point, the original and underived, or, to speak more accurately, God-derived, fact to be analysed. We are here concerned only with the analysis of the fact.

Yet again I would enter a caveat against a possible misapprehension. When I speak of an analysis of the fact of revelation, I do not mean a logical analysis. I mean a vital analysis. The fact of revelation is a fact of our life, of the whole history of humanity since its beginning. It is a fact which humanity has lived. And the analysis of it to which I refer is simply the exposure of its development in history and of the conditions of that development. In the first place let us consider the fact of revelation as history presents it to us. And that we may confine ourselves within manageable limits, let us take the case of the Christian revelation. That revelation is contained for us in the books of the Old and New Testaments. Now a critical study of those documents has disclosed to us a marvellous and sustained growth of revelation, an ever-deepening and more spiritual apprehension of God by men. In the earliest religious records of Israel, as for instance in the Book of Judges, we find conceptions of God's character current in Israel which differ little from those of the surrounding ethnic tribes, conceptions grossly material and magical. But gradually Israel becomes a single nation under the direct impulse of obedience to its national God Jehovah, who takes on a character entirely distinct from and infinitely more spiritual than that of the gods of the nations. That process of differentiation reaches a critical and decisive stage in the prophetic careers of Elijah and Elisha, and in the successful revolution of Jehu against the house of Ahab. But it is in Judah that henceforward the main stress of religious progress is felt. An immense advance in the spiritual realization of the character of Jehovah is indicated by the religious reforms of Josiah and the promulgation of the Deuteronomic Code. Then comes the age of the early prophets, of Amos and Hosea in Israel, of Isaiah and Micah in Judah. Here Jehovah, without ceasing to be the national God of Israel, becomes nevertheless the God of perfect justice, the God whose justice too is supremely manifested in the chastisement of His own people. For these prophets the "day of the Lord" is the day which is imminent when Jehovah will visit His people for their backsliding with crushing defeat at the hands of their enemies, perhaps even with temporary national

extinction. God was not, as the false prophets alleged, pledged to defend the national integrity of Israel without regard to Israel's conduct. He was pledged to an absolute fidelity to His own character of righteousness, and that righteousness He would declare chiefly in chastening His offending son Israel. The chastening came in the Babylonian exile, and under it Israel acquired new and enlarging conceptions of the character of God. Jehovah was no longer merely the God of Israel. He had become the God of all the nations of the earth. Mount Zion was but the ideal centre of the religious world. To it the Gentiles would flock in the new dispensation which Jehovah was preparing. Meanwhile the nations were but instruments in His hand. To the unknown prophet of the Exile, who wrote the last twenty-seven chapters of our Book of Isaiah, it seemed perfectly natural that Jehovah should have chosen Cyrus to be His Messiah, to lay the foundations of the new order by restoring the exiles to Jerusalem. In the Exile, too, Israel had absorbed much that was characteristic in God's revelation of Himself to the Eastern peoples whose central seat was at Babylon. Through that derived religious tradition we are to-day the collateral religious heirs of forms of revelation which have long ceased to exist except in their transformed Judaic and Christian character. But, above all, the experiences of the Exile transformed utterly the Jewish ideal of national integrity. That ideal ceased to be political and became religious. If the Jew henceforward aimed at political freedom, it was only that he might preserve the integrity of the religious brotherhood of Israel. Meanwhile he bent all his energies to the task of founding that brotherhood. That was the work of Ezra and those who collaborated with him in collecting the scattered fragments of prophetic tradition, and converting them into a sacred and binding law. Then came the period of the Greek conquest and the first Hellenic baptism of Judaism, a period of which we know little, but which has left its decisive mark upon the religion of Israel in the serene wisdom and philosophic amplitude of the Sapiential literature. And now we reach the Maccabaeian epoch, from many points of view the Golden Age of Jewish revelation. To it we owe what is perhaps the supreme religious literature of the Old Testament, the later Psalms and many of the most deeply spiritual additions to the collections of earlier prophetic writings. The fervour of this period of controlled religious exaltation passed rapidly into a mood of almost feverish expectation. Israel was on the verge of a new vision, it knew not what. It could only express its hope in the glory and splendour of apocalyptic dreams. At last, after a feverish century, the fulfilment came. A prophet,

acclaimed by his disciples as Elijah come again, announced the Kingdom of Heaven as at hand. But he recognized too in one of his own disciples One greater than himself, the true Messiah who was to bring in the Kingdom. The revelation of God in humanity had grown to its height. Yet those who saw most clearly what He was saw in Him but the Messiah, and in the near future only the certainty of that catastrophic judgement by which He would enter into His kingdom. Meanwhile He was crushed and broken under the weight of traditional religious conservatism and prejudice. Even though, after His death, His disciples held personal communion with Him, they recognized in Him still only the Messiah who, according to the ancient prophecy of the Servant of Jehovah, could not be holden of death. But there presently arose one who saw in Him the universal Redeemer, who felt that in Him the promises of Israel had been fulfilled for and extended to all humanity, who dared to dream that a world-religion had been born out of the Spirit of the Risen Christ. The Gospel of St. Paul had released Christianity from the womb of Judaism. Humanity was embarked upon a new religious course. Henceforward its religious life must learn the secrets which that new Spirit which had come to inform it could teach it. The author of the Johannine writings penetrated in some ways even more fully than St. Paul to the secrets of that Spirit, and bequeathed them to the new Christian world. Since then the whole history of Christianity, in so far as it has been a religious history, has been a growing vital revelation or unfolding of the secrets of that Spirit. Not in Church Councils or in the decrees of authority has that revelation been mainly given, though they have had their share, not unimportant though subordinate, in directing and safeguarding the revelation. But the real work of revelation has been accomplished in the holy lives that have been lived through the power of the Spirit of Christ. It is through them that the revelation has been given in ever enlarging scope down all the Christian ages. It is through such lives that that revelation will continue to increase until at last man will know as he is known, until that Church of humanity has been accomplished which will be "the fullness of Him that filleth all in all".

History then establishes the fact of a growing revelation. Our conception of God is different from and in many ways fuller than that of the Middle Ages, just as that of the Middle Ages was in some respects fuller than that of the age of the Fathers or of the first Christian disciples, or as that again was fuller than the conception of the Maccabaeon age, of the Exile, or of the early prophets. Nor was this development merely

conceptual. It was vital. Every age in its measure lived the revelation, and bequeathed it to its successor with the fuller apprehension of it which its life had acquired. Our realization of life under the category of development may have enabled us for the first time to discover this truth in all the largeness and breadth of its scope. But it is by no means a new truth. The writer who had apprehended most fully the significance of our Lord's life had already seen it when he put into His own mouth the words : " I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth." And again the same writer had fully realized the method of this growth when he made our Lord say, " If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God."

Yet it is just here that we are compelled to recognize certain conditions of this growth. If every age enters into a fuller spiritual heritage than its predecessor and by living the revelation bequeathes it still more richly developed to its successor, it by no means follows that there is a uniform development of religious power, that a later age is necessarily more religious than an earlier. Again we appeal to the evidence of history, and we find that that evidence by no means witnesses to such a conclusion. Revelation does not vary merely in the extension of its concepts, even its most vital ones. It varies also in the intensity of its apprehension of God. And history testifies to nothing with more certainty than to the uniqueness and superlative worth, the controlling and normative value, of the revelation through certain individuals and certain ages. Isaiah, Paul, Francis, the age of Ezra, the Maccabaeon epoch, early Christianity, the German Reform, these men and these times have left an indelible mark upon the history of religion. They were formative and permanently regulative forces in its development. Above all, in our Lord the revelation had at a single stroke attained the full measure of its completeness as a revelation through the soul of man. But again we must remember that these superlative revelations, even this unique revelation, were not effective disclosures to man from without of the will and character of God. They did not of themselves compel faith. If they had, then their supreme value would have been recognized by the contemporary world. But exactly the opposite is the case. It is succeeding ages that have gradually discovered and are continuing to discover the fullness of their worth. Life by growing out of their spirit is growing into it ; is gradually realizing the fullness of their spirit. When we speak, for instance, of going back to the Gospels, we mean that contemporary religious life is, in obedience to its own special needs and

capacities, beginning to discover in the Gospels some part or aspect of their treasure which had been hidden from the eyes of the previous ages. Perhaps we may even say that we are explicitly realizing certain aspects of the revelation which were only implicit in the religious experience of the great masters from whom we learn. We may seek for an illustration of this contrast between the intensity and the extension of revelation, between its depth and its fullness, in the development of any of the great arts, say Music. A Handel or a Beethoven may have felt the total living secret of music, may have been at one with its integral spirit, to a degree not likely to be surpassed in the future. The expression which they gave to that secret may therefore have gained a normative force and value. Yet that expression may be transcended in effective range and power, and that in virtue of the impetus which they themselves gave by their transcendent genius to the need and the capacity of still richer and fuller musical expression. In the same way revelation may be given in an intensity of religious experience, of the appropriated consciousness of God, which is unique and unsurpassable, but which may on that very account demand and inspire an extension of its own certainties into new forms of expression and even of practical realization which it had not itself consciously needed, much less actually achieved.

But again there is involved in this contrast between the intensity and the extension of revelation another condition of its growth which often escapes our notice. Between the great critical moments of revelation, whether in individuals or in epochs, there lie often what seem to us vast barren tracts, periods apparently of spiritual torpor or even positive reaction. But if we examine such periods a little more closely, we shall find, I think, that it is not necessary so to regard them. They are, on the contrary, for the most part periods of spiritual digestion, periods when the activity of the God-consciousness seems momentarily suspended only because the results of some recent expression of that activity are being slowly assimilated and distributed throughout the whole area of life. There is then a social as well as an individual factor in the growth of revelation. The two factors correspond roughly to what we have grown accustomed to regard as the typical Protestant and Catholic tendencies in religion. These tendencies are not contradictory and mutually exclusive, but complementary and mutually dependent.

So far I have attempted to establish the fact of the growth of revelation in its intrinsic character as the consciousness of God. History witnesses to such a growth and to its deter-

mination by conditions similar in kind to those which regulate the development of all other universal forms of human experience. There is the less need, therefore, to insist upon the fact of development in the conceptual realization and expression of revelation. If our very consciousness of God is progressive, it is not wonderful if the attempt to interpret that consciousness in terms of reason is also marked by change. The continual increase of knowledge gained by observation and experiment is always modifying our view of that world-order to which we have to accommodate our immediate consciousness of God, in which indeed we put that consciousness to the proof. The vision of God as the vital and elemental source of Truth and Right and Beauty and Order cannot become current among us, cannot pass from one to another, save in so far as it finds expression in the actual conceptions of truth and right and beauty and order which life lived has at any moment enabled us to acquire. And here it ought to be noted that these are all spiritual products, that they are in very truth our mediated and communicable vision of God as the immediate God-consciousness is an unmediated and incommunicable personal secret. If we deny to any honest pursuit of knowledge, to any generous activity, to any whole-hearted obedience to the inspiration of beauty, to any effectuation of the vital need of order, their spiritual quality, then we are making religion itself illusory. It is because religious teachers have too often, in their blindness to the method of God's revelation, committed themselves to such a denial that those who were by nature most fitted to appreciate religion have come themselves to deny it or to treat it as an illusion.

If, then, the certainties of faith need, in order to gain expression, to ally themselves with current knowledge, forms of activity, appreciation of beauty, conceptions of order, the alliance is not an unnatural one. It is but the alliance of a higher form of revelation with a lower. And the result of that alliance is the highest expression of these various aspects of human activity. Dogma is the highest expression of human knowledge. Action directly inspired by responsibility to conscience is the highest expression of human action. Worship is the highest expression of the appreciation of beauty. Order applied to spiritual things and obeying the conditions of spiritual growth is the highest expression of the human instinct for order. But here, as elsewhere, "*optimi corruptio pessima*." The knowledge, the forms of activity, the appreciation of beauty, the conceptions of order, through which faith-certainties express themselves must be the best at our command, or they will mutilate and deface rather than express those certainties.

And the best in this kind are not the absolutely best, but those which are living for us. It is when faith-certainties are cribbed within some dead form of thought, some world-view which is no longer current, that they are hard pressed to subsist at all even in the most religious souls, and that they utterly fail to commend themselves to those who are less naturally and spontaneously religious.

Thus I have endeavoured to show that revelation, which is the eternal and unchanging activity of God in making Himself known to all men, which is the immediate apprehension by all men of the same object of faith, has what I may call its phenomenal aspect ; that it is according to this aspect alone that we can make its certainties known to one another, or even in any vital manner to ourselves ; that this development of revelation is both conceptual or formal, and spiritual or vital ; and that the spiritual development depends in large measure upon the formal because form itself partakes, even though subordinately, of the nature and quality of life.

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PANTHEISM AND CHRISTIAN
THOUGHT

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§ 1. Cosmic Pantheism. § 2. Pantheism in which the World is lost. § 3. The appeal to Personality. § 4. Conceptions offered by Pantheism and Philosophy. § 5. Further Conceptions adopted by Christian Theism. § 6. Immortality. § 7. Moral Efficiency. § 8. Conclusion.

§ 1. PANTHEISM, when compared with Theism, may lie in opposite directions; in one form it makes too much of the world, in the other form too little, and this divergence affects fundamentally the conceptions of God.

There is the Pantheism which boldly attributes to the Universe taken as a whole—of which the finite things and persons we are aware of are parts—the series of infinitudes: eternity, self-existence, perfection, and the like. Some Pantheists make a selection from the universe and take Matter to be fundamental, to be the only infinite and eternal element, with finite conscious beings as blossoms upon it; others declare that the reality is Consciousness only; others that Matter and Consciousness run side by side in parallel reality. As in either of these views the cosmos, or what is regarded as fundamental in it, is invested with the highest attributes the mind can conceive, so that the name of Deity is claimed for it, we may call it Cosmotheism, to distinguish it from the other kind of Pantheism. It has often commended itself to men's thoughts in one or other of the above forms or in some similar form: to the Stoics, for example, in the days of Greece and Rome; soon after the renaissance to Giordano Bruno and Spinoza when they spoke of *Deus sive Natura*, God or Nature, regarding them as equivalent in reality, differing only in name: God and the Universe as absolutely identical.

That recent extensions of our knowledge of the universe should press men in this direction is easy to understand. The sciences, both physical and mental, have expanded our knowledge until boundaries have almost vanished. Physics and geology have unrolled the scroll of time by millions of years; even Lord Kelvin's limitation to twenty million years refers only to the solar system, while we are given to understand that in the world of stars system after system stretches out beyond all measureable limits of space or of time. And there is the study of the minute: the penetration of analysis has carried us down to atoms and finds each to be a system: we read now of "electrons" and "ions" almost infinitesimal; of the structures of living organisms being built not only of cells but of "ids" far beyond our ken. And so the mind is led to regard Matter as permanent and infinite, and Materialist Pantheism offers itself.

Then in the region of Consciousness: the recent tendency is to assign it everywhere, in various degrees: self-consciousness, waking consciousness, sub-consciousness, and even such a rudimentary state as just catches the name, the "unconscious". Some follow Spinoza in regarding Matter and Consciousness as different, but running completely parallel courses; others declare that they are two aspects of an unknown x ; others, and a growing number, that they are not different, but really one. And where we have

the view that this universe of which the sciences keep showing us more and more is in itself eternal and infinite, and is the Reality which we all desire to know, we have Cosmotheism.

Against this, Christian Theism asserts that the marks of limitation are upon the world. It is full of dependent, derivative, and finite kinds of being, and the sum-total of these, though expanded indefinitely in every direction, would yet fall short of being infinite, self-dependent, eternal, perfect. The protest is made very emphatically against Matter being elevated to infinity in solitary dignity, and there are, indeed, but few Materialists among trained philosophers, although there are a good many among men engrossed in the physical sciences. But Theism protests also against the whole aggregate of the modes of Conscious life disclosed by mental science—now more widely extended than it was a few years ago—being elevated to the rank of infinite and self-existent Reality. Nor can it cease its protest even when the claim is made for fully Personal life, with its capacity for Happiness, and Knowledge, and Freedom, and Goodness. Certainly Matter cannot compete with Personality in rank and in value, nor can the lower grades of Consciousness; we have reached a higher quality and order of existence in the presence of spiritual Personality: and here alone we have any plausible ground for thinking of the possibility of assigning the attributes of perfect Wisdom, Justice, Holiness, which we include in our conception of what Reality must be. But here, too, reflection shows marks of finiteness and imperfection, of dependence and relativity; evidence of imperfection in happiness and in goodness; and even worse, experiences of genuine misery and indubitable evil. Neither Matter, therefore, nor Consciousness in general, nor moral and spiritual Personality, as we know them, carry such marks as entitle any one of them, or the combination of them, to the august attributes which we mean when we speak of "Divine Reality". These make up the "universe" as we know it, and we are grateful for every extension of our knowledge which has been made by recent Science, but this welcome does not justify us in believing the world to be infinite and perfect: no mere removal of boundaries could accomplish that: limitations are in the very nature of the constituents of the universe, even at its best, and extension and multiplication of them still leave them finite.

If, now, an offer is made to acknowledge that there is a Reality over and above the finite, and that from and in this Reality the finite has its being, we shall accept this, but we shall not be prepared to call it the Universe or Nature; these words plainly refer to the region of things we know and other things like them which we may come to know some day. We think that the differences between such a Reality and the things we know are so great that another term is required if our words are to express our thoughts. We shall not be content to call it the Unknown or the Unknowable, for we have conceptions which we believe to be applicable to it. Nor can we call it simply Substance, the First Cause, or the Eternal ground, or the Primal and Ultimate Unity, the Perfect Being; the Reality is all of these, and more: and to express them we think of a concrete Personality, and name the Name of God. If the Cosmotheist really means by the Universe "God and the finite system", then we have only a question of words between us; but to us it seems misleading and opposed to common usage, which is clear in including in its thought that there is a distinction, that God is in Himself in a way in which He is not in the universe which He keeps in being, and that the universe is dependent upon God, but that it is confusing to say that the universe *is* God. Some Cosmotheists speak of a universe on which they confer all the divine attributes, and then the assertion of identity with God is, of course, meaningless, and

one term should suffice them : from them we only ask what name they wish to use for the totality of finite persons and things. But if the finite universe is meant and *that* is called divine, we have to point out that the position is really either Atheism or Agnosticism, and not Pantheism at all.

Against Cosmotheism, then, Christian Theism insists that there is difference as well as likeness between God and His world ; identity is quite wrong ; the relation of part and whole, constituent and totality, quite misleading ; and it seeks for conceptions which shall be more nearly adequate to express both the likenesses and the differences which it believes that reflection sets before us.

§ 2. We pass to Pantheism of the second kind. At times the mind is so deeply impressed with the transitory and imperfect character of all things finite, that when it turns to contemplate the Eternal and Perfect and Holy, with the confidence that it is Real, it stands overwhelmed. It loses its hold of the world and is unable to assign to it either reality or value. It declares that God alone exists. This attitude of the awe-struck finite mind is an ancient and a widely prevalent experience. In Greece, in Alexandria, in the Middle Ages, it found voices which expressed it in noble eloquence. And in recent times, when Kant had opposed Naturalism and Materialism with the force of a critical Idealism, men arose in Germany who proclaimed the reality of Absolute Spirit in a sense which left no reality for aught but Himself. In the Eternal Spirit our little individualities rise into being, they come and go, but their appearances are so marked with finiteness and transitoriness as to be unworthy of the name of real existence. Permanent support of this tendency comes from the influence of the prolonged reflections of the mind of the Hindu peoples : there the fundamental thought has ever been that Brahman is all ; the world is only Maya, illusion, a dream, even a pastime, unreal ; to spend our time in contemplating such a world is to be "bound fast to death". The Christian Theist sees Pantheism of this kind breaking out at times in the thought of Old Testament writers : the Physical Universe is a vesture ; individual men are things of nought, their lives passing away like shadows ; even the nations are drops in a bucket, the small dust in the balance, of no real account. Every sincere mind must at times be thus affected by the thought of God in His majesty ; must be touched with wonder that He can care for man at all, and feel as if dissolving into nothing before Him.

§ 3. But presently there stirs in every one who drives reflection home, the perennial thought, "I am I." The experience of selfhood reasserts itself with a force which holds us fast. We are clear and firm in our consciousness that we are not one another, and that each of us has, or is, knowledge which no one else can know, feeling which no one else can feel, and power of acting from a centre where no one else can act. And it is also a valid and true affirmation that we make when we are so moved by the sense of personality as to feel entitled, even in the presence of a vivid conception of the reality of the Eternal Spirit, to say Thou and I. It seems, perhaps, as if it would be more becoming to our finiteness to shrink from this in overpowered awe : and to this feeling no doubt is due the loss of true thinking at this vital point by so many reverent minds. But there can be little doubt that a firm and assured confidence in an inalienable birthright of the soul is of the utmost necessity. Failure to hold to this primal faith has led untold numbers into a Pantheistic temper if not into an explicit Pantheistic creed. We need not forego the reverence which we all respect and approve, and share : this is provided for by our thought that our very selfhood is derivative and dependent on His will : but even so, it is by that very will endowed with a capacity of existence for ourself,

as well as for Him in whom we live. We can verify it most clearly if we consider what is the nature of an affection, especially of love, though the nature of all affections is fundamentally the same. There cannot be an affection towards an object without an object towards which it looks, upon which it is directed. There can be no affection between God and man unless there is in man some objectivity *towards* which God's love may go forth and *from* which responsive love may return. To identify man and God is to abandon the possibility of affection of every kind—and this is seen quite clearly by so thorough a thinker as Spinoza, who regards all affections as imperfections due to our incomplete and confused ideas. This consequence should be pondered by all whose reverence leads them in the direction of suppressing the sense of personality. To do so is not to be jealous for God, but to remove from Him the spiritual order of beings which for His own good pleasure He has constituted and maintained. The vital affirmation of our experience at its centre is the anchoring ground of Theism as a philosophy of universal experience when probed to its depth. It is deepened in Christian Theism by reference to the special experiences of Christian believers and their faith that they *live* in God.

§ 4. Upon this foundation the structure of thought must be built, and Christian Theism seeks for conceptions which will secure the existence and personality of man in the presence of the Majesty of God. First, it looks upon the conceptions which are offered by the Pantheist. God is, and the world is an *emanation* from Him, is perhaps the principal: God is regarded as projecting from His own being what we can only call parts or particles of Himself. Hinduism is full of metaphors expressing this conception—we are sparks from the fire, the web woven out of herself by the spider, notes of a drum or lute: these mark the fugitive character of our existence; others express a more permanent connexion: we are rays from a lamp; even permanence is signified: we are radii from the centre of a circle. These physical metaphors are very prevalent. But there are also conceptions drawn from the ideas of higher intellectuality which are employed by science and philosophy: we are effects of God as Cause; qualities or modes of God as Substance; appearances or manifestations of God as Reality; we are forms of the divine Energy or Life; or subordinate centres of Consciousness in the Eternal Consciousness. Now each of these conceptions has some helpfulness in its place, and it is not for any reasonable mind to insist on rejecting them: but we are entitled to object to them, singly and in total, that they are insufficient even for our human thought. Each is a description of an abstract relation, and is good for the field of abstract thought; but the concreteness of living personality is not attained by their employment, even when they are taken all together. Great philosophical systems are based on the use of some particular selections of them, but an appeal to philosophy to-day would disclose the fact that no one of these systems has won predominance for itself, certainly not supremacy. It is to some minds the most significant fact in the history of recent philosophy that the great system in which Hegel seemed to combine more attributes of spiritual reality than perhaps any single mind had achieved before him, no longer holds the field: no one is Hegelian pure and simple; inquiry and intellectual construction still proceed. The lack of a commanding system is so impressive that men are looking on metaphysical conceptions themselves as akin to the ideas of poets, as special forms of our creative imagination. And so Philosophy takes an affinity with religion and is found resting on the conceptions of Personality: personality not as a total of abstractions, but as a profound concrete of which only certain features are apprehended, with hidden depths still to be developed. And this

Personality is not only such as metaphysical conceptions show, but is ethical and aesthetic also : it has values of goodness and of beauty as well as of simple existence. Nearly all modern philosophy accepts this, and Personalism in some form or other is now predominant in the intellectual centres of Europe and America.

§ 5. Christian Theism, therefore, is supported in its appeal that we should think about both God and the world in terms of personality. The relations of finite to infinite are best expressed by analogies drawn not from Physics or Biology, but from the life of persons : these give the highest and the best conceptions :

Man, once descried, imprints for ever
His presence on all lifeless things.

We use human relationships in order to express our best thoughts of the relationship between men and God. Amongst conceptions of this personal kind which Christian Theism offers we may enumerate as the most prominent :—

Self-limitation. The world comes into being and is sustained by the Eternal Spirit by reason of His deciding to create beings who shall have a degree of independence which will amount to His having limited His own power and authority in their favour. Divine action in this respect is like that of a man who renounces some of his own authority and power by assigning a measure of it to men who exercise it for him in some independence. This is a fundamental thought, and of great use, so far as it goes ; but it does not go very far, as it is only negative and only touches the initial act.

Permission. God permits beings of a secondary order, whom He has created, to exist and act and work out the designs they set before themselves. This is the conception of Plato (in *The Laws*), of Augustine, and of Leibnitz, amongst the great intellects ; relied upon by them especially when facing the problem of that opposition to Perfect Goodness which is exhibited in the existence of wrongdoing, vice, and evil in personal life. And it avails to some extent : yet what is “permitted” is only negatively accounted for : it is a cold conception, hinting at reluctance ; it contains no reference to any purpose in the Creative mind, for which the permission is allowed.

Delegation or Representation. This marks an advance, for we understand that a delegate has a positive function on behalf of his principal, whether a single person or a community. For some assignable reason he acts for the principal, to carry out his will. And so this analogy raises the conception of man’s relation to God : he acts, within his capacities, on behalf of God. He may go wrong : he may even substitute purposes and aims of his own, and so be a faithless and disloyal delegate : and the possibility of evil is thus provided for. Still a delegate is somewhat negative : he is appointed not for his own sake, but because his principal is for some reason unable to act personally. No reason appears why an Omnipotent Being should have delegates ; and there is no clear reference to the good of the delegate himself.

We still need a term which shall recognize that some purpose can be assigned for beings of a secondary order having been created. We can set such purposes before us in three ways :—

(a) The greater glory of God in the existence of beings who are new expressions of Himself ;

(b) His greater glory in the gratitude, adoration, and love towards Himself felt by the new order of beings ;

(c) The good of the new beings themselves, in and for themselves : that

good especially which they enjoy when offering their obedience, their gratitude, and love to God, and the minor love in which they can live through fellowship with one another.

To express relationships which carry out these purposes we can draw upon conceptions derived from the two highest spheres of personal life that we know: our life in the Nation or State, and our life in the Family. And so we arrive at the conception of

God as the *Sovereign Ruler*; men as His people in a kingdom. Sovereignty meets our desire to recognize the loftiness, authority, and majesty of the Power and of the Goodness of God, and the fitness of loyalty, obedience, and reverence on the part of man. But even Sovereignty is not as deep as we can go: there is something imperative about it, and it gives rise to Law and Duty in a way that is inexorable, perhaps stern. In this the religion of Israel made a farther advance by holding that this fundamental relation of Sovereignty left the people in so much independence that it could enter into a covenant with Him, which individuals were free to recognize or to renounce. The magnificent boldness by which the conception of such independence as this was retained by men who had advanced far beyond the idea of a tribal deity, and who were at the same time ascribing to God the creation and lordship of the Universe and the attributes of Eternity and Omnipotence, gives the religion of the Prophets and Psalmists of Israel a primary place in the history of religious thought, and contributes an important feature to the Christian religion.

But analogies from the State, though carrying us far, are deficient in intimacy; and so we advance to the region of personality where the inner affections are found and the most intimate personal relationships prevail, to the conception of

Fatherhood and Sonship. Here we have on one side origination, maintenance, protection, affection, tender mercy and lovingkindness; and on the other, dependence, gratitude, loyalty, affection, and piety. Here is the independence to which Christian experience testifies; even in love itself, for we know that no good can be done *to* a human soul, a free spiritual being; what can be done is to stimulate it into its own activity, thought, emotion, affection. Even Divine grace cannot be conferred upon the human soul; it is offered as from a Father, and must be taken hold of as by a son. Love may surround and envelop, the love that responds must proceed from within to meet it.

These highest analogies avail also to assist our thought upon the problem of evil and sin. We think of alienation, disloyalty, and rebellion as having broken into the kingdom of God; of evasion, opposition, ingratitude, even hatred, as having entered among the children of the Family. And yet we can venture to think that God prefers a family of disobedient sons to a household of slaves: for there is in the Family a potentiality which is lacking in the slaves, and by virtue of this potentiality His long-suffering is continued, and the tenderness which invites return never ceases. On these ground-conceptions Christianity frames its belief in Redemption and Salvation, the reconciliation of sons and the reconstruction of the Family.

That these are final conceptions and fit to be universal appears to be the reasonable conviction, when we remember that among men there is nothing higher than the State and the Family: no other region whence we can draw higher conceptions: we come to the maturity of thinking when we contemplate the conception of men as being in essence sons of God, and in that common sonship forming a universal brotherhood.

The highest venture of final Faith is reached by Christian Theism when it reverently carries up these conceptions into the height of the Godhead

Himself, and, though now with stammering tongue, speaks of the Triune Personality.

§ 6. The belief in personal immortality is another great article of religion upon which Christian Faith meets Pantheism with the same assured confidence that she is right in placing her trust in analogies drawn not from the Physical sphere, as emanations, manifestations, nor from Metaphysics, as qualities, modes, and the like, but from Personality. Pantheism of the second kind, with its thin range of conceptions for the "illusions" of the finite sphere, makes no attempt to draw personal immortality into the region of its faith: the hold on independence is too slight, even if permitted at all, and Pantheisms of this order invariably speak of the return to the Original One as the destiny of men, a return complete and without reserve. Very nearly all Pantheisms of the Cosmic kind do the same. An advocacy of a theory that the Universe—and therefore God, according to this view—is a plurality of immortal souls has appeared recently, but it is unique, and, so far, only its author has undertaken its exposition. Some Cosmotheists give some effort to vindicating permanence for the finite spirit, endeavouring so to establish the essentiality of each individual in the scheme of things that its loss is unthinkable. This can be welcomed as a recognition of the "infinite value of the soul", which we, too, claim. But all we need say here is that this attempt is made by but few Cosmotheists, and that their success is denied by the majority. It is only when we think on the lines of the highest personal conceptions that we can walk with any confidence. In a kingdom a sovereign may reasonably be conceived to decide never to lose a subject, even though constantly adding to the number of his people. And still more, in a Family where intimate bonds of affection have been rooted in the inner nature of father and children, that separation should be the ever-recurring law becomes improbable. Of course no proof of immortality is here; all we can claim is that continuance of a relationship like this is in accord with the essential character of the relationship, and affords a reasonable element in a belief which must be in large measure a venture of faith.

§ 7. Pantheism does not fail to make a vigorous claim for *moral efficiency*. In Pantheism of the second order the morality is negative: its ideals are renunciation, escape from conflict and bondage, and hope of return to identity with the One from whom we are separated in the present life by a deceptive and obstructive separation. "Steadfast in pain, in pleasure without desire, in longing self-restrained, in all things . . . free from hatred and from joy: the motions of every impulse have been stilled": here is no incitement to what we mean by *life*.

But Pantheism of the Cosmic order boldly claims efficiency for moral life due to the thought of our being a part of the actual Universe, and participants in its necessary course. Here we can only ask whether in our experience we can be animated to moral effort by regard for a Universe which is impersonal and in essence has no recognition for what ought not to be; which must proceed on its course, and take us with it. Can we really be stirred not only to renunciation, but to strong and resolute endeavour, when told that our sense of freedom to choose, our freedom to resist, divert, and destroy out of the universe the ills which restrain and chafe us from outside ourselves, which sting us with reproach and remorse within, is but ignorance of the resistless necessities of an order and a process which cannot really turn from its course? Can this seriously be offered to us, as beings trying to think in order that our action may be good, in exchange for the thought of ourselves as graciously permitted to choose ends and purposes, as entrusted with delegatory power designed for use for our own benefit, and for the glory of Him whose delegates we

are? Much more are we not on ground on which our thought may reasonably move us to moral efficiency when we think of our status as members of a kingdom the well-being of which depends upon our loyalty and cheerful obedience to the laws upon which it is based, laws which can only be carried out by free and reasonable citizens? And still more when obedience is asked from us as free sons in the Family, an obedience which should be grounded on love as the very law of our life, the privilege of our personality.

§ 8. "Pantheism," says Professor Campbell Fraser, "is the religious philosophy of a moiety of the human race." It is, therefore, seriously incumbent on members of a Christian Church to see how their faith stands in relation to it. I have endeavoured to indicate some of what I take to be the principal affinities and contrasts which stand out between it and Christian Theism. We should be ready to accept from Pantheists of the Cosmotheistic kind their beliefs in the expanded universe of which science is telling us ever more and more; but we cannot follow them in endowing that universe with the high attributes which mark Divinity. Rather we shall call to our aid, in this respect, the Pantheism of the second kind, in its ascription of these supreme attributes to God alone. But from this, too, we separate ourselves by assignment of reality, though of a secondary kind, to the world, and especially to the world of spiritual beings, such as our experience tells us that we are ourselves. We accept from Metaphysics and Ethics all the conceptions which they can offer, and especially we welcome the prominence of Personality in the philosophy of our day. And then we turn with confidence and gratitude to the great line of thought which is our portion. We find confidence especially in the revelation of the Fatherhood of God and the ideal Sonship of Man in Christ which constitutes the basis of the Christian Gospel, and we pass on to a like confidence in the belief that man is related to man in spiritual brotherhood in the Family of God, where the Spirit is manifested. And we hope with ardour for the extension of this Faith over the minds and hearts of men of every philosophy and every religion, till their thought and ours unite in reverence for the magnificent grace of the One God and Father, by which all men are called in the religion of the Spirit to live in the kingdom of the Son.

Some books which may be consulted in this connexion: Materialist Pantheism: Haeckel, *Confessions of a Man of Science* (A. & C. Black); Spiritual Pantheism: Pictou, *Pantheism* (Constable's Series); Hinduism: L. D. Barnett (in the same series) and Deussen, *The Upanishads* (T. & T. Clark); Bigg, *Neo-Platonism* (S.P.C.K.); Inge, *Mysticism* (Methuen); Caird, *Spinoza* (Blackwood). For criticism: Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*, and Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism* (Blackwood), and other books on Philosophy of Religion. For Christian doctrine, Expositions of the Creed, Article I, e. g. Westcott, *The Historic Faith* (Macmillan); A. Moore in *Lux Mundi* (Longmans); Illingworth, *Personality, and Divine Immanence* (Macmillan); Rashdall in *Contentio Veritatis* (Longmans); Cunningham and Caldecott in *Cambridge Theological Essays* (Macmillan); Lucas, *Faith of a Christian* (Macmillan).

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND THE CONTRASTING CHRISTIAN TRUTH

By ELEANOR M. REED, M.D. (U.S.A.)

DURING the last few years many valuable books upon the doctrinal fallacies of Christian Science have been written by acknowledged masters of the subject and authorized teachers of the Church. These books furnish such adequate and convincing arguments against the acceptance of this, to many, fascinating philosophy, that it is not my purpose in this short paper to re-state the grounds upon which we differ dogmatically with the followers of Mrs. Eddy.

It is generally agreed that there is, at the present time, a real need for a fuller and deeper understanding amongst Church people of the laws of mind in their relation to the physical organism, by the operation of which the cure of disease is often accomplished by mental and spiritual treatment, quite without medical or surgical interference. It is for this reason I urge the consideration of the Congress upon the subject of Christian Science, studied in the light of its successes rather than its failures, not only because of the intrinsic value of the principle which we shall find underlying all its achievements, but also because we shall be led to recognize this same principle as vitally inherent in the faith of the Mother Church, and so be inspired to teach the necessity of emphasizing it.

While there are many who are inclined to scoff at all the reported cures by Christian Science, and to ascribe the supposed results to imagination or hypnotism, or mere suggestion, this is not true of those who have honestly investigated available evidence. Such students all acknowledge that among those with whom this so-called religion has become a matter of genuine, personal conviction, there are occasionally wonderful cures of real organic disease, and very frequently relief from the less serious but only slightly less discomforting difficulties known as functional and nervous diseases.

Christian Science, as a distinct school of thought, stands as the arrogant claimant for supremacy in the field of mental therapeutics. She makes extravagant demands upon the credulity of rational people, and offers wholly illogical explanations for her physical achievements. In spite of her profound ignorance of the laws to which she owes her successes she is curing many; but, because of that ignorance, she is killing more. To her cures she owes her phenomenal growth; in her awful and unpardonable sacrifice of life lies her inevitable doom. In dealing with a lady, however, who has become a convert to this seductive philosophy, we may, of course, "meet" her on doctrinal grounds, and possibly make her see quite clearly how heretical her theories are as to the nature of God and man and sin; but that will not explain to her why she was cured in a month by Christian Science of facial neuralgia from which she had suffered for years. At the end of our interview she may be modest enough to admit that her knowledge of theology had been decidedly deficient, but she never will agree that she did not know facial neuralgia when she felt it, and it would seem a good deal to ask of her. If we can set her religious

theories aside and attack the fact of her restoration from the physical standpoint there may be more hope of enlightening her.

The thesis that I want to suggest is, that the cures by Christian Science are the result of physical processes induced by the mental and physical *practices* of its adherents, and that these results are wholly independent of, and uninfluenced by, the question of the truth or error of the tenets by which the practices are inspired. It will be convenient to consider the subject under two headings. I. The true principle of healing as revealed by (a) physical treatment; (b) hypnotism. II. The mental and physical practices of the followers of Mrs. Eddy.

I

THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF HEALING REVEALED BY

(a) *Physical treatment.* There is a curious misconception in the popular mind, as to the real meaning of the term *vis medicatrix naturae*. Instead of understanding it to be the expression of an active dynamic agency of which the tissues of the body are the instrument, it is more often regarded as a kind of passive endurance on the part of the physical organism. Thus it is supposed that if a person is attacked by a disease which is not inevitably destructive in its nature, the body will, if left to its own devices, carry on its normal functions as well as it can under difficult conditions, and by the continued operations of these functions the disease will, in some mysterious way, be overcome, and the "healing power of nature" will have scored one more triumph. Such a theory has no foundation in actual fact, and an illustration of the true activity of this healing power may be helpful. If there is a slight abrasion of the skin, say upon the finger, and the little wound becomes infected by pathogenic germs, there may be observed within a few hours an inflamed condition of the surrounding tissue. This condition is well described by Erichsen, when he says, "In the study of inflammation it is most important to bear in mind that the process is always the result of some injurious influence acting on the living tissue, and if the cause be removed the process will cease. It is not a disease in itself, it is, in fact, in most cases, if not in all, the *defensive reaction of the tissues* against the injurious influence acting upon them. The new cells that invade the inflamed area are engaged in removing the portions of tissue which may have perished from the injury, or in combating the micro-organisms which have invaded the affected area, or, should the process be due to the action of a chemical irritant, the abundant exudation from the vessels tends to dilute or wash away the irritating material and thus to bring the process to an end." (*The Science and Art of Surgery*. Sir John Eric Erichsen, Bart., F.R.S., LL.D., Edinburgh.)

In any form of physical treatment there are two primary objects in view, both of which are in direct relation to this curative force. First, by surgery or mechanical treatment of any kind, to remove hindrances to Nature's operations, and to adjust such structural relations of parts as may have been displaced by violence or disease; second, by drugs, to introduce into the body the chemical elements which research and experience have proved to be effective in starting these healing processes into activity. It is significant that we can only reach this dynamic agency which makes for the well-being of the body through the nervous system—that marvellous keyboard upon

which the harmonies and discords of the human soul are irradicably impressed throughout the life-history of that soul from the cradle to the grave.

These curative operations may be stirred into activity by various means, but the result is always physiologically the same ; that is to say, whether a tear is secreted by the lachrymal gland in response to a touch of nitrate of silver upon the cornea of the eye, applied for therapeutic purposes, or is the physical manifestation of a mental picture of suffering, the tear is of precisely the same chemical composition and results from the same functional process. Or again, a severe congestive headache is often cured by a cup of strong coffee ; it is frequently cured by a message which brings great joy to the sufferer. In both instances the real " cure " lies in the changed condition of the cerebral vessels. Coffee and joy alike tend to quicken the action of the heart, thus equalizing the general circulation and relieving the engorged blood-vessels in the brain which, by pressure, are causing the actual pain. This being true, why should the Christian Scientists presume to deny the efficacy of a drug, because they are able to prove by their methods that a certain form of mental treatment may accomplish the same results ?

So while we may divide the influences which endanger the well-being of the body into physical and mental *causes*, we cannot make any such distinction in the physical conditions which reveal the disturbance ; and this is quite as true of the assistance we may offer to Nature in time of distress. *Drugs* stand to physical therapeutics in exactly the same relation as *suggestion* does to mental therapeutics ; neither are curative except in their power of initiating the vital healing force which we hope to find inherent in the organism.

No one has ever defined the nature of a nervous impulse, nor explained why a chemical agent or an emotion can increase the force of the heart's action. In the absence of such knowledge, we can only accept facts of experience which certainly justify the hypothesis that " behind the thought is the thinker ", and behind the physical phenomena is the vital force of which it is the expression, and thus, ulterior to the mental conception and its physical manifestation, lies the realm of correlation of the forces which govern both.

Christian Science is conspicuously demonstrating, not only by her successes, but even better by her failures, that mind can never dominate body, but that in the realm of the intellectual life, we may, both by negative and positive practices, co-operate with and intensify the strength of that force which controls physical poise.

(b) *Hypnotism*. It is a matter of common experience, that definite physical conditions are concomitant with equally definite states of consciousness ; but we know that the body does not distinguish in its reaction between an emotion based upon truth or the reverse. That is to say, if the mental conception is clear and is accepted by the mind as being a reality, the physical result is inevitable. This is strikingly illustrated by the phenomena exhibited by hypnotism. If under hypnosis, a person is told that he is being pursued by some one whom he thinks he has reason to fear, there may only follow such superficial evidence of alarm as an effort to escape from the room or an appeal to those present for protection. If, however, the hypnosis is sufficiently deep, and the suggestion of danger is made with decision, the most profound physical manifestations of fear may be evinced, the most usual being uncontrollable trembling, ashy paleness, profuse perspiration, quickened respiration, with perhaps collapse from the intensity of the cerebral disturbance. It is significant that these

functional changes are not the result of a demand for, nor expectance of, their appearance (though they might have been so induced), but are the normal physical expression of a mental conception created by a suggestion in which the physical state of the individual was not involved; and it is also interesting that all that is necessary to release Nature's power to restore functional poise is the counter-suggestion of entire safety; the time required for this restoration being relative to the intensity of the disturbance.

In hypnotic treatment, when employed for therapeutic purposes, there are, as in physical treatment, two special objects, one negative the other positive. *First*, effacing from the subconscious or subliminal mind any unfortunate mental picture which has become a "fixed idea", such as that of a painful accident that has been witnessed, and which, by an effort of the will, may to a great extent be kept out of the waking consciousness, but haunts the dreams and depresses the mind, thus occasioning nervous symptoms for which medical treatment fails to afford relief. Under hypnotism, when the higher faculties of mind, the will, and the reason, are in abeyance, this impression may be entirely eradicated by counter-suggestion, and with it the physical results. *Second*, the arousing of happy emotions, such as joy, which, as we have seen, stimulate the activities of the body as truly as painful mental pictures depress them.

While this method of treatment is far from representing the highest form of mental therapeutics, yet, as hypnotism is so often offered as an explanation for the cures by Christian Science, it is well to think of its possibilities and its twofold relation to the principle of healing. Hypnotism, like drugs, never *cured* any one of anything, but both are *means* by which Nature may be helped to do the work which nothing can do for her. Its phenomena also teaches us how irrelevant is the question as to the intrinsic truth of the suggestions to which the body will respond, and this is important because Christian Scientists invariably claim that their physical results prove the truth of their theories.

II

THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL PRACTICES OF THE FOLLOWERS OF MRS. EDDY

In the majority of conversions to Christian Science the first inducement to its study is offered by the report of a cure or the personal investigation of one. Mrs. Eddy's textbook, *Science and Health, with a Key to the Scriptures*, is read with the real hope that the mind may be able to accept its teaching for purely physical advantages. I think this statement is substantiated by the testimonials given at the end of Mrs. Eddy's book. There are two supreme obligations resting upon those who would reap the reward of the faithful: first, the constant realization of transcendent personal power, and second, an unflinching expression of that power in spite of all obstacles. Here, again, we have the two essential elements for Nature's assistance. Now commence the *practices*. The first one of importance might be described as an act of mental surgery. By one stupendous excision the mind is cleared of every conception of life and its conditions which God and human experience have revealed to be true. Every intruding thought which would contradict this conception is met with stern denial and extinction, and the will is perpetually exercised in this essential

practice in order to test the *truth* of what seems to them to be a beautiful faith.

Deep-rooted in the heart of humanity is the conviction that it was God's original purpose that man should express human perfection, and if only we can set aside a few annoying facts of history, and the still more disquieting burden of personal experience, and see ourselves at once transformed into paragons of virtue and unerring expressions of Divinity, surely this conception must be both tranquillizing and stimulating! Such is the mental revolution which follows conversion to Christian Science. This happy consciousness of personal superiority is maintained by continual mental discipline. There is no suggestion of hypnotism about this, and it is unfortunate when their results are ascribed to a condition in which will-power is so conspicuously absent. In case after case the phenomena of healing by Christian Science disprove the theory, so generally accepted, that the subconscious mind is in more intimate relation to the functions of the body than the normal, supraliminal mind; for they demonstrate that where the reason is convinced of supernatural power, or the impossibility of personal danger, the physical expressions of this conviction are as definite as under hypnotism.

Let us think now of the physical effect of the Negations and Affirmations of a Christian Scientist. Take the case of a lady whose whole thought, as well as that of her entire family, is centred upon her physical condition, perhaps a truly pitiable one, and whose mental life is one of genuine terror; her mind concentrated upon the possible deadly effect of each mouthful of food; afraid to try and live without drugs, yet thrown into a state of apprehension by each new prescription; afraid of a breath of fresh air, though convinced that her death is imminent because of the lack of it—such a patient (and what physician is not acquainted with this lady) decides to try Christian Science. She soon realizes that the first thing to do is to live up to the theory that there is no reality behind her former fears, *and this she proceeds to do*. Her mental determination would be of no therapeutic value, but the results which logically follow are of stupendous importance. The bath-chair attendant is dismissed (there is often the most heroic courage exhibited in these first efforts), and regular exercise is taken; sufficient food is eaten, unsalted by tears and unaccompanied by dread; as she does not now acknowledge any cause for self-reproach or anxiety for herself or any one else, her sleep is sound and therefore refreshing. If we are told that such a convert has in a few months grown to look years younger, why on earth should we doubt it when the physical explanation is so obvious? This practice of leading a normal life is not a spasmodic one, for she is undaunted by the actual pain which results, and both denies and ignores its reality. Every physician knows how trammelled Nature is by the self-limitations imposed by patients, because of the discomfort experienced as the result of effort. This element of interference is wholly eliminated by the practices of the "Scientist", and Nature, which perhaps for years has been struggling to restore physical poise, but has been baffled at every point by the paralyzing effect of mental conditions, now finds herself working under the most ideal habits of mind and body. The body is so thankful to be relieved of this mental interference that it does not mind in the least that in order to accomplish this its very existence is hourly consigned to extinction. Whether the disease from which such a person has suffered is functional or organic is irrelevant so far as possible *improvement* is concerned. Nature makes no distinction

in her efforts ; were this not true, the physician's work would end with the commencement of structural changes. Up to the hour of death there is always the chance that, in spite of seemingly insurmountable obstacles, the vital power of restoration may respond to assistance and, if not entirely overcome the disease, at least prolong life.

That there are distinct limitations to Nature's power to restore, even under the most favourable conditions of mind and body, is unquestionable ; but Christian Science is not giving us the only phenomena which teach us how guarded we should be in arbitrarily fixing the point of this limitation. The "spontaneous cures" that from time to time take place in our large hospitals teach a most significant lesson. In these interesting cases a condition such as tubercular peritonitis or a malignant growth may be examined by an exploratory incision and pronounced inoperable and incurable. The patient is put back to bed just as she was taken out, except for the wound of the incision and the happy conviction that under anaesthesia a radical cure was effected, the surgeon not telling her of the true condition. To the surprise of every one the patient gradually begins to show signs of improvement, and is finally dismissed from the hospital leaving the above record upon its books. There is no mystery about these cures, but the perfect restfulness of mind induced by confidence and expectancy of recovery, together with the helpful environment afforded by the hospital, prove to be the essential factors that Nature required to strengthen her energies and make them effective.

It does not in the least matter whether this conviction of imminent recovery is inspired by faith in the surgeon's knife, or in a shrine, or in the belief that the disease was a delusion which it was only necessary to deny in order to cure. In each case the mental state is essentially the same and so are the physiological results, and if a condition is cured by one it might as easily have yielded to the others. It is only occasionally that a patient in a hospital is so deceived ; but it is becoming a matter of frequent occurrence for people in advanced stages of disease to accept the theory of the unreality of all physical conditions, and just so far as the removal of intense nervous strain with all its consequences can help Nature, so far will the "beliefs" of Christian Science be effective.

The followers of Mrs. Eddy claim not only immunity from infective diseases, but also from accidents. As to the former, it is probable, looking at the question from a scientific standpoint, that this claim could often be verified. Every pathologist teaches that germs have no harmful effect upon normal, healthy tissue, while upon tissue of lowered "vital resistance" within the body they have the same disintegrating effect as upon a bit of scraped potato in a culture-tube in a laboratory. This power of vital resistance is controlled by the mental and physical conditions under which the individual lives. While the germs would not be in the least influenced by the unkind affirmations of a "Scientist" as to their non-existence, the vital resistance of the lady herself would be wonderfully strengthened by the elimination of fear of their activity, always fatal to bodily resistance. As to mental conditions—when it is possible for a Christian Scientist to live, as they frequently do, in the midst of awful scenes of suffering without one expression of regret or one physical manifestation of sympathy, we can easily account for their high degree of "vital resistance". This brings us face to face with one of the saddest of facts regarding Christian Science, that true womanly sympathy is being imperilled by the prevalence of this philosophy which robs sorrow of its

reality and makes pain a delusion. The great cry of humanity is ever for more love, and though we may, if we choose, shut our ears and lull our sympathies to rest, by denying the reality of suffering, we surely cannot deceive ourselves into believing that we are the loyal disciples of Jesus Christ, who, as He stood by the grave of His friend and beheld the grief of the bereaved sister, "groaned in the spirit and was troubled," though He knew He was about to raise that friend from the dead. What a searching reproof to selfish indifference—God Himself meeting present conditions with human sympathy!

As to accidents—it is generally observed that the disciples of Mrs. Eddy are a distinctly cautious people. While they would *deny* the power of a motor-bus to injure them, they would *affirm* that as they are the embodiments of supreme *wisdom* they would naturally be inspired to look where they were going. Surely no one would question the soundness of this argument, nor fail to see that while their watchfulness is due to loyalty to their principles rather than to a spirit of precaution, this in no way detracts from its protective value.

While the Negations of the Christian Scientist, which result in more normal living and a happier state of mind, are of great importance in healing, their Affirmations are of even greater therapeutic value.

The central fact in the mental life of every faithful follower of Mrs. Eddy, is the belief that she is by nature Divine, and that no evil has ever, or can ever, penetrate her life. Sin is a delusion of mortal mind, which looses its horror even as a delusion in the knowledge that mortal mind does not exist. She believes that she is the perfect expression of the attributes of God, Love, Wisdom, Power. What she declares to be true of herself she claims for every one else; she sees her conception of God in all with whom she comes in contact. In our criticisms of their errors, are we not too apt to forget the minutes in each day in which the heart and mind of the earnest adherent of this faith are lifted above the petty annoyances of life, those fruitful sources of physical friction, and centred upon the thought of the universal Life of God, His unbounded Power, His unfailing Love. If her mental conception of these realities is a beautiful one, she owes it to Christianity, not to Mrs. Eddy. Her "Science" offers her no *means* by which to live up to her ideal, which may be a sublime one, but it supplies her with tremendous incentives to strenuous effort, namely, health and mental serenity. It is the result of this *effort* that the world recognizes as physical and moral improvement. Is this not a suggestive lesson to Christians?

If to live in a state of perpetual apprehension and self-pity results in functional perversions, not imaginary, but painfully real, so to live habitually in a dream of self-complacency, though it spiritually means the slumbering of the soul, yet from the physical standpoint we may confidently expect the most vital and tangible expressions of the calmness of that mental life.

Science has invaded the sacred realm of the human mind, and all its secret chambers are being opened to her scrutiny. New powers and undreamed-of faculties are being revealed, and many minds outside the fold of the Church who scorn her ministrations and deny the central fact of her life—the Incarnation of God—are demonstrating the practical value of co-operation with this new knowledge. But what of the Christian whose glory it is to co-operate with "the mind that was in Christ Jesus"? Are we not hearing too much about the lessons taught by those who turn away from the voice of the Mother Church, and too little about those whose lives are an answer to that voice?

8 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN TRUTH

Are we not so busy in criticizing the Church that we have no time to study the beauty of the Christian mind, the fruit of her labour;—a mind, hallowed by adoration, illumined by faith, empowered by grace, sweetened by Divine Love—such is the realm in which she bids us look for the armour of our physical salvation.

True, she bids us “weep with them that weep,” but has she not proclaimed through all the ages that a peace that passeth all understanding is the lawful possession of every faithful child of God? She calls us to repentance, but does she not teach us to transform each consciousness of sin into a deeper realization of the pardoning Love of God of which the Christian life is the manifestation? She clothes us with humility that she may endow us with transcendent glory—the fellowship of the Holy Spirit. She bids us honour the human body,—that marvellous mechanism that only Divine Thought could have created and only Divine Mind can fully understand—that perfect instrument for the expression of the soul and the temple of the Holy Ghost.

Realizing the essential unity of our threefold nature, as spirit, to adore the Father who is above all; as soul or mind, to co-operate with the Love that manifests itself through all; as body, to be ever led of the Holy Spirit who is in all,—is not this the Christian conception of the healing of mind and body?

Of the books upon Christian Science above-referred to, the best are *The True Dominion of Christ, a Criticism of Christian Science*, by E. F. H. Frere, with Preface by the Rev. J. R. Illingworth, D.D.; *Positive Christianity, an Answer to Christian Science*, by the same author; *A Review of Christian Science*, by Margaret Benson.

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

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AGNOSTICISM AND BELIEF

BY THE RIGHT REV. J. E. C. WELLDON, D.D.

DEAN OF MANCHESTER

AGNOSTICISM, if it is not the glorification, yet is the public profession of ignorance. That it should in practical or common use be limited to religious beliefs, dogmas, and interests, is an historical accident, but not a necessity. "The limitation of the word (Agnosticism)," says Professor Flint, "to the sphere of religion is quite unjustifiable." The word is originally derived from or related to the discovery, which St. Paul is said, in the Acts of the Apostles, to have made at Athens, of an altar erected to, or in honour of, An Unknown God, Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ. But as it is actually used it involves the being no less than the character and attributes of God in the clouds of nescience. So far then as it affords any ground for self-congratulation, it is only as a just recognition of the limits set by Providence or Nature to human ability. But apart from that one fact it is, and should be admitted to be, a source of regret, a confession of impotence, a proof of man's essential humiliation.

Agnosticism is the antithesis of knowledge—it is not the antithesis of belief. It declares that there are certain things which human nature does not, and perhaps cannot, know, but not that those are things to which human nature can rightly be indifferent. Agnostic and Believer are not inconsistent or incompatible terms. A Christian may claim, as I would humbly claim, to be an Agnostic believer. For although he cannot say "I know" and "I do not know" the same thing at the same time, there is no reason why he should not say "I do not know, yet I believe". Nay, it appears upon examination that belief begins exactly where knowledge ends. They are co-terminous; but neither of them invades, or at least ought to invade, the province of the other. The first word of the Creed is not "I know", but "I believe"; and such a word at once transports the Articles of the Creed from the comparatively restricted domain of knowledge into the far wider and freer atmosphere of belief.

It is not a little curious that the same historical origin of Agnosticism has been appealed to alike by the advocates of religious faith and of religious ignorance. For not only did the late Professor Huxley derive Agnosticism from the story of

St. Paul's experience at Athens when he came upon the altar erected 'Αγνώστῳ Θεῷ, but Sir William Hamilton could write "The last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar, 'Αγνώστῳ Θεῷ," a phrase which he wrongly translates "To the Unknown and Unknowable God".

In order to ascertain how wide or how narrow is the proper range of Agnosticism, it is necessary to determine the area of knowledge or science strictly so called. For wherever such knowledge or science is unattainable, there Agnosticism is the true attitude of the human mind. But to maintain that outside the range of knowledge or science there is no such proper mental habit as belief, or that belief is not sufficiently powerful to warrant one kind of action, and to prohibit or discourage another, would be to rob human life of its principal significance or utility. If a person is a pure Agnostic, or, in other words, if he persistently refuses to act unless and until his action is justified by knowledge, he will convert all human life into a chaos.

It is possible indeed to hold with the sceptics of old-time, such as the Pyrronists and the Academics, that all knowledge is to man unattainable. Or, again, it is possible to accept the arguments by which a modern thinker like Mr. A. J. Balfour in his *Defence of Philosophic Doubt* charges upon science itself the same fallibility as the men of science have alleged against religion. But assuming that knowledge implies certainty, or, in other words, the impossibility of thinking otherwise than in one way, upon a matter, I may fairly claim that it does not exceed the limits of strict logical or mathematical thought or of practical experiment. That a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, that the whole is greater than any one or more of its parts, that a straight line cannot enclose a space, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that fire burns, and cold freezes, and smoke goes up the chimney, are instances of indisputable truths. About them no educated person either expresses or entertains any doubt. Within the region of these truths there are no Agnostics.

But everything beyond this is liable to denial or question, everything admits or may admit a reasonable difference of opinion; and if there are some facts or classes of facts which are usually and perhaps universally treated as certain, the ground of their being so treated is not that they are known or knowable in the scientific sense, but that they attain so high a probability as in effect to deter anybody whose opinion is worth anything from calling them in question.

It is obvious, for example, that whatever is future is contingent and not certain. It may or may not come to pass; but there is

no sure warrant for saying that it will come to pass. It is all the proper domain of belief, but not of knowledge. To-day even the rising of the sun to-morrow is a matter of speculation ; nor can any experience or sum of experiences in the past justify an absolutely confident assertion that the same experience will repeat itself in the future. It is the part of honesty no less than of prudence that a man should not prophesy until he knows. But if the future is subject to doubt, so too is the past. All history is matter of evidence. It depends upon testimony. But human testimony is in its nature always fallible. It may be incorrect or incorrectly reported, or its authenticity may be weakened, as in the case of miracles, by an *a priori* improbability, or, as in many historical events, by the contradictions or discrepancies of the witnesses. The confidence reposed in history has been vigorously scouted by sceptical philosophers such as Bayle and Schopenhauer. It follows that the lessons of history and the facts by which they are supported are being constantly reviewed in the light of novel information. No historical event would seem to be better accredited than the murder of Julius Caesar in the Senate House at Rome on the Ides of March in the year 44 B.C. ; yet he would be a bold historian, or rather he would be ignorant of the canons of history, who should affirm that even that event is equal in certainty to a truth which is demanded by a law of thought or can at any time be tested by experiment.

It is, in fact, arguable, although I should not myself wish to argue, that, as all testimony becomes attenuated by effluxion of time, the facts of the past, however certain they may once have appeared, are inevitably lapsing into ambiguity.

Agnosticism then is the temper of mind which expressly disclaims the possibility of knowledge, but which implicitly admits the possibility of belief. It comprehends the whole field of the past as well as of the future, for throughout that field runs an element of greater or smaller uncertainty.

Let me now pass to the various human relations, as between man and wife, parents and children, friends, companions, fellow-citizens, partners in business or pleasure, in a word to the hundred and one associations which constitute practical daily life ; and there can be no doubt that the human element in them always and everywhere connotes uncertainty, it cannot be counted upon with precision, and may at any time prove a source of disappointment or failure. Action in life would become impossible, if it depended upon knowledge. But human life being such as it is, it is rather the ventures of faith than the certainties which are its ennobling characteristics.

So far I have tried to show how narrow is the province of

certainty in the world, how wide the domain of probability. I am far from arguing that probability, although it necessarily falls short of certainty, is not almost infinitely various in degree. But whatever it is, it is all that human beings have for the most part to act upon. To quote the familiar language of Bishop Butler in the Introduction to the *Analogy of Religion*, "Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacity. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an Infinite Intelligence, since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us probability is the very guide of life."

Probability, then, is not uniform; but whenever a person accepts probability as his guide, he professes tacitly, if not explicitly, a believing Agnosticism.

The fact is that not only is probability in many subjects a competent guide, but that to every subject belongs its own special probability. Aristotle laid down long ago the general principle, that the various subjects of human study may be classified and discriminated in accordance with such laws of evidence as are proper to them. Upon this principle, which is thoroughly scientific, it would be unreasonable to expect the same degree of knowledge or assurance in philosophy as in mathematics, or in history as in philosophy, or in ethics as in history, or in political science as in ethics, or in the personal relations of life as in political science. It would be a mistake to demand certainty where probability is all that is attainable. Not less truly would it be a mistake to demand in any subject a higher probability than the subject itself naturally allows. But the worst mistake would be to acknowledge that probability alone is attainable, and yet to deny the obligation of acting upon it when it is attained.

Now religion, if only because it is the expression of the relation between man and his Maker, falls *ipso facto* within the range of intellectual Agnosticism. For if God is infinite, and man is finite, it is inconceivable that man should know God. To apprehend God may be possible; to comprehend God is impossible. If it is urged as an argument against religion, that a religious creed, whether Christian or any other, contains elements which are mysterious, and therefore in some sense unintelligible, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, or even apparently contradictory, the answer is that religion, if it is true, just because it is Divine, must present more or less of difficulty to the human intellect. F. W. Robertson has profoundly argued that man's nearest possible approximation to

Divine Truth must sometimes lie in his assent to the equal truth of two apparently conflicting propositions. Is not this remark applicable to such antinomies as predestination and free will, perhaps also to eternal punishment and eternal salvation?

Wholly unwarrantable then is the Agnosticism which halts and hesitates and refuses all activity in religion, until it can see no longer "through a glass darkly" but in the full light of day. Such Agnosticism is a paralysis of the spiritual faculty. The obvious duty of man is to form as sound an opinion as possible upon the universe in which he lives, and then to follow out that opinion in its practical consequences. Nay, so far is he from being morally entitled to suspend his judgement indefinitely in a matter so vital as religion, that, if there are nineteen considerations upon one side, and twenty considerations of equal strength upon the other, it is his duty to act according to the preponderance of argument, however slight it may be. In fact it is the assent of heart and will to the superior probability, an assent which is called in the Bible "Faith", that attests and approves the spiritual elevation of the believer. Nothing can justify spiritual neutrality but an exact balance of opposing considerations, and it will scarcely be pretended that the scales of belief and unbelief are just equally poised.

So high an authority as Dr. Ward in his great treatise upon *Naturalism and Agnosticism* fully admits the place of Theistic speculation in human thought. "When we examine," he says, "that necessity which is the boast of science, the ground of its utility, and the criterion of its perfection, how singular is the result we find! For the sake of this ideal, the historical is ignored, the metaphysical eliminated, substance and cause become fetishes, God a superfluous hypothesis, and mind an enigma, a troublesome by-product, a veritable ghost that cannot be laid. Nevertheless this necessity itself remains inexplicable, and in turn is scouted as a shadow of the ghost or anathematized as an intruder. . . . But these necessary truths are, as Leibniz rightly called them, truths of *reason*. They originate in the subject of experience, not in the object. If the objects conform to them, then all experience is rational; our reason is confronted and determined by universal reason. Such is the world of spiritualistic Monism, and to this world, as I have tried to show, Naturalism and Agnosticism eventually lead us in spite of themselves. Thus the demurrer to Theistic inquiries is not sustained."

Leaving Agnosticism then as being—what in fact it is—an intellectual cowardice, let me consider how a thinker, possessing that combination of intellectuality and spirituality which is

probably the most attractive of human graces, may be supposed to look at the problem of religious belief.

He will feel that the universe, of which he is a part, by its majesty and mystery, by its beauties, and, not less, by its agonies, appeals to his mental and spiritual curiosity. He will not resolutely shut his eyes and his ears against the sights and sounds which are Nature's unconscious self-revelations. He will ask himself, as the great and wise have ever asked, What is the most probable interpretation of the universe upon its own showing?

There are practically three hypotheses which have commended themselves to men's minds at different times, or more properly, to different minds at the same time.

One is the Materialistic. Whether it takes the form of the so-called atomic theory as originated by Democritus and expounded by Lucretius, or any one of the derivative theories which have succeeded it, it treats the universe as being practically self-explanatory. But as it is the universe which needs to be explained, an interpretation lying within the universe itself is no explanation. Also there is something which has ever told the mind or the heart of man that Materialism is not and cannot be the last word in Nature. Science itself, like religion, is more and more coming to recognize and satisfy the spiritual instincts of humanity.

The second hypothesis is the Dualistic. It is properly Oriental, for the antagonism between Ormuzd and Ahriman was an idea springing from the meditative spirit of the ancient Persians. It is associated in the history of Christian speculation with heretical views which bore the name of Mani. Some modern critics, e.g. J. S. Mill, have felt surprise that it should have won so scanty a measure of support in philosophy and religion. But it is probable that the world of thought has judged correctly. Dualism as an interpretation of the universe stands in conflict with the law, the order, the progress, which are phenomena characteristic of the universe itself. Whatever difficulties may adhere to the supposition that the universe is the expression of one, Divine Almighty Will, there are far greater difficulties in the way of regarding it as the battle-field between two opposite and apparently co-equal powers.

There remains, then, the third hypothesis—the Theistic. To this the history of religious thought has steadily tended. For from the belief in many gods to the belief first in a few greater gods and then in one God the stream of religious thought flows naturally onwards. In proportion as the unity of Nature is realized, the belief in one God grows stronger and clearer. Few facts of human experience are more remarkable than the

tenacity with which religious thought, having once attained the faith in God, has clung to it in spite of all opposition. "In that belief," as Voltaire said, "one finds difficulties; in the belief that there is no God, absurdities."

It is not, however, belief in the unity of God, but the belief in His omnipotence and benevolence which troubles thoughtful and devout souls. Probably the Fatherhood of God is a truth which, however frequent might be the approximations to it, would not have finally stamped itself upon the conscience of humanity, apart from such a direct communication between God and man as the Gospel presupposes.

But if God be a God of infinite beneficence towards the children whom He has called into being upon His earth, it is not unnatural—it is *a priori* wholly natural—that He should adopt some method of imparting to them the intelligence respecting Himself which it is vital to their happiness that they should possess, and yet in the nature of things impossible that they should acquire unless by His grace. This in fact is the motive of Revelation—this is the secret of the Incarnation itself.

The Theist, then, in his study of Christian evidence starts with no intellectual prejudice against Christianity. Believing in God, he believes in the possibility—nay, even in the probability—of a Gospel; and if he finds such a Gospel impersonated in One who from His birth to His death, and in all the claims, experiences, and prerogatives of His life was authoritatively raised above the level of common humanity, he yields a loyal obedience to the voice of Him who was at once the Son of Man and the Son of God.

From such a belief he passes without difficulty to the recognition of the subtle, mysterious, invisible, all-pervading Power, comparable only to the wind, which operates upon individual hearts and in societies and ultimately in the world at large, breaking down the prison-walls of ignorance and prejudice, and flooding the world with an ever increasing measure of moral and spiritual light. This Power he calls the Holy Spirit.

To attain this threefold conviction is in effect to accept the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. I am far from denying that the believer in the Christian Revelation may and often does possess a far stronger assurance of his faith than it is possible to use controversially. The deepest grounds of Christian belief are necessarily the furthest hidden from view. But while the belief of a Christian may be justly stronger than such evidences as he can publicly adduce for it, it is upon these evidences that he must rely for his persuasive influence in the world; and I think he may assert that the man who acts reasonably in

religion—who judges religion not in the spirit of prejudice but in the temper of common sense—will conclude that Christianity is entitled to be accepted by all mankind as a guide in life, a sanction of duty, and a solace in the dark and awful crisis of death. He will yield his soul to Jesus Christ as his Lord and Saviour, and Jesus Christ will not fail him at the last.

LIST OF BOOKS.

- Balfour. *Defence of Philosophic Doubt.*
 Butler. *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.*
 Flint. *Agnosticism.*
 Salmon. *Gnosticism and Agnosticism.*
 Ward. *Naturalism and Agnosticism.*
 Forester. *The Faith of an Agnostic.*
 Huxley. *Collected Essays.*
 Ingersoll. *Why am I an Agnostic?*
 Stephen. *An Agnostic's Apology.*
 Wace. *Christianity and Agnosticism.*

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AGNOSTICISM : ITS MEANING AND CLAIMS

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AGNOSTICISM is a modern term ; and it signifies an attitude of mind which is mainly modern in character. Ancient views were simpler and bolder, even when they were similar. The ancient Sceptic denied the possibility of any knowledge whatever, and gave reasons for his denial—thus using knowledge to show that knowledge is impossible. The modern Agnostic is less extreme. He is satisfied with knowledge so far, but thinks it necessary to “fix her pillars”. Let us (he seems to say) cultivate our scientific garden and avoid the theological wilderness which lies beyond : with it knowledge has nothing to do. This way of putting the matter has its advantages : it drops the unpopular paradox of universal nescience, and substitutes a modest diffidence of the power of human faculty to deal with the ultimate or infinite, combined with a firm confidence in positive science. And it avoids or seems to avoid a certain theoretical absurdity into which the ancient Sceptics fell—the contradiction of asserting that we know that no knowledge is possible. In avoiding this contradiction, however, modern Agnosticism raises a new difficulty—that of delimiting the frontier between possible knowledge and nescience. The line must be drawn somewhere ; and from the time of Kant there have been many attempts to draw it correctly. For the moment we may assume that the line has been drawn somehow, with scientific and historical propositions on the right side of it facing knowledge, and theological propositions on the wrong side of it, turned towards ignorance.

Such propositions as these, it is contended, we have no right either to assert or to deny. *Ignoramus, ignorabimus* must express our attitude. But these words themselves and the term Agnosticism are used so as to cover two different attitudes of mind. To distinguish these attitudes is the first step towards a proper understanding of Agnosticism. Every theological proposition may be met by the contention “we cannot know”, or simply by the confession “we do not know”. Whichever attitude is adopted it may seem that the result is the same. In one respect that is so. The man who says simply “I know not” has no more knowledge of the object referred to than the man who says “it cannot be known”. But the two attitudes differ in their potentialities. The one presents a closed mind to the problem ; in the other ignorance is not a matter of principle. The one bases nescience on a theory of knowledge, a philosophy ; the other is nothing more than what it professes to be, an acknowledgement of ignorance. The distinction is worth bearing in mind.

The first attitude is that of Agnosticism properly so called, the Agnostic Philosophy. The second attitude may be called Popular Agnosticism ; it disclaims theological knowledge without maintaining that it is impossible. This is the creed of large numbers of the educated classes, and perhaps of increasing numbers of the uneducated classes. It involves an attitude of reserve and distrust towards theology, rather than a definite conviction

that the human mind is forever excluded from theological knowledge. This popular attitude is really more difficult to deal with than the former, just as the popular mind is often subtler than philosophy. It does not commit itself to a reason for the want of faith that is in it; and thereby it fortifies its position. Arguments of a certain kind simply do not appeal to it; and yet it does not assert that no such arguments can be valid. Obviously there is a theory lying at the basis of this attitude, but a theory which is not fully realized and often is not consciously held. The distrust of theology must have some reason behind it—such as the opposition of rival creeds and the lack of any consensus of experts, or some perception of the difference in this way between theology and the positive sciences. But these are reasons of the kind that lead to Philosophical Agnosticism. Popular Agnosticism, therefore, will be best understood when the grounds of Philosophical Agnosticism have been considered. It leans upon them for support, even in forming a mental attitude which is peculiarly its own.

Philosophical Agnosticism is a theory of knowledge which finds in the very nature of knowledge certain limits to its extent. This theory has one grave difficulty to face, and it has never faced it successfully. It is the same difficulty, in a modified form, as that which met the ancient Sceptics. The sceptical proposition "knowledge is impossible" is self-contradictory; for the proposition itself claims to be knowledge. The Agnostic avoids the contradiction by making the proposition a particular instead of a universal; he asserts "some knowledge is impossible"; and here there is no contradiction; for, while the proposition presupposes knowledge, it does not presuppose the kind of knowledge (theology, to wit) declared to be impossible. But this solution only pushes the difficulty a step further back. How comes it that we are able thus clearly to distinguish between the knowable and the unknowable? When the Agnostic maintains "God is unknowable", he asserts a separation and incongruity between our knowledge and God. On what is this assertion based? In other matters before we can assert the incongruity of two things, we must know something of each, not of one only. For example, in order to assert that there is no organic life on the moon, it is not sufficient to know what the conditions are of organic life, one must also have sufficient knowledge of the moon to be able to say that these conditions are not present on its surface. In the same way, how can I say that my knowledge cannot extend to God, unless I have some idea not only of the conditions of knowledge but also of the nature of God? Thus the contradiction which was inherent in the sceptical position reappears in the agnostic.

At the same time we shall never get to the root of the matter if we think it was a mere confusion of thought that supplied the intellectual grounds for Agnosticism—even although confusion of thought may have entered. Nor was it a fanatical preference for ignorance that made Kant, or even Spencer, say that certain regions were inaccessible to our understanding. It is more reasonable to suppose that they had a real difference in view, even when they expressed it incorrectly. And it is clear that, in both cases, their criticisms of theology were closely connected with their defence of the sciences. Some characteristics seemed present in the latter which are absent in the former. By the discovery of these characteristics they seem to have thought it possible to delimit the frontier between the knowable and nescience.

A long inquiry would be needed for an adequate account of the characteristics of scientific knowledge; even a long inquiry might not lead to results beyond dispute. But there are two points which may be taken to express the gist of the matter. In the first place there is the connexion with sense-experience; scientific knowledge keeps in close touch with things which

we can see and feel ; its objects are in space and time ; it does not claim to extend to things beyond the cognisance of the senses or outside the bounds of space and time. In the second place, the method of science is to proceed by distinction and comparison ; it passes from point to point, from facts to laws ; it is always of the relative and partial ; it does not attempt to grasp the absolute or the whole. The supersensible or supernatural, and the absolute or unconditioned—if it be allowable to speak of them at all—may be relegated to metaphysics or to theology : at any rate they do not belong to science.

Thus it would seem as if a wall were being built between science on the one hand and metaphysics and theology on the other. But the distinctions given come to look less absolute when we investigate them more closely. In the first place, the sciences travel far from the data of sense-experience, though they may never altogether lose touch with them. Even Physics calls to its aid conceptions of objects which are not objects of an experience possible for us ; the luminiferous ether is an example. Psychology offers a scientific account of a process which is in time but not extended in space. In Logic we deal with relations whose validity is independent of both space and time. All through the sciences we make use of conceptions which cannot be reduced to impressions of sense, even if not disconnected therewith. Thus we have to modify the assertion that science has to do simply with the sensible or natural.

In the same way we must also modify the statement that metaphysics and theology have to deal simply with a region beyond and are out of touch with the facts of immediate experience. The easy distinction between natural and supernatural, sensible and supersensible, has been responsible for the main strength of the positivist argument as well as for much bad metaphysics. It is impossible to explain the facts of experience without the aid of conceptions which in some sense transcend the facts to be explained. The scientist has always used such conceptions. In this respect the procedure of the metaphysician and of the theologian is not in principle distinguished from that of the scientist.

The second distinction is more important. On the whole it is correct to say that both metaphysics and theology are striving, each in its own way, to arrive at a conscious attitude towards the ultimate meaning of life, and that, as contrasted with them, science is content with a partial and limited knowledge. But here an instructive suggestion comes from the philosophical founders of Agnosticism. All of them acknowledge that the limits to which they have confined science must be passed by a consciousness of wider scope. Thus Kant proclaimed that he denied knowledge only in order to find a place for belief ; Spencer wearied himself in proving that we cannot know his unknowable, and then maintained that we have an indefinite consciousness of it ; and Dean Mansel defended an uncompromising Agnosticism in the supposed interests of the Christian faith. Now belief, faith, indefinite consciousness, all imply a mode of consciousness in which a subject is somehow cognisant of its object. They may lack the precision of scientific knowledge ; but if they are consistent with Agnosticism, the sting of Agnosticism has been drawn.

The genuine and significant outcome of this line of thought is different from Agnosticism as commonly understood. The thesis is no longer that there is a region of positive knowledge and a region beyond of which nothing can be said. This is a discredited, if not an impossible, doctrine. The result rather points to a difference in the method and kind of knowledge to be obtained in different departments of thought. In the physical sciences quantitative precision is aimed at ; only in so far as it is reached is the knowledge held to be satisfactory. Quantitative precision requires units of

measurement by which the quantities may be reckoned. Space and time make these units possible. No such quantitative measurement can be attained in our knowledge of the non-spatial: it lacks the kind of exactness which physical methods lead one to expect.

Again, the experience to which physical theories relate is sense-experience; it is connected with the presence and operation of external stimuli; and there is commonly an easy appeal from the experience of one mind to that of another—an easy method of verification, therefore. Experience of this sort is not disconnected with metaphysical and even with theological conceptions. But theology, at any rate, is more closely connected with experience of a different kind. This inner experience owes its character to its emphasis on meanings and values and not on mere facts. Here, accordingly, there is something alien to the habit of mind produced by the study of physical science, with its constant appeal to the external for verification. Further, religious experience has an individual character which puts it on a different level from sense-experience. It is not so universal a possession: "die Religion ist nicht jedermanns Sache", it has been said. Even when present it varies more from man to man than sense-experience does, so that one man's theological conceptions may seem unsuitable to the religious experience of another man. Certainly, there cannot be more than one system of truth. But not every man can receive it; nor can those who do receive it always see it and hold it in its purest form.

This distinction of ways and degrees of knowledge seems to me the truth in Agnosticism. But it is not Agnosticism. Rather it is a demonstration that the "varieties of religious experience" do not lead to theological nescience. There is a difference between the kind of knowledge we get in the sciences and the kind of knowledge at which we aim in theology. The Agnostic sees that there is such a difference in the systems presented to him; and he is not mistaken in his perceptions. It is in his expectations that he is at fault; he demands a compact and detailed system and then rejects it because it cannot be verified after the fashion of the sciences. In this error, it must be confessed, he is aided and abetted by many theologians who have imitated the scientists in their zeal for construction, without submitting their structures to the same scientific tests.

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THE ETHICAL ASPECT OF THE FAITH

BY THE RIGHT REV. C. F. D'ARCY, D.D., BISHOP OF OSSORY

WHEN we speak of the Faith we refer to a body of truth which may be expressed in terms of certain doctrines, but which derives its importance from the fact that it corresponds, not to some abstract intellectual system, but to a concrete life. This life is God's life in relation to man and man's life in relation to God; or, to pass at once to the central fact which grasps both sides and so creates unity, it is the life of Christ, both divine and human. It is that life as taking up man's life into itself and so bringing him into closer relationship with God. Therefore it is that Christian doctrine has ever fastened upon the ideas of Incarnation and Atonement as central principles. These truths, or perhaps some higher truth which contains them both and to which our theological categories are inadequate, express the life of Christ in its divine-human activity, overcoming and uniting, and realizing man by bringing his life into fullest correspondence with the life of God.

This statement may help us to discern the relation between religion and ethics. Religion has to do with the ultimate truth of man's life in its relation to God. But man has to live his life on earth. He finds himself face to face with a round of tasks and duties and social obligations. Here is the realm of what we call *conduct*. When we consider the principles which should control conduct we are engaging in the study of ethics. It is clear, then, that while religion has to do with the very central truth of man's life, ethics deals with the more derivative principles by which that central truth is brought into relationship with the manifold activity of human conduct. It is clear also that our way of regarding the central truth must have a great influence upon our views of the principles which should control conduct. A great conviction about God and the human soul gives depth to all our thoughts about human life, and must also change essentially our course of action. There can, therefore, be no truth in the opinion, so frequently expressed nowadays, that religious belief has nothing to do with morality. Even where a non-religious ethical system uses maxims which are in terms very like those which spring from religious conviction, the true meaning and the value of these maxims are widely different in each case. It is not to be supposed, for example, that the golden rule is the same to the Confucian as it is to the Christian who believes in the divine self-sacrifice of the Cross.

But the most important consideration in connexion with Christian ethics and their relation to other systems is to be gained by presenting to our minds constructively and positively a view of the ethical teaching

of our Lord Himself. It will then appear that the relation of the Christian system to others is not one of opposition or of comparative excellence; but in the main of inclusion or comprehension. And this will be found to be true in spite of vast differences, and even in the case of systems which do not appeal to religious sanctions.

It is commonly objected against the ethical teaching of Christianity that it is too negative, that in its insistence upon innocence and purity it ignores the active duties of life, that it is lacking in virility, that it fails in teaching political and social duty, that it is marked by too great a degree of other-worldliness.

There is no reason why we should attempt to deny that, at certain times and with certain teachers, all these defects may be found within the sphere of Christian teaching and practice. But it is an error to make Christianity responsible for all that has been taught in its name, and further we must acknowledge that the Church has never yet been able to live up to the standard set before her by her Lord, and that no one school of thought and no one period has been able to present His teaching in its fullness. The return to Christ has hitherto always been found to show that the difficulties which belong to each new age, or the problems raised by the influence of some new ethos, are but the means of drawing forth new stores from the treasury of His teaching and proving afresh His boundless capacity to supply all the spiritual needs of humanity.

So it will be found when, with minds filled with the needs of our own time, we turn back upon the moral teaching of our Lord.

Our Lord tells us that He came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets, but to fulfil them. And if we regard, as surely we must, the passages with which the evangelist connects that announcement as unfolding the manner of this fulfilment, we find two leading principles. The first of these is negative in its application, though not in its nature; the second is positive both in nature and application. The first is the principle of the inwardness of morality. Innocence, purity, must be of the heart and not of outward action merely. Thus the law becomes a far more searching instrument of moral judgement. "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of Heaven."

The second principle is central in all our Lord's teaching. Subjectively it is described as Love; objectively, it is the Kingdom. The former is a quality of character and thus connects the positive side of the teaching with that principle of inwardness already mentioned. The latter is a great system, or order of things including both the individual and the community to which he belongs. On both sides this great positive principle is traced to God as its reason and source. We are to love that we may be the sons of our Father which is in Heaven, and the Kingdom is described as the Kingdom of God, or the Kingdom of Heaven; that is, it is the rule of God among men.

There has been much discussion as to what is meant by the Kingdom of God in our Lord's teaching. Traditional habits of mind would

lead us to identify it precisely with the historical Church. That it includes the Church, and in some of its aspects is to be identified with the Church, must surely be acknowledged. But the Kingdom, as presented by our Lord, is a conception with an immense range. Three principal views of it may be discerned in the discourses which deal with it in the Gospels.

First, our Lord, as the preacher of the Gospel of the Kingdom, gives an account of what the inner life of that Kingdom must be if it is to realize the divine purpose. This is what we have in the Sermon on the Mount. Therefore it is that our Lord exhibits the relation of the new system which He came to establish with the old system of the Law and the Prophets. The first aspect of the Kingdom with which we are presented is then the moral aspect. The Kingdom is in the first instance a great ethical ideal.

Secondly, in the great series of the parables of the Kingdom, we have the historical aspect. Here it is that we see the historical Church developing through the ages, growing like a tree, spreading like the leaven, gathering of every kind like the net, springing up in the midst of worldly forces like the wheat among the tares.

Thirdly, in many of the parables and later teachings, we find the Kingdom presented from the eschatological point of view. Here is the truth which corresponds to the age-long prayer of the Church: "Thy Kingdom come." The Kingdom is incomplete, and must continue incomplete, in spite of its onward movement, until the great end, the renewal of the universe, is attained.

Even from the ethical point of view it is important to consider these three aspects of the Kingdom. For by means of this consideration we are able to see that the Kingdom, regarded as an ethical ideal, gives us all that such an ideal should provide: first, a standard of life which will serve to test our conduct and to train the conscience; secondly, a principle which can unite the individual and the community in one great moral order and progress; thirdly, a great final goal to give inspiration to moral effort, to crown faith and love with hope.

When thus regarded, we discern the intimate connexion which exists between the Faith as a religious and theological system and the Christian life; also, by thus taking a wide view of our Lord's teaching we are able to see how completely the idea of the Kingdom dominates the whole region of His ethical thought on its positive side.

The Kingdom of God is, in its simplest statement, the rule of God. But, as we see from the Sermon on the Mount, this rule of God demands inward purity in the heart of the individual and the supremacy of love as a bond of union among men. Thus the Kingdom is seen to be a community of souls under God, a community in which the individual finds his good in the good of all—that is implied in the dominance of love—and through which God accomplishes His great purposes of good for the world.

But how can this great conception be brought into relation with ordinary human life? Our Lord devotes one of the most beautiful

and most tender of all His teachings to the answering of this question. In that splendid passage which, in the first Gospel, we find as a part of the Sermon on the Mount, and in the third as a separate teaching at a later period, dealing with the anxieties of men who have to toil for their daily bread, He presents us with the principle and with the link which unites it to common needs. "Be not anxious," the Master says, "for your life what ye shall eat and what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body what ye shall put on." Your Father is watching over you. His providential care will not fail. Are we then to take our life less seriously, to be slack in our work? That is not Christ's teaching. Rather it is this: Do not live for these lower things, this eating and drinking and raiment; live for the higher things and you need have no anxiety about the necessities of life. "Seek first the Kingdom and all these things shall be added unto you." Translated into the familiar terms of modern speech, it is just this: Do the duty that lies nearest, whether it be simple or heroic, and the means of life will not fail you—a truth to which all that is best in human experience testifies. And, we must remember, every duty, even the most ordinary, takes its place in the Kingdom: it is an element in the universal blessing, a part of the will of God for man.

Here our Lord succeeds where all philosophies fail. He brings the most comprehensive of all principles into touch with the needs of our common human life. He binds the heroic and the common-place together. He shows how the dull routine of labour can be illuminated with the glory of the most splendid of moral ideals. And He is able to accomplish this great result, because in the most natural and inevitable way He blends morality with religion. The life of every man has its place in the divine providence, and that providence is concerned, above all, with the Kingdom. Thus the individual and the universal become one in God; and for the man, in the struggle of his earthly life, there is a faith which connects his little cares and duties with the great hope of all the ages. "Seek first the Kingdom" may then be taken as the maxim which expresses the leading principle of our Lord's ethical teaching on its most positive and objective side. It is a maxim which has, as we have seen, its application to the simplest and most common-place duty. It also grasps all that is greatest in human effort and noblest in human aspiration. Interpreted by means of the principle of love, it yields the conception of a universal good with which every individual good is united, and sets this great end before men as the guiding and controlling ideal. Insensibly, and with no definite impulse from philosophy or literature, it has come about that, in our day, every endeavour after moral or social improvement which claims any connexion with Christian influence expresses itself in the language of the Kingdom. Every reformer, every dreamer of the golden dreams of human progress, every worker who strives after better things for mankind, aims at what he finds himself impelled to call "the Kingdom of God on earth". There is to-day no other language which speaks so clearly the great desires of all that seek the good of men.

When we have attained to this view of the ethical teaching of Christ we are in a position to see the mistakes which underlie the modern criticisms of the Christian as contrasted with Pagan ethical systems.

First, the Christian ethical system is not essentially negative. It is not a mere rule of humility and self-denial—a pure asceticism. On the contrary, its great leading principle is positive, and progressive in its application to human needs and situations. Further, it is the principle which has become in our own day the great inspiration of all who are pressing on towards better social conditions for mankind. For what is every imagination of a regenerated society but an effort to form an adequate conception of the Kingdom of Love, and to set that conception up as an ideal? Thus it is that our Lord's teaching has inspired all the philanthropic activities of the modern world, and has worked the abolition of slavery and stimulated the crusades against cruelty and against the perpetuation of insanitary and vice-breeding conditions of existence. All that is best in the modern democratic movement may be traced to the same source.

Secondly, in consequence of these considerations, we are able to deny emphatically the assertion that Christian ethics ignore political duty. It is perfectly true that, with one great exception, our Lord does not lay down rules for our guidance in political affairs. But, we must remember, His method was always characterized by the declaration and illustration of principles, not by the giving of rules. Nothing like a code of laws can be found in His moral teaching. It is just for this reason that He is the Teacher of all ages and all races. A statement of political duties relative to the conditions of the first century would have only hindered His influence in the twentieth. But, in giving to men the great principle of the Kingdom of Love, our Lord legislated for every period of human history and every social and political situation.

Nor is it correct to say that here we have only a vague cosmopolitan idea which is inconsistent with the idea of the State and tends to destroy patriotism. On the contrary, every human and social institution, State, Church, or association, so far as it truly aims at uniting the individual with the common good, is, to that extent, a realization of the great idea of the Kingdom of God. It is forgotten that the principle is inevitably shaped by the material upon which it works and the conditions under which it is applied. And it is also forgotten that all partial realizations are elements in the great final universal realization which is not yet visible to human sight, otherwise than as a golden dream.

For example, the splendid patriotism of the Japanese may truly be said to be devotion to an ideal—a Kingdom of God—which, because it leads the individual to lose himself in the good of the whole, is the highest possible application of the supreme principle to which that people, in their present circumstances, could attain. And can we doubt that their rise as a nation has its place in the coming of the Kingdom?

Thirdly, it is this great positive principle, with its magnificent hopes

and the inspiration which it gives, which supplies the answer to the common criticism that Christian morality is lacking in virility. It is indeed strange how any one who considers the history of the Church, with its immense roll of heroes and its unflagging action, or who regards the doings of the races which have been nourished within the Christian fold, can imagine that it is necessary to go to Paganism for an inspiration to active virtue. The truth is that Christianity affords man the best possible reason for living an energetic life. It makes life worth living. It is essentially optimistic. It instils the conviction that the individual soul is a possession of priceless value. It has taught man to think of himself as possessing a worth which gives to his character and his every action a boundless significance. In this respect, it contrasts strongly with every pagan system ancient and modern. The result is that Christianity, in spite of its insistence upon the grace of humility, has nourished a human type which, by pure force of character, has gained an easy supremacy in the world, and which, when unduly and wrongly developed, is marked by an aggressive and arrogant self-sufficiency.

Fourthly, this same consideration disposes of the charge that Christian morality is imperfect by reason of its *other-worldliness*. It is perfectly true that the teaching of Christ and the traditional doctrine of the Church bring human life into close relationship with the unseen, and that the highest hopes of the Christian are directed towards a future which cannot be realized under earthly conditions. But it is this very other-worldliness which gives Christianity its hold upon the human heart by enabling it to supply the deepest and most enduring of human needs. This characteristic can only be shown to be an ethical defect if it can be proved that by reason of it the Christian faith unfits men for living their life on earth. But no such proof is, or can be, forthcoming. All history demonstrates the opposite. The magnificent success of the western races cannot be separated from the faith which nourished and brought them up.

The reason of this success in practical affairs is surely clear. The moral strength which fits men for the duties of life is essentially dependent upon *character*. It is indeed itself a quality of character. And, by its insistence upon the inwardness of all true goodness, and its emphasis upon the doing of the will of God, Christianity has created the truest discipline for the will. It teaches the importance both of *being* and of *doing*, holding the balance fairly between the two. Further, it teaches the truth, so necessary for all moral discipline, that every great advance, every high achievement, must be by way of self-denial and sacrifice. It must also be added that it is the other-worldliness of Christianity which gives it, in the last resort, its peculiar moral value. For here is the source of that profound seriousness about life and duty which are ever a mark of Christian faith. It is this which deepens *fault* into *sin* and *regret* into *penitence*. For the Confucian, moral commands are "the rules of propriety"; for the Christian, they are the laws of God.

It would be impossible, in the brief space of this paper, to deal with

the details of the Christian ethical system, or to discuss the objections which have been made to certain teachings in our Lord's discourses. There are statements in the Sermon on the Mount which always give the mind a shock of surprise : they are so unqualified, and so contrary, apparently, to common prudence, and out of relation to ordinary experience. Such are the sayings about non-resistance of evil, and about turning the other cheek and giving the cloak to him who has taken the coat. Also the sayings which seem to enjoin giving in a perfectly unlimited way. These latter seem to conflict directly with experience, for it is well known that indiscriminate giving is the most mischievous form of, so-called, charity.

But surely the difficulty arises simply because we take these sayings for universal laws. As a matter of fact, they are illustrations and are expressed in the language of parable. The shock of surprise which they give was doubtless intended. It was meant to quicken the mind to attention and so bring home the great principle of love—the principle of giving—as contrasted with the grasping spirit which must have all that it can by any means claim, the spirit which speaks in the *lex talionis*.

Having so far reviewed, in brief outline, the great principles of the Christian ethical system, we must ask, In what sense does our review justify the assertion that the Christian is the final and all-inclusive system in which all others find their realization?

Our Lord gives us the necessary principle when He teaches that He came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets, but to fulfil them. The relation of Christian ethics to Hebrew need not detain us. It is clear to all our minds.

But when we turn to the great traditions of ethical thought which have come to us from Greek sources, or to those systems which our modern acquaintance with the East has brought into relationship with us, or to the problems which have come to light with the rise of democracy, what are we to say?

To meet these needs Christianity has the magnificent conception of the Kingdom of God. It is only in our age that the full value of this conception, as an ethical principle, has begun to dawn upon the Christian mind. Here, in a very wonderful way, is new light breaking forth from the Word of God to illuminate vast spaces of thought and life which seemed to lie remote from the sphere of the Faith. All that ancient Greece can teach us about the relation of man to the State, all that Japan is teaching about the power of a pure patriotic devotion, all that Confucius taught as to the importance of benevolence, loyalty, reverence and faithfulness, find their fulfilment in that supreme idea of a Kingdom of Love in which the purpose of God, the perfection of man, the regeneration of human society, and the salvation of the individual, are to be accomplished.

And let it be noted that in the progressive application of this great principle will be found the solution of all those problems which arise from the clash of diverse civilizations. For example, the vegetarian of the East looks askance at the flesh-eater of the West, and the abstaining

Mohammedan is filled with scorn as he thinks of the wine-bibbing Christian. For all there is the lesson that "the Kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost". All such problems must be solved progressively as the higher principle prevails, and it may turn out that, in these things, the West has something to learn from the East. But at every step advance depends upon obedience to the great rule which the Master gave as the supreme law of the life of duty, "Seek first the Kingdom."

Many ethical systems have been able, within limits, to teach a law of conduct, to tell men what to do; it is the peculiar glory of the Christian Faith, in its ethical aspect, that it passes ever beyond the command and points to a source of moral and spiritual power. It tells us, not merely *what* to do, but *how* to do. It unites morals with religion and so brings the life of goodness, of holiness, from heaven to earth; or rather, it elevates the life of man and, in Christ, makes him partaker in the life of God.

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CHRISTIANITY AND THE LEGALISTIC RELIGIONS

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WHAT is a legalistic religion? It is, I should say, a form of religion which supposes a code of rules regulating belief, worship, and life to have been at some time or other promulgated by a supernatural revelation, and which those who profess the religion are expected to accept simply and solely on authority—simply because it has been revealed to another person or persons—without any exercise of their own reason or conscience, without any criticism of the matters revealed, simply upon the testimony that the revelation has actually taken place. Now of course great qualifications would probably be necessary in applying this definition to any one actual religion. Mohammedanism is perhaps the religion which approximates most closely to the conception of a purely legalistic religion, though it must be observed that its founder so far relied upon the intrinsic convincingness of the message which he had to declare that he did not appeal to the evidence of miracles in attestation of his own inspiration. Even in the Koran it is possible with a little ingenuity to find passages which suggest the existence of some capacity in each individual to distinguish between what is true and what is false in matters of faith and of morals; but on the whole Mohammedanism proclaimed its legalistic character from the very first. In other cases a religion which began in some fresh consciousness of divine truth, felt not merely by some one or some few great personalities but by many, hardens down and crystallizes into the belief that God has revealed himself solely in the past through the letter of a sacred book, a stereotyped creed, a prescribed ceremonial; or that, if He still speaks to men, it is only through some for ever unalterable organ of ecclesiastical authority.

In this way the religion which began most completely as a religion of the Spirit may end in becoming practically for the man of a particular time and place a merely legalistic religion. Christianity, the religion of the Spirit *par excellence*, has been unfortunately no exception to this rule. And the point which I want to emphasize in this paper is that, whether we are thinking of the prospects of Christianity in its missionary battle with the legalistic religions of the East, or whether we look to the warfare of Christianity against Materialism and Agnosticism at home, it is simply all-important to assert that Christianity is not itself a legalistic religion,—that it differs from such a religion as Mohammedanism not simply in possessing a better authenticated revelation, a truer and more valuable body of authoritative scriptures, or even a Founder who was the revealer of God in a fuller and higher sense than Mohammed even claimed to be, but that between it and

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Christianity there is a fundamental difference of principle. Moham-medanism is a religion of the letter : Christianity is a religion of the Spirit.

Let me attempt to formulate what I mean by saying that Christianity is a religion of the Spirit. I mean that it asserts that there is in the human mind a power of attaining to a knowledge of what is true in religion and in ethics, and that it requires no individual to accept as coming from God that which does not commend itself to his own reason and conscience. This does not imply that there is no value in an historical revelation—quite the contrary. Our principle does not assert that the Spirit of God—the power of spiritual discernment—is given to every individual in equal measure. In spiritual matters, as in matters of science, it is only by a slow and gradual evolution that the human mind has attained to truth ; in the one sphere as in the other the decisive moments of progress have been due to a few exceptionally endowed minds. Because science appeals to reason and disclaims bondage to any outward authority, that does not imply that great discoveries can be made without genius : nor, when the great discovery is made, do we expect each child, or even each adult, to discover again for himself the truth which an Archimedes or Newton was the first to see. Each generation enters into the intellectual inheritance won for it by the great minds of the past. Only, in a religion of the Spirit it is free to examine the truth for itself, and its assent is asked only in so far as the result of that examination proves it to be true. In matters of science a very ordinary mind can verify—can see for itself—the truth of what it took genius to discover ; the same principle holds when we turn to the work of the great revealing minds to whom may be communicated that measure of spiritual truth which each of the great historical religions has in possession. The revelation of the past can claim to be a revelation so long and so far only as it commends itself to the conscience and reason of the present. The claim of Christianity to be a full and (just because of its capacity for development) a final revelation of God must rest on its continued power to meet the demands of the human spirit.

This principle does not imply that there is no room for authority in matters of religion. Even in science we begin with authority. The science by which the great mass of men regulate their lives and their ideas of the universe rests very largely upon authority. They could not fully and adequately demonstrate their belief that the earth goes round the sun, or that species arose by gradual evolution. So in morals the great mass of men go on living by a moral code which is largely a matter of social tradition. It more or less commends itself to their moral reason or conscience ; but they have not freely investigated for themselves every accepted rule of morality, and it would be madness for them to attempt to do so. So it is, and must ever be, on the theological, as well as on the ethical, side of religion. All of us must be indebted to the great revealers of the past. Without them we should have seen very little ; and even throughout life most

men must always be largely reliant upon authority. But the very ground of a reasonable reliance upon the authority lies in the belief that others are doing what we perhaps have not leisure or capacity to do—thinking out and confirming, and, where need be, correcting the truth of what has been handed down as true from the past. No very high degree of religious or moral development is, indeed, possible unless the individual has to some extent confirmed the truth of what has come down to him by his own reflection and experience. But still he cannot afford to be independent of the judgement of those better qualified than himself to judge. To attempt to dispense with authority in matters of faith is suicidal, for it would compel each individual to start again at the lowest rung of that spiritual ladder by which the race has reached its present degree of spiritual attainment. To turn authority into infallibility is no less suicidal: for, when an authority has announced that it is not free to think, all ground for attaching any value to its deliverance is cut away.

Need I use any elaborate arguments to show that Christianity is a religion of the Spirit in the sense which I have, no doubt most inadequately, attempted to suggest? It is enough surely to say that our Lord Himself based His own claims primarily upon this ground. He always assumed that the same spirit which was given "not by measure" unto Him was moving also in the hearts of His hearers, and would attest the truth of what He said. Only, if at all, by way of concession to weakness of spiritual capacity, would He tolerate reliance upon signs. He claimed on the strength of His own "*ipse dixit*" to correct, supplement, and so, in a sense, to contradict the most authoritative utterances of the old prophets whose measure of divine inspiration he most fully acknowledged. "It was said to them of old time . . . but *I* say unto you." This implied not merely a claim to a higher measure of divine inspiration for Himself, but a power of recognizing it in His hearers. When the scribes questioned His authority, and accounted for His power of healing by diabolical inspiration, He did not appeal to a sign from heaven to establish His authority. He appealed to the hearer's secret consciousness that such teaching as His and the Baptist's could only come from God. "By their fruits ye shall know them: do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" Such a test would have been nugatory, had not the human soul possessed a power of discriminating between the morally good and the morally bad. The fourth Gospel still further emphasizes this side of our Lord's teaching, and we cannot doubt that, if it does not literally repeat the Master's words, it does appreciate and develope the true spirit of His teaching. "Have I been so long time with you and yet hast thou not known me, Philip?" "No man can come to me except the Father which sent me draw him." And then, too, it is recognized that no set of hard and fast rules could possibly serve as the guide of life in all the changing circumstances of time and place. In nothing does Christianity so emphatically proclaim its fitness for a universal religion as by the reserve with which its Founder confines Himself to a few great principles, entirely

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abstaining from issuing a mass of detailed regulations such as those of which the Pentateuch and the Koran are full. He recognized, if we may once more take the fourth Gospel as the interpreter of the Master's deepest thought, that the application of those principles to the needs and circumstances of future ages must be left to the Spirit, taking of His and showing to us, leading men to all truth. I need not go on to illustrate our principle, as it could be abundantly illustrated, from the teaching of St. Paul and of the Johannine writings. It will not be necessary for our present purpose to analyse and define the nature of the faculty or faculties by which the individual can satisfy himself of what is put before him by Christ and Christianity as the truth about God and about human life. That would require an elaborate philosophical or psychological discussion. It will be enough to say that I am not claiming for the human spirit a mysterious power, transcending ordinary intellect, of immediate insight into the Divine Nature such as is claimed by the mystics. I believe in the power of human reason to rise to a knowledge of God by way of inference from what it observes in nature, in consciousness, above all, in the immediate deliverances of the moral consciousness.

I do not think the principles which I have been trying to set forth have always been adequately remembered in missionary work, especially among highly educated peoples. Let me suggest one or two directions in which it will have to be more consistently applied than before.

I. *As regards the Old Testament.* We have only perhaps recently become aware what a puzzle the Old Testament offered to the early Church. On the whole there is little doubt that the acceptance of the Old Testament Scriptures by the Christian Church has proved a gain to Christianity. Not only is the Old Testament necessary to make Christianity historically intelligible, but it meets needs that the New Testament could not meet, simply because its writers presupposed what was contained in the Jewish Bible. Our Lord Himself did not explicitly teach the rudiments of morality, or insist upon the elementary truths of Theism, simply because He was addressing Jews who had the Old Testament before them. The early Church found it unnecessary to create a new literature of devotion, because the Psalms, interpreted largely in a new way, adequately met the need. But, enormously valuable as the Hebrew Bible has been to the Christian Church, it cannot be denied that it has sometimes been used in such a way to bring back legalism into Christianity. Rules and regulations—ideas about priesthood and sacred buildings and sacred rites, about days and months and years, ideas which St. Paul clearly regarded as opposed to the religion of the Spirit—were re-imposed upon those who had for the moment escaped the yoke of the law. Still more calamitously its use brought with it the tendency to look upon morality as obedience to arbitrary commands of God; and the laws which God was thought to have made it was held that God could arbitrarily suspend. Religious persecution, wars of extermination, political assassination, acts of treachery, and atrocities without number—the Inquisition, the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, the

cruelties of triumphant Puritanism—utterly inconsistent with the spirit of Christ as they are, have been justified on the ground of Old Testament precedents. In cultivated religious circles the imperfect, gradual, progressive character of the Old Testament revelation is by this time perhaps sufficiently recognized. But we have hardly yet begun to popularize such a view of inspiration among the classes to whom the anti-religious writings of men like Haeckel or Mr. Blatchford appeal. We have yet to discover how to use the Old Testament in the instruction of the young as a means of teaching elementary religious lessons without laying the seeds of future infidelity by teaching what will subsequently have to be unlearned. And, above all, hardly a beginning (so far as I can learn) has been made in applying the now generally received ideas about inspiration to foreign missionary work.

And it is here that a new departure is most imperative. Traditional respect, unacquaintance with the books of other religions, association with the Christian Scriptures, may enable even educated religious people at home to glose over or explain away the immoralities of the earlier Jewish books, and blind them to critical and historical difficulties. But when in appealing to educated Indians or Japanese we make the acceptance of the Old Testament Scriptures as in all parts historically true, or plenarily inspired, a condition precedent to the acceptance of Christianity, it is obvious that we are creating an appalling obstacle to the success of our own efforts. We shall never succeed in combating the legalistic religions so long as we represent Christianity merely in the light of another, however much superior, legalistic religion. Christianity must be exhibited as the religion of the Spirit; and, that it may be clear that it is so, it must be represented as no mere patch upon the old garment—the legalistic religion of Judaism. We need not, of course, deny or minimize the debt which Christianity owes to the higher, prophetic Judaism. But in doing so we must emphasize those elements in Judaism which made it more than a legalistic religion, and which prepared the way for its transmutation and absorption into the religion of the Spirit.

2. It cannot, I fear, be denied that the legalizing influence of the Old Testament has not stopped with itself. The idea of an authoritative and plenarily inspired letter of Scripture was taken over by the Christian Church from Judaism. At first it was applied only to the Old Testament: eventually it extended itself from the Jewish to the newly formed New Testament canon. Now here no such serious results followed upon the adoption of a theory of verbal inspiration, as was the case with the Old Testament. Speaking broadly, the New Testament writers are too full of the Spirit of Jesus for very serious discrepancies to arise between this or that particular text and the general spirit of the whole. Still, it is important, if we are to be faithful to the position we have taken up, that we should not treat the New Testament writers as imposing rules or doctrines *ex cathedra* from the outside, but should look upon them rather as “commending” themselves “to every man’s conscience in the sight of God”.

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Even when we come to the teaching of our Lord Himself there are two fatal objections to our attempting to found either theology or ethics upon mere isolated utterances of His, considered as externally compelling authorities. In the first place there is the uncertainty as to what He actually said. Even in the Synoptists we find conflicting versions of many sayings; and the variations are not always quite unimportant, as, for instance, in the case of the sayings about divorce. And when we turn to the Gospel of St. John, the difficulty of reaching any *ipsissima verba* of Christ becomes still greater. Whether the Gospel was written by St. John or by another, no competent critic will now claim that we can treat each and every utterance ascribed to our Lord, just because it is contained in that Gospel, as the very words which He spoke: the author's comments, reflections, and interpretations are inextricably mixed up with the remembered sayings. Treat the Gospel as a record of dogmatic utterances or ethical injunctions, which are to be binding merely because they claim the authority of Christ Himself, and the fourth Gospel must be practically eliminated from our canon. Treat it as revealing the impression which Christ produced upon an early disciple, explaining, expanding, developing his or his Master's reminiscences of *the* Master's teaching, and we may regard that Gospel as having penetrated, more even than any one of the Synoptists, to the inmost essence of Christ's own teaching, and as having appreciated more than any one of them what that teaching really meant for the world. Treat Christianity as a legalistic religion, and we must dispute the claim of the fourth Gospel to be one of its authoritative documents; treat it as a religion of the Spirit, and we shall regard the contribution which its author makes to Christianity as ranking next in importance to the foundation laid by Christ Himself. So considered, the fourth Gospel represents the beginning of that development which it was the mission of the Church to continue.

3. The final objection to treating even our Lord's own teaching as so many oracles claiming authority—not because they commend themselves to heart and conscience and understanding, but simply because they form part of an authoritative book—is that it practically tends to the denial of that doctrine of the Holy Spirit which forms part of that very teaching. Apart from some power in the human mind to judge of truth and falsehood in religion, we could not understand or recognize the truth and supreme spiritual value of what is recorded, still less could we apply that teaching to the changing needs and problems of modern life, and develop it in accordance with the progress of human thought and knowledge in other regions. It may be disputed whether it would have been altogether good for us to have such a perfect record of Christ's *ipsissima verba* as to leave no doubt or uncertainty about their exact nature. The critical doubts and uncertainties of the present day have more than ever brought home to us the profound truth of those words, "It is expedient for you that I go away; for, if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you." "I have yet many things to say unto you, but

ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he shall lead you unto all truth."

Let me conclude with a little incident which will, I think, illustrate the importance of presenting Christianity in the light which I am insisting upon you. An Indian missionary of very orthodox and conservative views was head of one of those colleges in which non-Christian students are given secular instruction on condition of listening to a regular religious lesson. He found, so he told my informant, that when he talked to them about the miracles of the Bible they only laughed. When he talked to them about the moral teaching of Christ he could always command respectful attention. Now I do not suggest that they were right in laughing at all accounts of super-normal influence of mind over matter: any discussion of that question would lead me away from our subject. What I want to insist on is this. So long as the missionary treated the Bible merely as one of the many rival claimants to be a miraculously revealed embodiment of a law from heaven, it struck the students as just on a level with one of those books in which their western education had destroyed their confidence. Directly he set forth the moral teaching of Jesus they at once saw the difference. I have no doubt that an account of the strictly religious teaching of our Lord would have been listened to with equal respect. The fact that the moral teaching of Christ (illustrated by His own life, and expressing His own character) comes straight home to the conscience of mankind and carries its own authority with it, must (as it seems to me) be the basis of the claim of Christianity to constitute the fullest and truest revelation of God. The second step in the Christian argument is to show that its theory of the universe—the theory of the universe taught by Christ Himself—is a theory which is capable of being confirmed by an appeal to reason. These two points—the fact that the Christian ideal appeals to conscience, and that the Christian doctrine of God appeals to reason—should be the basis of Christian theology, as it must be exhibited to those not yet acquainted with Christian teaching. The fact that Christ was the first to teach these truths in all their fullness and completeness must be the basis of any argument or doctrine about the Person of Christ, of all argument for His position as the personal Revealer of God, as the one man in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. And this implies, as we have seen, that the same Spirit which was outpoured "not by measure" upon Him is not wholly denied to any of the sons of man. The fact that Christianity does not deny, but includes, an assertion of the existence in each man of a power to judge of the truth of the doctrines presented to him for his acceptance—that it does not prohibit but rather encourages the claim of the human spirit, enlightened by that divine Spirit from which it proceeds, to advance to more truth—this ought, it seems to me, to occupy a very prominent place in any Apologetic which attempts to justify the claim of Christianity to be not merely one of the religions, not merely a stage in the development of religion, but the universal religion, capable

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of absorbing into itself all the scattered elements of truth that have been revealed to men at any time and place, and all that shall be revealed hereafter by the same Spirit.

There is one other aspect of the matter on which I must just touch. I have tried to show that there is a fundamental antagonism between Christianity and the legalistic religions, so long as the latter claim to impose eternally binding rules upon human society. Christianity cannot, without proving unfaithful to all that gives it its superiority to all other religions, come to terms with ordinances, social customs, and particularly social exclusions, which are repugnant to a conscience once awakened by the teaching and example of Christ and the Spirit which He breathed into His Church. But the very same principle—the principle of the supremacy of the Spirit over the letter—will make it very tolerant of diversities in outward observance or national custom which do not really conflict with its own spirit. The religion of the Spirit will freely admit the existence of degrees of truth—yes, and of revealed truth—in all religions; and it may well sanction, appropriate, if necessary re-interpret harmless social observances or religious rites without asking for a sanction for them in the letter of Scriptures or in the traditional customs of existing Churches. The exclusiveness of caste, and the usages about eating and drinking which keep up such exclusiveness, it can no more tolerate than it could tolerate St. Peter's refusal to eat with the Gentiles. As societies for mutual helpfulness, Christianity need no more forbid the existence of castes than it opposes itself to the Mediaeval Guild or to the modern Trade Union. Any religious rite which seriously disputes or ignores the exclusive sovereignty of God it must condemn: but there are many observers who think that it will never make serious headway in the far East till it recognizes, and invests with a Christian meaning, harmless rites implying the respectful commemoration of ancestors. These are matters which it requires expert knowledge to examine in detail. Suffice it for me here to indicate the general principle—that the recognition of Christ's religion as pre-eminently *the* religion of the Spirit, while it assuredly does not tend to obliterate the line which marks it off from all other religions, may yet prepare the way for variations in the external machinery of ecclesiastical life wider than most missionaries are willing at present to contemplate.

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BUDDHISTS AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY

BY THE MOST REV. THE BISHOP OF CALCUTTA

THE conflict, as it is going on in Ceylon, between the Faith and Buddhism, is not the comparison of two theories : it is the effort of the Divine Love, expressing itself through the energies of the Christian church, to overcome the special conditions which make Buddhists unwilling to accept God's offer of salvation. The question before us is : What are these adverse conditions in the case of the living men and women who hold the beliefs which Buddhists actually now hold, and who value the pleasures or the supposed advantages which their actual position as Buddhists secures to them? These beliefs may, or they may not, be such as would have been expected to result from the teaching of the Buddha or of the sacred "books"; they are what they are, not what they ought logically to be. Our question is not to be answered, therefore, by a discussion of the philosophy, the theology, the ethics, or the ritual which the books teach. A knowledge of these may help us to recognize the beliefs, customs, and attachments, which the Faith has to meet, and to understand their force; but the collision we are concerned with is not one of system with system, but the collision between Divine Love and the prejudices which stand between it and the consciences of these particular men and women.

In the educated Buddhist, the most characteristic hindrance to his reception of the Faith is his perception of the similarity of some Buddhist tenets to the materialist opinions and sceptical views which he finds put forward under the name of science. He does not believe Buddhism, but he wishes to retain the title of it, while accepting what he regards as the conclusions of European science. The Faith is confronted, in this case, not with Buddhism but with European unbelief. We may pass at once to the case of those who have not been influenced in this way by the scientific and philosophic thought of the West.

The herald of God's love looks out, of course, when he approaches any class of men, for that which will respond to his message. He wishes to start in sympathy with the truth which his hearers already hold, with the aspirations which they acknowledge, with the love of goodness which is already (however obscurely) awake in their hearts. Such a preacher must seek these, in the case of Buddhists, in that which is common to human nature; he will scarcely find them in anything which Buddhism especially supplies. The truths to which he must appeal, such as the dependence of man on a Creator, the fact of human weakness, the fact of sin, the future judgement, these are not taught by Buddhism; and if the Buddhist holds them, he holds them as part of the common

belief of man, and in spite of Buddhism. Here is one of the missionary's greatest difficulties. These beliefs, which he has a right to expect to find, more or less recognized, in every man, are obscured in the Buddhist. Of those which have been mentioned, one, the belief in man's dependence on a Creator, can, as a matter of fact, be often successfully appealed to, in spite of its being specifically denied by Buddhist theory. It is not far below the surface in most Buddhist minds, and can be pretty easily elicited. But the sense which responds to the truth of sin and responsibility is dead in the actual Buddhist; the nerve is atrophied by his belief (a belief which is no mere acceptance of a dogma because it is taught, but is a deeply ingrained part of the structure of his mind), in the quasi-mechanical operation of merit and demerit in the endless succession of births.

Nor can the advocate of the Faith count on any special response from the Buddhist when he sets forth the beauty of love, of purity, or of moral effort. These have, it is true, a high place in the books; but they have not a high place in the hearts of most living Buddhists. Their conscience does not respond to these appeals the more readily from their being Buddhists; in the case of purity, and in that of moral effort, the response is less ready, probably, than on the part of Hindus. The preacher will meet with readiness to admire self-sacrifice, for his hearers have been taught to admire it in their Buddha; but what is told them of our Lord's laying down His life will not much impress them, because they are familiar with exaggerated stories of the Buddha's laying down his life in former existences, and of his postponing his own Nirvana for the good of gods and men. The difference here between the historical and the impossible does not strike them. On the whole, they show no serious interest in moral excellence, and no strong aspiration towards high and heavenly things. Indifference in religious matters is as characteristic of living Buddhists, as strenuousness in religious effort is of the Buddhism of the books.

Not only has Buddhism not prepared hearts to welcome the great truths about God and man, it has created a false common-sense and a false conscience, which rise in protest against teaching which is inseparable from the Christian faith. For the Christian teaching appears to Buddhists as obviously wrong in two points, one of belief, and one of moral principle. In the sphere of doctrine, it proposes to rob them of a belief which seems to them both to be self-evident, and to be the only key to a great part of the facts of life; that is, the belief that each individual passes through a succession of existences, that they have themselves lived in many successive lives before this, and that to acts done in such former lives all the troubles and all the inequalities of this life are due. The Creed which denies this, assails what seems to them of all things most certain. The argument, "If we have not lived before, why are some born blind?" seems to them irresistible. They have been brought up, as all Hindus also have, to explain everything that occurs as the consequence of what occurred "in a former birth"; and the teaching which denies this strikes at their root-conception of life, and leaves the world without an explanation. It

seems a want of common-sense, a gratuitous refusal to see a perfectly adequate explanation. Familiarity with European ways of speaking, writing, and acting, does surely, and not slowly, substitute the Western and Christian view for the Indian ; but it is chiefly by that means that their very strong prejudice is removed. It does not give way to argument, but is dissolved by the subtle invasion of new habits of thought and of a new common-sense.

Much the same is the case with what appears to a Buddhist to be the utter and repulsive moral obliquity of the Christian view of right and wrong, in its failure to insist on the enormity of " taking life ". In making little of the guilt or peril of killing animals,—still more in defending it—the Christian teacher, to the unsophisticated Buddhist, stands self-condemned. To the unsophisticated Buddhist, the evil of " taking life " is the A B C of morality. Deny that, and all distinction between right and wrong, between (that is) what is meritorious and what is ruinous, is thrown to the winds. For " taking life " is the unquestioned type of bad action, the Buddhists' " first and great commandment " ; there is no second to it. His conscience has been trained to seem to bear witness to it.

Thus the teaching of Christianity does not naturally commend itself to a Buddhist ; for these two principles, about rebirth and about killing, are the foundations of Buddhist thinking, and form a strong and, as it were, a natural barrier against the Faith. The common-sense and the conscience of the Buddhist both rise in protest against the Truth.

The devotion of Buddhists to the name of " Buddha ", vague as it is, and even when it is admitted that the Buddha is not now in existence, is a real devotion, and it makes them slow to attend to what is said of our Lord as an example. They think Buddha was perfect, and therefore are sure that Jesus Christ cannot be better. And the feature which distinguishes Christianity from all other religions—that it centres in a Person—is not so marked a distinction as against Buddhism. They have, they say, a Teacher, a Saviour—for in a vague way they attach the idea of Saviour to the Buddha—who loves them and whom they love. And if Gotama Buddha has ceased to be—well, Maitri Buddha is coming, and he will restore all things.

Such are some of those features of the actual belief and temper which stand between the conscience of Buddhists and the Truth.

In the matter of customs to which they are attached, while here, of course, as everywhere, the *vis inertiae*—" our fathers did without it "—offers the strongest resistance, there are some special conditions which call for notice.

Buddhism does not mean to the practical Buddhist only what we understand by religion, or by religion and morality together ; it stands for a whole body of customs, public and private, which have become very dear to the Buddhist, and which form his world of pleasant and homely associations. In Ceylon, at any rate, the frequent holidays, which bring merit as well as pleasure, with their bright processions and harmless merriment ; the pretty decorations, flowers, and arches ;

the village tree, with its stone slab for offerings of flowers ; the village monastery, with its superficial but kindly charities,—the offer of a new religion sounds like a proposal to spoil all these ; to come between the man and his home ! The missionary ought not to be without a feeling of this, and should disturb it all as little as possible. He does not come to the Buddhist, as he does to the “ low-caste ” Hindu, with the offer of release from oppression and from gloom ; he seems at least to threaten to cloud a scene which is bright and gay.

But under the bright surface there is a stern tyranny ; the fear of evil spirits, of ill-luck, of the evil eye, of planetary influence, and of malignant charms fashioned by neighbours—a whole realm of half-secret superstition. The palm-flower stuck in the field to protect the rice-crop, the spotted jar set to arrest the evil eye, the milk poured out to secure favourable presences in the new house—these are parts of Buddhism which the Buddhist is very reluctant to give up. The charm tied in a little box on the arm, the devil-dancers to drive away the spirits of sickness—these he dare not dispense with. And perhaps, worse still, he is engaged in some magical practices to injure an enemy, and believes that his enemy has some at work against him. These “ darker spells ” the preacher of Christ must reckon with. They, and not the “ Three Pitakas ”, are the practical forces, from which Jesus Christ will deliver the Buddhist. And here the missionary’s ground is clear, and though the poor Buddhist’s fears stand in the way, his conscience is on the side of the Truth. Of these things it is easy to make men ashamed ; they own that here is a weak point, and that here their condition is pitiable : they have been known to say : It is useless to talk about God till we have got rid of this anxiety about devils. Here perhaps is the Faith’s best opportunity.

But if what has just been said is correct, it is plain that, however desirable may be an acquaintance with theoretical Buddhism (as a key to the facts), the work of the missionary lies in another region. It is plain also, that to have formed too favourable an estimate of Buddhism may be injurious to the missionary’s work : he attacks the wrong thing.

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THE FAITH AND LEGALISTIC SYSTEMS

BY THE REV. W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, D.D.

THE various non-Christian systems of religion may be regarded from many different standpoints. They may be considered, for instance, as rivals to Christianity, disputing with the latter the empire of the human race. They may be esteemed men's guesses at truth, attempts to find out the Unknown God, gropings in the dark on the part of men created to become children of light, faint adumbrations of the great facts regarding God and man fully revealed to us in the Gospel. We may see in them certain truths which are gleams of the brightness of the Sun of Righteousness, showing that God has not left Himself without a witness in men's hearts, and that, in Tertullian's grand phrase, the soul of man is naturally Christian. A deeper knowledge of these faiths, however, is apt to lead us to hold with St. Paul that "the things which the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice to devils and not to God", and to recognize as by no means devoid of foundation the old belief that many of these systems reveal evident proofs of a superhuman intelligence plotting to deceive man and to lead him farther and farther from God.

But our object at present is to compare Christianity with various Legalistic systems, especially with the Caste system of Hinduism and the rigid religious law of Islām, and to show that, in the very respects in which these systems endeavour to satisfy certain requirements of human nature, Christianity accomplishes what they merely aim at, and at the same time is free from the very serious drawbacks which in them far more than counterbalance any apparent success they may achieve. The comparative study of religions has abundantly justified St. Augustine's dictum, "Nulla falsa doctrina est, quae non aliquid veri permisceat." Yet it must not be forgotten that the measure of truth, justice, or wisdom which a religion predominantly false and erroneous may include often does harm by commending the system as a whole to men's acceptance. Lucretius reminds us that in olden days,

"Saepius illa

Religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta,"

and to-day, also, this is the effect of all false faiths.

All legalistic systems—not only the Caste rules of India and the religious law of Islām, but those of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism as well—are more or less consciously based on the axiom that method lies at the root of whatever is to be done properly, which again implies that law rules the universe. Hence in each of these religions an attempt is made to prescribe rules to regulate men's conduct. In order to be perfect, such a system of laws should provide for every possible variety of circumstances and declare what is permissible and what is not. This

renders very strict definitions necessary, as in an Act of Parliament, and requires a clear statement of the "sanctions" (or punishments) attached to the breach of any such law. Hence we find that Muḥammadan Doctors of the Law (the 'Ulamā—عُلَمَاء—and the *Muḥtabidūna*—مُجْتَبِدُونَ) are much of their time engaged in studying very unsavoury matters, endeavouring to define exactly what measure of approach may safely be made to certain prohibited immoral practices, and what constitutes a breach of the Muḥammadan moral law in matters affecting the relations between the sexes. A system of casuistry like that of the Jesuits has naturally resulted, and reprehensible treatises have been drawn up in a vain attempt to state what precise actions are allowable and what are proscribed. It is evident not only that to devote general attention to such matters must have a very bad effect on the community at large, and not least on their spiritual guides, but also that the whole system rests upon false ideas and tends to divert men's minds from the essential principles of morality. No attempt to specify all possible forbidden acts *can* be successful. It is clear, therefore, that what should be done is to find out and enunciate some great general principle by which each man may judge for himself beforehand whether any particular act or contemplated line of conduct is permissible or not. Islām rightly holds that religion is the basis of all moral law, and teaches that God is Himself the supreme Lawgiver, from whom all such laws must proceed if they are to have any validity and claim to bind men's conduct. But Islām regards the laws of God as arbitrary expressions of His will. They have been changed from time to time, and those at present in force have not always been so. For instance, it is now right to draw the sword to spread the faith, since Muḥammad, "the prophet with the sword," was commissioned by God to command Muslims to do so. But this law annulled the preceding law of Christ, which was in force until Muḥammad's time, and which forbade taking up arms for such a purpose, and decreed that those who took the sword should perish with the sword. Hence we see that the Muḥammadan conception of law is defective. Christianity recognizes God as the source of all law, in the moral as well as in the material world. It does not, however, hold that the moral law is a series of temporary arbitrary enactments, the existence of which alone renders certain actions wrong which are not wrong of themselves. Christians believe that the "moral law within us", that of the conscience, is an expression of God's own nature, to which ours bears a resemblance from the fact that He created us "in His own image", and that, though fallen, we are the children of our Heavenly Father. Hence we do not agree with Muslims in fancying that, as a sign of God's special favour to him, a prophet can be given permission to be more immoral than ordinary men. Nor do we hold with them that, if we observe an arbitrary series of Divine commandments here, we shall be rewarded by receiving permission to live hereafter in unbounded impurity in Paradise. In this respect Islām falls very far short of even the Mosaic Law, though that might seem to a careless reader to be a mere series of enactments: for in the Mosaic Law we have the grand principle enunciated—by which, as De Wette says, it is distinguished

from all heathen systems—that God is holy, and that men should be like Him in this. “Ye shall be holy, for I, the LORD your God, am holy.”

No thoughtful man can avoid noticing, moreover, that Christianity represents God as judging “the thoughts and intents of our hearts” as the sources whence, if polluted, evil deeds spring. Islām, on the other hand, like every other merely human code of laws, is shallow, and deals only with overt *acts*, and not with the *motives* which render them guilty or innocent.

The Hindū Caste system has enacted a considerable number of laws, which are rigidly binding upon every member of each several caste. Infraction of even the least of these is an unpardonable offence against the caste, and *ipso facto* “breaks” it. The culprit at once loses family, friends, country, home, and all claim to participation in the joys to which the members of his caste look forward in more births than one after death, subjecting himself to great humiliations in transmigration. Nor do the Laws of Caste at all coincide with the Moral Law of Conscience. They cause much suffering, parting men from one another, and making sympathy impossible between members of different castes. The principle enunciated by Terence,

“Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto,”

or that which Virgil puts into Dido’s mouth,

“Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco,”

is an axiom of the eternal Moral Law of which Cicero speaks so nobly,¹ but this is absolutely annulled in India by caste. True, we find the sentiment,

“*Prāṇā yathātmāno ’bhīṣṭā bhūtānāmāpi te tathā ;
Ātmaupamyena sarvatra dayāṃ kurvanti sādhaṇāḥ*”

(“As life is dear to thyself, so is it to (other) beings too. Through (drawing) an analogy with themselves, good men show mercy to all”)—but this merely proves that human nature asserts itself in common sense and conscience, even though in practice caste expels it. Caste laws forbid the Brahman not only to eat with but even to come in contact with a member of a lower caste, much less is this permitted with an outcast, as we are taught in the line,

“*Śvānakukkuṭachāṇḍālāḥ samasparśāḥ prakīrtitāḥ*”

(“A dog, a cock, and a Pariah have been declared equally defiling to the touch”).

The laws of Manu (*Dharmaśāstra*) actually decree the infliction of cruel punishment upon the *Sūdra* who even casually overhears the reading of the Vedas. Caste laws condemn to degradation and misery during their whole lives the great mass of the people of India. Forbidden to practise the rites of the Āryans, the whole of the lower and mixed castes were compelled to adopt those of the aborigines. This reacted upon the religion and conduct of the upper castes themselves, turning the comparatively lofty rites and conceptions of the Vedas into the foul

¹ *De Republica*, Lib. iii, quoted by Lactantius, *De Div. Instit.* Lib. vi, 8.

practices and debasing doctrines of modern Hindūism. As for the rest of the world, its people are all barbarians (*mlechchhas*), entirely outside the pale, hardly human at all. The highest hope which can be offered them is that perchance in some future birth they may re-enter the world as Hindūs, even if of a very low caste. To caste laws was due the practice of *sañ*—(or widow-)—burning, and, now that this is abolished by English law, the perhaps greater suffering to which widows are condemned for life is caused by the same laws.

Yet the Caste system has some good effects and prevents some evils. It may in this respect be compared with our own social rules, peculiar to each several section of the community. "Society" condemns certain actions as "bad form", and visits the culprit with severest disapproval and even with expulsion from its ranks. A man must not refuse to pay his gambling debts, misnamed "debts of honour", but he is not compelled to pay his tailor, nor is he obliged to live a pure life. The schoolboy code prohibits "sneaking", but not foul language and vile actions. Similarly caste rules forbid eating with men of a lower caste, but not necessarily theft, lying, *Kulin* polygamy, or the abominations of the *Mahārājā* sect. At the same time, to break down all such restrictions before something better takes their place would be somewhat dangerous. The Caste system is based upon (1) the difference of social rank, which must in some measure exist everywhere, and (2) the desirability of preserving purity of race and colour by preventing mixed marriages. But it produces extreme injustice to the children of such marriages, punishing them for their parents' offence. It also stereotypes society by forbidding a man of ability to rise to a position of higher rank and greater usefulness than that held by his forefathers. The descendants of a man of caste may become outcasts: they can never rise.

Christianity, too, recognizes social grades, but it leaves every one free to choose, according to his circumstances, the position for which he is best fitted and to which he may be able to attain by honest toil. The Caste system professes to rest upon Divine enactments (in Manu's Laws and similar religious codes), but it is unaffected by the acceptance of the Pantheism which underlies all modern Hindūism. A man may become a *Nāstika* (Atheist), or he may worship all or any of the gods in the Pantheon, but his caste is not thereby affected. He may even scoff at them all, or may with impunity profess belief in certain Christian doctrines, as long as he does not break the laws of his caste. We Christians, on the other hand, endeavour to realize the perpetual presence of our Saviour and to "endure as seeing Him who is invisible". We agree with the Hindū as to the duty of avoiding whatever would disgrace the community to which we belong, but it is because "we are the body of Christ, and members in particular". It is not from what Luther calls "painted sins", not from transgressing social or class enactments that we strive to keep free, but from neglecting the will of God. Faith has no part to play in Caste legalism: abstinence from certain actions is alone requisite. With us a living Faith is the source not only of the avoidance of wrong, but of the doing of right.

We may here notice that Christianity imposes positive moral obliga-

tions, whereas legalistic systems in general content themselves with prohibitions : "Touch not, taste not, handle not."

One of these prohibitions, common to both Islām and Hindūism, is that of using alcohol in any form. But it is one thing to prohibit and quite another thing to prevent. The prohibition has caused indulgence in *Bhang* (*Hashish*) and opium, which produce evils far worse than even those which result from the abuse of alcohol. Christianity does not prohibit the *use* but most strictly forbids the *abuse* of alcohol. Hence men are left free to choose for themselves in the matter, and therefore very many wisely abstain, for others' sake even more than for their own. Thus a voluntary and not a grudging abstinence, a beneficial example and self-denial, are produced among Christians worthy of the name, or at least strict moderation takes the place of compulsory abstinence; when this is enjoined there is a danger that it may in practice degenerate into mere pretence, or even that excess may result from the desire to get some compensation for the punishment incurred by the very slightest infraction of the law. Here, again, we Christians are given, not an arbitrary prohibition, but a reasonable principle and a noble motive, remembering whose we are and whom we serve. A Christian does not ask, as does a Hindū or a Muḥammadan, whether a particular stimulant was known when his legal system came into force, so as to be able to indulge in it if not specifically prohibited. He inquires rather whether its use in his case is in accordance with the rule, "Whether therefore ye eat or drink or whatever ye do, do all to the glory of God." Thus each man settles the question for himself before God, and so in all other matters.

Both Hindūs and Muslims have many forms and religious practices enjoined upon all or upon only certain sections of the community. In both religions the value of *institutions* is fully recognized as, among other advantages, binding together into one body those who observe them. Thus the Caste system itself is the one common bond uniting in some measure the multitudinous sects of Hindūism, which otherwise differ from each other in almost every conceivable way. The ceremony of investiture with the sacred thread (*Yajnopavītam*) is necessary for every member of the three highest castes before he can be considered "twice-born" (*Dvija*). Worship has certain fixed laws, one of which enjoins the repetition of the Sanskrit prayer *Gāyatrī*. In these two matters Zoroastrianism closely resembles Hindūism, viz. the sacred thread or girdle and the Avestic prayers (such as *Yathā Ahū Vairyō*, &c.).

Islām admits males by the rite of circumcision, insists on fixed Arabic prayers at stated hours of the day and night, on the *Hajj* or pilgrimage to Mecca for males able to make it, on turning towards the *Qiblah* and performing certain prostrations in worship. Here, again, Christianity provides for the needs of human nature by the two Sacraments appointed by our Lord. But instead of elaborate rites and worship in a dead language, Christ gives us a rule at once more strict and more liberal than any to be found elsewhere : "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." In prayer Islām insists on the necessity of *intention* (*Niyah*), and presupposes *faith*

(*Īmān*), but Caste makes no account of either. In this matter, as in every other, to use Bishop Lightfoot's words, "Christianity has substituted a principle of life for a code of rules." The "New Birth", only faintly adumbrated in Hindūism, is explained and *bestowed* by Christ, and only through this life-giving action of the Holy Spirit can any one enter His Spiritual Kingdom. To become a member of a Caste one must be born into it of Caste parents; all not so born are for ever excluded from its privileges. But no one the wide world over is necessarily excluded from Christ's Church, since all may receive New Birth through the Holy Spirit. Christ's last command enjoins on believers the—alas! too often neglected—duty of making all nations disciples and giving them in baptism the outward sign of the inward and spiritual grace which God longs to bestow on all.

Christianity is the only religion which recognizes the value of the individual in God's sight. "Belief¹ in human nature, in the priceless worth of the person and his immortal destiny, in the abiding solicitude of God for the meanest and most depraved," is one of the greatest excellences of the Christian faith. But underlying the Caste system is belief in Pantheism and the final absorption of the individual into the impersonal Divine All, the *Tat* ("that"), the *Sadasat* ("Existent-Non-Existent"). Caste crushes the individual into a mere cell, as it were, in the body of the community. If he breaks Caste he is lost. In himself he is of no importance to the Deity or to any one else. Christ, on the contrary, invites each human being to personal knowledge of, belief in, and spiritual union with Himself. The "Israel of God" is formed of such individuals. It is a spiritual body with Christ as its Head, and blessings flow to each member through personal union with Him. Christianity teaches the perfectibility of every individual, and the possibility of his enjoying an eternal existence of purity and happiness, in which his will is to be brought into perfect harmony with God's will, while his personality is not lost. In Islām personality is preserved and individual faith in Muḥammad is demanded, but to be saved a man must be a member of the *one* sect which *alone*, among all Muslim sects, can obtain salvation.

Hegel has well said, "Morality is the substance of Society, religion is the substance of morality." But neither Islām nor the Caste system inculcates any proper sense of the heinousness of Sin. In each case not only are innocent acts called by that name, but certain wicked ones are prescribed or sanctioned. To eat with a man of a lower caste is a deadly sin, to indulge in the obscene rites of the *Tantras* is not, if the latter be sanctioned by one's caste. It is a sin for a Muslim to eat in the day-time during the month of *Ramazān*, it is a good deed for him to die in a *Jihād*, destroying those who do not accept his faith. "One *Dirham* of usury which a man takes, knowing it to be such, is more grievous than thirty-six acts of fornication." Christianity teaches us that even our own most ordinary actions should be all for the glory of God, who is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity". We have also the "Golden Rule" of Christ to regulate our dealings with our fellow creatures.

¹ Dr. Bussell's Bampton Lectures.

Islām adopted the veil, and has segregated women in order to prevent licence. As we have seen, the Caste system aims at something of the same kind by forbidding mixed marriages. Christ purifies the heart, thus rendering it safe for men and women to associate freely and naturally with one another, and so producing a healthy social and family life.

Caste Hindūism forbids the admission of outsiders : Islām compels acceptance at the point of the sword : Christianity adopts the Golden Mean by inviting all but compelling none to enter. Indeed, as Christianity is inward and spiritual, compulsion is impossible. Here once more we see that Christianity possesses all that is best in both these legalistic systems, while remaining entirely free from the evils which in each exist in conjunction with the good. As Christ was the Fulfilling of the Law to Israel, so is He to be to Muḥammadan and Hindū alike. Recognition of this may enable us to use these legal systems each as the *παιδαγωγός* of its own adherents to bring them to Christ.

Finally, Christianity is "the Way", as its first adherents called it, and not a dead system of rules. Yet we have a more binding law than any legalistic system in the two great Commandments on which hang the Law and the Prophets. We are subject to "the Law of Liberty" that we may gladly serve Him "whose service is perfect freedom". and wait for His Son from Heaven and the dawn of the perfect day.

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THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE

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§ 1. *Introduction.* In fulfilling the duty laid upon me of discussing the modern conception of the universe, I shall endeavour to examine how far that conception leads to or is consistent with the idea of an almighty Creator having a just claim to the obedience and worship of men. We must not expect that the testimony of science, unaided by spiritual insight, can lead to anything more than the simplest form of religion, but if it does go so far the testimony is of immense value. If men grasped no more than the idea of the existence of an almighty Creator and allowed its significance to have a place in their lives, the gain would be very great.

But this paper is not intended to be in any way an apology for religion. I shall merely endeavour to set down, as simply as possible, some of the conclusions to which modern scientific investigation unhesitatingly points. The survey will, however, be incomplete, for it will be necessary to omit all but a bare mention of the moral and spiritual feelings and experiences of men, though these are phenomena of the universe, just as much as any physical or chemical actions, and generally lead to actual events in the world of matter, as, for instance, when a call to the mission field leads to the transport of a human body, with clothes and books, across the ocean.

It should be noted, before we go further, that the essential character of the universe does not depend in the least upon our intellectual conceptions, for the universe remains the same whatever may be our individual views concerning it. It is important to bear this in mind, because some persons, who have not grasped the distinction between an hypothesis and a fact, are in danger of imagining that these great questions are settled by the pronouncements of the popular speaker who is fashionable at the time. The distinction between fact and hypothesis must be continually remembered in discussing scientific discoveries, for, apart from the inevitable errors of observation, the simplest experiment is in reality so complex an affair that we can do no more than frame an hypothesis which will account for its main features. Yet, if the hypothesis is verified when the experiment is repeated under a variety of conditions, it acquires a high degree of credibility. That is all that we can say.

There is a popular notion that some strange impersonal thing called Modern Science has examined the universe in the cold light of experiment and has arrived at infallible conclusions. But this is not a true picture, for there is no one of the conclusions of modern science which can be said to be absolutely established, and the utmost that can be said of any conclusion is that the experiments are in approximate agreement with it. It is true that some conclusions become more and more firmly established as the accuracy of the experiments is increased, but, on the other hand, an increase of accuracy sometimes requires us to modify a conclusion. A striking example is furnished by the discovery of the gas argon in the atmosphere. In spite of an old experiment of Henry Cavendish, it was believed that atmospheric air was a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen, carbonic acid gas and water vapour, with *very small* additions of other known gases.

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But the accurate work of Lord Rayleigh and Sir W. Ramsay showed that more than one per cent, of what was supposed to be nitrogen was the previously unknown gas argon, and this has led to the detection of other gases.

§ 2. *The Complexity of the Universe.* In the earlier stages of scientific progress it was to some extent possible to divide science into branches and to confine attention to one branch at a time; it was possible to attend to the phenomena exhibited in one or more bodies without much regard to the relations between those bodies and the rest of the universe. But modern investigation makes it logically impossible to work any longer in water-tight compartments, and is gradually leading us to appreciate the fact that the number of actions to which every particle in the universe is continually subject is very great.

One instance will show how the progress of discovery compels a wider outlook. Newton accounted for the motions of the planets and their satellites by the law of gravitation, and the work of subsequent mathematicians and astronomers has abundantly verified his formula in the case of bodies of considerable mass. But recent investigation has verified the theoretical prediction of Maxwell that, when one of the bodies is intensely heated, as the sun is, the stream of radiant energy which falls upon the second body exerts a force upon it. As the second body becomes smaller, this force rises in importance relative to the force due to gravitation till at length it rivals and surpasses it, and it follows that the motions of those particles of cosmical dust, which are scattered through space, depend not only upon the action of gravitation, as was formerly supposed, but also upon the pressure of radiation.

Modern discoveries have led us to a point of view from which we are compelled to regard every particle in the universe as continually subject to a great variety of actions, though of course at any given instant some actions may be more strongly in evidence than others, and thus we realize that the history of even a single molecule, considered as a whole, is one of great complexity. But the evidence of the spectroscope and other considerations show that each molecule has a very complex structure and very complex connexions with its surroundings. When we combine the complexity of each molecule with the vastness of the number of molecules in the world of stones and trees and men and sun and stars, and consider that each molecule acts on every other one, the complexity of the conception is enough to make us despair of further progress. But science has not stopped here and has not left us without some sign-posts to guide us in our perplexity. I shall now endeavour to indicate some results obtained from experimental work which lead to conceptions shedding a little light upon the nature and character of the universe.

§ 3. *Nature of Matter.* In the bodies around us, on the earth or in the sky, whether they be inanimate or whether they be living organisms of any kind, we see a bewildering variety of substances. But the labours of chemists have led to the belief that all bodies are built up of a comparatively small number of elements, such as oxygen, carbon, or iron, and have shown that, if the elements be arranged in a series according to a certain law, there are very remarkable relations between the properties of an element and its place in this series. The existence of gaps in this series was thought to indicate that some elements remained to be discovered, and the theory of the series enabled the general character of the missing elements to be clearly described. The predictions have been confirmed by the actual discovery of some of the missing elements. These results of chemical science at once simplify our ideas about the material bodies around us, for instead of thinking of countless millions of different substances we

need only think of about one hundred. That the elements found on the earth occur in the sun and stars is shown by the spectroscope and by chemical analysis, which proves that many meteorites which have fallen on the earth are almost identical in composition with the most deep-seated terrestrial rocks.

The numerical relations between the elements suggest that they are all built up of some primordial substance. The most promising speculation is that which regards a molecule as consisting of a considerable number of very small charges of electricity. The variety of elements can then be accounted for by variations in the number and the arrangement of these electrical charges, and, in addition, the inertia and momentum of matter can be explained by the principles of electro-magnetism.

There is some evidence that a few substances, such as radium, which according to most tests behave as elements, suffer transformations into other forms which again appear to be elements, but this only strengthens the belief that all matter is ultimately a single substance under a great variety of forms. The conception that molecules are merely arrangements of electrical charges promises to account for these transformations and for the remarkable effects which are found to accompany them.

The elements differ one from another by *abrupt* steps, just as polygons of 3, 4, 5 . . . sides differ. The transformations of radium may be due to *abrupt* changes in the number of electrical charges in the molecule.

§ 4. *The Universe as a single System.* The view that all matter is built up of a single primordial substance is a great step in advance, but it does not at once replace complexity by simplicity, for the fact remains that the number of molecules in the universe is inconceivably great. If a rain-drop is estimated to contain many millions of millions of millions of molecules, who shall grasp the number of molecules in the whole universe?

But the results of scientific investigation lead us to regard all these molecules in their vast array less as so many separate entities than as forming one great and indivisible whole. One instance will make this clear. We believe that if there were only two molecules in the whole universe the force of gravitation would still draw each towards the other. There is therefore some connexion or relation between the two molecules, and to speak of them as two separate systems is only a convenient mode of speech which does not express the whole of the conditions. If they were two entirely independent systems, the motion of one molecule away from the other would have no effect upon the latter. But the law of gravitation assures us that the second molecule would experience a distinct effect, for the attractive force acting on it would gradually diminish as the distance increased. An extension of this idea leads us to realize that all the molecules in the universe are so linked together by gravitation as to form but a single system. Yet gravitation is not the only link, for electric and magnetic actions between molecules produce their effects, whatever the distance between the molecules. In addition, there are other actions which are sometimes practically in abeyance, as when two molecules, one of oxygen and one of hydrogen, are too far apart for chemical combination to take place. Nevertheless, the power of combination remains ever ready to do its work, when the distance between the molecules is sufficiently reduced and certain other conditions are fulfilled.

We could, of course, suppose that these actions between molecules arise from something inherent in the molecules themselves, and that the intervening space has nothing to do with the affair. But the facts of optics and of electro-magnetism compel us to recognize the existence of an all-pervading medium to which the name of ether has been given. This medium is conceived to extend through all space, and there are good reasons for

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the belief that the forces between electrified bodies are in reality due to stresses in it. The ether enables radiant energy to be transmitted from one body to another, as when the earth receives heat from the sun, or telegrams are sent, with or without the aid of wires, from one station to another. There is thus a most intimate connexion between molecules and the ether, and hence the ether may be regarded as the substance, if it can be called substance, which binds the whole universe together.

Thus we come to recognize that the whole tribe of molecules is linked together by the ether in such a way that they and the ether form a single indivisible system. The word *atom* was originally coined to express the belief that certain minute particles are incapable of a physical division into smaller parts. But in the light of modern science the whole universe is to be regarded as an atom, or, in other words, as something which cannot be divided.

The conception of the unity of the universe, to which modern science leads us, must of necessity have a most important place in any speculation concerning the origin of the universe.

§ 5. *The Origin of the Universe.* All the evidence is against the idea that the existence of molecules is due to any physical or chemical actions occurring in the present state of the universe; we are thus compelled to believe that they have been created, unless, indeed, we suppose that they are self-existent or, in other words, that there never was a time when they did not exist in their present forms—a supposition which has no place in the conception of the universe in the minds of modern physicists.

The fact that all the molecules of any given element have absolutely identical properties makes it clear that matter has been made on some plan, and the certainty that there is no molecule which is not associated with energy indicates that both plan and energy come from the same Source.

In thinking about the creation of the universe, we shall perhaps be helped if we first consider what would be involved in the creation of a single new molecule at the present day. This event would not only require the creation of new matter but would also involve the establishment of relations between the new molecule and the countless millions already in existence, and this would change all those molecules to the extent of enabling each of them to act upon the new molecule. If we speak in terms of the ether, we may say that such a connexion must be established between the new molecule and the ether that the molecule is able to cause disturbances in it which produce effects throughout the whole of space.

Thus the Power which is capable of creating a single molecule is able to originate effects extending through all space, and to this degree may, therefore, be described as bearing rule over the whole universe. We could, of course, suppose that the ether was created by one such Power and that each molecule had its own Creator, but the evidence of the unity of the universe leads to the conviction that the whole universe, the ether included, is the work of a single Creator, and that the energy in the universe is His gift.

§ 6. *Law and Order in the Universe.* What has been said about the unity of the universe and its creation is surely enough to justify the expectation that the universe will be found to be the scene of the operations of laws of such a character as to appeal to the intellect as rational laws, or laws which have good reasons behind them. So far from modern science having any doubts on this point, one of the chief aims of scientific investigators is to discover laws. In fact, many of the greatest advances have sprung from speculations and experiments inspired by

the belief that the actions occurring in the universe take place according to some intelligible plan, while many of the laws which have been discovered are capable of being expressed by very simple mathematical formulae.

One of the most conspicuous instances of belief in such a plan is furnished by the doctrine of the conservation of energy. According to this doctrine, the total energy in the universe is fixed in amount, and any chemical or physical change involves merely a redistribution of energy or a change from one form of energy to another. Such a law is obviously of the utmost significance, and it is not surprising that many of the modern advances in science are due to its recognition. Men would have been dull indeed if they had not seen in the law, as revealed by experimental investigations, an ordinance of an intelligent Power bearing rule over the whole universe. But to some extent the process took place in the reverse direction, and, instead of experiments leading to the doctrine of the conservation of energy, it was the expectation that the plans ordained by the Creator would be found to be intelligible to human minds which led the way to the establishment of the law as an article of scientific belief, for it was his faith in a Creator and his belief that the Creator had made energy subject to the law of conservation which led Joule to make the series of experiments which went far to secure the acceptance of the doctrine. His own words deserve to be quoted. "I shall lose no time," he says, "in repeating and extending these experiments, being satisfied that the grand agents of nature are, by the Creator's fiat, indestructible."¹

§ 7. *The Beginning and End of the Universe.* The modern conception of the universe sets before us a wonderful system working in a manner so regular and so orderly that we are almost tempted to believe that this regular working has continued not merely for many centuries or for many millions of millions of years, but that there never was a time when the universe was not guided by the same laws, neither more nor less, as are in operation to-day. This temptation must, however, be resisted, for if we yield to it we abandon the conclusion that the universe was created, since to assert that there never was a time when matter did not exist is equivalent to saying that it is self-existent.

If the universe consisted merely of the ether and of a single sphere of matter without any motion either of its centre or of the parts of its molecules, we could set no limit to its age, because no changes could occur in it. But the universe is not of this character; on the contrary, it contains matter in very vigorous motion—both in bulk, as seen in the earth's motion round the sun, and in detail, as seen in the molecular vibrations which give rise to light. Hence the state of the universe to-day differs from its state yesterday, and so on. We might, of course, conceive that all these motions are periodic and that any particular state of the universe recurs continually, though perhaps at long intervals, and, apart from the difficulty of accounting for them, we might suppose that these periodic changes had occurred regularly for an infinite time, and that they would continue for an infinite time. But modern investigations prove such a view to be untenable. For they have shown that, while the total amount of energy remains unchanged, there is at present a progressive diminution in its availability, and they point remorselessly to a time when the energy will be so distributed that further redistribution will be impossible. Thus water in a reservoir on a mountain represents available gravitational energy and in descending to the sea level may be made to produce electrical energy, but once at the sea level it ceases to be available for doing work.

¹ Joule's *Scientific Papers*, vol. i, p. 157.

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When the further redistribution of energy ceases to be possible, the universe will be physically and chemically inert; in simple words we may say that it will be dead.

The power of chemical combination of the carbon of coal with the oxygen of the air is a great reserve of energy, but in a few generations this source of wealth for England will be practically exhausted, and then the humblest households will learn by the experience of hardships something of the meaning of the loss of availability of energy.

When the operations of the physical laws are traced backwards into past time, they lead to greater and greater availability of energy. But there is a limit to this process, for the total sum of energy is limited. Speaking generally, the rate at which redistributions of energy occur increases with the availability of the energy, but even if the rate of loss of availability had never been greater than at present we should, in going back, arrive in a finite time at a state in which all the energy was, so to speak, in one basket. We thus conclude that only a finite number of years has elapsed since the creation of the universe.

§ 8. *Life and Matter.* So far we have considered matter apart from life. But on the earth there are living organisms ranging from lowly bacteria to stately trees and splendid animals and man himself. The bodies of these organisms are composed of some of those elements of which inanimate objects are formed, and to that extent living organisms are identical in nature with the inanimate world around them. But it is evident that there is a profound difference between life and matter, in that life involves individuality. Life is capable of employing the molecules of various elements to form the organism and to maintain it as the abode of life for a longer or shorter time, but the organism does not always consist of the same molecules, for it is continually taking in some molecules and rejecting others. Thus, for instance, after the carbon which an animal takes in as a constituent of its food has been assimilated, it is combined in the body with the oxygen taken in from the air and the resulting carbonic acid gas is breathed out. Both the carbon and the oxygen form parts of the body for a time, but only for a time. Yet the life of the individual preserves its identity, though the body which it controls is never, for two minutes together, composed of exactly the same molecules.

At the death of an organism, no immediate change occurs in the materials composing the body, but it is evident that in the corpse something is missing which the living organism possessed.

§ 9. *Origin of Life.* Experiments have led to the conviction that in the present order of things the linking of life with matter can only arise from the action of living organisms, and thus we arrive at the conception that living organisms did not appear on the earth as the unaided result of actions between mere molecules. We therefore conclude that the first living organisms were created.

The question at once arises whether the creation of the first living things took place at the same time as the creation of inanimate matter, or whether inanimate matter was in existence before the creation of living organisms. The only guide with which science provides us is the existing order of things, and if we follow this in tracing back the history of the earth, we come to a time when the earth's surface was red-hot. Lord Kelvin made this conception more precise by estimating how many millions of years have elapsed since that time. The discovery that radium gives off vast quantities of heat in the course of its transformations makes it necessary to revise Lord Kelvin's numerical estimate, but it does not invalidate the conclusion that only a finite number of years has elapsed since the earth's surface was red-hot. Now the connexion between matter and animal or vegetable

life is destroyed when the organism is exposed to a red heat, and thus, if the existing order of things had prevailed without interruption from the time when the earth's surface was red-hot, there would be no living organisms on the earth at the present day. Hence we conclude that the creation of the first living things on the earth has occurred since the time when the earth's surface was red-hot.

The conception of the creation of a living organism is obviously more difficult than the conception of the creation of merely inanimate matter, on account of our very slight knowledge of the nature of life. If we give rein to our imagination we might suppose that the body of the organism was formed of freshly created matter or that it was formed in some miraculous way of matter already in existence, and we might suppose that life was imparted to the body either at the time of its formation or at any subsequent time. But these are mere speculations; all that science teaches us is that the first living organisms were created.

Whether all species of living organisms descended from one or from many ancestral forms is a question to be discussed by the aid of biological and geological evidence. With regard to the past history of the various species, many biologists now believe that the present diversity of forms cannot be entirely accounted for by the accumulated effects of infinitesimal variations. They think the evidence points rather to a succession of abrupt changes. The argument of the present paper does not, however, depend upon these questions.

It has been suggested that life first appeared on the earth in elementary forms carried hither on meteorites, but this is no explanation, for it merely pushes the difficulty one stage further back.

§ 10. *The Fate of Living Organisms.* From the creation of living organisms we may pass to their fate. Though they die one by one, life is handed on from parent to offspring in such a way that we might expect it to continue in an unbroken succession for all future eternity, provided the prevailing physical conditions are not destructive to it. But the present order of things, which is the only guide of science, points, as we have seen, to a future time when the energy of the universe will be no longer capable of further transformations, and without such transformations living organisms cannot continue to exist. Thus a time will come when there will be no longer any living organisms on the earth. The present order of things does not, however, suggest that the universe will not continue as a mass of inanimate matter after the death of the last organism.

What happens to its life when an organism dies, is a question to which physical or chemical science has so far given no answer, for the sufficient reason that life evades the measurement and analysis of those sciences.

§ 11. *Man and the Universe.* A survey of the universe would be incomplete without an examination of the surveying instrument itself. That instrument is the human race, which has been so created and developed that it is able to make scientific observations and from them to discover laws obeyed by the universe. It is worth while to notice how those laws have been recognized. They have been established by experiment, and modern science, flushed with success, is steadily pressing its claims for more money and better opportunities for research in the hope of establishing further laws. But if we were to inquire why some man had made certain experiments or made certain calculations, the answer would often be that he had had an inspiration. The man is, however, conscious that it is the opening of his eyes which is the new thing, and not the fact or principle which he has perceived. The inspiration comes suddenly, like a flash of light, and makes an *abrupt* change in his intellectual conceptions. But no conclusions could be drawn from experiments unless it be admitted that

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some of the conditions can be varied in an arbitrary manner, and this amounts to a declaration of the power of free-will on our part. Thus, if we stroke a steel needle with a magnet, the needle becomes magnetized, but if the act of stroking was inevitable we could not decide whether the magnetism of the needle was directly due to the action of the magnet or whether other causes were involved. The power of free-will is of great significance, for the effects of a single act of free-will extend through the whole of space, and will last as long as the present order continues. Thus the voluntary motion of a man's hand not only affects the motion of the earth by a calculable amount, but also the motions of the sun and of the remotest stars, and the motions of all these bodies will differ for the rest of time from the motions they would have had if the man had not moved his hand.

But there are many other impressions received by man's consciousness, and all of them are undoubtedly phenomena occurring in the universe. Among them are the demands of conscience, the sense of temptation and the knowledge of yielding to it, the power of prayer and the consciousness of answers to it, and the other spiritual experiences of men. Our knowledge of these things did not arise from the recent work of a few scientific men; the whole human race, for many centuries, has been conscious of their reality. The universe is so clearly the domain of order that it would be strange indeed if spiritual things were not subject to laws, though it is to be expected that these laws will differ from those obeyed by inanimate matter, just as free-will differs from gravitation or chemical affinity. The unity of the universe makes it impossible to suppose that we can ever cut ourselves off from the operations of those laws. Did we but realize this, we should covet earnestly the spirit of holy fear. When men have this spirit they not only pay reverent attention to spiritual things, but also think and speak reverently of all the things of the material world, as, for example, of the weather. They are conscious that they are dwelling in the Temple of God and it is the joy of their lives to give Him their worship and their obedience.

The unity of the universe proclaims that there is absolute harmony between what is true in science and what is true in religion, and the fact that many of the greatest men of science have publicly acknowledged God in their scientific work shows the fallacy of the supposition that there is any antagonism between science and religion. Among these pioneers was Newton, who concluded his great *Principia*, or Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, with a wonderful passage on the nature of God, 'to discourse of whom', he wrote, 'from the appearances of things does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.' Another pioneer has lately passed away from us in the person of Lord Kelvin, who for fifty-three years began the first lecture of each day by reciting a Collect from the Prayer Book. In such lives as these there was wisdom and there was holy fear. May it not be that, after all, the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom?

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

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THE FAITH AND SCIENCE

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IN his Epistle to the Romans, St. Paul declares that the "invisible things" of God, "since the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made : even His everlasting power and divinity". The apostle thus asserts that the world of Nature is a revelation of God. To us who live in the fuller light of the manifestation of the Word made Flesh, such a revelation through the material universe is but of secondary importance. Still, it is one which has become less capable of being ignored as activity and success in discovering Nature's inner constitution, her hidden order and beauty, have steadily increased. God fulfils Himself, reveals Himself, draws us to Himself, in many ways ; and the literature of religion testifies not only to the profoundness of the influences exerted in all ages upon the souls of men by the sublime and beautiful in the order of created things, but also to the generality of the belief that Nature is indeed the "living visible garment of God".

At the same time, it is true that acquisition of a systematic knowledge of Nature, her processes and laws, has been looked upon during a lengthy period of the history of the Christian Church with disfavour and alarm by multitudes of her faithful members. "The conflict of religion and science" is a phrase that has long been so familiar that even its inaccuracy has ceased to strike us. In view of this fact, it may be that an endeavour to ascertain what principles were actually at stake in the past warfare between theology and physical science, and what, if any, are the points at issue between these two departments of knowledge at the present time, will not be without interest to the believer who cares to adjust to each other his scientific knowledge and his religious faith, and who would assure himself whether there is anything in the mass of empirical knowledge of Nature hitherto accumulated, to conflict with the cherished convictions and hopes which he grounds upon revealed religion.

Let us, then, briefly review the relations which have existed in the past between Christian theology and natural science, before proceeding to examine some of the problems in which science and theology have a common interest at the present time.

In the age in which the Church was planted the scientific spirit was not active in the world. The physical investigations begun by the

philosophers of ancient Greece had come to an end, or had survived, in an enfeebled state, only at Alexandria. Speculation had supplanted observation and experiment. Opinions once expressed by a recognized authority were transmitted without question or verification. And this attitude of mind, natural to the world at that time, was not disturbed by the growth of Christian thought. It was scarcely likely that theology would stimulate research by means of experiment and observation, when science itself showed practically no such inclination. Indeed there were reasons which disposed many within the early Church to attach scant importance to natural science of any kind. The belief prevailed that the present order was nearing its end, and was destined to be superseded by a new heaven and a new earth. There was also a tendency, apart from this belief, to concentrate contemplative effort exclusively upon the spiritual life and its concerns. But we find scarcely a trace, in the writings of the Fathers, of a disposition to stifle or oppose genuine scientific progress; nothing which savours of obscurantism. Several patristic writers ridicule the folly of the only science of their time—the science, “falsely so called,” of baseless *a priori* disputation and conjecture; none, so far as I am aware, showed hostility to empirically ascertained physical facts, unless it were in the sphere of medical science. Human anatomy was indeed discouraged; but so it was in heathen Rome as well as within the pale of Christendom. The superstitions which Christians owed to their pagan culture, with regard to demoniacal agencies, charms and magic, doubtless would retard the progress of sound views as to the treatment of disease if views of this kind were ever voiced. But such an attitude in Christian men cannot be attributed to their Christianity. As for the only other scientific matters on which individual Fathers seem to have expressed their opinions—the flatness of the earth’s surface and the non-existence of antipodes—we must remember that, in the patristic age, the time for proving the earth’s sphericity and the existence of human beings on its opposite surface had not as yet arrived. These were then purely speculative matters for which no evidence was forthcoming; and assertions of their truth might easily be considered fanciful, even by intelligent men. We may conclude, then, that in the patristic period there was more indifference than active antagonism to the pursuit of physical knowledge. That science was stagnant during this age was not largely, if at all, to be attributed to the influence of the Christian Church. Its scant progress was due rather to general causes, which operated independently of the Church as well as within its sphere of influence; causes which existed, for the most part, before Christianity appeared. Science had not as yet discovered any facts at variance with traditional theological beliefs. Conflict between theology and science was not as yet possible.

It remains to be mentioned, however, that during the age of the Fathers was forged the chain with which the Church was destined to fetter science in a subsequent period. The patristic age was an age of elaboration of dogma; and the system of doctrine which it produced included statements on matters which fall within the province of

physical science. A natural philosophy derived largely from the Old Testament was one of the established possessions of the Church when the night of the dark ages closed down upon it. And the finality of the ecclesiastical cosmogony and anthropology was grounded on the belief in the inerrancy of Scripture: in the theory of Biblical inspiration which became dominant in the Church during the early Christian centuries. There grew up an almost universal belief in the infallibility of the Bible as to matters of physical fact; whence it seemed to follow that Genesis was one of the foundations of Christianity, and that a science of Nature had been divinely revealed, admitting of no advance and of no correction. It was the Fathers' misfortune, hardly their fault, that there was no body of ascertained facts by which their account of the world might be supplemented or corrected.

In the Middle Ages these doctrines concerning the phenomena of Nature passed more and more into dogma to be received on authority; and error or dissent on such subjects became more and more to be identified with heresy. There was still little pursuit of physical knowledge; and where signs of desire for it were manifested, inquiries were often diverted from secular study by the irresistible attraction and the inherent coercive power of the supreme and exclusive science of theology; sometimes by the actual intervention of ecclesiastical authority. There were no fresh physical doctrines condemned during this period, for there were none to condemn. But after the appearance of a protest, from Bishop Grossetête and Roger Bacon, against the baneful influence of authority and tradition upon the progress of natural knowledge, and the assertion of the supremacy of the empirical method, the belief that science was futile began to be displaced by the feeling that it was dangerous; thenceforth scientific inquiries sometimes met with forcible repression. The desire to study the works of God was regarded by many as a sign of being in league with the devil. Had physical science been born in the patristic age, instead of after the bloom of scholasticism, it would probably have encountered less ecclesiastical opposition than, as we know, it did.

With the history of the warfare which science, from the time of the Renaissance, had to wage in order to emancipate itself from ecclesiastical authority, we are all familiar. The fact that most of the founders of modern science were devout Churchmen, and were guided, as they themselves declare, in their search for simple and universal laws of Nature, by their theistic belief, did not avail to protect them from persecution. The protests of philosophers such as Francis Bacon, and of ecclesiastics such as Nicholas of Cusa, against regarding the Bible as a text-book of science, could not prevail against the strongly entrenched conviction that, as Peter Martyr expressed it, "if the account of creation in Genesis were not true, all the life of our religion would be lost." The preliminary warning, delivered by the results of the great voyages of discovery performed by Columbus, Da Gama, and Magellan, that the old view of the world, which many divines were seeking to identify with revelation, was demonstrated to be untenable, did not serve to restrain the Church from blind opposition to the Copernican astronomy.

The new truth, however, gradually prevailed, and the period of persecution was succeeded by that of reconciliation. It became clear that Christianity could survive the loss of the Biblical astronomy. One would have thought that after this assured victory of astronomy, the other sciences would have been allowed to arrive at their unexpected results without serious opposition; for the one point which had been at issue, the validity of the traditional theory of Biblical inspiration, had been fully decided. This, however, was by no means the case. So, when geology emerged as a science, and began to accumulate facts which pointed to another series of discrepancies between the Biblical cosmology and the irrefragable testimony of the rocks, she had to fight the long battle of astronomy over again.

This struggle brings us well into the nineteenth century. It was succeeded by another, as to the mode of creation of organic species. From the time of the contemporaries Milton and Ray, the doctrine that species were unalterable, and that there were exactly so many of them as the Almighty had originally created, had been identified with both theological and scientific orthodoxy. The question had been held an open one by several of the Fathers and schoolmen; but Darwin's solution of it, given to the world in 1858, provoked a storm of ecclesiastical opposition. No sooner had *The Origin of Species* become familiar to the public, than the volume entitled *Essays and Reviews* brought another violent shock to the minds of many Churchmen. And, shortly afterwards, Bishop Colenso's criticism of the Hexateuch increased an excitement already intense.

We marvel now, perhaps, that each of these successive inrushes of new knowledge excited afresh the opposition of the bulk of Christian people. For we can plainly see that at bottom there was only one great principle at stake in all these controversies, and that the same which had before been repeatedly called in question, and indeed obviously proved to be at fault, viz. the assumption that the inspiration of the Old Testament was of such a nature as to invest the Biblical cosmology with the character of revealed truth. Apart from the implied negation of this presupposition, it is difficult to see what bearing the doctrine of organic evolution, or the discovery of discrepancies between the Hexateuch and natural science, could have upon theology. But to understand the remarkable tenacity with which the old presupposition as to the authority of Scripture was contended for, we need to remember that logic was unlikely to be the sole arbiter in a question which appealed so much to sentiment. We have to bear in mind how intimately the Englishman's religion had for centuries been associated with reverence for the letter and authority of the Bible. That authority being assured, the rest was easy for him. But, confidence in that plain and definite guide being once unsettled, we are well aware how he scarce knows where to turn for a foundation for his most cherished beliefs and hopes. The loss of a Bible equally inspired and infallible in all its parts was to him really a bereavement. No wonder the convictions of his forefathers in this matter were fought for with that tenacity which refuses to know when it is beaten.

But now the truth is established, and many, at least, can say the truth has made them free. And if they look wistfully back to a time when a simpler and more definite theory of Biblical authority sufficed, they nevertheless realize that such a theory was of those things of childhood which ripper Christian wisdom requires the Church to put away.

Such is the main result of the past conflict between theology and natural science. The cause of dispute has all along been *one*, though the ground of the battle has been shifted from point to point. And the dispute is now over. I spoke advisedly in characterizing the long conflict of science with theology as past. But the assertion needs guarding against misconstruction. It is not intended to imply that there are no representatives of science who claim, in its name, to refute the fundamental propositions of theology; it is intended to imply that this claim is wrongly advanced in the name of science. We need, in fact, very carefully and very jealously to distinguish between natural science or empirically demonstrable and therefore irrefragable knowledge of Nature, on the one hand, and the elements of crude metaphysics which unsuspectingly lurk in the very language which science uses as its means of expression, in the working hypotheses which it adopts, the generalizations which it formulates, and the abstract concepts which it employs when these are confounded with actual entities. It is these alien elements, these marginal glosses, so to speak, on the deliverances of science proper on which the various systems of naturalism, so plausible to some scientific students, are always built and alone can be built. It is these which supply the anti-religious sting to some of the utterances which are put forth as scientific verities, and lead many people to suspect that the trend and temper of modern science is hostile to the Christian Faith.

It will be asked, perhaps, if it be of any moment whether these elements in the creed of many who pursue physical studies are scientific or philosophical in nature; have they not equally to be reckoned with, whichever of the alternative views of their character we take? But the answer is easy, and of much significance controversially. For, if science is a body of systematized facts, empirically verified and ever verifiable, together with logically necessary inferences from such facts, it surely must be the very ideal of objective truth and solid knowledge. The unbounded respect which science nowadays receives is no whit exaggerated or misplaced. Incompatibility with such a body of truth inevitably means self-condemnation for any theological doctrine professing to refer to matter of possible experience. Science, in this strict sense, is a rock upon which if any dogma fall it is inevitably broken in pieces. Nothing more disastrous to a theological tenet could well be imagined than conviction of being in contradiction to a solid certainty of science; for that would mean nothing else than being contradictory to experience.

On the other hand, the unverifiable metaphysical elements which serve sometimes to effect the transition from scientific fact to naturalistic philosophy, and even to beg the question at issue between the scientist and the theologian, can lay no claim to be on a par with empirical facts.

They cannot, therefore, carry with them the authoritativeness which rightly belongs to the pronouncements of pure science.

Leaving on one side, then, all cases of conflict between theology and what is often mis-called science, but is really philosophical speculation suggested by the empirical results of science proper, we may ask again the question to which we were previously led: is there at the present time any theological doctrine, any conviction or religious hope, with which the findings of science may be said to be in opposition? Science and theological belief have, as we have seen, been at variance as to matters of fact in the past. Is there evidence of any such conflict now, or do not such cases as are sometimes alleged resolve, upon close scrutiny, into examples of opposition between theological belief and the pseudo-science which we have just now discriminated from empirically established truth?

I believe there remain no points with regard to which pure natural science claims to oppose Christian belief.

That science furnishes no material out of which proof or disproof of the existence of God could be elaborated, without recourse to metaphysics, is perhaps too generally recognized a truth to need any justification here. That science only deals with changes, not with ultimate origins, with "becoming", not with absolute being, deprives it again of any right to pronounce upon the theological concept of "Creation". The scientific account of the origin of man has almost ceased to shock the religious consciousness; and if science should ever succeed in throwing light on the obscure problem how human souls come to be, and to be what they are, no difficulty need arise for theology. Man is none the less man bearing the image of his Maker and capable of communion with Him, however the human species may have come to be what it is. Nor, in spite of a somewhat prevalent belief to the contrary, has science aught to say against our hope of immortality. That the soul or self is an activity or a product of the material body is beyond the power of the physiologist to prove, and beyond the power of the philosopher even to conceive. For if what we call matter is ultimately composed of our sensations and thoughts, it is absurd to speak of our sensations and thoughts as if they were only an activity of our brain. Nor does it follow that because science only knows of conscious selves which are associated with bodies, and whose sensations are mediated by bodily processes, therefore the body which we now possess, and no other, is essential to the self. The self may, at death, enter into connexion with another kind of body; and inability now to feel or think except through the mediation of our present body may be of the nature of an actual limitation imposed upon us in virtue of our connexion with that body. These are possibilities which it is beyond the power of science to affirm or to deny. It is likewise impossible to argue from the transient nature of all material systems which she knows, to the transiency of the conscious personality. There is no analogy between a material object and a self. Nor are there any facts of science which otherwise cast doubt on our belief in human immortality.

A similar result would, I believe, be attained if we were able to

examine one by one the remaining possible points of contact between theology and science ; the remaining problems, that is to say, in which theology and science have to-day a joint interest. But it is time to return from isolated instances of this mutual contact to the broader issue from which we set out.

We have seen that the acquisition of a scientific knowledge of Nature has forced upon theology the recognition of the untenability of her traditional view as to the authority of Scripture. The long conflict between science and theology has also taught us that *a priori* ideas as to what is fitting or not to expect from the Deity, or to attribute to Him, are not to be trusted. Even when born of reverence and humility, such ideas have proved sometimes not to point to the eternal truth, but to stand in need of revision and amendment. Science has doubtless rendered other services to modern theology ; but into these we may not now inquire. We have also seen reason to conclude that there are not, and in all probability never can be, any further matters with regard to which physical science can claim to doubt or deny the doctrines taught by the Christian Church. The warfare of science and the suspicion of religion are both at an end. There is nothing, so far as our assured knowledge of Nature goes, to cause feelings of uneasiness to the believer of this generation, as he contemplates the accumulations of physical knowledge which science is ever gathering in, or as he allows his imagination to exercise itself with the prospect of discoveries awaiting the future development of present-day methods of research. Science has made it no harder for us to believe that the world is the work—or, if we like the expression, the garment—of God. On the contrary, in tracing the connexion between its parts and the orderly sequence of its processes, she has helped us to understand something more of the mode in which the Creator has worked, and of the stages by which He has accomplished His design. It is not the reduction of all phenomena, including the most mysterious, to cases of uniform law ; not the discovery of causal connexion between things ; not, in any sense, the extension of scientific knowledge, which the theologian or the Christian believer watches with anxiety. It is simply the tendency on the part of some, who take liberties with the name of science, to stretch formulae, which are perfectly legitimate in summing up our empirical knowledge of natural phenomena, in order to include quite other matters to which they are not applicable ; and, in so doing, to make plausible a philosophy of the universe which levels down everything that is spiritual in man to the mechanical, the automatic, the material : a philosophy which threatens the intellectual bases of the highest of man's hopes and aspirations.

But as for science itself—we have no reason to be jealous of its triumphs, as if each successive discovery were the conquest of another portion of the territory of religion. We feel no compulsion to conclude—as our fathers commonly did—that where science has “explained” thence God is banished ; that where physical causation can be traced, there divine activity is absent. It rejoices us nothing to be assured that scientific knowledge has its gaps, evolution its limits, as if

within those gaps or beyond those limits we could alone plant in safety the foundations of our faith. Rather do we look forward with eager interest to the day when science shall sum up all her knowledge in one concept or a single law. For we claim that all which science has to teach is, in a sense, theological knowledge also : that in Nature, as in Holy Writ, or human history, or the inner experience of the individual soul, we may find what is worthy to be called a revelation of God.

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This last book is one of quite a simple nature.

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SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN FAITH

By SIR DYCE DUCKWORTH, M.D. LL.D. F.R.C.P.

CONSULTING PHYSICIAN TO ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S HOSPITAL; VICE-PROVOST OF THE GUILD OF ST. LUKE.

THE idea that a profound study of any branch of Natural Science is incompatible with the convictions and assurances of the simple Christian Faith is, I venture to think, probably less tenable to-day than it was some five-and-twenty years ago. Leaving out of consideration the leaders in Science on the continent of Europe, there were, at the time just mentioned, some eminent men in this country who were aggressively agnostic, and had a following of devoted pupils. We have learned by a study of this mental quality to recognize varieties and degrees of it.

Firstly, the condition of mind in the honest and conscientious observer who is a widely educated and thoughtful man, and not in any degree irreligious. He may, and sometimes indeed does, lament his lack of faith, and his inability to grasp it. Secondly, we meet with a profession of agnosticism which represents little more than the attitude of a sycophant who copies his leaders in Science, constituting a mere cant. Thirdly, we find a vulgar variety of it, often blatant and offensive, in persons whose general education and early religious training have been defective or painfully narrow.

I have long regarded the first variety as distinctly due to a mental failure or flaw, akin to the definite condition known as colour-blindness in certain persons, and it pertains, not seldom, to some of the finest minds.

There is a tendency in some of those who are pursuing the exact sciences to go no further than the facts elicited lead them. All beyond the demonstrable is for them unknown, if not unknowable. The scientific imagination, if it is possessed, may dispose such persons to further research, but this may not always be projected in the realm of Faith, or induced to pry either into the unseen or the moral world.

It is difficult to understand the mental condition of the scientist who is honestly a materialist, who acknowledges his own personality, his ignorance of the origin of life, of its purpose and its destination. His wonder at the revelations he displays, and his quickness to see the adaptations in each field of Nature lead him no further on the way to find the primal Creator and Designer. He may become a deist, but for him there is no purpose, and can be no explanation; nor indeed is there any possibility to reach out beyond the hard facts he elicits without the illumination of Christian Faith.

To-day it is as true as ever that the last revelations of Science tell nothing as to the intimate nature of life, or the origin of it; nothing as to the nature of the soul of man, and all Nature is silent as to the future.

It is also true that many of those who devote their lives to pure Science are by the nature of their work shut off from intimate contact with the world and with their fellow beings. They are not always the most human of their kind. They probably see less of the strife and sufferings of men and women than most people. The Laboratory in any of its departments is not an appropriate school for these lessons. The Hospital supplies a better one. And, truly, suffering is one of the best schools for implanting the teaching and value of Faith. Without doubt, much of the faithlessness which is prevalent is due to the fact that men have never assumed a proper attitude towards it.

Whence then comes Faith, how has it been found, and how has it helped those who once had it not, who "went through seas of doubt and difficulty" before grasping it? The Faith, and the hope which comes with it, are commonly regarded by such philosophers as are here under consideration as vain and fanciful imaginations, evolved by ecclesiastics and visionaries, as a sort of anodyne adapted to meet the fears and apprehensions of simple, unlettered people. Inasmuch as there is no sign, and nothing demonstrable in such matters, they find themselves adrift, or at a standpoint whence extends a vast sea or desert of the unknowable. For them, all beyond is dark and impenetrable. There is no element whereon to fasten belief, or encourage hope as to the future and the far beyond. Such men may lead exemplary lives, and practise all the virtues which are commonly regarded as pertaining to Christianity, and it is quite certain that their environment by such influences and practices sets a standard for them to live by and practise unconsciously. Such a standard in the world is therefore of supreme value, and constitutes no small argument in favour of professing Christians maintaining, and labouring to spread, the Christian ideal everywhere.

Again, it is sometimes asserted that the ability to hold the divine Faith is a matter of temperament, but "Faith is a supernatural gift of God by which we firmly believe in God, and in all that He has revealed". Temperament, however, is essentially a natural quality, and myriads of faithful Christians of all races certainly possess very varying temperaments. The acquirement of the Faith can in no way vary or modify temperament. A man may lose and re-acquire his Faith without altering this natural endowment. Were it possible for a temperament to change, it is inconceivable to imagine that the supernatural should also change with it.

Men of Science are seldom vicious or sensual. Their minds in respect of higher things may rather be regarded as a *tabula rasa*, on which to inscribe the true principles of the simple Faith of Christianity. Such men, as I have said, have not yet acquired the right attitude in which such Faith is alone to be secured.

This attitude is primarily one of humility, with a determination to make the experiment of a trial to hold and live by the simple Faith. With that effort, made in all honesty and earnestness, together with prayer for guidance and grace, comes unflinchingly, and gradually, the conviction of its power and reality. Nothing is more certain than

the sequels of an honest trial of the simple Christian Faith, as is abundantly evidenced by large experience, and certified by the assuring words of Christ himself :—"If any man will do his will, *he shall know* of the doctrine" (John vii. 17). God never fails to grant this gratuitous gift to those who ask Him for it with fervour, and who show by their acts that they desire to receive it, and to use it. This attainment is obviously as open to the unlettered man as to the philosopher. Science, so-called, is not in question here. The method which is necessary to secure the Faith is apart from all those rigidly followed by the scientist. He can maintain, and retain, all his most advanced and his latest acquirements in any branch of knowledge which he has pursued, and can add to these the conceptions and firm belief that flow from simple efforts to grasp the Faith. This achievement cannot fail to bring with it conviction, and a glorious illumination of all his studies.

The conception of the great abiding and sustaining force in Nature, that of the Deity, is ever incomplete and inexplicable without the realization and frank acceptance of the incarnate Son of God as a Divine Person, Who was certainly sent into this world to manifest to our common humanity an adequate ideal of the great All in All, of his Fatherhood, and of our relation to Him.

For those who are faithless, or feeble in faith, a careful perusal of St. John's Gospel is the best remedy :—

"There is a book, who runs may read,
Which heavenly truth imparts,
And all the lore its scholars need,
Pure eyes and Christian hearts.

"The works of God, above, below,
Within us and around,
Are pages in that book to shew
How God himself is found."

It has been said, that Jesus Christ was "not the product of his age", after the manner of other great men. His age did not account for Him. He is a solitary figure in all history, none like Him before or since, unique indeed, and for all time. His life and influence are obviously the greatest and most uplifting the world has ever known. His closest followers have proved, and prove daily, the great sustaining and sanctifying influence of His example and character, and have inspired the best lives that have been lived, and are living amongst us to-day. This life supplies a pattern for all, learned and unlearned, to follow and be inspired by. Here, too, is the ideal set forth to train and perfect the personality of each human unit. What is this personality? Man recognizes it as an individuality blended with his humanity. We regard it as most fully developed and perfect in man, the essence which alone brings him into relation with the Divine nature. This conjunction truly is mysterious, or, in the Johnsonian definition of this term, something "awfully obscure". Yet we cannot regard it as perishing together with the disintegrating body in its humiliation; rather, we instinctively predicate for that part of

our nature an immortality in eternity. We realize that our Maker "knoweth whereof we are made, and remembereth that we are but dust", but the enlightened and reflecting mind is assured both by faith, experience, and respect for its Creator that this part or essence which has animated humanity has a destiny towards a future, and a vast capacity for further development and purpose. This, we may believe, is the part of our nature which is ultimately to be "clothed upon", when the fleshly covering has dissolved. The innate tendency to peer into the future, and to gratify the longings and conceptions of the pure and refined mind could never, as we firmly believe, have been permitted by a beneficent Creator to arise were they never ultimately to be gratified and fulfilled.

Our failures and incompleteness, our incapacity and limitations here are all inadequate, as we often feel, for the full play and possibilities of the better part of our nature. So, with Mansel, we must say that "personality, as we can conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation", and we are convinced with the writer of the Book of Job that "though the body be destroyed, yet out of our flesh shall we see God", and with the Preacher, that "the spirit shall return unto God who gave it", that spirit which "goeth upward".

This is the Faith which I believe may be fairly claimed as held by the great majority of those who, as "priests of the body", are engaged in daily service to minister to the needs of suffering humanity, who have come to their duties after studies in many sciences, and have, with the divine gift of healing, to apply their skill to all sorts and conditions of men. Thus they work in harmony with the "priests of the soul" for the betterment and uplifting of their fellow men, and to fortify the faith of humanity.

The agnostic physician brings little brightness and assurance to the bedside of the sick, and even he must testify to his experience of the calmest and most happy deathbeds as being those in which the patient was sustained by that Faith which has no meaning and no comfort for him. We may safely repose in the faith which sustained one of the greatest Christian philosophers of modern times, but recently entered into rest, Lord Kelvin, who, with his vast knowledge of Science, was never moved from a faith in a world that is real, though invisible.

The inevitable changes in knowledge and thought which come with each century, now slowly, now rapidly, can never, and should never, shake or blot out the one enduring simple Christian Faith which must ever remain as fundamental and essential, as the most refining influence, for every wise and thoughtful man who does his duty strenuously as he passes through the world.

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

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SCIENCE AND RELIGION

By F. C. S. SCHILLER, D.Sc.

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THE relations of Science and Religion have undergone a startling transformation in recent years. For among the great discoveries of Science in the latter part of the nineteenth century was that of the existence of Religion. Of its existence, that is, as a fact in the world of human experience and so as a scientific subject, to be studied with all the reverence with which Science welcomes such facts as it has consented to recognize. Religion thus ceases to be for Science an obstacle to natural knowledge and the jealous guardian of mysteries which cannot bear its inquiring eye: it has itself become a source of natural knowledge, and something from which it is possible to *learn* new facts about the nature of the universe.

This implies the deepest and most thorough reconciliation of Science and Religion which it is possible to conceive. It puts an end in principle to the unworthy bickerings between them about the territories of each, and the futile attempts at the delimitation of their borders, which even if it could be carried through, would result only in cleaving in two the realm of human experience. For it permits each to claim the *whole* of experience—in its own fashion—while nevertheless neither can oust or contradict the other. Thus it places their difference not in the objects which they severally contemplate, but in the subjective attitudes which man assumes towards his experience, and regards *both* these attitudes as indispensable for the prosperous conduct of life. Science may justly deal with all things; for the whole of Reality may provide food for scientific reflection. So may Religion; for the whole of Science may support and nourish the religious attitude. Both are means of transmuting the crude “matter” of “appearance” into forms better, truer, more beautiful and more real.

But within the unity of their ultimate end in the common good of man, there is abundant scope for recognizing differences of purpose and of method between Science and Religion. The religious attitude is not primarily intended to augment our practical control of things; the scientific attitude is not primarily intended to augment our spiritual strength. The fact that secondarily each may do the other's work, as human interest shifts from the one to the other, tells as strongly in favour of distinguishing their nature as it does in favour of harmonizing their services.

The Science which must be credited with the leading part in the discovery of the vital function of Religion is psychology. Psychology has itself been relatively slow to grow up to its full scientific stature, and even yet has not quite outgrown servile imitations of physical methods, and concessions to a materialistic metaphysic, which its weakness at first demanded. Even now it is still far from being generally recognized that psychological facts are facts as real and hard and undeniable as those of any other science, and that humanly they are often far more insistent. But once a philosopher has nerved himself to reckon with the reality of psychological facts, the whole drama of human history is marvellously changed. He begins to grasp a unity of plot pervading the multiform vicissitudes of its evolution and subduing the antagonism of its protagonists. He begins to see how always and everywhere "rational" activity has been directed upon a remoulding of human experience into consonance with human ideals. He traces both Science and Religion to their common root in the heart of man. He traces them with unblenching eye through the crudities and atrocities of their pedigrees, and dissects with remorseless sympathy the "errors" that gave birth to "truth".

For both Science and Religion owe their birth to human sin and weakness. Had the world been from the first amenable to all man's demands, he would never have adopted either the scientific or the religious attitude. But such was not the way of the world in which man's spirit has grown strong. To primitive man the world is a very terrible affair, replete with incalculable horrors, whose burden was alleviated only by the limitations of his imagining. It is still so beset with dangers that Science may legitimately wonder whence man draws the strength to sustain the unequal struggle with the cosmic forces, and Religion may legitimately argue from his continued success to some hidden source of divine assistance. In either case we do but formulate, but not reveal, the mystery of man's success, when we ascribe it to his adoption of the religious and the scientific attitude.

Both were sorely needed. Man had to watch, with inexhaustible credulity and patience, but undaunted courage, the ways of men and animals and things. And then, blindly at first and unintelligently, he imitated and interfered and attempted to control. So Magic grew up, and out of Magic Science, the Magic which works.

But it was a fight of course in which man was, and is, and long will continue to be, overmatched. He must often, therefore, have been terrified. Where control ceases, terror reigns. When terror is humanized and deified, superstition begins. *Primus in orbe Timor fecit deos.* True; the early gods are

largely devils—devils, however, who can be propitiated. Suffering, fear and sin, are feelings which early religions evoke as well as control. But if Religion had been based on fear alone, it could never have grown rational. Man was prompted (how?) to imagine other gods than the powers of nature that appalled him. He beheld the vision of a Divine Helper who could assuage terror and control the inhuman powers, and so inspire human progress. From the depths of despair there rose before the eyes of faith the figure of the Saviour, and sublimated Superstition into Religion, the superstition which comforts and uplifts. Thus, by a combination of the scientific and the religious attitude, man has contrived to survive.

Such, stripped of all theologic pedantry, is the psychologist's notion of the vital function of Religion and of the nature of man as a religious animal. He does not hesitate in consequence to speak of a religious sense, none the less real for being restricted to no special organ, and interfused throughout man's way of taking his experience. He regards its existence, function and value, as definite facts for scientific study, as definitely correlated with man's success in life, and with the functioning of his whole intelligence, and even as illumining the latter.

For it appears that certain characteristics of man's procedure in aiming at the control of his experience stand out more clearly in his religious than in his scientific attitude. For example, the fact that faith everywhere precedes knowledge. No doubt it is true that Science also ultimately rests on acts of faith, that the assumptions which encourage us to control and understand the world must be risked before experience can confirm them. Thus no order of events, however regular, could ever prove the existence of "laws of nature" to an intelligence which held this sequence of events to be fortuitous. For such an intelligence would not connect them, and so would see no reason why the sequence should not stop, or go on, at any point and in any way.

The unity of Space and Time, the indestructibility of "Matter" and the conservation of Energy, nay, the very unity of the "universe" itself, are similarly postulates. Science, therefore, indubitably starts from postulates which are envisaged by Faith before they are proved by experience. It is mere verbalism (as well as sheer negation of Science) to claim to have removed the risk of postulates by calling them *a priori*. For even *a priori* necessities of thought do but conceal the risk, and cannot dispense with an act of Faith which believes in their continuance. But it is true that, until recently, Science was not so keenly conscious of its acts of Faith, and (when misguided by philosophers) even imagined that pure reason or unaided experience could establish its foundations.

No religion has ever made such a pretence of dispensing with Faith, or of laying claim to a purely rational demonstration.

Again, Religion has never committed the folly of allowing itself to be dehumanized, while Science, though essentially as human as Religion, has often seemed oblivious of the fact. Engrossed by a multitude of useful abstractions and conventions, it has often seemed to eliminate the very person whose interest and interests had set on foot the whole inquiry. There is here nothing but a difference of purpose : in Science, man at first seems passive ; he restrains himself and watches, that he may the better intervene : in Religion he is conscious that he must be active and implore, in order to have consolation and to rest from the troubles which oppress him. Still there is no doubt that the personal venture, which every act of Faith always contains, comes out much better in Religion.

Religion, on the other hand, has been much less sedulous to emphasize the technique of verification, which confirms such ventures. It has often been suspected of doing without it altogether. It has been accused of taking the will for the deed, of accepting Faith without works, of deluding itself with airy shadows of its own desires.

But this is a complete mistake. Religious postulates need confirmation as much as those of Science. The true claim of religious experience is that they receive it after their kind, that e.g. prayer "works", that it really uplifts and consoles. This, of course, the rationalist is most unwilling to concede. He puts the whole effect down to "imagination". But his position is logically quite untenable. He has not made the religious assumptions ; he has not put himself into the religious attitude ; he has not put himself in the way of the religious experiences ; he is not qualified to judge how and how far they constitute a verification of the religious attitude. His only means of recognizing its value *ab extra* is to record its bearing on the survival of those who have ventured on it, and in this respect he may contend that the truth of Religion is still *sub judice*. But for this very reason his denial of its value *now* is a purely dogmatic expression of his own will to disbelieve. Scientifically his attitude is that of one who denies the reality of phenomena he has refused to experiment with. This attitude is not unknown, even in Science ; for dogmatism and intolerance are common human failings ; but it is profoundly unscientific, and men are growing more ashamed of it. Once, therefore, we admit the psychological reality of Religion, nine-tenths of the current rationalism is put out of court. It is swept away by the suspicion that its objections are analogous to those of the colour-blind to the existence of colour.

But, it is urged, these psychological verifications prove too

much. They would be just as efficacious if they were merely subjective. Just because Religion is such a spiritual need, it is a methodological necessity, whether or not it is true. It is enough to act as if it were true, to obtain its spiritual benefits. Psychologically all religions work, whatever the nature of the objects they allege, whether or not anything objective corresponds to the ideals they postulate. Pragmatically, there can be no distinction between a true religion and a false.

Now there is not a little in this argument. It contains the explanation of the immense variety of religious opinion, and of the multifarious developments of religious history. It should be welcomed, therefore, by all those whose faith has been distressed and shaken by these facts. And philosophically, also, it may mean a great advance, if it leads to a perception that the existing plurality of truths must not be ignored for the sake of an unattained ideal of the unity of truth.

But on the whole this view is an exaggeration, and even its logic is at fault. It does not draw the right inference from its own premisses. If all religions work, all are true, and what is false is the rigidity of an idea of truth which cannot tolerate such plural truth. It is not true, however, that there is no pragmatic difference between a theory which is true and one which is merely thought to be true. Though all theories which are current must work in some degree, the true theory *works better*, and this is precisely the reason why, once thought of, it is accepted and supplants the theories which were merely thought to be true. Moreover, for any theory to work, it must be believed in, i.e. believed to be true. It is impossible, e.g. to practise prayer merely as a piece of spiritual hygiene, and in order to get the strengthening which is said to result from the practice. The practice need not of course start with a firm belief in the reality of its object. But unless it engenders a real belief, it will become inefficacious. Hence to conceive Pragmatism as ultimately sanctioning an "act-as-if" attitude of religious make-believe is a misapprehension; it is to confound it with the discredited and ineffectual dualism of Kant's antithesis of practical and theoretic "reason". Lastly, it should be noted that any theory which works must evoke some response from the objective nature of things. If there were no "God", i.e. nothing that could afford any satisfaction to any religious emotion, the whole religious attitude would be futile. If it is not, it must contain essential truth, though it may remain to be determined what is the objective fact corresponding to the postulate.

The parallel case of Science will serve as illustration. The postulate of uniformity would be made as a subjective necessity, as a method of control, upon the slightest hints in nature.

But it would not be persisted in and believed to be true (and even axiomatic!), unless it showed itself to be extensively applicable. There is, therefore, something "objective" to correspond with it—which in this case we know. The objective factor is the fact that all things have habits, and change them (if at all) so slowly that for most scientific purposes we may assume them to be constant.

It is clear, therefore, that the truth of Religion has both a subjective and an objective aspect, and that the two are connected. The way to the latter lies through the former. Both are capable and worthy of far more scientific study than they have yet received. It behoves Science, therefore, to be cautious. It is dealing with subtleties and complications not to be unravelled by the *a priori* affirmations of a rationalistic dogmatism. Its attitude towards the facts of the religious life should be that of the student and the learner. It need not pretend as yet to pronounce what is the precise vital value of religious experiences and of the institutions founded on them, what is their cognitive value, and what are the objective facts to which they "correspond". If it could answer these questions fully, it would supersede dogma and turn the theoretic aspect of Religion into a Science. But intrinsically these questions are not unanswerable, if men are interested enough to try, and honest enough to learn, from the results of trial.

About the subjective side of Religion, Science can already speak more positively. That it exists, embodied in a thousand forms, and has had a long and wondrous history, are patent facts. What it wants is also pretty clear from history. Experience, therefore, already throws such light on the psychology of Religion that there is not much scope for dispute about the constitution of most men's subjective demands. History exhibits a significant convergence upon the main outlines of the "God" who satisfies the normal religious instinct. A "god" who is a mere principle of unity pervading a universe which furnishes equal accommodation to the just and to the unjust, and is equally indifferent to both, is a postulate which has unceasingly been urged upon mankind as the most truly philosophic deity. But it has never won acceptance, and has never become widely functional. It has had, therefore, to be stowed away in the darker corners of theological systems. To human feeling unity is precious only as a guarantee of union, and the unity of a common life and a common purpose is more important than that of a common substance and a common basis. For the latter guarantees the former, about as well as a common battlefield is a guarantee of concord. Again, the god of the religious sentiment must be *good*, and, if need be, his power must be limited by his goodness. He must also be

active : a "God" to whose agency nothing in particular can be referred, because he inertly sanctions whatever happens, is an otiose hypothesis : nor do the banquetings of Epicurean deities evoke religious feelings.

But, above all, *God must sympathize with man*. This is the first and most enduring postulate of the religious attitude. God to be really worthy of our worship must be man's Helper, nay, his Saviour, his ideal refuge from the grinding pressure of the cosmic mechanism.

Now this loftiest ideal no religion has embodied with anything like the perfection of the Christian. For Christianity alone takes it quite seriously, in the full splendour of its poignant paradox. Buddhism comes second. But though Gotama, the Enlightened One, also took pity on men and taught them, and showed them the way of salvation, he taught them how to save themselves by discovering the way of salvation for himself. He did not yield up his share of any good from sympathy with man.¹ Christianity, on the other hand, has chosen this directest way to the human heart. It conceives the Divine as lowering itself to the human, nay, to quite an inconspicuous form thereof, in order to save it by betokening its love. It has thus transformed the historic Jesus into the Eternal Symbol of God's sympathy with man, and through man with all that struggles and suffers in the scheme of being.

For it is only a suffering world that needs to be saved. And it is only a suffering God that can save a suffering world. For sympathy means suffering with others. This is why the Crucifixion is the greatest and divinest of all symbols, which cannot lose its meaning so long as suffering endures.

Not that Religion stands alone in recognizing the significance of suffering. Science also has its sacred symbol of suffering, more ancient and as solemn. Prometheus, chained to the icy rocks of Caucasus in awful loneliness, and lacerated day by day by the savage bird of cruel Zeus for the sublime crime of stealing from the nature-gods the secret whereby man wins the power to control them, is no unworthy symbol of the unceasing martyrdom of Science, of the hideous vivisections, of the unseen and unrequited sacrifices, which cement together fragmentary facts into the growing fabric of our knowledge.

When, however, we compare the Prometheus-symbol with that of the Christ, the differences are striking. Its emotional appeal is much less powerful. Its triumph and its tragedy are

¹ It is only in its much later, and according to philosophic standards "corrupter", form of Northern (Tibetan) Buddhism that the Buddha (probably under Christian influence) renounces his right to enter Nirvana, and consents to enlighten the world by his continued reincarnations. This mitigates, but does not quite obliterate, the taint of individualistic selfishness which clings to the Buddhistic scheme of salvation.

enacted in regions unapproachable save to those specially prepared. The Caucasus is not, like Calvary, a spectacle for anxious crowds. Its sacrifice is consummated far from the thronging haunts of men in the solemn silence of the highest human thought, a silence which is barely broken when from time to time some overweighted system topples over in an avalanche.

Lastly, Prometheus is nothing but a symbol, which lacks (for us at least) the support of history. Now the value of this support may easily be overrated. Neither Science nor Religion are dependent on mere history. For Science no fact can be assured by history alone; it is not effective fact until history can be made to repeat itself at pleasure. By Religion history is valued as the vehicle of an eternal meaning. Hence in both the symbolic meaning tends to obscure the literal. Without it, fact can have no meaning and no value. For Science, the facts of history are the play of nature's abiding "laws"; for Religion, they are the growing fulfilment of a divine purpose. Still, we should not forget that history alone can infuse the abstractness of our symbols with the warmth of immediate experience, and prove that the ideal can be realized. So our human weakness craves for history to incarnate the "eternal" truths in; even though it recognizes that history may, nay must, mean myth, and that whatever has happened once and irrevocably may be doubted, nay will be doubted, the more tenaciously, the more important its achievement. Hence the chief difficulties of Religion are the historical, and Science shows its wisdom in dwelling as little as may be on the records of its past.

Such, approximately, are the claims which Science and Religion seem to make on man's allegiance; and it will be seen how little need there is to construe them as incompatible. Both are the expression of human needs, and their (partial) satisfaction. Both should be directed towards further and loftier achievements. And it is safe to hazard the prediction that the form of Religion which realizes this most clearly will be the religion of the future.

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

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THE CHURCH AND LITERATURE

By A. C. BENSON, M.A.

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THE question of the relation of the Church to literature is one of great importance and at the same time of extreme complexity. With education widening on every side, with a daily increasing circle of readers, with a flood of literature and journalism pouring from the press, with a constantly growing interest in religious problems, and with a dimly formulated claim on the part of the democracy for a share in the culture that has hitherto tended to be an expensive luxury, it is clear that the Church ought to consider the problem carefully, and adopt a deliberate attitude with regard to the question, whether that attitude be one of definitely exerted influence, or one of reasoned non-intervention.

We are met at the outset by a difficulty of the first magnitude. If we turn to the Gospel and attempt to discover or to infer what was or would have been the attitude of our Saviour towards questions of art and literature, we find an entire and conspicuous absence of any direct guidance in the matter. We must not hastily conclude that the principles of the Gospel cannot be applied to the artistic region, because the nation with whom our Saviour was directly concerned had at the beginning of the Christian era practically no artistic life at all. The genius of the Jewish nation applied itself to questions of patriotism, of politics, and of morals, and the artistic sense was hardly developed among them. But there are traces in the Gospel that our Lord had a tender and loving observation of beauty in nature, and interpreted it poetically; while in the direction of literature there is abundant evidence that He realized and used and consecrated the powers of the imagination; and that the parables, quite apart from their moral significance, are in many cases conspicuous instances of literary art applied with extreme delicacy and fine economy of effect.

We may therefore conclude that there is no prohibition of the application of the resources of literary art to the Christian life; and further it is clear that our Saviour did not advocate any abstention from the exercise of the imagination or the employment of literary forms, although there were questions of national interest, such as taking a part in current politics, from which He seems to have indicated the desirability of abstention.

It is not possible here to give a historical survey of the attitude of the Church to literature, but it may be said that that attitude has always been sympathetic rather than hostile, and that though prac-

tically abandoning the attempt to control the forces of literature, the Church has used the resources of artistic language with the frankest recognition of its influence.

Now there are only two ways in which the Church can control or affect literature directly, by (1) prohibition and (2) creation.

(1) The Roman index is the best instance of an attempt to control literature ecclesiastically, and nothing can be more clear to the candid observer that, in the presence of the growing liberties of the democracy, such a system is not only useless but disastrous. There was a time when the Roman Church could enforce its prohibitions by the use of the secular arm, but now that this has become impossible, the retention of the Index has become a powerful instrument to aid the spread of opinion which the Roman Church aims at suppressing. I believe that at the present time few, if any, publications are prohibited on the ground of heresy; the ground of expediency is that which is generally taken. Submission and withdrawal are required; but the directors of the Index know that the prohibition of a book now invariably means an immense extension of its sale. Those who defend the policy say that the Church is even desirous that ideas of a subversive kind should be widely ventilated, while for the sake of the faithful, she erects a danger-signal over the course. But it is abundantly plain that such a policy would be alike revolting to our British ideal of liberty and our Anglo-Saxon common sense, and that therefore though an individual pastor is quite within his rights if he thinks fit to point out the sceptical and irreligious tendency of certain kinds of literature, the Church itself has no desire to multiply transgressions by any exercise of jurisdiction or coercive pronouncement; and it is clear that her policy should be to define as clearly and as lucidly as possible a constructive scheme of faith, rather than to tilt against individual expressions of opinion. Indeed it has always seemed to me that the most conspicuous note of Catholicity and essential Christianity is the frankest possible recognition of individual Christian liberty; and it is in virtue of that note that the Anglican Church holds her supreme and sovereign station; there is no Church where so much detailed divergence is possible, no Church where candid criticism is so generously welcomed.

(2) The other policy which it is possible for a Church to pursue is the creative policy; and that is to train and develop a school of writers who should present as far as possible distinctively ecclesiastical opinions through the medium of literature. There would be much to be said in favour of this plan, if poets, to use the old proverb, could be made; but they have to be born. The desire which is shared by all writers that their writings should be widely read does not ensure a large circulation. But it is interesting to note that one school of religious thought has in the past century set a very deep mark indeed on the literature of the country. I have no doubt that from the literary point of view Newman's *Apologia* will be considered one of the great books of the century. But the Tractarian movement had a more popular writer still, in a woman who I believe may be said to have had a touch of genius,

Miss Charlotte Yonge. Quite apart from the general effect of her writings it may be remembered how strongly she affected the Pre-Raphaelite movement. Strange as it may appear, Rossetti and William Morris found deep delight and inspiration in the *Heir of Redclyffe*; and the influence of Miss Yonge no doubt played a great part in the development of Christina Rossetti, who was not only a poetess of the very first rank, but was devotedly and distinctively Anglican. The genius of Miss Yonge is shown by the extraordinary way in which she handled groups of individuals such as the family in the *Daisy Chain*, all faithful to the same ideals, and inspired by a very definite view of life, but yet all absolutely and unforgettably distinct. How many novelists could depict a family of eleven children, all thinking and living on the same lines and yet perfectly clear and sharp individualities, beyond any possibility of confusion? The genius of Miss Yonge is shown in these books by the way in which she contrived to invest projects of a simple and even prosaic kind, such as the establishment of a Sunday school, the building of a District Church, with a light of high romance; moreover, she was able to communicate to the religious events of life, such as baptisms and confirmations, the same sense of suspended and breathless interest which many writers fail to lend to events of a far more sensational character. It will be remembered how Mr. Palgrave, travelling with Lord Tennyson, was interested and even vexed to observe the great poet reading a small book, oblivious of scenery and antiquities alike. At one point in their journey Palgrave attempted to distract his companion's attention from the book. "Don't interrupt me now," said Tennyson: a few minutes later he laid down the book with a sigh of relief, saying, "I see light! Harry is going to be confirmed."

Of course, if writers such as Miss Yonge could be found and trained, capable of producing books that could fascinate old and young alike, and able at the same time to build upon this basis of doctrinal orthodoxy a structure of romantic realism, the influence might be incalculably great, but this requires a certain vital impulse, and I can make no suggestion as to how such a process could be furthered.

In another region Charles Kingsley played a considerable part in the religious development of the time, though it may be said that in many of his books the impulse is ethical rather than doctrinal. Still, in his first book, *Yeast*, he did much to effect an important reconciliation of thought on two lines; he showed that religion had not only nothing to fear but everything to gain from the investigations of science; and he did even more than that, and sowed the seed of religious interest in social movements, a region in which great progress has been made, and which seems to open up an immense prospect of possibilities in the direction of the application of religious ideas to democratic conditions.

Of late it seems that the tendency of literature has rather been in the direction of sceptical speculation; but I am not afraid of that. Such problems are multiplying, and have to be faced, and though it may be held that it is rash to familiarize immature minds through

fiction with problems which demand all the resources of highly-trained philosophers, yet the great thing is to encourage a vital interest in the conditions of faith, not to isolate it in guarded strongholds, but to show that religion underlies and touches life at every point, moral, intellectual and social, rather than to segregate it into a province of life.

It must be remembered that the bent of the Anglo-Saxon race in the Victorian era lay more in the direction of morals than in the direction of art. The great writers and even the great artists of the time have been as a rule concerned with moral ideas. Tennyson, Browning, Carlyle, Ruskin, and Watts were all of them moralists first and artists afterwards, and I do not see any signs that this allegiance is likely to be transferred. It is customary to speak of a devotion to literature and art as though it were antagonistic to the religious ideal. The conditions may of course insensibly change, but any one who studies the tendency of thought at the present time must become aware that we Anglo-Saxons are still profoundly preoccupied with morality. It would be, I think, disastrous if the Church adopted an attitude of intolerance towards religious speculation; she must direct rather than suppress; she must show sympathy with every attempt to speculate on religious questions which is made in a reverent spirit; she must show that religion and not ecclesiasticism is her chief concern; for the only strength of ecclesiasticism is that it meets and satisfies a definite human need; but the closer that any corporation draws its lines, the more risk there is of sacrificing the inclusion of all for the sake of the security of a certain section; the duty of the Church is rather to strive after simplicity than intricacy of ideal, to emphasize points of agreement rather than points of difference; to make the old run smoothly into the new, and not to sacrifice the interests of the future to the claims of the past, however venerable and august those claims may be.

Before I pass on to consider what the principles are which should underlie the attitude of the Church to literature, I should like very shortly to indicate the conditions which now prevail. There is an immense output of printed matter in the form of papers, magazines, and books, of which the greater proportion is fiction. But there is also a large production of cheap books of a serious and classical kind. It may safely be said that no cheap books are issued unless a very wide sale of them is confidently depended upon—of a sixpenny book 25,000 copies have to be sold before profit accrues—and I have been much impressed of late by the excellence of the cheap literature which is displayed upon the railway bookstalls; for it may safely be said that what one finds upon a railway bookstall is a very representative selection of the sort of books which it is expected that the ordinary public may be disposed to read.

Of course the cheaper journalism is characterized by three chief qualities. It aims at brevity, picturesqueness, and sensationalism. The natural object of a cheap newspaper is to give the impression to its readers that a large number of interesting incidents have occurred,

and it is also intended for hasty rather than for leisurely perusal. Then come the magazines. The old-fashioned solid reviews of a critical and literary kind are on the wane ; the ordinary monthlies aim at giving in a compendious and readable form summaries of the chief questions of the day. The cheaper magazines are filled with scraps of desultory and attractive information. Then, in literature itself, fiction holds a supreme sway. What do we naturally infer from all this? I think it is fair to say that what the public seems to want is conversational material with regard to current events and questions, and also it desires to have its imagination fed and stimulated, either by fiction or picturesque description or facts of a striking character.

Now it is rather the fashion to decry the growth of magazines and to hold that they cultivate a diffuse and flabby kind of mind ; but I do not believe that this argument will hold good, in the face of the largely increased output of solid literature. It only means, I think, that there are far more readers in existence, and that a much wider public is being catered for than used to be the case. Education has produced, I believe, a much wider habit of reading ; and whereas in old days immature minds had little or no pabulum provided for their exercise, they are now sedulously supplied ; and on the whole I believe this to be a gain. If literature is to have a hold on the country, it must first condescend ; and it is more important that a habit of reading should be formed, than that a classical standard of taste should be rigidly applied ; that must come afterwards. It is useless to say that minds ought to be nourished on the best literature ; the question is whether they will consent to be nourished at all. The real object is to make people, if possible, think for themselves ; and this can only be achieved by giving them materials on which the mind can and will work. And there is one very hopeful sign which must not be overlooked, and that is the general wholesomeness of what is provided. Of course there are exceptions to this ; there is a tendency to dwell on the details of sensational horrors in journalism ; but as a rule the cheap and popular magazines are distinctly wholesome in character and supply materials for simple interest and mild wonder. I do not mean that such interest is of a very exalted character, but at the worst it is a very harmless quality which is encouraged by a picture of a potato with an accidental resemblance to the features of the great Napoleon, or a model of a steam-engine constructed entirely out of cotton-reels. The unsophisticated minds which find such objects alluring may perhaps so be led on by the hope of finding entertainment in printed matter ; and a generation which revels in potatoes of an interesting shape may be succeeded by a generation which will study Boswell's *Life of Johnson* or even Law's *Serious Call*.

These, then, are the conditions of the problem ; that instead of reading being only a serious occupation for cultivated people, which it still remains, it has become a source of entertainment for many thousand ingenuous and ordinary minds. I am of opinion that the gain is great. I believe that any literature which widens the horizon, which diverts the mind from local gossip, which indicates the diversity

of interests in the world is wholesome in tendency. I do not mean that we ought to consider that it has attained its object, but we may hope to refine and enlarge its scope. Milk for babes! We must not be in a hurry to condemn or to despair; it is not as if, in these democratic days, we could limit the supply. I remember in a certain Cathedral town that the organist gave organ recitals on Sunday evenings, and played only the strictest and most classical music. The thing began to get popular, and he was asked if he would not play some pieces of a less austere character. "No," he said, "if people do not care for good music, I shall go on playing it till they do." Which noble principle he carried out so sternly that he ended by practically emptying the nave of all but a few cultured amateurs.

The fact is that nowadays the democracy gets what it wants; and we must raise if we can the standard of individual taste rather than try to cut off the natural and simple aliment which unsophisticated minds crave for.

Before then we attempt to indicate the line which the Church should take towards the literature of the time, let us attempt shortly to summarize what are the dangers that beset the diffusion of popular literature. The one serious danger is the danger of intellectual dissipation, and the absence of serious intellectual effort; the tendency of much of the literature circulated is such as to prevent reflection and to increase illusion. One can see from the subjects started in papers in what is called not inappositely "the silly season" the sort of topics which draw out the loosest and flabbiest sort of discussion that it is possible to conceive, a discussion devoid of logic, conducted on the principle of mistaking preferences for axioms, and confusing metaphors with arguments. Such a subject, to select one that may be considered not unfairly typical, as "the kind of men that women prefer", is a topic the discussion of which can serve no useful end; it does not fortify the intellectual powers, and it certainly cannot be said to elevate taste. No grave objection could be made to the subject as a topic of familiar conversation in an appropriate circle, but to turn it into a species of intellectual joust is to dishonour the lists.

And then on the moral side, the danger is that people tend to prefer sentiment to principle and to mistake notoriety for renown. The journalism which practically tries a case before it comes into court must have a deleterious effect on the minds that submit to it; but on the religious side the difficulty is more acute still. There is, as I have said, a fairly well diffused interest in a mild sort of theology abroad; and there is too much literature current of the kind that amuses and stimulates superficial persons, when they see orthodoxy tilted against, and dignified matters made, if possible, to look foolish. I do not myself think that this amiable speculation on abstruse matters is as deleterious as it is sometimes held to be, because after all, for the religious life, the current conceptions of religious dogmas matter more than the definitions of theologians; it is more important that the large majority should be interested in religious questions than that the small minority should be soundly instructed; both indeed are necessary, and

the sound instruction may ultimately prove a corrective to vapid half-knowledge; but even though one may deplore the tone of certain kinds of religious speculation, it at all events proves that the subject is one which interests the majority of readers; and thus though it is in one sense a danger, because it tends to encourage irreverence, yet on the other hand indifference is a far graver danger; and as long as a subject is widely discussed, it is certain that a considerable number of the disputants are thinking seriously of the whole question. Well, then, in the face of these dangers and these conditions, what policy is the Church to pursue?

To speak with absolute frankness, I do not think that in the matter of raising religious problems, it is possible to acquit the Church in the past wholly of blame. The tendency of the Church has been till lately rather to stifle inquiry and to crush speculation on religious matters. If we look back at important religious controversies, such as the Oxford Movement, the publication of *Essays and Reviews*, the rise of Christian Socialism under Maurice and Kingsley, one is confronted by a curious fact. One reads the documents that provoked the controversies, and one finds that most of the ideas there promulgated have become so much matters of current belief that one wonders what there was to disapprove of. Some of the *Tracts for the Times*, if one studies them dispassionately, seem an almost tame statement of the rights and privileges of the Anglican Communion; if one takes an essay such as Jowett's in *Essays and Reviews* on the interpretation of Scripture, he appears to be making unnecessarily clear a principle which no one feels any inclination to doubt, namely, that if we are to understand the origin of Christianity, the Gospels must be studied critically and with due reference to the accepted beliefs of the time, like any other historical documents. If one looks at the writings of Kingsley in which he champions the rights of the masses, he seems to be only emphasizing, with almost undue passion and rhetoric, principles which would not be disavowed by a staunch Tory of to-day. And yet if one comes to look at the counter-charges made by the opponents of the Tractarians, the Essayists, the Christian Socialists, one finds a perfectly deplorable tissue of Erastianism, illiberal Pharisaism, and sham Whiggism. It was asserted that all the movers in the matter were conscious and deliberate traitors; that the Tractarians wished to Romanize, that the Essayists wished to secularize, and that the Socialists wished to foment popular discontent against a rational and due subordination of classes. Yet as a matter of fact all of these reformers were merely the first spokesmen of perfectly irresistible and desirable tendencies; and the attitude of the orthodox critics was purely reactionary. The fact is that these questions must be raised, and that the duty of the Church is to raise them herself in a tranquil and reverent spirit. The note of the Gospel is that it was in advance of current morality and conventional thought; the note of the orthodoxy of the middle of the last century was that of a profound mistrust of any progressive ideas. One of the things that has brought the Church of late into a far more dominant and influential position, is that she has begun, through the medium of philosophical and intel-

ligent minds within herself, to raise the coming questions and to welcome them frankly. What she ought to reserve her thunders for are the qualities of cynicism, irreverence, and flippancy. What she ought to do and what she is increasingly doing is to show that she feels that he who is not against us is with us. The old judicial attitude by which the Church claimed to be the *arbiter* of morality and religion is giving place to the far more hopeful and wholesome attitude of the Church being the champion and promoter of religion and morality.

Finally, to sum up the whole question of the line which the Church should take with regard to the literature of the day, I believe that the true principle is or ought to be the realization that the duty of the Church is primarily to the individual. Whenever the Church has intervened to direct or to suppress movements, she has sooner or later found herself in the position of fighting against God. Her duty is to indicate to the individual a sense of pure and high morality, to define the relation of man to God, and of man to man. If she can successfully achieve the purification and redemption of the individual, the whole question settles itself; the trained Christian will naturally cling to what is pure, lovely, and of good report. She must direct her members not what to think but how to think. She must not warn them off from the great questions which one by one open before the human intellect. She must rather say, "All intellectual speculation, all scientific discovery, all political remedial measures are matters which are bound to occupy the mind of the serious Christian. Only be sure that you approach them keeping in view the one all-embracing ideal, the redemption and reconciliation of humanity." We have yet far to go; the relation of man to God is still obscured by many sad and bewildering mysteries, many seeming contradictions; but God fulfils Himself in many ways; and our duty is, without hastily sacrificing the old order, to see that it corresponds to the growing needs of humanity, and melts smoothly and equally into the new order. The Church cannot afford to be old. With the wise tenderness of the experienced parent, she must combine the ardent enthusiasm of the young reformer; if she allows herself the privilege of the old, the seeing of visions, she must also not forget to dream the dreams of youth. If prudence and caution are to be found in the Gospel, there is far more of an uncalculating eagerness. And thus in all the modern problems of the day what one desires is to see the Church not clinging timidly on to the skirts of her children, but advancing courageously and lovingly, hand in hand with them.

And after all there is an unmistakable voice that speaks in our literature to-day—the voice of aspiration. Through its eager merriment, its restless love of sensation, even through its cynical levity, there makes itself heard an accent which is in itself a prayer for knowledge and wisdom and spiritual growth; to draw nearer to God, to learn to what heights man can and may rise, and to base aspiration not upon frail imagination or luxurious dreams, but upon a deep and profound study of the mind of God as it reveals itself in the works of nature and the history of man; that is the deepest ideal of the age, and who can say that it is not a Christian ideal? There are many things that fight

against it, materialistic aims, selfishness, indifference, frivolity ; these are the real foes that beset us ; if the Church could but recognize and welcome every touch of that higher aspiration, in whatever region it makes itself felt, making common cause with it, sympathizing with the spirit even when she cannot wholly approve the method, she would do more to show the boundless possibilities, the infinite adaptability of the Christian principles, than by proscribing as subversive or dangerous whatever does not correspond exactly with the details of a tradition that has its roots in the past, and which is almost hampered by the very security that such tradition is bound to lend to conventional minds.

Of the depth and warmth of the Spirit of Aspiration of which I have spoken I have no doubt at all : let the Church welcome it, claim it, nourish it.

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LITERATURE AND THE CHURCH

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LITERATURE is such a wide subject that the writer of a short paper can only deal with a section of it, and I must therefore confine my attention to what is avowedly popular and addressed to a large public. For various reasons literature has rarely busied itself with religion, and the writers on this topic who have produced masterpieces in prose worthy to represent the best literary output of their age and country are exceedingly rare. Among the Fathers perhaps Augustine alone deserves a high place in literature. France has produced Pascal; England Hooker, Law, and Newman; and it is not easy largely to augment the list. The fact is that from early times literature has been largely humanistic. It has undertaken the task of describing mundane passions and aspirations; and its models having been taken from classical and pre-Christian times, its general tone has often been frankly pagan. The antagonism which went on in the mind of St. Jerome, between his literary proclivities and his Christian convictions, was typical of a strife which continued from the conversion of the Empire to recent days. I venture to think that the paganism of the revival of letters in the fifteenth century has scarcely yet been fully recognized. We are prepared to acknowledge it in the Latin nations, though even here we have an impression that it was at any rate partly destroyed by the Catholic revival in the sixteenth century. But we assume that the more serious Teutonic countries were profoundly influenced by religion at the time of the Reformation, and that there was a renaissance in the spiritual as well as the intellectual world of Northern Europe. In a sense of course this is perfectly true; but we must not forget that an anti-religious element, unknown during the Middle Ages, made its appearance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries throughout Western Europe, and resulted in the complete separation between sacred and profane in art, literature, and life. The story of the Middle Ages is one of the splendid failure of a high ideal. The theory of life was absurdly different from practice: nevertheless it existed. Feudalism upheld a high sense of responsibility of the overlord to his vassal. Chivalry insisted on the duty of the strong protecting the weak, and Bishop Stubbs has pointed out how strong a desire the men of that time displayed to justify their actions by an appeal to law. All this is distinctly opposed to the avowedly lower ideal of modern life inaugurated at the Renaissance. Politics, law, commerce, and the majority of human

interests were deliberately divorced from religion and subjected to a non-Christian code; and the spiritual sphere, once all-embracing, was reduced to a minimum. This tendency was nowhere more manifest than in literature, which became avowedly profane and troubled itself hardly at all with religion. Thus we can account for the non-religious tone of popular literature in Europe for centuries, and it is hardly too broad a generalization to assert that down to our own days religion has hardly been recognized at all—or if it has, Christianity has been assumed, and its professors or ministers regarded as no more than social types.

The present condition of literature seems beyond question to be decadent, a fact partly no doubt due to the strong anti-classical feeling of the day. The protest against classical learning continuing to be the basis of modern education is undoubtedly prompted by other than purely materialistic considerations. The classical spirit, so thoroughly understood in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, has not the sympathy of our age. It is essentially aristocratic even when its sentiments are apparently most liberal, its virtues are military, it recognizes gradations in society as part of the natural order of the world, it is on the side of the strong, the brave and the beautiful, and has little love for commerce or manual labour. Except in the case of agriculture the classical writers show no interest in those who toil. The fact that our ancient schools of England are still producing men of the pre-Reform Bill age in this twentieth century more than explains the anti-classical agitation of to-day.

This abandonment of the classical ideal is sure to react unfavourably upon literature, and amply accounts for its decadence at the present time. The question, however, is whether this does not indicate the rise of a new spirit which, though avowedly anti-Christian, is really more Christian than the professed Christianity it is supplanting. The spirit of our age has revolted against that of humanism because a new ideal is being set before it. The aim of both the Renaissance and the Reformation was to assert the rights of individualism. In the Middle Ages the body-corporate, whether Church or Empire, had been of paramount importance, and in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries men had demanded to live their own lives and think their own thoughts, and consequently the intellectuality of the Greek and the virility of the Roman appealed most strongly to them. At the present moment mankind, tired of the failure of individualism as revealed in the gross inequalities of modern life, is reverting to the ideal of the Middle Ages, and is evidently resolved to place the happiness of humanity at large before the development of the stronger units. In making this attempt we are confronted with the question whether the Christian ideal is to be adopted or rejected. On this account the interest in Christianity at the present time is greater than it has been in almost any other age of the world's history. People are beginning to realize that there are only two possible alternatives to incorporate Christian beliefs and practices with the new order of things, in other words to set about creating a new Christian civilization or to discard it altogether, and

to govern the world without any thought for the religious element in man.

Perhaps I may be criticized unfavourably for my selection of books to illustrate the meaning of the foregoing remarks; but my object is to show how the religious tendencies of our age are revealed in works which command an immense circulation. No apology, however, is needed for the first writer whom I have chosen, as her knowledge, literary ability, and breadth of mind entitle her to consideration in any treatment of the religious problems of our day. I mean, of course, Mrs. Humphry Ward, and I propose to make use of two of her novels, *Robert Elsmere* and *David Grieve*.

In both the novels before us, especially in *Robert Elsmere*, we have the question, Is the orthodox view of Christianity able to bear the test of historical evidence? We read of the struggles of a young clergyman of great ability and undoubted earnestness. The man who detaches him from his Christian beliefs is drawn by the author with great skill. Too observant of human life to depict Mr. Wendover as morally superior to Elsmere, Mrs. Ward gives us the portrait of a hard, cold, unsympathetic student demolishing the Christian position by the mere force of reason. But, whilst influenced by what he conceives to be the overwhelming argument against historical Christianity, Robert never loses sight of the necessity of Christ in the progress of mankind. His doubts lead him to a very different goal to Mr. Wendover's.

"In the stillness of the night there rose up weirdly before him a whole new mental picture—effacing, pushing out, innumerable older images of thought. It was the image of a purely human Christ—a purely human, explicable, yet always wonderful Christianity. It broke his heart, but the spell of it was like some dream-country wherein we see all the familiar objects of life in new relations and perspectives. He gazed upon it fascinated, the wailing underneath checked by the strange beauty and order of the emerging spectacle. Only a little while. Then with a groan Elsmere looked up, his eyes worn, his lips white and set."

Throughout the book it is the same; the historical difficulties are to Mrs. Ward evidently insuperable, though I confess as she states them they do not seem altogether so: but the seriousness of breaking with Christianity, and the still greater dangers of an utterly irreligious democracy are fully realized. She makes Elsmere write to a friend:

"Consider what it means, what it will mean, the Atheism of the great democracies which are to be our masters! The world has never seen anything like it; such spiritual anarchy and poverty combined with such material power and resource. Every society—Christian and non-Christian—has always till now had its ideal, of greater or less ethical value, its appeal to something beyond man. Has Christianity brought us to this: that the Christian nations are to be the first in the world's history to try the experiment of life without faith—that life which you and I, at any rate, are agreed in thinking a life worthy only of the brute?"

In the *History of David Grieve* we have the successful self-educated Manchester man who, towards the end of the book, gives us a soliloquy on his religious opinions. Rejecting orthodox Christianity, he clings to the shadow, and shows how much it has been a part of his life when he says:

"But the last glow, the certainties, the *vision*, of faith! Ah me! I believe that He is there, yet my heart gropes in the darkness. All that is personality, holiness,

compassion in us, must be in Him intensified beyond all thought. Yet I have no familiarity of prayer. I cannot use religious language which should be mine without a sense of unreality. My heart is athirst."

In these volumes we see Christianity, rejected on philosophical and historical grounds, reasserting itself and claiming the need for that communion with God which is its special feature. I shall now take a book, perhaps less well known, but which still keeps its place in public favour. I mean the clever *Stark Munro Letters* by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. In a series of letters to a friend a young medical man relates his struggles to make a practice for himself, and incidentally he discusses his religious views and position. The manner in which he does this perhaps reveals incidentally the working of the author's mind at the time. His scientific training, combined with his hatred of all bigotry and dogmatism, drive him to reject the usually accepted creed of Christianity; but he cannot by so doing dismiss the subject. He falls back on an attempt to conceive of God as He is revealed in Nature. As he remarks :

"I confess I have never been able to understand the position of the atheist. In fact, I have come to disbelieve in his existence, and to look upon the word as a mere term of theological reproach. It may represent a temporary condition, a passing mental phase, a defiant reaction against an anthropomorphic ideal; but I cannot conceive that any man can continue to survey Nature and to deny that there are laws at work which display intelligence and power. The very existence of a world carries with it the proof of the world maker."

And again :

"Religion is a vital living thing still growing and working, capable of endless extension and development like other fields of thought."

Thus the author who writes from a literary standpoint is in agreement with the one whose knowledge is mainly scientific, in agreeing that either Christianity or a religion based on Christianity is necessary. To quote Sir Arthur Conan Doyle once more : "The last Reformation simplified Catholicism. The coming one will simplify Protestantism."

In this respect the difference between the state of feeling in England and France is very marked when we contrast Zola's trilogy, *Lourdes*, *Rome*, and *Paris* with the above, especially with *Robert Elsmere*. In these novels a young priest, as in Mrs. Humphry Ward's book, is led gradually to break with Christianity, first by what he sees at Lourdes, then by his realizing the hopelessness of inducing the Holy See to embrace the cause of the workers, and, finally, by his experiences in Paris. But the pain of the rupture is not depicted with the vividness observable in *Robert Elsmere*, and freethought is a veritable haven of rest, not a position inevitable, but none the less regrettable, as it is in the English novel. The breach between French Catholicism and liberalism is wider and deeper than that which parts orthodox Christianity from even secularism, and apparently cannot be passed without a veritable suicide of the religious nature.

Probably the works of fiction most widely read by the British public at the present moment are those of Mr. Hall Caine and Miss Marie Corelli, and it is noticeable what prominence both these successful writers give to religious questions. If we compare their novels with those

of the sixties and seventies we cannot fail to notice that, whilst those writers whose books commanded the largest sale a generation or so ago, scarcely alluded to religious matters, the interest of these two are mainly religious. Neither of them seems to go at all into the profounder depths of the problem, but both depict the thoughts, the difficulties, and the struggles of those engaged in religious work. *The Christian* has for its central figure a young clergyman of high aims, warm sympathies, and advanced opinions, perhaps a little caricatured, but still representative of a type of earnest London clergyman, and Mr. Hall Caine is untiring in his condemnation of the worldly clergy in the Church. Miss Marie Corelli's successful book *The Master Christian*, well written as it is, is primarily a collection of sermons rather than a story, yet it was read with avidity, and the fact testifies to the interest the public have in the religious question.

When we turn to journalism we find it is the same as with popular literature, that the topic which never fails to attract readers and correspondents is almost invariably a religious one, and as it is impossible to deal with this subject in detail it may be well to treat only of its general features. The public as a rule express very little sympathy with the supernatural, and none whatever with the official or clerical element in religion. For Church law or discipline they have, scarcely any appreciation; and to the majority Christianity appeals almost entirely on its subjective side. But the chief point noticeable seems to be the general desire to clothe their highest aspirations, moral, social, and political, in the trappings of religion. The English race is not given to devotional practices or ecstatic feelings, but its nature is profoundly religious, and never has this been more clearly manifested than at the present time, when there is a widespread feeling that the fate of Christianity is hanging in the balance.

Thus far I have dealt with the phenomena of the day as regards religion, and if from one point of view these seem to be discouraging, from another they are eminently satisfactory. The Church's opportunity has not passed; it is actually present, and can be seized upon. It is the work of the prophet to see in what way advantage can be taken of the existing condition of affairs. The problem is briefly this: there is a naturally religious spirit in the Anglo-Saxon race, but the forms which it assumes are often somewhat surprising and unexpected.

If I were compelled to state in a summary form my own convictions, for in such a matter one can only speak personally, as to what was demanded by the readers and writers of popular literature in regard to religion, I should answer, "simplicity and sincerity." Were I to be asked what they themselves really needed, my reply would be, "honest instruction." The ideal of the average man and woman seems to be a practical simple Christianity shown in a life. The clergy in many cases seem to fail because they seem to be interested rather in trifling matters of creed, ceremonial, or church law, rather than in the vital questions of life and conduct. With such people Christianity must show its power of appealing to the imagination, and its utility in being a guide to life. It is by no means impossible that the revival of the

future may not result from some striking manifestation of ascetic sanctity or conspicuous acts of complete self-denial. Modern scepticism may prove far less deeply engrained than some of us are inclined to imagine. Instruction is also greatly needed in an age in which the emotions are singularly little under control. Much of the anti-Christian spirit is due to a sort of undefined fear that all the fundamentals of the Faith have proved to be unsound. But there is wonderfully little knowledge among the semi-educated, or, for that matter, the educated classes, as to what the Creed really teaches. It is rare to hear either the practical duties of a Christian man, or the responsibilities of a believer, or the nature of sin, or the bearing of the doctrines of the Creed on the moral life insisted upon in the pulpit, and it is equally striking to observe how appreciative a congregation is when these things are presented to it. Careless habits of thought fostered by our modern system of education, and lack of boldness on the part of Christian teachers in explaining their position are, I venture to think, at the bottom of many of the tendencies revealed in literature and journalism. But if there is much which is unsatisfactory disclosed, there is also much ground for encouragement. The divorce of modern literature from the classical spirit may prepare the way for a reversion to those ideals which placed humanity before the individual and made personal advancement a secondary consideration. A literature thus inspired is bound to revert to Christian principles, or at any rate to give them a prominence which they have not hitherto received; and this may be the cause of a fresh renaissance, a new learning. The Christianity of the future may, moreover, take a completely different attitude towards literature to what it has done in the past. Instead of regarding the man of letters as a natural enemy, or at best a dangerous friend, it will frankly and freely welcome his assistance. From the time of Charles Kingsley ministers of religion have recognized the value of popular literature, and have availed themselves of this method of securing the hearing of the public, and the tendency to do so appears to be on the increase. Perhaps the Church of England is at the present time somewhat less willing to avail itself of this opportunity than other religious communities.

The appearance of a literature really Christian in tone and spirit would have an enormous, an almost incalculable effect on the future, and to secure this must be one of the chief ideals of those who have the interests of the Anglican branch of the Church at heart; nor is it possible to say how great the influence which a great Christian novelist, essayist, or poet might exercise at the present crisis.

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SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE.

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

Being Problems for consideration at the *Pan-Anglican Congress*, 1908.

THE CHURCH AND DRAMATIC LITERATURE

BY MRS. EDWARD COMPTON

It is a commonplace of analogy to say that the play-actor and the ecclesiastic have many points of resemblance, but the comparison soon breaks when the superficial characteristics of both are passed. The priest uses his gifts to arouse emotion for a worthy object: the actor has not necessarily any such object in view. The Church has always been suspicious of the Stage as of any institution that seems to hold some of her own secrets; the Stage, too, has always been apt to scoff at the Church from a certain feeling of familiarity with the ways and means of extorted emotion.

In the former case there have always been additional causes to strengthen the foundations of hostility; and a half-expressed conviction of their justice has not taught the Stage a sense of proportion—that quality in which it is, and, I fear, always will be, utterly deficient. The result of this has been unfortunate for Art. The Church has never been very ready to recognize good taste unless actively religious in intention; and on the side of the Drama there has often been an inclination to assume that the divorce between Culture and Religion should be accentuated by details of ribaldry.

No doubt, Beauty is the handmaid of Religion, but the converse is just as true in another way, and it seems most expedient for modern humanity to recognize that Religion and Art are attempts to express the same aspirations to the Eternal under a different form. The frequent use of encaustic-tiles in the renovation of chancel-floors is not calculated to help this point of view, and the welcome accorded by the Church to books, plays, and pictures with a somewhat blatant advertisement of Religion is even more destructive. It is impossible in a paper of this kind to point an accusation with particular names, but the allusion is sufficiently obvious. This willing, almost eager, encouragement of bad taste damages the allegiance of cultured men and women, and provokes their enmity to the great principles on which the support is most unjustifiably based.

I am aware that many sincerely religious people will contend that it is better to steep the emotion and intellect in vulgar bathos, if they emerge with a tendency to accept orthodox Christianity, than to entice them with a performance of *Hamlet* with no such openly satisfactory result. But why should Art be condemned to effect at the present day what thumbscrews, fire, and water failed to effect in the past? Men gave up the latter from a growing sense of moral, not physical, superiority, and bad Art is as barbarous—indeed it is a veritable *peine forte et dure* to intellect and emotion. Christianity acquired by such questionable means is open to the gravest suspicion, and, at the best, savours of a too hysterical "revivalism".

In the Middle Ages, when play-acting as an independent art was not considered seriously, Mysteries and Moralities were the recognized handmaids to popular Religion, and, indeed, the dramatic instinct was allowed the fullest play in the services, ceremonies, and accessories of Christian worship. Those winking images of Erasmus were only crude attempts to extract wonder, fear, surprise, and awe from the uneducated. Unfortunately the Reformers in their zeal for simplicity often forgot to be more than merely destructive, and much that was genuinely useful was lost in the wreckage of more childish toys. The Puritans, having destroyed

or tried to Destroy Drama in Religion, set out to destroy Drama outside Religion, and with such unhappy effectiveness that the Restoration Comedy which followed in the reaction secured for the Drama an odium from which it has never entirely recovered. We have been somewhat oppressed lately by too many debates and articles on the future of the English Drama. Possibly one of the fruits of this vast amount of talk has been the Pageant—already apparently an acknowledged recreation for *amateurs* of the Drama. Obviously the Pageant will play a great part in familiarizing the public with the representation of religious incidents, and may be regarded as a really strong connecting-link between the Church and the Stage. Furthermore, there has been a revival of mediaeval Mysteries, but it cannot be too clearly understood that they create an atmosphere by their own unconscious art, not by the simple faith of the audience and actors as formerly. The success of *Everyman* was a triumph for Art, not for Religion, and if I seem to accentuate that separation between them of which I was complaining, it is only to display more distinctly the inherent unity of the two. The Passion-Play of Ober-Ammergau does not serve to contravert my statement, but rather emphasizes it; inasmuch as the latter secures its effect by a faith in which there has been no perceptible break through the centuries, and does not belong to the category of *Everyman*, where the predominance of Art was shown by the appearance of a woman in the name-part. The success of the first revival produced a number of mysteries by modern craftsmen—somewhat pallid even for ghosts. There was no deliberate insincerity, but the simplicity of the indigenous product could not possibly find a real reply in the heart of a modern writer, and the effect was always that of artifice.

So far, then, we have three forms of dramatic literature with a religious bias. But the shrieks of theological melodrama are more harmful than beneficial to the cause which it seeks to assist, and the by-way of pseudo-mediaevalism is only a badly-lighted *cul-de-sac*. With the Pageants, however, I really believe we are on rising ground, and if the authors of them will only curb their ambition we may expect great results.

But the real Drama of modern England exists in none of the above. The real Drama, the Drama that counts for a column in the daily press, exists in the plays of Mr. Pinero, Mr. Barrie, Mr. Shaw—to take three of our real dramatists, and it seems a little invidious at a great congress of Christian men and women to inquire how far such writers help Religion and Morality; still the question has to be answered, cursorily, it is true, if only to disabuse some of my listeners of the theory that the Stage is hostile to both.

Mr. Pinero represents the man in the street. His problems are the problems that may confront an average stockbroker. In one of the more embarrassing, we have a young lady who is supposed to represent the general Christian attitude to a fallen woman. Actually she is an odious little prig. But if, in the opinion of the average stockbroker, that is the ordinary attitude of a Christian girl, the great virtue of charity must be absent from her point of view, and there is something the matter with her Christianity. Must we accept her as true and condemn her accordingly? Surely Mr. Pinero may be generalizing a type on a prejudiced system of induction. This would be bad Art; but unfortunately the Churchman is apt to criticize the character on different grounds, and argues, not Mr. Pinero's failure as an artist, but his failure as a moralist. As a matter of fact, in the latter aspect, he is always unimpeachable, and his bad women come to a bad end with clockwork regularity. Clergymen as critics are usually prejudiced: they often complain that they are caricatured on the stage. That is true, but they forget that actors are often caricatured in the Church, and the "pulpit voice" is the caricature of such a very bad actor. But this is merely by the way, and dramatists as artists are cer-

tainly to blame for again generalizing a type on a defective system of induction.

As to Mr. Barrie, few, I imagine, would attribute to him any active hostility to religion or morals. Indeed, no one could suspect him of so *banal* a pursuit. His problems are storms in fairy tea-cups. In Mr. Bernard Shaw, however, we have a dramatist who, in the opinion of the orthodox, is a foe to Religion and Morality; and yet, without paradox, he really benefits both. From a moral or religious standpoint a play like *Mrs. Warren's Profession* is irreproachable. It has all the advantages of a *Family Herald* novelette—the complicated plot, the aristocratic intrigue, the extravagance and the improbability, and withal a certain earnestness of outlook that should excuse minor delinquencies of taste. This is true of all the earlier plays, and though success has made Mr. Shaw more eager than ever to *épater les bourgeois*, that is only because it would have had an exactly contrary effect upon any one else. Mr. Shaw's characters are all very free with their advice and very prodigal of their ideas, but in *Man and Superman* we get a debauch of conversation, from which it is difficult to rescue some shreds of a philosophic reputation. The result of some childish and pantomimic profanity, if regarded without Mr. Shaw's earnestness, can only benefit both Religion and Morals; for the dreary Sahara of his thought, where every oasis conceals a chatterbox, only helps us to appreciate more truly the meadows of Christianity with their many flowers of Hope.

Mr. Shaw is still tilting at Mid-Victorian windmills. Like Roebuck Ramsden in his play he would have been considered advanced in 1860. But Christianity is not a derelict truck on the railway of Thought, and if Churchmen try to obstruct that great permanent way with the vicarage pony-cart they make themselves and their conveyance look absurd. Mr. Bernard Shaw has a point of view. So have most of our serious dramatists, and they are entitled to a hearing. If the former considers that orthodox Christianity is open to criticism, he is probably right sometimes, but the orthodox should prove by their own attitude that Christianity is not the outworn creed which so many of its opponents assume. If the Church in her official representatives will always fight against bad Art, vulgar Art, and insignificant Art, she will find that the serious Drama will be on her side, not in terms of theology, perhaps, but certainly in terms of morality as unequivocal for women and men of to-day.

We are drenched at present with what is known as Musical Comedy. Actually it is a very harmless way of giving amusement to a large number of people; but unluckily, like everything which merely diverts without any pretensions to beauty of form or expression, in fact without any Art, it vitiates public taste. As for its attitude towards Morality, it preserves a chilling indifference. Religion does not inevitably promote good taste, but bad taste is certainly subversive of Religion, and sham sentiment, sham drama, sham music, sham gentility, nay even sham vulgarity, will not breed a taste for *Hamlet*, and if the nation that produced Shakespeare can cease to care for him, there will be a perilously small hope for the Bible.

So much of this paper has been simply destructive, that I should like to return to a point I made at the beginning, and indicate, however faintly, a road by which the Drama might be led to coincide more completely with Christian faith and practice than by the bare promotion of good taste in Art.

While admitting that the Stage is deeply to blame for the stigma of worldliness attached to it, I do think that the injunction against the dramatic representation of biblical subjects produces a very serious waste of material. The Athenian tragedy was able to attract the populace because, in its essence, it was religious and familiar. A modern tragedy of ancient Greece, howsoever grand, faithful, and sincere, cannot possibly make more than a literary appeal. Our critics invariably miss the point in their appreciation of a poetic drama. For then it is always the presence or absence of dramatic

moments, good or bad construction, literary or dramatic language, that determines the success or failure of a play in verse. But a modern version of the *Oedipus Rex* might possess even melodramatic merit, and still fail to reach the ordinary theatre-going Englishman, because for the latter it would inevitably possess that quality of strangeness which he so genuinely dislikes. The only way in which he can tolerate strangeness is the way of Comic Opera, where an opinion or a people already absurd is made more clearly absurd by the fantasies of the author.

We do, however, possess in our Bible stories which, though in their origin alien and oriental, have been made familiar by the passing of time. An allusion to Jezebel outweighs in its effect an allusion to Medea, and Jehu is a more notorious driver of horses than Hippolytus.

Very few of the great Biblical dramas of passion, hate, revenge, ambition, greed, and jealousy, are told with such fullness as to make the renarration of them superfluous and impertinent. The love of dramatic irony is not peculiar to the Greeks. The man in Bond Street, should he care for a story, cares all the more when he reads or sees it acted for the second and third time. "There is nothing original about the plot of this piece." With what wearisome reiteration do our critics preface their judgements with this meaningless phrase. It is always levelled as a reproach, and drives our dramatists to exert the merely ingenious side of their talents at the expense of the constructive and illuminative. It is better to take Classical subjects than to invent stories for themselves, but the greatest of the former is just a marble anachronism, and chills the spectator into indifference by its very incongruity, whatever there was of hot blood in the making of it years and years ago.

I shall be told that the Elizabethan dramatists were able to avoid Scriptural dramas. So they were. But they chose Classical subjects that were applicable to the political stress of their period, and treated them without any archaic affectation. Their high poesy was plain food for the people; and though, at this distance, their world seems an enchanted world, to them a duel with rapiers in the dusk meant no more than a dispute over twopence in a motor-omnibus means to us. Being more pictorial, the incidents of everyday life produced a more pictorial drama and literature, but the impersonal character of our age has robbed us of everything save meticulous suburban excitements, and for the man in the street the Bible is the only book that commemorates the "grand style". Even Shakespeare is to him unfamiliar, and if the Elizabethans had handled Biblical subjects with that breadth with which they handled History, they would make a more extended appeal to the present generation. But to them the Bible was a new book, and had not yet impressed its greatness on the mind of the people.

And now that mighty book is open to the poet of the parochial magazine to supply a subject for his mediocre couplets: it is vulgarized by the popular novelist and the revivalist: even the expurgator may employ his savage pen. To the dramatist alone is the great fount of poetic inspiration eternally sealed.

Let the English clergy effect the removal of this illogical prohibition, and they will lay the Drama under an obligation which the latter will not be slow to repay.

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

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THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM

BY J. ST. LOE STRACHEY,

EDITOR OF "THE SPECTATOR"

THERE is a story of Delane, the editor of the *Times* when the *Times* was at its greatest, which should never be forgotten by the critics of journalism and journalists. Some one had been taking Delane to task over an incident connected with his newspaper, and Delane replied: "You forget that my business is publicity." If the public would not forget this essential fact in regard to newspapers they would attain to a much clearer and juster understanding of the problems of the Press. We must always remember that the journalist's business is publicity. At first the plain man may be inclined to say that Delane's words have nothing to do with the matter, or rather he may feel inclined to reply in the spirit of Talleyrand's answer to the man who said he had to live—"I do not see the necessity." A very little reflection, however, will show the necessity of publicity, will show, I mean, that publicity has a real and very important function in the State, and that it is literally true that the modern world could not live and progress without the newspaper. The newspaper is indispensable to progress, and to progress in the right direction. Unless we know, day by day, what people are doing, in our nation, in our county, in our town, in our village, we should be like men wandering about in the dark, and we should find it far more difficult than we do now to obtain the co-operation of others for good and worthy objects. We should fail also to get that encouragement, moral, intellectual and social, which is obtained by knowing that others are thinking the same thoughts and entertaining the same aspirations that we are. It is good to know of the righteous work which is being done by others. It is even good to know, within reasonable limits, the evil that is being done under the sun in order that we may lay our plans and bring up our forces to check that evil. Without that daily report on the world's doings, which is the modern newspaper, we should for the most part be blind and deaf, and if not dumb, at any rate hardly able to speak above a whisper.

This view may at first sight seem the presumptive claim of a journalist for his trade. Let any of my hearers, however, try to imagine a newspaperless world and he will soon realize that I am not exaggerating. It is not merely a desire for amusement that makes the leaders of men in a besieged town, or even in so narrow a field as an Arctic expedition, encourage the foundation of a newspaper. They want it as a means of illumination quite as much as of entertainment. I never myself so fully realized the utility of the Press as when I happened to do a week's marching with a large body of troops under conditions which made

it very difficult, nay, almost impossible, to obtain a newspaper. I was trekking with one of the armies that took part in the great autumn manœuvres of 1903 in Wiltshire and Berkshire. As the troops moved long before the newspapers had penetrated into the villages, and as we were, as a rule, out on the open downs all day and pitched our camps at an hour too late for any wandering paper-boys to reach us, we for the most part had to do without the aid of the Press. The result was that we felt very acutely the fog of war, though only of mimic war. I don't mean by this that we felt being deprived of telegrams as to what was being said or done in France or Russia or America, or as to what plays were being acted in London or Paris. What we hungered for was first, of course, information as to the enemy, and, next, as to the movements of our own troops. Here again our desire was not to be let into the secrets of our own general, or to learn details which would have exposed his plans, but for all sorts of information which there would have been no harm in our knowing, but instead would have been very useful both to officers and men. In a sense, no doubt, Divisional, Brigade, and Regimental orders and reports are news, but there is no method of publication. To put the matter shortly, I realized how useful it would have been, though of course the thing was impossible, if an active and enterprising field newspaper could have followed us in a couple of automobile vans, and if a resumé of what had happened the day before could have been struck off during the night and placed in our hands at *Reveillé*. Though it would not have been convenient to tell the troops everything, there was, as I have just said, an enormous amount that they might not only have known without injury, but which it would have been exceedingly useful for them to know.

People sometimes talk of men's instinctive desire for news, but like many other instincts, this one is founded on convenience and the law of self-preservation. Readers of Stevenson's *Kidnapped* will remember how after the Appin Murder the fugitives on the heather obeyed, even at very great risk to themselves, the sacred duty of the Highlands to "pass the news". In savage countries and in troubled times a man is looked upon as a wild beast rather than a human being if he does not pass the news. Asian travellers dwell upon the way in which the Bedouin observe the duty of passing the news and describe how, if a solitary Arab is encountered, the news is, as a matter of course, passed to him. The seclusion of women even yields to this imperative law of the desert, and an Arab man and an Arab woman may be seen with their horses, tail to tail, and so themselves back to back also, giving and receiving the news over their shoulders.

I am tempted, before I pass on, to give a modern example of the advantage of news in the purest sense. In the course of the brave attempt which has been made and is still being made, to clean the Augean stable of municipal politics in San Francisco, the editor of the chief newspaper engaged in the campaign of purity was kidnapped in the streets of San Francisco, hurried off in a motor car and placed under restraint in a train at a suburban station, the plan being to

carry him some 500 miles away. It happened, however, that a reporter caught sight of the editor's face in the reserved portion of the Pullman car where he was imprisoned, and telegraphed to a San Francisco evening paper the fact that the well-known Mr. So-and-So was "on the — train going North". The reporter had not the slightest notion of the romantic circumstances of the kidnapping, and thought he was merely telegraphing an item of social news. One of the editor's colleagues, in the campaign against corruption, happened, however, to see this item in the evening paper and at once realized what it meant. He instantly telephoned to the proper authorities at a town halfway between San Francisco and the kidnappers' destination, with the result that the train was stopped, and the kidnapped man brought before a judge on a warrant of *habeas corpus* and promptly released. No doubt mere publicity can occasionally serve the evildoers equally well, but here, at any rate, is an instance of its utility which may be regarded as proof of the advantage of collecting and transmitting news even of the most unimportant, or apparently unimportant, kind.

Though I hold that publicity is a function of very real utility to the State, it must not be supposed that I think it can be practised without limitations, or that I do not realize that it has dangers both great and many. It has been said that honesty is not as easy as Blind Man's Buff. The same thing may well be said of publicity. The first and most obvious limitation of publicity is that publicity should only be given to truth and not to error. Here, however, we must not forget that there are certain forms of error which can only be exposed and got rid of by publicity, and again that it is often only possible to find out what is truth and what error by submitting the alleged facts to the test of publicity. What at first seems an incredible rumour turns out to be literally true and therefore a failure to report it would actually have been a suppression of the truth.

But though the general rule may be strong in favour of stating facts, there are plenty of occasions when it is better that the facts should not be known, or at any rate known in detail to as few people as possible. As Sir Thomas Browne says somewhere: there are matters which deserve to be recorded only in the chronicles of Hell. In other words, every sound newspaper must obey the rule, which, if I remember rightly, is inscribed on each issue of one American newspaper: "We print all the news that is fit to print." Publicity, in fact, if it is to be honest in the true sense and of good report, like life demands an art.

The more one studies this question of publicity the more it appears that what is wanted in the public interest is a just and clear understanding of the way in which publicity is to be achieved. The journalist's business is publicity, but it is also his business to see that this duty of publicity, though carried out to the full, is carried out in a way which shall do not harm but good. If the methods of publicity are sound, fearless, and without guile, all is well. If they have not these qualities, then publicity may become

the most degrading and dishonourable of trades. It is not difficult to see where the chief temptations to misuse the tremendous power of publicity arise. Publicity may be so used and turned as to misrepresent most atrociously the doings of individuals or bodies of individuals. Facts may in a sense be given correctly and yet so presented as in effect to be little better than figments. A half truth, as all the world knows, is the worst form of a lie. Again, some record of wrong may be so given as to be a veritable source of pollution. Though apparently pilloried, the evil may really be held up for imitation and made not deterrent but attractive. Such cynical willingness to debauch the public mind is, however, I am glad to say, very rare, at any rate in this country, so rare indeed that it may almost be said to be non-existent in our Press. Heaven forbid that I should defend the Yellow Press, indiscriminately, but the Yellow Press deserves strict justice, as much as any other accused person, and it certainly would not be right to deal with the subject before me without pointing out how free even the least responsible portion of our Press is from using its function of publicity to pander to the baser appetites of man in the matter of indecency. It would not be at all just to say that this is because the public would not now tolerate an immoral newspaper, or, again, that it is due to the fact that the guardians of the law would intervene, for though the Press has most certainly been growing purer during the last twenty years, the same cannot be said of our books. Our fiction has degenerated in this particular as much as our newspapers have improved. The pioneers of cheap newspapers have every right to say that they have refrained, and deliberately refrained, from any attempt to make profit by corrupting the public mind.

The justifiable complaints that can be raised against popular journalism in its newest form are irresponsibility, cynical carelessness in the matter of truth, sensationalism, the destruction of a manly and honourable reticence and the introduction of triviality. To my mind the worst of these faults, after the supreme evil of indifference to veracity of statement, is triviality. Sensationalism and want of reticence will probably cure themselves, or at any rate the newspapers will give up their misdeeds in those respects as soon as the public taste has improved. The triviality of a great portion of our daily newspapers is, however, a defect which unhappily grows. What I mean by triviality can be seen at its worst in the American daily press, but it is fast becoming a feature of our own newspapers. For example the greatest of the New York dailies will often devote their most prominent columns to the foolishly expressed accounts of the trivial doings of very rich people. The bride's mother is warned in stentorian tones that the public demand to know where her daughter's honeymoon is to be spent, whether in California or Florida, must be respected and that any attempt to withhold information will be viewed as an insult by the sovereign people. This devotion to triviality is debasing and degrading in a high degree. It is twice cursed. It degrades both him who reads and him who writes. I once had a conversation with the reporters

of two very Yellow newspapers on an Atlantic liner outside the port of New York. The *Lucania* had run upon a sand-bank and we had to wait all day in sight of that towered city, exposed to the full fury of the interviewer. When I ventured to ask the two reporters in question whether they did not think it was perfectly absurd and ridiculous to print the chronicles of small beer, or rather of small slops, such as appeared in their columns, they readily, and I believe perfectly honestly, agreed, but said in defence that they had to obey their editor's orders. To me, at any rate, they acted most honourably and gave no report of our conversation, for I had reminded them that dog did not eat dog. A third reporter, however, to whom I had not thought it necessary to indicate as "private and confidential" an enthusiastic remark drawn by the beauty of New York harbour in an autumn sunset, honoured me next day with a head-line of such colossal triviality that I cannot refrain from quoting it: "Editor Strachey says New York skins Venice!"—a contribution to the illimitable inane worthy to stand by a headline in an English provincial paper: "Vestryman choked by a whelk!"

I have dealt with the problem of publicity, but publicity, of course, is not the whole of journalism. Besides news there is comment, and comment, at any rate among serious-minded people like the British, is quite as much thought of as news. It is with that part of journalism that the editor of a weekly newspaper has most to do. The journalism of comment may be divided into two parts, both perfectly legitimate. There is what I may term judicial journalism and the journalism of advocacy. In judicial journalism the writer attempts to approach the jury of the public rather as a judge than as a barrister, to sum up rather than make a speech for the prosecution or the defence. This does not of course mean that he does not in the end take a side or give a decision. He forms a view and states it, but in stating it he admits the existence of the other side and does not try to carry the jury away with him by the arts of rhetoric. Such journalism is not necessarily cold-blooded. Just as a judge may denounce baseness or misconduct in burning words, so the journalist who endeavours to maintain the judicial attitude may, when the necessity arises, be strong in his denunciations of what he holds to be weak, dangerous, or evil. He, however, who is bold enough to essay this form of journalism must never forget that a judge who professes to be judicial in tone, but who ends in being partial, is a worse man than an honest advocate, because he is, in fact, cloaking partisanship by hypocrisy.

Little need be said in defence of the advocate journalist. He makes no pretence to be doing anything but pleading the cause of his party and placing it in the best possible light. It is not his business, but that of the opposition writer, to put the case for the other side, and if he occasionally pretends to an enthusiasm which does not really belong to him, he is only practising the innocent artifice of the counsel who tells the jury that he will be an unhappy man should he have failed in the task of persuading them to restore his long suffering client to his wife and family.

It must not be supposed, however, that the advocate journalist is a cynic who realizes that his own cause is a poor one, but calls it the best of causes because he is paid to do so. That, as all men of experience know, is a fallacy as regards the barrister, and it is still more a fallacy as regards the journalist. We should remember the story of the barrister who, at the end of a long career, declared that he had been singularly fortunate. He had never been called upon to defend a guilty person or to argue a case where the merits and the law were not strongly on his side. If this feeling grows up in the case of a man who, changing from prosecution to defence and from plaintiff to defendant, may often have to alter his point of view completely, how much more is it likely to grow up in that of the advocate journalist who is always on the same side? Believe me, the notion of the political journalist perpetually writing leaders against his own convictions is a pure figment of the popular imagination. No doubt an editor will sometimes ask a leader-writer not to put a particular view so strongly as he, the leader-writer, is known to feel it, but such reticence cannot surely be regarded as insincerity.

I wish I had time to deal with the ethics of anonymity in journalism. The public are apt to suppose that anonymity is the cloak of all sorts of misdoings, and I have often heard people declare that in their opinion every leader-writer should be forced to sign his name. As I once heard it picturesquely expressed, "the mask should be torn from the villain's face. Why should a man be allowed to stab his neighbour in the dark!" As a matter of fact, I am convinced that anonymity makes, not for irresponsibility, but for responsibility, and that there are many men who, though truculent, offensive and personal when they write with the "I", will show a true sense of moderation and responsibility when they use the editorial "we". The man who writes for a newspaper very soon gets a strong sense of what is right and proper to be said in that particular organ, and he instinctively refuses to give way to personal feeling and personal animosity when he is writing, not in his own name, but in that of his newspaper. "I have hated and distrusted So-and-So ever since I was at Cambridge with him. I know what a false-hearted creature he was then, and how vain and supercilious, and I should like to get my knife into him some day. I feel, however, that the *Daily Herald* could not possibly attack him in this way. Even though my editor has told me that I may say what I like about him, it would not be fair to go for him unless I signed my name." That is an imaginary soliloquy which I am sure represents the feelings of plenty of leader-writers when confronted with a personal issue.

Again, men who write anonymously, and in the name of their paper and not of themselves, are much less likely to yield to the foolish vanity of self-assertion. When Zola visited England I remember a very striking passage in which he expressed to an interviewer his astonishment at the anonymity of the British Press. He wondered how it was that our writers refused themselves the "delicious notoriety" which they might obtain through signed

articles. Thank heaven, our writers prefer the dignity which can be maintained through the honourable traditions of a great journal to such "delicious notoriety". The delicious notoriety of the individual is the ruin of the better journalism.

Again, we must never forget that the signed article, however true and sound it may be, is always to some extent discounted through the personality of the writer. A. may have written in perfect sincerity of a particular statesman, but if he signs his name the gossip-mongers are sure to say that the article in question is to be accounted for by the fact that a fortnight before the writer was stopping with the Cabinet Minister who has been spoken well of, or because the writer's wife is well known to be a friend of the wife of the statesman, or for some equally trivial reason. Just as a good chairman of a committee should sink his individuality and speak for the committee as a whole, so a good leader-writer can with perfect honesty and sincerity sink his individuality and speak for his newspaper rather than himself.

There is another point upon which I can only touch very shortly, and that is the ethics of newspaper proprietorship. People sometimes talk as if it were a great misfortune that the newspapers of England are as a rule owned by rich men. I cannot agree, though I do think it is a great misfortune that a newspaper cannot be started by a poor man. My reason for desiring that as a rule a newspaper proprietor should be rich is the danger of newspapers being bought, or at any rate of their articles being bought, as too often happens in those foreign countries where newspapers are not great properties. It is often said, for example, that a few thousand francs will always procure the insertion of an article in a French newspaper. This is no doubt a gross libel on the bulk of the French Press, but it indicates a danger when newspapers are owned by men of small means and make small profits. When a newspaper is bringing in £50,000 or £60,000 a year it is obvious that even if we assume the newspaper proprietor to have no sense of public duty, it will not be worth his while to sell the influence of his paper. He is not going to risk the destruction of a great property—destruction would surely ensue from his corrupt act becoming known—for a few hundred pounds. But though it makes for soundness that newspaper proprietors should be personally independent, it is also most important that they should be men whose wealth is derived from their newspapers and not from other sources. A great newspaper in the hands of a man who did not look to make a profit from it would be a source of danger, for, strange as it may seem at first sight, the desire for direct and legitimate profits in a newspaper is an antiseptic and prevents corruption. One does not want, no doubt, to see a newspaper proprietor, with his ear to the ground, always thinking of his audience, but the desire to stand well with his readers is often a power in the direction of good. The proprietor who endeavours to be the honest servant of his readers will not go very far wrong. When I say honest servant, I mean the man who plays the part of the servant who, though he will do his master's bidding when that bidding is

not positively immoral, at the same time is prepared to warn that master, courteously but firmly, against rash actions. There is nothing corrupt in such honest service, when rendered either to a man or a nation, or even to a Party.

To put it in another way, there are worse things than studying public opinion and endeavouring partly to interpret it honestly and partly to guide it in the right direction.

I will end by asking my hearers to do two things. Firstly, to think better of journalists and their morals than they are probably inclined to do. Secondly, not to exaggerate the influence and power of the Press. No doubt it has some great powers, but those powers are much more limited than is popularly supposed. Remember that by using exaggerated language in regard to the power of the Press people increase the evil which they desire to diminish. Dr. Johnson said very truly that no man was ever written down except by himself. Believe me, this is as true now as when Dr. Johnson said it. I do not believe in the power of the Press either to crush a good man and a great man or to exalt a weak man or a base man. No doubt a conspiracy of journalists might conceivably keep back a wise statesman or public man for a year or two, and, again, might for a time advertise into undue prominence an inferior man. In the end, however, matters right themselves. The public have a very sound instinct in persons as well as in things, and when the public recognize real worth in a man they will know how to prevent the newspapers from doing him wrong, supposing him for some reason to have incurred the enmity of the Press.

Don't be afraid of the Press, but do it justice and keep it in its place, that is, the place of a useful public servant, but not of a master.

This is the last word of a working journalist, who, though he holds no high-falutin' illusions as to his profession, is at the same time intensely proud of that profession, and who believes that, taken as a whole, there is no calling more worthy of being practised by an honourable man.

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PAN-ANGLICAN PAPERS

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THE CHRISTIAN USE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

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THE question, How is the Bible to be taught? is one which presupposes and includes the preliminary question, What is the Bible that it should be taught? It is evident that, whether he speak from the pulpit or in the schoolroom, no one can satisfactorily teach the Bible to others, until he has first determined what it is to himself. We may therefore begin our inquiry by asking, What is the value of the Bible to the Church of to-day? meaning by the term *Bible* not the New Testament only but the Old also, the whole collection of books prized by the Church as containing in a special way the revelation of God.

It would certainly be idle to deny that in the case of a very large number of educated Christians an extraordinary change has gradually come about in the estimation in which the Bible is held. The belief once common, which maintains every portion of the Scriptures, narratives of the Old Testament, law, prophecies, apocalypses, epistles, and gospels, to be equally valuable for direct spiritual edification, has certainly been abandoned by a great portion of the religious community. It is no longer deemed necessary to "religion" (I quote from a book written some hundred years ago which largely reflected the feelings of that time) to "know whether the Tower of Babel was before the flood or the flood before the Tower of Babel". There is a growing disposition to recognize that geology and other sciences compel us to a theory of the history of our planet and of the whole universe which is at variance with the description of creation given in the first chapter of Genesis; and, what is even more important, so rapidly has the knowledge of the higher criticism spread within the last twenty years, that many, who once believed that the first chapter of Genesis could be so interpreted as to make it agree with the conclusions of science, now frankly admit that it cannot be made to agree with the chapter which immediately follows it. Moreover, as was indeed inevitable, the habit of criticism has grown to such an extent that no single portion of the Bible remains unassailed by it, or at any rate regarded as beyond its scope.

It is probable that the unrest caused by Biblical criticism would not have been so great, if Christians as a whole had been more willing to consider the earlier discussions of critics. Too often, however, these were ignored. There was a not uncommon conviction that sooner or later a Daniel would come to judgement, who would vindicate both the absolute consistency of the Bible against the higher critics and its absolute truth in all matters as against the assertions of scientific men. The consequence was that those portions of the Bible which first gave rise to discussion were to a great extent ignored. Teachers who had shelved these questions for themselves left them alone as far as possible in their teaching of others ; with the result that at the present time a large number of men and women under middle age have grown up with no definite ideas as to the value of considerable portions of Holy Scripture to the Church of to-day. They realize indeed, more or less vaguely, that the old theories of the absolute verbal accuracy of the Bible are untenable, and that the Bible is not throughout, so to speak, up to the same level ; they are therefore too frequently disposed to regard as altogether obsolete, and consequently foreign to the present life of the Church, everything which does not manifestly agree with what they believe to be the teaching of Christ.

But although this is true of a large section of the Church it is by no means true of the whole. There are not a few, whose self-devotion and saintly life give them a claim to the Church's consideration, to whom any criticism of the Bible, however reverent, is an attack upon the very citadel of their faith. Horrified by the conclusions at which some critics have arrived, it seems to them that the only course consistent with true religion is to resist to the uttermost the thin end of the critical wedge. To them the Bible is still a storehouse of statements applicable to any or every question which may arise, from the decision of which there is no appeal. To concede the historical inaccuracy of a book revered by Jesus Christ appears in their eyes to be nothing less than a rejection of Him.

It is my conviction that in the attitude which we adopt towards the Bible we should occupy a position between the two classes which I have indicated. Believing, as I do, that faith is not credulity, not a shutting of the eyes to obvious facts, but such a trust in God as will fearlessly scan the whole religious horizon, and that the duty of criticism was clearly taught by our Saviour Himself, when He pointed out that certain great principles contained in the Old Testament abrogated isolated laws ; convinced, as I am, that He who drew a lesson as to the Fatherly care of God from the sparrows and the lilies of the

field would not have us shut our eyes to the equally obvious lessons contained in the rocks of the earth and in the marvels of the sky ; I cannot doubt for a moment that it is the Church's duty to follow in the path which the Saviour has pointed out ; both to test all things by the highest standard of truth known to us, and to recognize that, since God is the Creator of all things visible and invisible, and since "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made", so all natural science must be to a reverent mind the revelation of the God of nature. To refuse to accept those statements of scientific men on which even the layman is able to form an opinion is, in the words of James Russell Lowell, of one's "idol volume's covers two" to "make a jail to coop the living God."

But though I believe that we must freely acknowledge the duty of the Church to criticize the Bible, though we must unreservedly admit, as our Saviour Himself taught, that it is not all of equal value to the Church of to-day, and that there is in it a progress from the infancy of religion to "the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ", it seems to me that this perception of the progressive nature of revelation needs to be supplemented by considerations of almost equal importance. Those who maintain that, since Jesus Christ is the perfect revelation of God, only those portions of Scripture are necessary which, so to speak, directly set the picture of Him before our eyes, are in danger of ignoring much that is essential to the completeness of the portrait which they admit to be necessary. It is not enough for the Church to study either the Gospel records of what Jesus said and did, or the Apostolic declarations of what His disciples found him to be. It is not merely the outer life of Jesus, the life of word and deed, which the Church must reconstruct, but, so far as it is possible, the inner life also, the life of devotional thought. We are explicitly told what Jesus said and did when He came down from the Mount of Transfiguration ; but we need to know also what is only told us implicitly, that meditation on the law and the prophets which determined the nature of His Ministry, and gave Him strength to endure. Now the truth which is perhaps in some danger of being overlooked is that to our Lord Jesus Christ the Old Testament was the Bible, the written message of God to man. To Him it was not merely a convenient collection of texts with which to enforce the lessons which He taught the simple. Even in those portions of it which some would regard as altogether legendary He found illustrations of the truths He was teaching ; He laid stress on its great utterances as to God's attitude towards man and man's duty to God.

But the use which He made of the Bible in His teaching was not a mere concession to the prejudices of a bibliolatrous public, rather what He gave His hearers for their edification was part and parcel of His own religious life. When He is tempted to command that the stones around Him should become bread, and to satisfy, as it would seem, the hungry by a faith-compelling miracle, He draws from the Old Testament Scriptures the restraining thought that "man doth not live by bread alone". From the great allegory of Daniel He derives alike the certainty and the extent of the kingdom of the Son of man, and from the prophets and that other great allegory, the book of Jonah, the knowledge which made it possible for Him, humanly speaking, to drink the cup of suffering to the dregs, the knowledge that the Christ must suffer before He could enter into His glory, and that, "as Jonah was three days and three nights in the belly of the fish, so must the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth." In the supremest hour of His trial His agonizing soul expressed its bewilderment in the language of a psalm, and in the language of another psalm He yielded up His soul to His Father.

It is therefore evident that, if we can but approach the study of the Old Testament with a keen appreciation of those principles of criticism and interpretation which our blessed Lord applied to it, we shall be in a far better position to understand the secret of His inner life and the nature of the teaching which He delivered to His disciples. As the modern traveller in the Holy Land finds that at every turn some passage of Scripture is lit up, as by a flash, when he contemplates the characteristics of the country or the life of its people, so to the careful and sympathetic student of the Bible of Jesus Christ new light will be incessantly shed on His teaching.

Accordingly, in teaching the Bible we must keep prominently before us two main considerations, first, that those portions of the Bible which were in existence in the time of our Lord were held by Him in the highest estimation, not only in His teaching to enforce His lessons, but in His own devotional life; secondly, that He did not scruple to criticize the Bible, and to test the value of its various parts by the touchstone of what were admitted to be its greatest precepts.

And since our Lord's firm grasp of critical principles as applied to the Bible of His time enabled Him to discriminate between the kernel and the husk, while he valued even the husk as preserving and giving flavour to the kernel, the Christian teacher of to-day will do well to imitate his Master. When Jesus, while He summed up the whole duty of man in two great sayings of the law, affirmed of one of its commandments,

“For the hardness of your hearts wrote He you this precept,” He made the all important pronouncement that not all parts of the law came up to the same level of spirituality, but that some precepts were given because the age to which they belonged allowed of nothing better; in a word He laid stress upon the progressive nature of the Old Testament revelation. Here therefore we have a definite principle for our teaching enunciated by Christ Himself, and we may follow our Master’s lead in pointing out what precepts are of permanent value, and what are merely temporary and local.

And here the teacher will find that the literary and historical criticism of the Bible is an invaluable aid in pointing out the progressive nature of the revelation of God. As he carefully scrutinizes and dates the stones of which the Biblical building is composed, he is able to understand why one is so roughly hewn and one so exquisitely chiselled. He can appreciate alike the fitness of the crude blocks of stone for the foundations and of the marble for the carving of the master workman; he can understand how the lightness and delicacy of one part is enhanced by the rugged sternness of another; he can see why the book of Joshua is so vindictively stern; why some of the stories in Genesis bear so strong a resemblance to some of the legends of heathen mythology; he knows why in the law ritual ordinances bulk so large, and why ethical and spiritual teaching is not there more prominent; he has an explanation for the otherwise inexplicable fact that, while the commandment, “Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother’s milk,” is given three times over, the law which Christ declared to be the first and greatest comes but once; why, while the *lex talionis* is set forth with so much detail, the commandment, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” is far less prominent, and is indeed in danger of being overlooked.

Moreover, in the light of literary and historical criticism, we are in a position to appreciate the lives of the Old Testament heroes and saints. We are able to measure David’s character not by the exalted standard of Deuteronomy, but by the lower standard of the age in which he lived, and to vindicate from the charge of inconsistency both the king himself and those who regarded him as a man after God’s heart. But this, important as it is, is by no means the whole value of historical criticism, for by means of it we are able not only to obtain a fairer estimate of the character of the great men of the Old Testament, but also to see in its true proportion the magnitude of the work which they accomplished. Few people indeed could read the message of Amos without feeling a deep sympathy and respect for the prophet; but when a critical study of the

Old Testament has revealed the character of the religion of Israel in the days of Amos, the feeling of sympathy and respect gives way to one of awestruck wonderment, and the question forces itself upon us, Whence had this man this wisdom?

So likewise in the case of the prophet Jeremiah : when we realize the degradation, as it seems to us, of the official worship at the temple during the first five years of the prophet's ministry, we shall the better appreciate the faith which enabled him to lift up his voice in a state of things so apparently desperate, we shall see a new force in the words, " Is not my word like as fire? saith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces? "

The Church has therefore much to gain and has already gained much from literary and historical criticism. At the same time it is important in Bible teaching to observe a due proportion. It has been said that an artist should learn anatomy and forget it, and in a similar sense and with similar limitations the teacher of the Bible will do well to learn criticism and forget it. As the artist would not direct the attention to the anatomy of his model, but would rather present its life and movement, so the Christian teacher should use his critical knowledge, in order to present the Scriptures not as a dead subject, but as a living, growing revelation. Those who resent, and rightly resent, a sermon dealing almost exclusively with the dry bones of criticism, who feel that, having gone to Church in need of bread, they have been given a stone, will not resent critical teaching, when it is used to make what has been in their minds mere dry bones, live as by the breath of the spirit of God.

But it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion as to the way in which the Bible should be taught without taking account of the attitude towards it of those to whom it is to be taught. It will generally be admitted by those who, having been brought up on old-fashioned lines, have come to value a critical study of the Bible, that those difficulties which they have experienced in the new teaching have been not so much inherent in the teaching itself as due to the fact that they have been required to unlearn what they once learnt as beyond all doubt. Those who, when they passed out of that stage of childhood in which all stories are equally true, were frankly told that the value of some of the Bible stories does not depend on their historical accuracy, have been spared one stumbling-block which has lain in the path of most of those who are above middle age. Such people will not consider historical truth more essential in a story told by an Old Testament Prophet than in a parable told by Christ. The analogy of their own first crude attempt at drawing, for example, will

satisfy them that there could not but have been crudities in the first attempts to portray the character of God. And being freed from the necessity of harmonizing all difficulties by more or less desperate methods, they will be ready to value even the more primitive stories not only as relics of an early literature, not only as having been stepping-stones to raise former generations to higher things, but as material from which the Church of to-day, no less than the Church of the Apostles' age, may derive a parable setting forth the truth of the kingdom of God. And though it may perhaps be said that new allegories constructed on modern lines would be better than Hebrew stories adapted to teach lessons for which they were not originally intended, yet it must be remembered that this kind of adaptation originated centuries before Christ and received both His sanction and that of His Apostles. We cannot forget that it was of Israel that, according to the flesh, Christ came, and, this being so, to those who look to Him as their Master and their Lord, the early legends of Israel which He knew, and which He used in His teaching, must have greater value than, say, those of our Scandinavian forefathers. The hill of Sion which He loved must be more to us than Scafell, or Snowdon, or Mont Blanc.

On the other hand, in teaching those who have grown up with the traditional views of the Bible great patience is necessary. Here we must be content to teach the principles of interpretation, and to leave the application of those principles to be made by our hearers. There are, needless to say, several views which would find almost universal acceptance among scholars, of which the enunciation would cause pain to Christians of the older type who have no technical knowledge of Biblical science. It would not be right to suppress truth; at the same time it is important to remember that we cannot expect these new aspects of the truth to be appreciated all at once. When our Lord affirmed that "whatsoever from without goeth into a man, it cannot defile him", He enunciated a principle which made all meats clean; but had He Himself acted to the full on that principle, had He eaten things strangled or blood, He would have stifled the very germs of a new faith in the hearts of those who were not yet prepared to accept so radical a change.

I have dwelt on the necessity of placing ourselves as far as possible in the religious atmosphere in which our Saviour lived, and I have laid stress on the study of the Old Testament as enabling us, because the Old Testament was His Bible, to fill in to some extent the outline which the Gospels give us of His inner devotional life. But it is, perhaps, equally important to emphasize the fact that, as we ought not to put a meaning on

any words of our Lord which takes no account of the Scriptures which He revered, so also we must avoid explaining statements or definitions in the other New Testament books without endeavouring to read these books with the eyes of those for whom they were first written. A critical and sympathetic study of the development of thought in the Old Testament will enable us to perceive not only the precise bearing of St. Paul's doctrinal statements, but also the necessary limitations in their interpretation. No greater effort of sympathy could be made than that which is required of the Gentile Christians of to-day, viz. to understand the heart of a Jew, and to look at the teaching of Christ with the eyes of those who, believing that they should love the Lord their God with all their heart and with all their soul and with all their might, nevertheless regarded all the ordinances of the law as pointing out a path of life leading to Him in whose presence is the fullness of joy.

The words of the Rabbi Hillel, when in one pungent sentence he had summed up the whole law to an impatient proselyte, may be adapted also to the New Testament teaching. "This is the whole law," said Hillel, "all the rest is commentary; go, study." So Jesus Christ is the whole revelation of God, all the rest is commentary: let us therefore read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest it.

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THE WRITERS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT AND THEIR MESSAGE

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IN writing this paper I shall assume certain points of documentary criticism as proved and generally accepted, and shall not attempt to recapitulate the evidence upon which they are based. These points may be stated in brief as follows :—

1. The documentary theory of the Pentateuch, and with it the view that, broadly speaking, the prophetic period of Israel's religious development is anterior to the legalistic period. Upon this view we find in the Pentateuch four main sources :—

(a) A continuous narrative emanating, apparently, from a writer belonging to the kingdom of Judah, whose work is probably to be dated cir. 850 B.C., i.e. about the time of king Jehoshaphat. This narrative, from its employment from the beginning of the divine name Jahveh (Yahwe), or (to use the form more familiar to English readers) Jehovah, is usually cited by the symbol J.

(b) A similar and parallel narrative, probably drawn up by a writer belonging to the Northern kingdom, cir. 750 B.C., i.e. about the time of king Jeroboam II. Since this narrative does not use the name Jahveh until the account of God's revelation to Moses in Ex. iii, and from that point only sparingly, and makes use for the most part of the title Elohim (rendered "God" in E.V.), it is quoted under the symbol E.

(c) The book of Deuteronomy (D), which, substantially in the form in which we know it (i.e. chs. iv–xxvi, xxviii; with perhaps parts of chs. i–iv and xxvii–xxix–end) appears to have been "the Book of the Law" discovered in the Temple in the eighteenth year of king Josiah, i.e. 621 B.C.

(d) A document which, from its interest in ceremonial matters, genealogies, &c., is usually known as the Priestly narrative and cited under the symbol P. To this document belong the main part of the ceremonial matter of Exodus and all that is found in Leviticus and Numbers. It embraces in itself a smaller complete code (Lev. xvii–xxvi), which, from the emphasis which it lays on the duty of *holiness*, both moral and ceremonial, is usually known as "the Law of Holiness" and cited as H or LH. Evidence shows that H must be nearly contemporary with the prophet Ezekiel, i.e. cir. 600 B.C. or a little later. P appears to have been drawn up during the Exile cir. 500 B.C. and to be based on pre-existent temple usage which had gradually grown up in earlier times. The first stage towards the formation of the Pentateuch, as known to us, appears to have been the welding together of J and E by a redactor (RJE) not long subsequently to 700 B.C. The final stage was the working of JE, D, and P into a single whole, probably about the time of Ezra, i.e. between the years 450 and 400 B.C.

Most scholars assume that the documents of the Pentateuch (J, E, and P) run on throughout Joshua, and speak accordingly of the Pentateuch and Joshua together as the Hexateuch.¹

2. The other Historical Books fall into two groups :—

(a) Judges, Samuel, Kings, which attained their present form through a process of compilation, old narratives being brought together by editors or redactors cir. 600 B.C. In Judges and Kings, where they make large additions, in a style closely moulded on that of Deuteronomy, the editor's hands can readily be distinguished from their sources.

(b) Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah. These are the work of a writer cir. 300 B.C., who combined a series of excerpts from Samuel, Kings, and other sources (e.g. in Ezra, Nehemiah, the Memoirs of Ezra and Nehemiah) with additional matter, contributed by himself, which manifests great interest in everything relating to the Temple, the Levites, &c.

3. The Prophetic works are, in the main, unities, and to be ascribed to the writers whose names they bear. But to this conclusion there are notable exceptions, the most important of which concerns the Book of Isaiah. Chapters xl–lxvi are much later than the pre-exilic prophet, chapters xl–lv dating from the closing years of the Exile (cir. 540 B.C.), and some of the latter chapters being possibly even later. Zechariah ix–xiv also is distinct from chapters i–viii, and by a later author (or authors).

4. The general result of documentary criticism has been to bring a great part of the Old Testament literature down to a later period than was formerly assumed by tradition. Thus exilic and post-exilic times have been enriched at the expense of the pre-exilic period. The Psalter must now be regarded as the hymn-book of the second (i.e. the post-exilic) Temple. The greater part of its contents dates not earlier than exilic or post-exilic times. Some of the Psalms have even been supposed to be as late as the Maccabean period (167 B.C. and later). The "Wisdom" literature represents a late phase of thought. Proverbs, though made up of collections of very various dates, cannot have been edited until after the Exile; Job probably dates from the Exile; while Ecclesiastes is marked by its literary style and tone as a very late post-exilic work, certainly not earlier than the close of the Persian rule (332 B.C.), and possibly considerably later.

I shall assume also that the Old Testament, when looked at as a record of Divine revelation, is seen to represent that revelation as gradual and progressive, conveyed through human media which were subject to the limitations of humanity. Here, as in other departments of knowledge, we find an evolution from small beginnings upward towards the fuller light. This fact, so far from being new and startling, is in accordance with New Testament teaching. So the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews (i. 1) speaks of God's revelation made in time past to the fathers in the prophets as partial and fragmentary (*πολυμερὴς καὶ πολυτρόπως*), in contrast to the final revelation made "in His Son".

¹ The grounds upon which the critical theory of these books is based may be studied in Driver, *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. Orr, in *The Problem of the Old Testament*, argues against this theory. The present writer has carefully read his arguments, but does not think that he has succeeded in showing the traditional view to be consistent with the data of the Old Testament itself, or that he has met the arguments upon which the critical conclusions rest.

Thus we find limitations in the morality of the Old Testament. Our Lord Himself recognizes this fact when He claims to override and supersede the moral standards of the Old Testament :—"Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time . . . but I say unto you " (St. Matt. v. 21-48).

It may be concluded, then, that the Old Testament possesses a religious value from two points of view :—

1. As an historical record of the process of Divine revelation in old time, leading up to the New Testament revelation. Thus, as pointing forward to and finding its fulfilment in the New Testament, it may be regarded as evidential of the truth of Christianity.

2. As of practical spiritual value for the present needs of individual souls. From this point of view the distinction between what is imperfect and transitory and what is of permanent truth and application must be judged by the conscience of the individual reader as enlightened by the revelation of our Lord. In this connexion we may fitly recall the words of S. T. Coleridge in his *Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures* (Letter i) :—"Need I say that I have met everywhere more or less copious sources of truth, and power, and purifying impulses ; that I have found words for my inmost thoughts, songs for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs, and pleadings for my shame and my feebleness ? In short, whatever *finds* me, bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit, even from the same Spirit 'which remaining in itself, yet regenerateth all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets' (Wisdom vii. 27)."

Having made these assumptions, I do not propose to speak in general terms of the permanent religious value of the Old Testament, but rather to take one special point the consideration of which may be of value as bearing upon the practical teaching of the Old Testament by the Church.

The point which I have in view concerns the authors of the Old Testament literature. Adopting the modern critical standpoint, how far may it be said that we gain a clearer insight into the personality of the writers, and the message which they felt themselves inspired to convey to their age ? This subject may be considered under the following divisions :—

(c) We may start from the eighth-century prophets (Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah) as forming a good central point from which to work, since our information as to the circumstances of their times is relatively fairly full, both from internal (Old Testament) and external (Assyrian) sources. From this point we may work back to

(b) The prophetic schools of the middle and earlier period of the monarchy as illustrated by J and E in the Pentateuch and by the old narratives of the Historical Books (Joshua to Kings). This may lead us back to

(a) The importance which is to be attached to the personality and work of Moses.

Having thus worked backwards from the eighth-century prophets, we may advance forwards to later times, and briefly consider

(d) Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic school (the Editors of the Historical books), together with the prophets of the seventh century, notably Jeremiah.

(e) The beginnings of legalism in the exilic period as seen in Ezekiel

and the Law of Holiness (H), and the counter-tendency towards prophetic universalism as seen in deutero-Isaiah (chapters xl ff.).

(f) Post-exilic legalism as seen in P, Chronicles, &c.

It is impossible within the limits of this paper to attempt a full development of this scheme even in outline. I will therefore confine myself to suggesting as briefly as possible a few of the lines along which it may be profitably treated.

(c) Critical study of the writings of the Hebrew prophets has made it clear that their message was directed in the first place to the men of their own day and concerned itself with the circumstances of their own times. It is imperative, therefore, that these circumstances should, as far as possible, be understood, and the immediate import of the prophetic message be grasped, before the wider message which the prophets have for all time can be followed out.

In the middle of the eighth century B.C. we find a similar condition of affairs in both the kingdoms of Israel and Judah—a period of prosperity bringing in its train moral and social corruption coupled with mere formalism in religion (cf. Amos ii. 6–vi. 14, viii. 1–14 with Isa. i–iii). This prosperity was merely the lull before the storm. The kingdom of Assyria, which was at this time the dominant force in Western Asia, was reaching the zenith of its power, and the time was approaching when it must try conclusions with Egypt, the only rival likely to offer effective resistance to its victorious career. The two small kingdoms of Israel and Judah lay upon the line of advance between Assyria and Egypt. The prophets foresee the impending danger, and shape their warnings accordingly. Among the principal points of their teaching the following should be noted:—

Emphasis on the doctrine of monotheism. In contrast to the popular view which regarded Yahwe as exclusively the national God, the truth is emphasized that He is God of the whole earth, and holds the fate of nations in His hand. The development of this truth was doubtless influenced by the spectacle of the victorious advance of Assyria, and the fall of nations and their gods before it.

Israel's special relation to Yahwe implies special responsibility (cf. Amos iii. 2). Yahwe desires spiritual and not formal service. His religion is intimately bound up with morality. Moral corruption is hastening the catastrophe which must surely come to pass as a punishment for national sins.

After impending punishment brighter times are to dawn for a purified remnant of the people. So we trace the development of the doctrine of the Messianic age. Different prophets vary in their treatment of the subject. It is doubtful whether Amos holds out any alleviation of the impending calamity (chap. ix. 11–15 being of doubtful authenticity). Hosea speaks in general terms. It is in Isaiah that the doctrine of the Messiah and His kingdom is first definitely developed; though it is probable that Isaiah's "sign" of the birth of Immanuel (vii. 14), and the similar prediction of Micah (v. 3), pre-suppose a popular expectation which may have been current for some time previously, and of which these prophets and their successors make use. This doctrine of the Messiah is based upon older teaching with regard to Yahwe's relation to Israel:—

First, the doctrine of the covenant ratified once for all between Yahwe and Israel in the person of Israel's righteous ancestors (JE in Genesis and Exodus). Thus we get the doctrine of the indestructible nation. So founded, the covenant can never be annulled even by

defection of the greater part of the nation at any particular time, for there always must exist a righteous nucleus which is the true Israel, "the holy seed" of a regenerated community, with whom the covenant stands sure.

And secondly, Yahwe's promise to David as recorded in 2 Sam. vii. David is always to have "a lamp" before Yahwe at Jerusalem, the quenchless flame being emblematic of an unfailing posterity to sit upon his throne. Hence arises the doctrine of the Messianic King of David's line.

(b) Reference to this older teaching takes us back to the earlier prophetic interpreters of Israel's past history. We do not know the names of these writers, but their work as seen in J and E in the Pentateuch and in the Historical Books proves the existence of considerable literary activity both in the Southern and Northern kingdoms during the middle period of the Monarchy and probably earlier.

It is important to notice that these writers' conception of history is essentially religious. Throughout they present a narrative of the way in which Yahwe deals with His chosen people, and shapes the course of history in accordance with His Divine purpose.

This conception emerges most clearly in the Patriarchal narratives of J and E. Thus, Yahwe has taken notice of Abraham "in order that he may command his children and his house after him, &c." (Gen. xviii. 19); for Jacob He is "the God, before whom my fathers Abraham and Isaac did walk, the God who hath fed me all my life long unto this day, the Angel who hath redeemed me from all evil" (Gen. xlviii. 15); for Joseph He supplies the standard of right action in the hour of moral danger—"How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?" (Gen. xxxix. 9). Here we have worked out the idea that a man can feel that he stands in such a moral relation to God that he is able to commit the whole guidance of his life to Him, to feel that he is an instrument in God's hands for the performance of His will, that each and all of his actions are not too trivial to come within the range of this all-embracing relation, and, so doing, to be directed, inspired, heightened, and purified. This idea, worked out most markedly in the lives of the Prophets (cf. the expression, "As the Lord of hosts liveth *before whom I stand*," i.e. whose servant I am, ready to do His bidding, lead where it may), is finally developed in its highest degree in deutero-Isaiah's conception of the suffering servant of Yahwe, which reaches its culmination in chapters lii. 13-liii. 12. Here we have an illustration of the unity of the Old Testament as unfolding the Divine scheme of revelation.

(a) It is reasonable to inquire whence this high ethical conception of Yahwe's relation to His chosen people took its rise. Biblical tradition traces it to Moses, who is constantly represented as the founder of Israel's national and religious life. Yahwe made choice of Israel, and sealed His claim to their allegiance by the deliverance from Egypt, and on the basis of this claim a covenant was concluded at Sinai or Horeb. Yahwe's claim on Israel's allegiance was a claim for undivided service. He was to be Israel's only God (Exod. xx. 2, 3). This much is admitted by all students of the Old Testament.

But this alone is not sufficient to explain the subsequent course of Israel's religious history. We desire to know what was the source of the lofty ethical conceptions which we have noticed under (b) and (c), and why the religion of Israel took this course, instead of assimilating itself, as it well might have done, to the Canaanite cultus by which it was surrounded. The only satisfactory answer is that Moses not

only established the exclusive worship of the one God Yahwe, but also must have invested his presentation of the Deity with certain definite *moral* characteristics which enabled the religion of Yahwe to resist, in the long run, the seductive influence of the nature-worship of Canaan, and so preserved it to become the pure ethical monotheism of the eighth-century prophets.

Granted this, it becomes relatively unimportant how much of Israel's religious institutions can, in the form in which they are known to us, be actually ascribed to Moses. Throughout Israel's subsequent history, the ceremonial codes which took shape from time to time represent the adaptation to the needs of particular ages of the religious principles which Moses laid down. They may be regarded as the stream of which he forms the fountain-head, and thus (if we judge them by the literary standard of their age, and not by our modern standard of literary integrity) they are justified in assuming the sanction of his great name. The ultimate test of their religious worth is not what verdict would be passed at the present day upon such a *method* of literary composition, but the way in which their *purpose* appeals to the human conscience as having been animated and directed by the Spirit of God.

(d) One such code is the Book of Deuteronomy, which may be taken as representing the stage next subsequent to the work of the eighth-century prophets, since its promulgation took place, as we have noticed, in 621 B.C., though as to the precise date of its composition we have no information.

Hosea, Divinely taught by the bitter circumstances of his personal experience, had gained the inspiration that *love* was the principle which determined the relation between Yahwe and His people. Deuteronomy takes up this idea, and shows that Yahwe's choice of Israel in time past was a spontaneous action on His part dictated by His love. This demands love in return, which must find its expression in whole-hearted *service*. Thus the duty of loving, serving, cleaving to Yahwe is again and again emphasized, and the guilt of idolatry stands out in bold relief as a heinous breach of the covenant-relation. Deuteronomy has been aptly described as a "prophetic reformulation, and adaptation to new needs, of an older legislation". The influence of the book was very wide and clearly marked. It gave rise to a school of writers who adopted its phraseology and applied its principles to the interpretation of Israel's past history. Such were the editors or redactors of the older narratives of Joshua, Judges, and Kings.

Under this section I may refer very briefly to Jeremiah, since he commenced his prophetic career a little before the promulgation of Deuteronomy, and his writings exhibit affinities to its teaching and language. Jeremiah lived through the troublous times which preceded the destruction of the kingdom of Judah by Nebuchadrezzar, and he seems to have foreseen the issue of events from the beginning. For him the decay of the *nation* served to bring into prominence the importance of the relation of the *individual* to Yahwe. Like Isaiah, Jeremiah looked forward to the establishment in the future of an ideal Messianic kingdom, after the near impending chastisement had done its work, and the iniquity of his people had been purged away. But the moral regeneration of the nation must come about through realization of the moral responsibility of the individual. The future is to witness the establishment of a new covenant, written, not like the former covenant, upon tables of stone, but upon the hearts of its individual recipients.

It is the realization of the importance of the individual, as distinct from the national, ideal which brought into prominence the need, and paved the way for the development, of the doctrine of a future life of continued relationship with Yahwe, beyond this present stay.

(e) Another prophet who laid emphasis upon individual responsibility was Ezekiel. This prophet, though partially contemporary with Jeremiah, was one of the captives deported to Babylon with Jehoiachin in 597 B.C., eleven years before the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C. Thus he may be taken as illustrating a later stage of thought—that of the Exile. From the Exile and onward the religious ideal may be said to have been rather that of a Church than a Nation. Ezekiel, “the priest in a prophet’s mantle,” in laying down a system of regulations for the restored community of the future, closely associates himself with the Law of Holiness (Lev. xvii–xxvi), which must have been nearly contemporary. Both lay the greatest stress upon the duty of *holiness* and its application to the minutiae of daily life. The importance of this conception in the scheme of Israel’s religious development cannot be over-estimated. As it leaves Ezekiel’s hand, however, a defect may be found in its one-sidedness, which, in the picture of the community of the future hedged round with ordinances for the maintenance of its peculiar sanctity, leaves no place for the inclusion of the Gentiles within the terms of the covenant, and thus falls short of a doctrine of religious universalism, the beginnings of which we may trace in the writings of earlier prophets.

This aspect of the religious ideal, however, attained a high state of development in the prophecy of the unnamed author of Isaiah xl ff., whose work must be dated during the Exile, after 549 B.C., i.e. after the union of the Medes and Persians, and while Cyrus was coming into prominence as a conqueror, but prior to the fall of Babylon 538 B.C. This writer idealizes the nation of Israel under the figure of the Servant of Yahwe, who has a mission to be a light to the Gentiles, that Yahwe’s salvation may be unto the ends of the earth.

(f) It was reserved for Christianity to unify the two conceptions of the holy community and the world-wide scope of its mission. In post-exilic times they failed to be reconciled, and it was the former which prevailed. An instance of this may be seen in the action of Ezra and Nehemiah with regard to mixed marriages (Ezra ix, x, Neh. xiii. 23 ff.). A veiled protest in favour of the wider point of view may be seen in the Book of Jonah, where in allegorical form the prophet represents the nation of Israel charged with a mission to the Gentiles, and seeking to evade its responsibility.

This period is pre-eminently the age of legalism. The impulse initiated during the Exile takes shape in the enactments of the Priestly Code (contained in P). In Chronicles, which is later than 300 B.C., we have an attempt to re-write pre-exilic history from the standpoint of this later Judaism. The great value of the religious development of this age was no doubt the deepening of the sense of sin and the need for atonement, which, as St. Paul shows, the Law in itself could never satisfy. It may be noticed that modern criticism, in showing that the age of legalism forms the period immediately prior to the Christian Revelation, adds point to the Pauline argument which is summed up in the statement, “I through law died unto law, that I might live unto God” (Gal. ii. 19).

It would be a mistake, however, to regard legalism as wholly a bondage to ordinances. The fact that the Law was capable of arousing the joy and enthusiasm of pious souls is finely illustrated in many

of the Psalms (cf. e.g. Ps. xix. 7-14, cxix); and its value as a religious discipline bore noble fruits in the lives and deaths of the martyrs of the Maccabean age.

In this brief sketch my aim has been to show that, through recognition of the process of development in Old Testament religion, which has been brought about by the modern critical method of study, the figures of the writers of the literature come to stand out in bolder relief. A man is best known through the understanding of his ideals; and it may be claimed that we now possess a clearer comprehension of the religious ideals of individual writers through the viewing of them in relation to the history of the times which gave them birth, and as links in the chain of religious thought which can now be traced through the pages of the Old Testament.

The fact that many of the Old Testament books are seen to be composite, and to contain the work of several writers instead (as was formerly thought) of one only, is surely of the nature of a gain rather than a loss. For this means the gaining of new accessions to "the goodly fellowship of the prophets", who, in many ages and under varied circumstances, felt themselves moved by the Holy Spirit to proclaim some special aspect of Divine Truth, and thus to prepare the way for the Revelation in the fullness of time.

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THE GAIN FROM CRITICISM FOR THE STUDY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

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WHEN we speak of criticism we use the word in a wide sense to cover the whole of that change in the attitude of loyal Christians towards the Bible which may be described as the special product of the last fifty years. Fifty years ago a good Christian consulted the Bible as he might consult a law-book; he went to it as an authority from which there was no appeal for a rule of life and conduct and for a rule of faith. The Bible was authoritative for him because he regarded it as a sacred book. It was sacred because it was inspired. It was in a true sense the Word of God; the human authors wrote down what was put into their minds to write by the Holy Ghost. It seemed to follow from this at once that a book, the origin of which was so divine, must be exempt from error, and from error of all kinds; that its statements were equally to be received whether they related to matters of religion or of morals or to the more neutral facts of history or science or common life.

Now the present paper is written from the same general standpoint. It aims at expressing the views of many who desire to be, and believe themselves to be, loyal Christians. They too believe the Bible to be a sacred book. They believe it to be sacred, because inspired. They believe that the Holy Spirit really influenced the minds of the human authors; that the book really is what God willed that it should be; that it conveyed what He willed that it should convey; and therefore that it is still rightly called His holy Word.

But at this point they begin to make a distinction. It does not follow that they go to the Bible exactly as they would go to a law-book, the absolute authority of which is assumed, and in regard to which all that remains to be done is to apply the text to the matter in hand. The new school differs from the old in this, that the conception of the Bible as a law-book no longer seems adequate to it. It no longer starts from the Bible as a fixed text, written as it were upon tables of stone. It treats the Bible as a *living* word, proceeding ultimately from the *living God*, and proceeding from Him through the channel or mediate agency of *living men*.

For this reason the newer school considers itself called upon to go behind the written text, the legal statutory text. It considers itself called upon to investigate the living process by which it came to be written, and never loses sight of the fact that the text itself is a product of life, with the characteristics of such a product. In other words,

the difference between the new view and the old is like the difference which St. Paul drew between Law and Faith, the difference between obedience to a rigid code and the vital apprehension of that which is itself alive.

This study of a living process is what we really mean by criticism, though criticism in the narrower sense is only a part, and a subordinate part, of the whole scheme of study. The first step in the growth of what we now call critical method was the recognition of the principle that the Bible must be studied in the first instance like any other book. Those so-called critics for whom I venture to speak would lay stress upon that qualifying phrase "in the first instance". They refuse to prejudge the question before them by assuming that the Bible is in all respects like other books. They have seen as yet no reason to discard the ancient view that the Bible is really a sacred book and that the Holy Spirit speaks in it. But, on the other hand, experience does justify them in the conclusion that the Bible as such is not exempt from the conditions under which other books were composed as to human authorship and the transmission of the text. It is this double observation which has given rise to the double science of criticism: to what is often called the Higher Criticism, dealing with the whole question or group of questions connected with authorship; and to the Lower Criticism, dealing with the history and transmission and reconstitution of the text.

This critical process is subservient to the still more important historical process, which enables us to study the sacred books one by one according to their place in history, with reference to the immediate surroundings of each, the general and particular atmosphere of the time and place in which each book was composed. It is this process which puts us in a position to take our stand as it were by the side of the author and enter for ourselves into the actual life which he breathed and of which his book is the expression.

This is the one great gain of the studies of the last fifty years. Everything else is subsidiary to this. Criticism, which is often pushed forward to the front, has its proper place rather in the rear; it is not so much an end in itself—except in so far as all truth is an end in itself—as an indispensable means of approach to what is really the central object, which we have described as the living apprehension of that which was and is itself alive.

With thus much of preface I may go on to summarize the main heads under which I should be inclined to classify the gains from criticism for the study of the New Testament. They are all consequences of approaching the sacred volume as an embodiment of the results of a living process, and not merely as an authoritative code. Two of the heads represent general ideas which the new way of looking at things has brought into prominence, and two are characteristic results of the application of the new methods.

1. *The Idea of Evolution.* Criticism has brought with it the idea of Evolution. It happens that this idea, owing to the influence of the Darwinian philosophy, has held a leading place in the scientific thought of the period with which we are concerned; and it has

proved especially applicable to the history of religion. As we look back over the course of Biblical religion, we see at work in it a principle of growth, and of what we may call providential growth—of growth that from first to last has been in the hands of God, accomplishing His purposes and culminating in the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. From the point of view of Evolution, the Incarnation has been the centre and climax of human history. One line of growth—or rather, one series of convergent lines of growth—has led up to it; and another line, or series of lines, has led down from it, and exerts a conspicuous influence in the life of the leading nations of to-day.

For the missionary this conception of growth, and of guided and regulated growth, must be one of great importance. At the outset it supplies him with an answer to questions that would otherwise cause considerable perplexity—to such questions, for instance, as polygamy and slavery. In practice it must be a great help to be able to apply to them the principle of St. Matt. xix. 8. They were permitted because of the hardness of men's hearts—that contrariant influence of evil which has been also at work in the world, though it is being as we hope gradually eliminated. Such customs belong to an earlier age before Christ came, and before the Christian had learnt to know what spirit he was of. A clear recognition of the fact that his own religion has grown will enable the missionary to deal more sympathetically and gently with the religions of lower races.

But the value of the conception of growth does not cease with the removal of difficulties and stumbling-blocks. It has the positive merit of supplying a large, comprehensive idea under which many detailed phenomena may be brought, while it in no way conflicts with the supreme position claimed for Christianity. The idea of Evolution only becomes dangerous when it is regarded as *godless* Evolution. It is not to be thought of as a blind mechanical force acting by itself; but the phrase is only a concise and summary way of describing the method by which God has chosen to work, the method of steady progressive expansion, spread over long periods of time and admitting of great fluctuations, but always ending in advance. If this definition is carefully borne in mind we shall be saved from being troubled by such pictures of Evolution as that drawn in the recent Papal Encyclical. And these remarks will apply to the whole field of criticism as well as to that of Natural Philosophy.

2. *The Comparison of Religions.* Another characteristic of the scientific thought of the last fifty years has been the extended use of the Comparative Method. In the latter part of the period this method has come to be, and is being increasingly at the present time, applied to religion. One of the first results of criticism was to bring out the fact that Christianity, especially in its preparatory stages, but not only in these, has many features in common with other religions, just as they, too, have many features in common with each other. This is a state of things that ought not to surprise us. It seems to follow inevitably from the unity of the world, which does but reflect the unity of God. The disturbing element, which is at the root of

all the perplexities that arise under this head, is that contrariant influence of evil to which allusion has just been made. In some religions, and at some stages of religion, this influence has been more active than in others. It has been felt, as we have seen, even in Biblical religion. We must frankly and unreservedly recognize this ; but it is something to know from the first the definite cause to which it must be referred.

The comparative study of religions, as a science, is as yet rather in its infancy. But under this head as under the last we may expect considerable help in the practical work of missions. Here again, the effect ought to be an increase of sympathy in dealing with inferior religions. The first step, I suppose, in each case should be to collect and to emphasize all that is good in the particular religion ; and then to show how this is taken up into and carried forward in Christianity. We are far more likely to make converts in this way than by simply attacking and denouncing the religions that we wish to persuade men to leave behind. In most cases we may assume that the missionary comes to the study of the native religion with a wider and more instructed knowledge than the natives themselves possess : his better knowledge puts into his hand, so to speak, the key to their religion ; it enables him to see the special function that it was intended to serve in the counsels of God. I would therefore venture to suggest that it might be well to take advantage of this, and—perhaps even before attempting to present Christianity—to begin with a course of sympathetic lectures on the natives' own religion, so as to help them to make the best of it. Even if they do not at once go any further something will have been gained.

3. *The Biblical Writings as Living Products.* But I suppose that the first experience of those who have themselves adopted and attempted to base their convictions upon critical methods has been the heightened feeling of life in contact with life. There was always a danger, under the old way of looking at the Bible, of losing this contact. The very reverence with which it was regarded caused it to be rather deferentially laid aside and treated as a collection of proof-texts, a grave mentor in the background rather than an intimate friend to be taken to the heart and cherished. And the feeling that the Bible, critically studied, can be thus taken to the heart,—that the figures which stand out upon its pages are living figures—I suppose has been the chief compensation which has come to those who have seen the objects of their veneration handled more rudely than they could approve.

There is a striking paragraph in the Appendix to Dr. Hort's *Hulsean Lectures* (p. 183) :—

“ In the times when Christianity owed nothing to custom and tradition, and when all the ways of ordinary society tended to draw men away from it, what drew them to it and held them to it despite all persecution was the power of its life. Naturally this was the element which could give least account of itself. Many were drawn by the testimony of the moral power of

Christianity, a few by the satisfaction which it gave to reason. But life calling to life was the one victorious power which mastered men and women of all conditions and of all grades of culture."

It is the effort of constructive criticism to get in touch with this life; and criticism does not justify itself until it succeeds in being really constructive. Any other aspect or function of criticism is only subordinate, a clearing of the ground to make the foundation deeper and more secure.

The book of the New Testament that was most hopelessly misunderstood in the precritical period was the Apocalypse. The turning-point in the study of this book has been the resolute application to it of the critical principle that all interpretation must at least start from facts of contemporary history. It may be that these facts suggest larger far-reaching laws of the divine government of the world and of man; but in each case the writer who states and enforces such laws does so with a definite example or examples of their working before his mind. The Apocalypse deals with the conflict between the powers of good and of evil as represented by Christianity on the one hand and the anti-Christian, persecuting, and idolatrous State upon the other, the Roman Empire and the worship of the Emperor, with the assurance of final victory and of the new order in which it is to issue. Satisfactory expositions of the Apocalypse may now be had in Dr. Swete's commentary (Macmillan, 1906), Sir W. M. Ramsay's *Letters to the Seven Churches* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1904), Prof. F. C. Porter's *Messages of the Apocalyptic Writers* (James Clarke, 1905), and art. "Revelation" in *Hastings's Dictionary* (1902), Mr. Anderson Scott in *The Century Bible*. It is not too much to say that before the appearance of these works the Apocalypse was really a sealed book for English readers; and it is a book that deserves to be understood as "a cordial for drooping spirits" for all who are engaged in that perennial conflict with which it deals.

In regard to the Epistles, especially the Pauline Epistles, the older exegesis had not gone so far astray. In this field the ancient commentators had much to teach; and the debt that is owing to later writers like J. J. Wetstein (1693-1754) and J. A. Bengel (1687-1752) must never be forgotten. There was also much delicate and penetrating psychological analysis in preachers like J. H. Newman. And yet no one can doubt the advance that has been made in recent years, beginning with the work of the great Cambridge exegetes. No one in these days fails to understand that he has to do with real letters, with a definite situation in which the readers have had specific questions to ask, or practical as well as speculative difficulties to propound, and that the writer is seeking to answer these questions and set straight these difficulties as in the intercourse of man with man. More and more the intensely human character of this intercourse has been brought out. Both writers and readers cease to be mere lay figures. We have learnt to sympathize with them as our forefathers can hardly have done. And, in doing so, we have had put before us an object-

lesson in practical Christianity that is not coldly didactic but warm with the thrill of life.

If it is true that some of the Apostolic Letters possess this character of human intercourse in a higher degree than others, that fact, too, has been cleared up by the labours of scholars like Deissmann, who have pointed out the existence in the period with which we are concerned of two distinct types of epistolary literature, the one more and the other less personal; on the one hand the Letter properly so called, and such as real letters have always been; and on the other hand the Epistle, which was a more formal kind of composition, intended to be the vehicle of more deliberate teaching. It is easy to see how the Letters of St. Paul fall into one or the other of these categories.

In the meantime the figure of the great Apostle has been growing in distinctness. We realize better than we did its extraordinary fullness and richness in personal traits, the play of tender emotion and subtle tact with which he responds to the perplexities of his converts or expresses his anxieties for them. And along with these finer touches of comprehension, we are also coming to understand the broader lines of the statesmanship with which Christianity was piloted on its entrance into the Graeco-Roman world. How much has Sir W. M. Ramsay taught us under this head! We owe to him not only the filling of the void, but also in the first instance the awakening of the consciousness how much we had to learn.

We are apt to think of criticism as a dry and rather profane dissection of documents. And it is true that, at a preliminary stage, a good deal of work of this kind has to be done. It is in the same manner that prolonged courses of comparative anatomy had to precede a really scientific understanding of the human frame. In regard to the most central and most sacred portion of the New Testament, study has not yet emerged from this preliminary stage. And yet a great deal has been done; and perhaps a greater advance has been made than the world is quite aware. Besides the process of analysis which has been going on for so long, new materials have been brought to light, in the shape of contemporary literature which had been either unknown or lost sight of. On the basis of this literature a great amount of illustrative matter has been collected. In due time all of this will be brought to bear. But it must be remembered that in proportion as this section of the subject is central and sacred, so also is the treatment of it delicate and responsible. We understand better than we did both the nearer and the more distant surroundings of the Life of our Lord, not only the political institutions and the social manners and customs of His time but the thoughts and aspirations that were in the minds of His contemporaries. This is a necessary preliminary to the better understanding of Himself and His teaching. The conditions of which we speak are something more than mere externals; the whole meaning of language differs with the persons to whom it is addressed, and to understand these is one half of the problem. But to understand the Speaker and Teacher Himself is the yet more difficult and important half; and the effort to enter into this must not be hurried.

4. *Doctrine as the Expression of Life.* That which applies to the personages of the New Testament and to the course of the history in which they moved applies also to the body of doctrine that is extracted from these writings. As compared with the older treatment of Doctrine, much more stress is laid now upon the process of genesis by which the doctrine took shape. It is recognized now, as it used not to be, that Christian doctrine is not a mere system of cold abstractions, suspended as it were in mid air, but that it, too, arose directly out of the actual facts of life. The facts in each case came first, and the doctrine is the attempt to express their higher significance in terms of reasoned and coherent thought. Man cannot live upon emotion alone; he cannot help reflecting upon the events through which he passes, and especially those events which belong to and affect the life of the soul. It is the result of this reflection which is expressed as concisely as possible in the form of doctrine. And to make the doctrine more intelligible, to bring it home, and to revive its power of stirring the heart, it is well to remind ourselves of the facts which originally gave rise to it. We need to translate it back into the language of concrete experience.

All the great doctrines of the Christian faith have this background of reality behind them. Even such seemingly recondite theorizing as the doctrine of the Trinity is no mere wanton speculating for speculation's sake. It is the attempt to express in such language as could be understood at the time the consequences, with reference to the belief in God, of the further belief in the deity of our Lord Jesus Christ. If Christ was God, then there must be in the Godhead such distinction as permitted of the appearance of God incarnate upon earth. And the further belief in the Holy Spirit was just also an attempt to express in the language of the time the divine force which lay behind the peculiar spiritual phenomena of early Christianity. It was inevitable that these attempts to find appropriate intellectual expression for the concrete experience of the primitive Church should link themselves on to older beliefs already formulated, or partly formulated, in the Old Testament and the contemporary thought, especially of Palestine. These were the kind of steps by which Christian reflection, the reflection of the Apostles and leaders of the Church, took the shape it did, always, we may believe, in as close continuity as they could make it with the teaching of Christ Himself.

5. *Caution against the Undue Disparagement of Doctrine.* It is a tendency of the age to be impatient of doctrine and, by way of contrast, to exalt the value of religious experience. But this is to put asunder what God has joined. The human mind cannot permanently refrain from reflecting upon the cause of its experiences, or from the attempt to describe that cause or set of causes to the best of its ability. Each generation will have recourse to the kind of language that comes most natural to it. We Christians are, most of us, in the habit of regarding the first, or Apostolic, generation as normative in a higher sense than those which followed. At the same time we are not precluded from the attempt to retrace—and to retrace as critically as we can—the processes by which the Apostles and the early Church

arrived at their formulations. Neither is the present generation precluded from applying to the same objects the language that seems most appropriate to itself. But it is essential that the study of the past should be a sympathetic study, that it should not be self-complacent and patronizing, but modest and anxious to understand before it judges. And in any restatement that we essay for ourselves we ought not to lose sight of that continuous history which connects the age of the Apostles with our own.

For the missionary we can only repeat what has been said above. It is important that he should start from as large a conception as he can form of the providential purpose of God in His ordering of the world's history from the first. He must seek to find the place in this history of the particular people among whom his work lies. He should look at its religion from both its sides, the good and the bad that are sure to be intermingled. He should gently but firmly discriminate between these contrary elements ; and, while putting aside the one, make use of the other as a stepping-stone leading on to Christianity.

LITERATURE.—It is not easy to name books on the subject of this paper ; the writer is not aware of any which deal with it quite directly. Some profound remarks on the principles of Criticism and the character of the critical movement will be found in Dr. Hort's *Hulsean Lectures* for 1871 (published posthumously under the title, *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, in 1893). The idea of Development, or Evolution, underlies most modern presentations of Biblical Religion, as, e.g., in the articles devoted to the subject in Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, notably in the impressive article on "The Religion of Israel," by Dr. E. Kautzsch in the extra volume. There is some discussion of the subject in the recent Papal Encyclical *Pascendi Gregis* and in the literature connected with it. It has been pointed out above that the form of the principle which is condemned by the Pope differs fundamentally from that described in this paper. An excellent example of the application of the Comparative Method may be seen in the volume *Mankind and the Church* (Longmans, 1907) by seven Bishops of the Anglican communion. As in the case of these leading ideas so also for the vitalizing effects of criticism, examples may best be seen in the positive characteristics of critical writings—in the more recent dictionaries, commentaries, and descriptive sketches, such as perhaps especially those of Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay (*St. Paul the Traveller, The Church in the Roman Empire, &c.*).

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Being Problems for consideration at the *Pan-Anglican Congress*, 1908.

HOW TO TEACH THE BIBLE

By PROF. F. C. BURKITT

THE way that the Bible should be taught is acknowledged to be a question of serious difficulty at the present time. Modern science and modern criticism, if they have not destroyed the real value of the Bible, have certainly shattered many popular beliefs about it: the presuppositions with which the Bible was studied a century ago are our presuppositions no longer. I am aware that this Pan-Anglican Congress does not wish to waste its inevitably over-concentrated attention and unextended time upon historical investigation, but in discussing how to teach the Bible I venture to think that we shall not make progress towards any practical solution unless we attain a clear view of the way in which our old-fashioned notions about Bible study grew up.

The Reformation, which swept away so many of the supports of Mediaeval Christianity, left the authority of the Bible untouched. Roman and Protestant alike were agreed that the Bible, rightly interpreted, contained the Divine attestation of the true doctrine. And in this connexion our own branch of the Church is certainly to be classed as Protestant. It was Chillingworth, the friend and convert of Laud, who formulated the famous battle-cry "The Bible, the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants". Indeed the position of the Bible seemed for many a generation only to be strengthened by criticism and controversy. The elementary literary criticism which in its first free flight had demonstrated the unauthenticity of the works ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, and which before long exposed the colossal imposture of the Forged Decretals, had no weapon to break up the solid and antique phalanx of the Canonical Books.

And from the practical side also the free use of the Bible proved a wonderful stimulus to religious thought and action. The Bible had been for centuries the mere handmaid of the dominant Church. The Bible sayings and the Bible stories were only familiar in their received application to the Church's doctrine. Now it was discovered that this Divine Armoury of proofs was free to all who could read. No doubt there was some perversion and much eccentricity in the exegesis of Protestant writers, but the Protestant conception of Biblical study, as the independent use of Divinely authorized means for learning the true relations of God and man, was in itself an invigorating idea, combining as it did freedom of individual effort with respect for constituted authority.

Something of this kind appears to me to be the philosophical basis that underlies the old English reverence for Bible study. Bible study was practically regarded as a sacrament, an appointed means

of grace. But this theory carried with it the premise that the Bible was true—true, that is, in the natural meaning of the words of the text. As long as this theory held the field there was no real difficulty in teaching the Bible, or in understanding why it should be taught. The only difficulty lay in the capacity of the teacher and the pupil. When once the true text was ascertained and its natural meaning comprehended the student was in possession of the revealed will of God, able to make men wise unto salvation.

Now all is changed. From the story of Creation in the first chapter of Genesis to the description of New Jerusalem at the end of Revelation, those whom we teach soon discover, if we do not tell them ourselves, that things did not happen exactly as it stands written. And thus the teacher often feels obliged to teach not only the Bible, but also an interpretation, which is perceived now not to lie quite on the surface. To take, again, the story of Creation as an example, we have now on the one hand the established doctrines of Geology, on the other the Biblical text, and we proceed to teach some theory of interpreting the first chapter of Genesis, whereby the apparent contradiction between the Bible and ascertained fact can be evaded. In other words we allegorize; we have abandoned the intellectual atmosphere of the older Protestantism, and we find ourselves in a position analogous to that of the great Church Theologians of the third century.

There is, however, one difference. Clement and Origen were fully persuaded that the Scriptures were in some sense the inspired Word of God and therefore were necessary to man. What place does the Bible really hold in our theory of religion? We have found out that the science of the Bible is antiquated, its history not essentially different in kind or in accuracy from other old chronicles, and its ethics and its theology at the best only suited for the stage of development at which the various writers had arrived. What, then, is there really permanent about the Bible, which makes it an indispensable textbook for successive generations? Why should we teach it at all? Why not leave the study of it to scholars, and confine ourselves to teaching the Church Catechism?

I am asking these questions in all seriousness, because I believe many persons are not prepared with a sufficient answer. They do not realize that it is hard to teach the Bible chiefly because the teacher has no clear idea why the Bible should be taught. I venture to hope that my own answer will help to indicate some of the principles of teaching it, whether in the School or from the Pulpit.

Very few of us, I believe, become Christians from reading the Bible, at least nowadays. We are Christians because of the ministry of living Christians, because the Christian Church in its varied activities is still a living force in our midst. Bible study may profoundly modify our Christianity, but it does not produce it. Now the Christian Church points us to Christ. It insists on the unique importance of Jesus Christ, whom it proclaims to be in some sense an incarnation of the Divine Essence. The systems of Christology are

many, but no system that called itself Christian would say less than this. Through Jesus Christ something which Christians call salvation came to men.

It is therefore most important for Christian men and women to learn what manner of man Jesus Christ was, what He did and what He said, and what His place was in the drama of History. As we know, all the Churches, all the Apologists, all the Critics, all the enemies of Christianity are ready with answers. But when we come to examine these answers at close quarters we soon discover that they are all interpretations of the data furnished by the Bible itself. They bring up no new historical evidence. We cannot get back directly to our Lord and His contemporaries; the picture of them has been transmitted to us through the New Testament, while the Old Testament supplies us with the mental outlook with which the men of the New Testament regarded the universe. The Bible may give only fragmentary and unscientific information about the rise of Christianity, but it practically contains all the information we possess. And this pre-eminence of the Bible is not likely to be seriously impaired by modern archaeological discovery or critical theory. The Gospels may perhaps have been elaborated out of "Ur-Marcus" and the so-called "Logia" of Matthew, but I fear there is little probability that the spade will unearth these venerable documents; and until they are unearthed the Canonical Gospels still remain the quarry out of which we must reconstruct them, if such a reconstruction be deemed necessary. It is only by studying the documents in their transmitted form that we become able to judge whether the reconstructed document or the reconstructed history is credible and in accordance with the available evidence.

It may be objected that this view of the Bible is too much concerned with critical study. But I answer that as a matter of fact the Bible is mainly useful to us as an instrument of criticism, an instrument whereby we may correct and amplify the picture of our Lord and His Work that we have inherited. The Bible is not the object of our worship: it is the means whereby we become acquainted with that portion of our religion which belongs to the past—a portion which according to almost all Christian theory is essential.

What the preaching or teaching clergyman seems to me to need—and here I speak not so much as a lay teacher of Theology, but as a listener to sermons—is a general theory of the Bible, a grasp of the relation of the parts to the whole from the point of view of the Christian Religion. If the parson has a knowledge of Ancient History, or Biblical Archaeology, or the Higher Criticism, he needs it for this purpose. The congregation in the pews do not want lectures in historical criticism, but they have a right to expect from their parson a clear perception of why the Old Testament is a sacred collection of books. They do not get this from ingenious ethical essays upon the moral character of the Patriarch Jacob, or from a sermon upon Naaman the Syrian as illustrating the power of Faith. And with regard to the New Testament the Bible teaching that is most needed

is not some one detached lesson extracted out of the Gospel or Epistle for the day, but explanations of the leading ideas of whole Epistles or Gospels, so that the members of the congregation may learn from what point of view to study them and how to listen intelligently when they hear them read.

There is a real distinction between "teaching the Bible" and religious instruction. As a matter of fact at the present time, if we do not believe a doctrine or observe a practice out of personal conviction, or on the authority of the society to which we may belong, we do not do so because it stands written in an ancient piece of literature. In certain portions, and with regard to certain departments of knowledge, the statements found in the Bible do not agree with what we now believe to have been the course of events in the past or to be matter of reasonable expectation for the future: this is to some extent the case with what we find in the New Testament as well as what we find in Genesis. Like every other historical source the Bible must be used with discrimination. But it remains the only historical source—perhaps for accuracy's sake I ought to say practically the only historical source—through which we can learn about our Lord, about the Work He actually accomplished, and about the long trains of thought and action that led up to that Work.

Everything of value in this world is difficult to use well and possible to misuse; the Bible forms no exception. We shall use it best not by making it into a fetish, but by using it with knowledge, and the knowledge that the clergyman most needs about the Bible is a just and clear conception of the subordinate yet indispensable office that the Bible holds in the scheme of the Christian Religion. Not only the Law, but the Prophets and the Epistles and the Gospels also, are our means of access to Christ—the means whereby we can judge of the truth and the value of what others tell us about Him.

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